A2AD Characterization in the Baltics

Russia’s control of information and rhetoric promoting their military capabilities can be viewed as an additional component of their anti-access/area-denial strategy in the Baltics. By pushing rhetoric and propaganda relating to specific capabilities, they have the potential to deter or influence US and NATO courses of action in the region. Analysts and planners should, then, consider Russian capabilities from the Russian perspective when determining the most effective courses of action to ensure NATO freedom of movement in the area. Characterization from the Russian perspective starts with examining where a 175% increase in defense spending has been allocated to over the last 20 years, which shows heavy spending on in air surveillance and fighter procurement. Emphasis on these core functions of A2/AD is also reflected in state media which advertises weekly and annually the number of enemy aircraft tracked by the Russian air defenses, as well as the number of intercepts conducted. In 2020, Russian state-controlled media outlet TASS claimed that total number was close to 5,000, with 170 intercepts and no border incursions allowed. Russia is also vocal about the successes of its primary military exercise in the region, Ocean Shield. Results from this exercise are lauded in the media by Putin himself, praising the Russian military for integrating dozens of air and naval assets along with ground-based point defense systems in order to protect strategic SAMs in Kaliningrad. Russia makes no secret that the construct of Ocean Shield aims to counter NATO’s own regional exercise, NATO BALTOPS. Observation of how the Russians interpret this exercise, the successes they advertise countering it, and their boasting of specific capabilities should be considered along with classified reporting in order to mitigate the rhetoric arm of Russia’s A2/AD strategy.

Russian Views on Cyber Operations

Published May 25, 2026
By US Cyber Command

TOPIC SPONSOR: US Cyber Command

What are Russia's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for conducting cyberspace operations? What does Russia perceive as U.S. or partner red lines regarding cyberspace operations? What geopolitical events and/or actions would drive a Russian retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or our allies and partners?

Lange, Maj. Patrick, "Russian Information Warfare: Context and Perspective," ACSC EL, 2020, 13 pgs.
- Major Patrick Lange (2020) answers the questions regarding Russia's policy, objectives, and drivers for retaliatory attacks by explaining that Russia views information and cyber warfare as an inherently defensive strategy. The paper notes that the Putin regime perceives the spread of Western liberal ideas and democratic values as a direct, existential threat to its legitimacy, which acts as a geopolitical driver for Russian retaliation. To counter this, Russia’s strategy employs "reflexive control" and cyber-enabled disinformation to impose a constant state of dislocation and polarization within Western societies. By operating below the threshold of armed conflict, Russia avoids crossing U.S. military red lines while exploiting social divisions to prevent the West from unifying against Russian interests.
Winklepleck, Lt. Col. Christopher, "The Risk of Nuclear Response to Cyberattacks against Russia," AWC PSP, 2022, 31 pgs.
- Touches on geopolitical events that drive Russian retaliatory cyberattacks by citing the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, which was triggered by the geopolitical event of Estonia moving a Soviet war statue. Furthermore, while the paper does not explicitly detail Russia's perception of U.S. red lines, it explores Russia's own ultimate red lines regarding cyber operations, arguing that a U.S. or NATO cyberattack against Russia's dual-use military systems or nuclear command and control could trigger a Russian nuclear response, as Russian doctrine allows for nuclear retaliation when the existence of the state or the viability of its nuclear forces are in jeopardy.