Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC Behavior

  • Published
  • By PACAF/A303

Topic Sponsor: PACAF/A303

PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives.


  • Barcus, Colin V., "Slighting without Winning: Analyzing CCP Narratives Regarding US ISR Operations in the Indo-Pacific," SAASS thesis, 2022.
    • Offers a methodology to assess PRC perceptions by systematically tracking and analyzing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) strategic narratives and propaganda. Barcus measures the CCP's relative "weight of effort" by quantifying data points across state-controlled media, foreign affairs spokespeople, and think tanks to determine how the PRC views specific US military activities, such as airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). For PACAF, applying this methodology of monitoring the propagation, tone, and volume of CCP narratives could effectively capture how US Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) cumulatively impact Chinese behaviors and how Beijing attempts to coerce or shape US military operations in the region.
  • Crimm, Mark A., "Rethinking Deterrence: Using Social Science to Improve Planning and Prediction," AF Fellows (US House of Representatives), 2022.
    • Addresses how to accurately predict and alter adversary behavior by proposing a social science-based, probability-driven Cost/Benefit methodology. Crimm's model requires the deterring party to either increase the cost magnitude/probability or decrease the benefit magnitude/probability of an adversary's action to preemptively change their decisions. By treating deterrence holistically—where small deterrent strategies are tightly woven together—PACAF could apply this mathematical and probability-driven framework to succinctly capture how the cumulative aggregation of regional OAI alters the PRC's decision calculus, thereby ensuring US actions effectively achieve desired behavioral changes.
  • Garrison, Maj. John, "Strategic Messaging Implications for Military Reactions in the Taiwan Strait," AFGC thesis, 2025.
    • Provides a concrete, data-driven methodology for capturing the cumulative impacts of U.S. strategic actions on PRC behaviors over a ten-year period. Garrison developed a 0-5 severity scale to measure both PRC escalatory rhetoric in state-run media and the intensity of its physical military responses, such as Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions and multi-domain operations. By correlating these severity scores against specific U.S. and Taiwanese actions (e.g., diplomatic visits, arms sales, and military transits), this methodology allows PACAF planners to succinctly measure which activities successfully deter the PRC, which actions are ignored, and which ones trigger unwanted escalatory behaviors.
  • Gronau, Maj. Mark A., "Strategic Empathy: Avoiding Pitfalls along the Competition Continuum," AFGC thesis, 2025.
    • Provides a qualitative methodology for assessing adversary behavior through the deliberate application of "strategic empathy" and narrative analysis. The author argues that because quantitative data on adversary perceptions is difficult to obtain, intelligence assessments must evaluate the PRC’s actions by placing them within the context of China’s historical and cultural plotlines. By understanding the "why" behind PRC actions through this narrative lens, analysts can better anticipate how China will perceive US activities and investments. This methodology helps PACAF capture the impact of its OAIs by requiring planners to continually assess whether a PRC response fits expected behaviors and, if not, identifying what portion of the adversary's worldview or narrative misaligns with US expectations.
  • Hayward III, Lt. Col. James Daniel, "Changing an Adversary's Behavior: A Taxonomy for the Human Domain of Warfare," SAASS thesis, 2021.
    • This taxonomy requires planners to thoroughly understand the adversary's cultural and political system, clearly communicate desired end-states, select appropriate strategies (such as deterrence or compellence), utilize optimal kinetic or non-kinetic means, and implement rigorous MOEs. By actively measuring observable behaviors—such as public concessions or the movement of forces—and iterating the strategy when MOEs indicate the current approach is failing, this framework provides PACAF with a structured way to determine if its cumulative operations and activities are effectively altering the PRC's decision-making calculus and behaviors.
  • Kirklin, Russel J., "It's a We Said, Xi Said Kind of Situation: Analyzing CCP Perceptions of US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea," SAASS thesis, 2020.
    • This methodology operationalizes a "say, write, do" approach by coding English-language Chinese state media (what the CCP says and writes) and cross-referencing it with physical People's Liberation Army (PLA) actions (what the CCP does). By plotting these combined reactions on a spectrum that measures their degree of agreement or disagreement with the US strategic narrative, the framework allows planners to assess whether the strategic messages behind US operations were accurately received and interpreted by the PRC. This provides PACAF with a measurable, empirical method to evaluate the cumulative impact of its actions on Chinese perceptions over time.
