EMS/EW Awareness

TOPIC SPONSOR: ACC/A3/2/6K

In response to the 27 June 2019 SecAF/CSAF memorandum on EMS Superiority, how does the Air Force re-instill a culture of EMS/EW awareness throughout the force? Draw on lessons learned from efforts of other services and, if time and space allow, include recommendations for the Joint Force as well. In what ways should the AF consider electronic spectrum operations a part of the emerging concept of Information Warfare and what is the cyber ops role within the broader set of activities?

• Clark, Christopher S., "How Cyber Has Changed the Nature of Electronic Warfare over the Last and Current Century," ACSC course paper (Cyber Concentration), 2025, 14 pgs.  
  • Clark argues that modern militaries no longer treat cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) as separate domains, but rather as complementary elements of a broader information warfare strategy. The paper explains that while traditional EW focused on manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum through radio jamming or radar disruption, cyber operations now complement or even supplant these methods by directly targeting the underlying digital infrastructure, such as command and control networks. In this converged battlespace, cyber operations can map network vulnerabilities prior to an EW attack, or EW techniques like electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) can disable physical infrastructure to create windows of opportunity for cyber exploitation. To handle this new reality, Clark notes that the military is shifting its doctrine to create integrated command structures that bring together cyber security and traditional EW experts into a holistic, cross-domain framework.. 
• Costello, Lt. Col. Christopher, "Riding the Wave: Re-Instilling a Culture of Electromagnetic Spectrum Awareness throughout the Air Force," AFGC thesis, 2025, 51 pgs.
  • Answers how the Air Force can re-instill a culture of EMS/EW awareness by advocating for a centralized training structure and whole-force education tailored to the realities of Great Power Competition. To achieve this cultural shift, the paper recommends establishing a dedicated EMS training squadron under the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing, implementing mandatory annual computer-based training for all Airmen, and utilizing Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) environments to simulate congested and contested spectrums. Addressing the Information Warfare (IW) and cyber aspects, Costello highlights that EW and EMS operations fall under the broader umbrella of Information Operations (IO), recommending an increase in Information Operations (14F) personnel to bridge knowledge gaps and seamlessly integrate kinetic and non-kinetic (cyber and EW) communities. For the Joint Force, the paper suggests that unifying training standards and leveraging Joint organizations, like the Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWC), can help eliminate duplicative efforts and consolidate EMS expertise across all branches.
• Deibler, Maj. Jeremiah, "WinningWars of Cognition: Posturing the Air Force for the Tactical Information Fight," ACSC, 2020, 16 pgs. 
  • Answers how the Air Force should conceptualize the integration of EMS and cyberspace as part of the broader Information Warfare (IW) framework. The paper explains that tactical IW seeks to gain information superiority by combining cyberspace, EMS, information operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to disrupt an adversary's decision-making process. Cyber operations and EMS operations are described as critical tools to defend or attack the machine components of an information system, serving as "information fires" that weaponize data and modulated EMS waves to induce fog and friction. To operationalize this integration and support Joint Force commanders, the author recommends restructuring the Air Force by establishing a global Network Security Operations Center and target-centric Information Warfare Wings, which would pool offensive cyber, EMS, and ISR forces to jointly train, equip, and provide mission assurance across the battlespace.
• Dutcher, Capt. Briana, "From Survivability to Superiority: Strengthening Our Electromagnetic Spectrum Presence for Joint All-Domain Operations in Great Power Competition," SOS AUAR, 2020, 11 pgs.
  • Focuses on the Joint Force implications of EMS operations, specifically emphasizing the need for joint, global satellite bandwidth allocation to manage the spectrum effectively across all military branches. While the Air Force traditionally managed its own bandwidth statically, the author argues that the Joint Force must treat the EMS as a fluid domain where frequency assignments are dynamically allocated based on desired effects. The paper recommends that Joint Force planners leverage automated systems to track and apportion satellite footprints and bandwidth across different combatant commands, which would strengthen the military's unpredictability and secure its communications resilience against adversary jamming in a contested environment.
• Galbraith, Maj. Shane, "EMS=COG 2.0," ACSC course paper (Cyber Concentration), 2025, 20 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Argues that decades of operating in an uncontested "electronic sanctuary" during the Global War on Terror bred complacency, requiring the Air Force to re-instill Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) awareness by institutionalizing Electronic Warfare (EW) education, embedding EMS into joint planning, and rigorously training forces to operate "in the black" under degraded conditions. Drawing on Army lessons regarding vulnerable network platforms, Galbraith asserts that the entire Joint Force must develop unified tactics for positioning, spoofing, sensing, and communicating to survive against near-peer adversaries. He contends that the U.S. currently fails to integrate EW into the broader concept of Information Warfare (IW), overlooking the EMS as a critical Center of Gravity (COG) while adversaries like Russia systematically synergize cyber operations with EW to manipulate information, geolocate targets, and disable networks. Ultimately, future operational success relies on mastering the EMS to protect networks and exploit vulnerabilities within an emerging "land-human-cyber convergence" across physical and digital domains.
• Hartman IV, George C. "Achieving Dominance, Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority," GCPME Thesis, 2024, 36 pgs.
