Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

  • Published
  • By JSOU

TOPIC SPONSOR: JSOU

During the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China supported numerous resistance groups as a foreign policy tool. In the post-Cold War environment, the PRC and CCP have focused on elite capture strategies to achieve its desired foreign policy goals. As elite capture strategies are exposed and become less useful as an effective strategy to support PRC foreign policy goals, it is possible that China will follow the Russian example and begin to sponsor existing, or foment new dissident movements, or resistance organizations.

What foreign irregular armed groups, such as the Wa State Army and other similar organizations in neighboring Burma, have the PRC supported in the past or continue to support? What nonviolent civil resistance movements have the PRC supported in the past? What types of support has the PRC provided to such groups in the past and how effective were they? What non-state organizations does the CCP United Front have relationships with today? What are the most effective influence methods employed by the United Front? What makes non-state organizations or prominent individuals vulnerable to the influence operations, propaganda dissemination, and perception management activities of the CCP United Front? How can the bonds between regimes and their population be disrupted with irregular warfare?


  • Amico, Maj. Brandon J., "Words as Weapons: Counterintelligence-Driven Rhetoric in US Defense Strategy," SAASS thesis, 2024, 73 pgs. 
    • Directly addresses the UFWD, its most effective influence methods, and what makes prominent individuals (like politicians) vulnerable to elite capture and perception management. How it answers the question: The paper explains that Xi Jinping has dubbed United Front Work (UFW) as China’s "magic weapon" to sway foreign government decision-making. The UFWD and the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employ effective influence methods that span diplomatic engagements, clandestine activities, and harnessing the Chinese diaspora to advance Beijing's foreign policy. Prominent individuals are vulnerable to these influence operations through tactics of "foreign elite capture," which include financial enticements, campaign fundraising, expansive networking, and romantic entanglements. The paper highlights the cases of Rose Pak and Fang Fang in California, who successfully penetrated political circles to coax elites into championing China's policies or to gather political intelligence.
  • Brandt, Samuel J., "China's Soft Power: Building Friction against U.S. Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region," AFGC thesis, 2025, 49 pgs. 
    • Explains how the CCP United Front builds relationships with non-state groups and individuals globally through cultural attraction and coercion. How it answers the question: It explains that the "Overseas Chinese United Front" conducts seemingly benign activities, such as subsidizing cultural activities for Chinese communities living outside of China. However, it leverages these relationships to encourage overseas Chinese citizens to engage in local politics, inform on behalf of the PRC government, and co-opt foreigners to do the same. This demonstrates how the UFWD uses cultural and educational exchange as an effective influence method to build a pro-Chinese narrative globally.
  • Fritz, Maj. Matthew, "China's Irregular Mace: An Undetected War with the US," AFGC thesis, 2024, 38 pgs. 
    • Answers how the PRC utilizes irregular warfare to disrupt societies and target civilian populations without escalating to conventional conflict. How it answers the question: The paper explains that the PRC uses the "Three Warfares" (Media, Legal, and Psychological) to operationalize information warfare. It defines modern Irregular Warfare as a strategy that deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in adversary systems and "undermine[s] societal cohesion" by blurring the lines between the military and civilian domains. By targeting cultures and all of society within the cognitive domain, the PRC weakens an adversary's will and ability to counter Chinese influence.
  • Hulshizer, Lt. Col. Eric D., "Every Wallet a Target: Fusing Financial and Military Targeting in Strategy for the Decisive Decade," SAASS thesis, 2024, 115 pgs. 
    • Answers the question of what specific non-state organizations the PRC and CCP currently have relationships with, detailing how China uses them to foment resistance and disrupt rival regimes. How it answers the question: The author explains that authoritarian states like China rely on Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) as non-state actors in the "gray zone" of irregular warfare. Specifically, the PRC supports and finances pro-Beijing TCOs, such as the "Bamboo Union," which work alongside legitimate political entities like the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) in Taiwan. The PRC provides these groups with illicit funding streams (via human trafficking and narcotics) and uses them to create political agitation, target anti-Chinese groups, and "discredit Taiwan’s democracy". This method provides the CCP with plausible deniability while creating chaos for local law enforcement.
  • Reeves, Melanie M., "Shadows of Doubt: Exploring Disinformation's Influence on Public Trust in the U.S. Military," SAASS thesis, 2024, 110 pgs. 
    • ​​​​​​​Details the exact role of the UFWD in China's "mind dominance" strategy and answers how irregular warfare and disinformation are used to disrupt the bonds between a regime and its population. How it answers the question: The paper notes that the UFWD is one of five organizations charged with implementing China's mind dominance strategy, functioning to unite foreign and domestic Chinese communities, manage the global diaspora, and promote loyalty to the CCP. It answers how bonds between regimes and populations are disrupted by explaining that the PRC uses cyber-enabled disinformation and cognitive domain operations to erode public trust in government institutions. By amplifying polarizing content and false narratives (such as casting doubt on the integrity of the U.S. voting system), these irregular warfare campaigns succeed in creating domestic doubt, shifting beliefs, and engineering societal division.