  • Mokrovich, Lt. Col. Justin Mokrovich, Justin P., "The SOODA Loop," AWC SSP, 2020.
    • Introduces the Strategic Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (SOODA) Loop, a holistic framework designed to continuously link operations and activities to national strategic objectives while evaluating adversary perceptions. The methodology requires planners to establish Lines of Effort (LOEs), Measures of Performance (MOPs), and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) across all instruments of national power to objectively evaluate actions taken against an adversary. Crucially, the SOODA Loop replaces the traditional, static "End State" with a dynamic "Ensuing State" that continuously incorporates feedback regarding the adversary's viewpoint, global opinion, and changing environmental conditions. This continuous feedback mechanism enables strategists to measure the long-term, cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) and adjust them to ensure they are successfully shaping the adversary's behavior.
  • Moxley, Maj. Robert M., "The Berlin Airlift and Integrated Campaigning in the Early Cold War," ACSC EL, 2025.
    • Provides a conceptual framework for evaluating Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) within the broader competition continuum. To measure the cumulative efficacy of integrated campaigns, Moxley recommends that U.S. Combatant Commands continuously commission independent assessments (such as from the Government Accountability Office) to evaluate their campaign plans for vertical and lateral integration. This methodology emphasizes continuously measuring outcomes against expectations by asking if the military's OAIs advanced national objectives and placed the U.S. in a more favorable position of relative advantage without triggering armed conflict.
  • Mueller, Brian C., "Prelude to War or Competition? The Strategic Implications of Deterrence through Peacetime Airpower Projection," SAASS thesis, 2024.
    • Investigates how peacetime airpower exercises and deployments affect the cognitive state and behavior of adversary leaders, specifically examining the dynamic between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific. The paper evaluates how OAIs influence PRC perceptions through sunk costs and audience costs, demonstrating that while these activities can successfully signal resolve during periods of general deterrence, they can also trigger negative actions driven by fear and misperception during times of acute crisis. This analysis helps PACAF strategists understand the psychological impacts of their operations and adjust their campaigning activities to ensure they deter war rather than inadvertently escalating tensions.
  • Rapelje, Maj. Crystal L., "Leveraging Air Force Intelligence to Maximize Adversary Reactions to Operational Exercises," AFGC thesis, 2025.
    • Addresses the need for methodologies to assess the impact of Air Force-led operational exercises by proposing the integration of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) into existing intelligence frameworks. The research suggests utilizing the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) and the broader intelligence cycle to track adversary cognitive and behavioral responses. By establishing a metrics-based evaluation framework that tracks key indicators like adversary media narratives, political discourse, and force posture changes before and after exercises, PACAF can accurately assess how its shaping operations influence PRC perceptions and ensure they align with broader strategic objectives.
  • Skaggs, Lt. Col. Ryan D., "Chinese Communist Party Information Warfare: Ideology, Influence and Coercion in the Indo-Pacific," SAASS thesis, 2022.
    • Develops a comprehensive typology and a practical methodology for characterizing the level of CCP influence and coercion, which could be adapted to evaluate PRC behavioral responses to US actions. Skaggs provides a detailed framework of "indicators of influence and coercion" across six mediums: traditional media, social media, Overseas Chinese, friends of China, geoeconomics, and geostrategy. PACAF could utilize these specific indicators to methodically assess how the PRC's behaviors and influence operations change over time, providing commanders with a systematic tool to measure the cumulative impacts of US regional investments and activities against PACAF's desired objectives.
  • Stinson, Joshua S., "Stubborn Giants: Assessing Resolve between the United States and China," SAASS thesis, 2020.
    • Provides an analytical framework for capturing PRC perceptions by evaluating interactionist resolve models and emphasizing the need for "strategic empathy" to measure latent variables like perception and resolve. Because perception cannot be measured directly, Stinson argues it must be captured through proxy variables such as distinct behavior changes, policy reversals, and pattern-break events. By analyzing how iterative past events and temporal horizons shape an adversary's assumptions—such as how past US foreign policy actions shape Chinese estimates of future US responses—Stinson offers a methodology that PACAF could use to accurately track how cumulative US operations over time influence China's strategic calculations and behaviors.