  • Recommending that the Air Force combat EMS atrophy through robust synthetic, virtual, and "hardware-in-the-loop" simulators, exposing operators to near-peer threats to re-instill force-wide spectrum awareness. For the Joint Force, he argues against "stovepiped" EW capabilities, proposing a fully integrated Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) framework that upgrades legacy systems to share real-time data across a modernized Command, Control, and Communications (C3) network. Finally, Hartman highlights the critical intersection of cyber and the EMS by noting that both cyber and space operations rely entirely on EMS maneuverability, suggesting the DoD track EMS readiness much like it does for cyber and utilize software-driven, rapid reprogramming to treat EW systems as agile nodes capable of countering both electronic and cyber threats simultaneously.
• Kean, Maj. Christopher, "'Jamming Into the Wind': USAF Electromagnetic Warfare and Training Exercise," SAASS Thesis, 2023, 86 pgs.
  • Evaluates how the Air Force can rebuild its atrophied EMS expertise through the framework of "deliberate practice" in Electromagnetic Warfare Officer (EWO) training programs. Recognizing that the EMS is becoming increasingly congested and contested, the paper argues that re-instilling a culture of awareness requires a fundamental overhaul of how EWOs are prepared for high-end conflicts. Kean recommends shifting from legacy training models to rigorous, deliberate practice utilizing Virtual Test and Training Centers and synthetic environments, ensuring that the specialized EMS workforce can rapidly identify, adapt to, and counter adversary signals across the Joint Force.
• Larson, Maj. Matthew J., "Leveraging Naval Airborne Electronic Attack to Develop Air Force Electromagnetic Policy," GCPME thesis, 2022, 48 pgs. 
  • Explicitly outlines how the Air Force can revitalize its culture of EW awareness by drawing on lessons learned from the U.S. Navy's integration of the EA-18G Growler. Noting that the Air Force ceded much of its airborne electronic attack capabilities to the Navy while focusing too heavily on stealth, Larson suggests the Air Force must leverage Naval EW expertise to meet the goals of the 2020 Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy. To enhance the Joint Force, the paper recommends establishing Air National Guard squadrons to pair with Navy expeditionary squadrons for the cross-pollination of tactics, upgrading the F-15EX with the Next-Generation Jammer to perform the "Wild Weasel" mission, and better utilizing the Special Experience Identifier (SEI) for EW experts to actively shape joint doctrine.
• O'Brien IV, Lt. Col. William H., "Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Pervasiveness in Military Strategy and Operations: A Call for Joint Authorities," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2019, 27 pgs. 
  • Explores how the DoD must instill an "EMS maneuver mindset" into joint planning, framing EMS superiority as the absolute linchpin for all Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)—which inherently drives information warfare. Looking at lessons from other services, O'Brien highlights that the Army's Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) and the Navy's Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concepts successfully integrate cyber and EW but remain dangerously uncoordinated at the joint level. To rectify this and bolster Joint Force capabilities, O'Brien recommends granting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) command authorities over the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) for EMS to enforce a unified strategy, prevent redundant service-specific acquisitions, and hold commanders accountable for EMS readiness.
• Odom, Maj. Richard K., "Russia & China's EMS and Cyber Maneuver: Different Histories, Complimentary Strategies," ACSC CAOSS, 2024, 14 pgs. 
  • Illustrates how EMS and cyber operations function as complementary pillars within the broader concept of Information Warfare. Through case studies of Russian and Chinese military actions, the paper demonstrates that while offensive cyber operations offer the initial ability to infiltrate networks and disrupt an adversary's decision-making process, these effects are often short-lived; therefore, they must be sustained and amplified by EW capabilities flooding the electromagnetic operating environment. Odom argues that the Air Force and Joint Force must shift away from the disaggregated employment of these tools and instead nest cyber, EW, and Information Operations across all military domains. By synchronizing cyber intrusions with electromagnetic spectrum maneuver, the military can effectively shape the information environment, disrupt adversary command and control, and prevent the cognitive collapse of friendly forces.
• Pienkowski , Capt. Jaclyn, "The Air Force's Competitive Shift in Information-Related Capabilities to Contend in the GPC," SOS AUAR, 2020, 19 pgs.   
  • Explains how the Air Force is structurally combining Electromagnetic Warfare (EW), Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Information Operations (IO) to deliberately affect adversary behavior. The paper details the creation of the 16th Air Force as an Information Warfare Numbered Air Force designed to synchronize these disparate elements into multi-capable, cross-functional teams. By illustrating how cyber operations, public affairs, and EW must converge to attack an adversary's cognitive capabilities and systems, Pienkowski demonstrates how electronic spectrum operations and cyber operations act as co-equal, interdependent tools used to shape the operational information environment short of open armed conflict.
• Salas, Maj. Carri M., "It Hertz, But the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the Warfighting Domain," SAASS thesis, 2020, 75 pgs.
