As the prospects for near-term bilateral and trilateral arms control treaties and agreements between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing remain in doubt, the U.S. must still consider the framework for future stability. What are the key elements of a possible trilateral nuclear arms control treaty that will maximize the value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enhance U.S. national security?
Furthermore, if traditional trilateral agreements remain unachievable, is there any value in taking some form of strategic risk mitigation discussions to a broader set of nuclear actors? For example, could Washington leverage the P5 forum to open the aperture for strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China? Ultimately, how could entering into a nuclear arms control agreement with the P5 impact U.S. deterrence and assurance architectures around the world, and what would that broader agreement mean for DoD and DAF nuclear force structure and posture?
- Kessler, Matthew J., "The U.S. Nuclear Triad: Effects on the U.S. Government Interagency," ACSC thesis, 2020, 52. pgs.
- Halvorson, Maj. Christopher G., "The Future of Arms Control with China," ACSC paper (SANDS), 2024, 49 pgs.
- Juarez, Maj. Carlos, "Russia's Nuclear Weapon Use in Modern Times," AFGC thesis, 2025, 44 pgs.
- Juarez points out that dialogue between the U.S. and Russia regarding arms control has nearly ceased, with Moscow rejecting new proposals and leaning into nuclear blackmail. However, with the New START treaty expiring in February 2026, he recommends that the U.S. must return to the negotiating table with Russia and China to establish unilateral limits on nuclear stockpiles. He also strongly recommends that the U.S. and NATO must stop allowing Russia to dictate the agenda through nuclear threats, arguing that overly cautious Western responses only validate Russia's bullying tactics.