Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure, what is the optimal framework for the Joint Force to conduct real-time and steady-state counter-small unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) protection of these vital assets?. Given the proliferation of low-cost, high-lethality sUAS technology by malign actors, this threat represents a new means of surveillance and harmful activity against defense operations and service members both overseas and at home. To define this operating environment, what are examples of emerging threats of UAVs/UASs and the tactics, techniques, and procedures of those groups that employ them?.
To combat these threats, how can the Department of Defense incentivize or direct unified service investment to field C-sUAS capabilities rapidly? This research must address the unique challenges of operating within American airspace and the inconsistent threat perception and prioritization across the services, each responsible for its own installation protection. With the most likely and damaging threats increasingly coming from Group 3-sized sUAS capabilities, how should the military organize and train appropriate operators and leaders—including those with kinetic engagement authorities—to operate more complex C-sUAS/SHORAD-like capabilities in the future?.
The study should propose Department of Defense–level strategies to stimulate joint investment and recommend a multilayered defense concept integrating federal, state, and local partners. Because military installations and defense-critical infrastructure have deep dependencies on non-DoD-owned critical infrastructure, what capabilities can the Joint Force employ to protect these non-DoD-owned assets, and what military assets will be required to recover from potential disruptions?. Furthermore, it should examine the legal authorities and command and control (C2) mechanisms required for a cohesive and agile national defense against the C-sUAS threat.
- Allen, LtCol Zachary S., "Invisible to the Drone's Eye: Leveraging New Concepts and Technology to Safeguard Marine Aviation against the Unmanned Threat," AFGC thesis, 2026, 40 pgs.
- Utilizing the Russia-Ukraine war as a case study, Allen details how adversaries have perfected a rapid "finder-killer" model. Adversaries use high-altitude ISR drones (like the Orlan-10) and mass swarms of cheap First-Person View (FPV) drones to locate targets, drastically compressing the kill-chain to mere minutes before striking. These autonomous swarms can overwhelm base defenses and impose a staggering asymmetric cost-exchange ratio, where an adversary can risk a $2,200 drone to destroy a $125 million U.S. helicopter.
- Anderson, Maj. Richard, "Exploiting Offensive Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS): Learning from Our Adversaries," AF Fellows paper (Department of Homeland Security), 2024, 2 pgs.
- Azan, Daniel E., "No Safe Haven: The Rise of Drones and USAF Vulnerabilities," AFGC thesis, 2026.
- Azan answers this by detailing how adversaries in recent conflicts—such as in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and CENTCOM—have utilized low-cost, one-way attack (OWA) drones, first-person-view (FPV) drones, and swarming tactics to saturate the "air littoral zone" and overwhelm traditional integrated air defense systems. Because these unmanned systems can remain undetected by large interceptor radars and operate too fast for current counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems, he explains that they present an urgent kinetic risk to dispersed expeditionary forces and installations, exposing severe vulnerabilities in current Air Force base defense paradigms.
- Claypool, Capt. Andrew H. "Chinese UAV Integration: A New Era of Maritime Deterrence in the South China Sea," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Addressing the emerging threats and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of UAV employment, Claypool details how the PLA and its maritime militia utilize swarm and loitering munitions to execute "grey zone" operations. He explains that commercial off-the-shelf small unmanned aerial systems (COTS sUAS) can be launched from almost any civilian or fishing vessel to conduct electronic warfare, provide ISR, and threaten adversaries with sudden one-way attacks. These proto-swarm and loitering UAVs create an environment of unpredictable violence that inflicts heavy psychological stress on regional mariners and forward basing locations. Claypool notes that such TTPs allow China to constantly harass and intimidate claimant states while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding direct military escalation.
- Davis, Maj. Eric A., "If It Flies, It Dies: Implications and Opportunities in Army Air Defense Investments," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Davis explains that small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) have become a severe threat due to their low cost, small radar cross-section, and widespread commercial availability. He highlights modern TTPs observed in recent conflicts, such as the use of first-person view (FPV) flying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and long-range kamikaze strikes in Ukraine. Furthermore, he points to Hamas's tactical use of explosive-equipped quadcopters to systematically neutralize border observation cameras, command and control towers, and Iron Dome launchers, demonstrating how both state and non-state adversaries employ sUAS to deliberately blind and degrade air defense networks prior to a larger assault.
- Griffin, Col. Ethan C., "Turbulent Skies: Regional Stability Implications of Unmanned Aerial Systems," AF Fellows paper, 2015, 33 pgs.
- Hickey, Col. Mark, "Inflection Point: A Study of Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems Usage in the Russia-Ukraine War," AWC Strategic Studies Paper (Kenney Airpower Seminar), 2024, 23 pgs. Winner of the AWC Joint Air Power Award
- Johnson, Capt. Kyna, "The Threat of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) against Mobility Air Force (MAF)," SOS AUAR paper, 2020, 10 pgs.
- Klokun, Anton, "Bullet Background Paper on Mobile Counter-UAV Weapon Technology," SOS AUAR, 2023, 3 pgs.
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Musselwhite, Kenneth O., "Army CONUS Installations: Protected, but Still at Risk," AWC Strategic Studies Paper, 2020, 28 pgs.
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Sutton, Kelvin, "An Explorative Paper on Current and Future Strategies for Improving Radar Track Continuity using AI-assisted Predictive Modeling," SOS AUAR Ideas and Weapons, 2023, 5 pgs.
- Tedder, Capt. Nathan L., "Research and Development Strategy: Next-Generation Technology Defeat Mechanisms," SOS AUAR elective Paper, Ideas and Weapons, 2021, 7 pgs.
- Thompson, Col. Kristen D., "How the Drone War in Ukraine is Transforming Conflict," AF Fellows research, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024.
- Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defending USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Using the war in Ukraine as a case study, Tittinger details Russia’s extensive use of the Shahed-136, a cheap, delta-wing OWA UAV. He explains that Russia’s TTPs involve launching these drones in massive, combined waves alongside cruise missiles to overwhelm air defense systems. When initial strikes against military targets failed to yield swift victories, Russia adapted its TTPs to use these drones against civilian infrastructure—such as electrical grids and transportation hubs—to instill chaos and drain the adversary's air defense interceptor stockpiles.