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PLA Organization and Command Culture

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  • By CASI
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Topic Sponsor: China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) 

How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?

  • Amico, Maj. Brandon J., "Words as Weapons: Counterintelligence-Driven Rhetoric in US Defense Strategy," SAASS thesis, 2024, 73 pgs.
    • This paper addresses the question by highlighting the PLA's self-identified command shortfalls, known as the "two inabilities" and "five incapables." These concepts reveal deep-seated issues within the PLA's organizational culture, specifically noting the inabilities of their officers and a fundamental lack of trust in operational commanders to effectively execute mission command during combat. 
  • Fritz, Maj. Matthew H., "China's Irregular Mace: An Undetected War with the US," AFGC thesis, 2024, 38 pgs. 
    • This paper explains how the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) absolute leadership dictates the PLA's command culture. It notes that decision-making is heavily centralized under the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman responsibility system, currently led by Xi Jinping. To prevent opposition and consolidate power, Xi frequently rotates senior officers out of familiar units, which stunts military opposition but also creates a "principal-agent" problem where civilian leaders lack military experience but still retain absolute control over military experts. 
  • Hinckley, Maj. Eric W., "Troops-in-Contact: Utilizing the A-10C in Contested South China Sea Airspace," AFGC thesis, 2024, 36 pgs.
    • This paper discusses recent cultural and organizational changes designed to decentralize decision-making within the PLA's air defense forces. It notes that the PLA has improved operational decision-making training and granted surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery commanders the authority to engage targets on their own initiative. Because these commanders no longer have to wait for a higher divisional commander to issue a launch order, SAM batteries can now act more independently and impulsively. 
  • Hou, Jiemin, "Avoidable War or Destined for War: Conflict between the United States and China," SAASS thesis, 2023, 101 pgs. 
    • This paper highlights how the top-down organizational structure of the PLA affects its strategic and operational decision-making. It notes that under Xi Jinping, the PLA underwent a massive reorganization in 2016 to strengthen command and control and ensure total Party control over the military. However, the paper argues that this strongman command culture degrades institutional competence; because contrarian views are rejected, the decision-making ecosystem is filled with "yes-men," hindering effective, rational military decisions.
  • Martin, Jeremy A., "Dispute Resolution with Chinese Characteristics: People's Liberation Army Legal Warfare and Chinese Legal Culture," SAASS thesis, 2023, 129 pgs. 
    • This paper explains that the PLA operates fundamentally as a "Party-Army," employing a dual command structure that pairs military commanders with political officers. Decisions are made through a consensus-based party committee, which remains the primary source for planning and decision-making even during combat operations. While a commander is allowed to make an immediate, necessary tactical decision on their own, the command culture dictates that they must subsequently justify those decisions to the party committee.
  • Mitchell, Lt. Col. Eli G., "Comparing the Chinese and US Militaries," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 10 pgs.
    • ​​​​​This paper emphasizes that the PLA’s decision-making is severely constrained by its dual command structure, where a military commander and a political commissar share authority under a Party Standing Committee (PSC). This collective leadership model requires PSC consensus for actions, which causes administrative and operational time delays, stifles flexibility, and creates hesitancy in urgent combat situations because commanders fear admonishment from the Party. Furthermore, because command culture relies heavily on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) loyalty—and not all Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are Party members—there is a profound lack of trust between officers and NCOs. As a result, NCOs are not empowered to make decisions, which prevents the PLA from effectively utilizing "mission command" (decentralized execution) during chaotic, fast-paced combat. 
  • Roberts, Lt. Col. James E., "Red vs. Blue: A Comparison between PLA and US Military Command Climates and Joint Doctrines," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 11 pgs. 
    • ​​​​​​​Roberts argues that the PLA’s command culture prioritizes unwavering loyalty to the CCP over critical thinking and innovation. Because the system lacks mutual trust, decision-making is held by a select few, leading to groupthink. The PLA demands perfect obedience to highly prescribed plans, actively punishing initiative in the field. For example, during a simulated communications outage, an on-scene PLA leader who achieved his objective through unscripted means was reprimanded for deviating from higher headquarters' directions. This rigidity indicates that the PLA cannot easily adjust to new operational variables on-the-fly and lacks tolerance for tactical improvisation.
  • Sheffield, LTC James D., "The US Army NCO Corps vs. the PLA NCO Corps," AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 13 pgs.
    • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Sheffield echoes that the PLA's decision-making is undermined by the CCP’s unit party committee system, which shares responsibility between commanders and political officers and strips lower-level leaders of autonomy. The PLA NCO Corps is primarily technical and lacks the authority to independently lead squads or tactical elements. Furthermore, a deep cultural and social divide between officers and enlisted personnel prevents cohesive teamwork. Sheffield also argues that the PLA's organizational culture suffers from a severe lack of recent combat experience (having not fought a war since 1979), meaning their command structures and decision-making processes remain practically untested in modern warfare
  • Stinson, Joshua S., “Stubborn Giants: Assessing Resolve between the US and China,” SAASS thesis, 2020. 
    • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Stinson addresses PLA decision-making at the strategic level, noting that it is heavily influenced by domestic political survival, internal factions, and nationalistic constituencies. After the military saved the CCP's mandate during the Tiananmen Square protests, the PLA gained a more active and vocal role in Chinese policymaking. Consequently, the PLA's decision to use force or stage military demonstrations (such as the missile tests during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis) is often a highly choreographed political tool designed for strategic signaling rather than actual warfare. The PLA carefully calculates its aggressive maneuvers to appease domestic audiences and show resolve without accidentally sparking a full-scale war
  • Sullivan, Lawrence, “Teaching Bitter Lessons: How Analogy and Prospect Theory Predict Chinese Risk Tolerance during Crisis Response,” SAASS PhD Dissertation, 2020.
    • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Sullivan highlights that the PLA's command culture enforces a tight, top-down chain of command that deliberately coordinates military operations with specific political objectives. When the PLA fights, its goal is rarely to conquer territory, but rather to deliver a psychological shock and "teach a bitter lesson" to deter future aggression. Decision-makers perform highly calculated risk assessments—such as ensuring superpowers will not intervene—before authorizing sudden, surprise attacks followed by unilateral ceasefires. However, the paper notes that the heavy politicization of the PLA (such as during the Cultural Revolution) degraded its actual warfighting proficiency. This caused the PLA to rely on outdated, rigid "human-wave" tactics during its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, resulting in poor tactical execution and massive casualties.
  • Towell, LTC Justin E., "The PLA Army NCO: Strength or Weakness?"  AWC elective paper (The Chinese Warfighter), 2021, 12 pgs.
    • Towell focuses on the PLA's highly centralized command system, where commissioned officers make all decisions and NCOs have almost no influence. The PLA discourages initiative at all levels; even junior officers are penalized for taking unauthorized action when communications fail. Because PLA NCOs are largely restricted to administrative and technical tasks rather than leadership, and because they are never taught to take the initiative, the PLA would likely face chaos on the battlefield if its commissioned officers were killed or injured.     
  • Williams, Maj. Eric M., "Warfare by Attrition: Why China Could Win a Conventional Conflict," AFGC thesis, 2025, 49 pgs. 
    • ​​​​​​​This paper answers the question by focusing on the PLA's macro-level organizational structure. It details how the PLA conducted an extensive reorganization between 2015 and 2017 to establish geographically focused Theater Commands. This structural change was designed to emphasize each military service's strengths, enhance joint interoperability, and better organize the PLA for modern combat and regional contingencies.