  • Addresses the relationship between electronic spectrum operations, cyberspace, and information warfare by arguing that the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the overarching warfighting domain, and that cyberspace is merely its "wired" component. To re-instill a culture of EMS/EW awareness throughout the force, Salas recommends merging Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) and Cyber Officer undergraduate training programs. This combined training would remove organizational stovepipes and provide officers with a holistic understanding of how cyber and EMS operations interconnect to manipulate information. For the Joint Force, the author recommends combining EW, Cyber, and Space EW doctrines into a single unified doctrine to prevent "strategic blind spots" and ensure the seamless execution of joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) across all services.
• Salvador, Maj. John A., "Radio Frequency Photonics: Enabler of Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance," ACSC, ACTS 2.0 RTF, 2020, 21 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Directly references the EMS Superiority Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team's call to "re-instill a culture of EMS awareness" and argues that the Air Force must fundamentally advance its technological base to dominate the spectrum. The paper connects EMS to broader information and cyber capabilities by highlighting that Radio Frequency (RF) photonics can revolutionize ultra-wideband signals, which are necessary to maneuver within the spectrum and combat adversary cyber and electronic attacks. For the Joint Force, Salvador warns that disjointed, service-specific doctrines inhibit unity of effort. The author recommends aggressively partnering with academia and industry to invest in integrated photonic circuits (IPCs), eliminating duplicative EMS efforts across the branches, and educating all Airmen on EMS capabilities so the fielded force can better provide feedback on integrating EMS with JADC2 networks.
• Stuckenberg, Maj. David, et al, "Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF) 2.0," Published as an AU Press LeMay Paper, 2019, 118 pgs.
  • Provides recommendations for the Joint Force by focusing on how to keep military capabilities operational and viable in a "severe EMS-degraded environment". The report highlights the need to identify strategic blind spots and invest in cost-effective resilience against enemy efforts. To accomplish this, the task force recommends war-gaming and collaboration between the military, industry, and academia across four main tracks: electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), directed energy/high-powered microwaves, EMP defenses, and quantum and 5G technologies. 
• Stuckenberg, Maj. David, et al, "Electromagnetic Defense Task Force," Published as an AU Press LeMay Paper, 2018, 71 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Utilizes the "Stuckenberg Model" to demonstrate that classical strategic deterrence is insufficient against "gray zone EMS threats". The report argues that threats like an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) could threaten national survival, yet both the military and civil society are entirely unprepared to mitigate them. Regarding the intersection of cyber and EMS, the report notes that quantum and cyber activities operate within the EMS, and the military must prioritize exploring and understanding this relationship.
• Weldon, Maj. Ryan T., "Beneath the Veil: Dominating Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations during the Next Major Conflict," AFGC  thesis, 2024, 42 pgs. 
  • Draws heavily on lessons learned from adversary force structures, specifically the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (now Information Support Force), which successfully consolidated space, cyber, EW, and psychological operations under a single command. Applying these lessons to the U.S. Joint Force, Weldon argues that the current disjointed nature of U.S. EMS capabilities hinders interoperability and recommends creating a unified Joint EMSO command reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In terms of Information Warfare, the paper emphasizes that the EMS permeates all domains, meaning that cyber-attacks, electronic jamming, and space operations must be synchronized as interconnected components of a broader strategic information operations campaign to disrupt enemy command systems. To elevate EMS awareness and readiness across the force, Weldon also stresses the critical need for advanced LVC training infrastructure to replace outdated threat representations in large-force exercises.
• West, Major Timothy, "More Than Paying Lip Service: Three Keys to Solving the USAF EW Culture Problems," AFF short paper, 2022, 3 pgs. 
  • ​​​​​​​Addresses how the Air Force can rebuild its degraded electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and electronic warfare (EW) culture through a three-pronged approach: educating the force, training like it fights, and normalizing the solution of complex problems. The paper notes that the Air Force's historical divestment of EW platforms led to a loss of institutional expertise, transitioning the culture from one of subject matter experts to one of mere equipment operators. To re-instill an EMS warrior ethos, the author recommends creating dedicated EMS and combat training squadrons to provide specialized education, as well as loosening electromagnetic attack restrictions during large-force exercises so warfighters can experience and learn from a realistically contested environment. Furthermore, the paper addresses the cyber role by emphasizing that cyber payloads delivered via the EMS are prime for grey-space operations and must be normalized and integrated into standard schemes of maneuver alongside EW capabilities.
• ​Worrell, Lt. Col. Ryan, "EW and Cyber Convergence: Beyond Information Warfare," AF Fellows Paper, 2020, 31 pgs.
  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Argues that the Air Force must converge EMS operations and cyber operations to successfully execute Information Warfare and joint all-domain operations. Drawing on lessons from the US Navy and Army—which have already successfully incorporated cyberspace into their EW functions—the author criticizes the Air Force for its myopic focus on internet-based applications of cyber operations rather than integrating them to target embedded military systems. The paper asserts that cyber operations and EW are two sides of the same coin, where EW opens the physical medium (the EMS) to allow cyber operations to manipulate closed adversary networks like integrated air defense systems. For the Joint Force, the author advocates for unified development and testing processes, pushing for a consolidated tactical training environment where offensive cyber and EW operators develop capabilities in unison and update joint doctrine to reflect these enduring cross-domain lessons.