TOPIC SPONSOR: JSOU
The rapid proliferation of commercial and state of the art drone technology has impacted the character of armed violence be it terrorist, insurgent, or military forces.
What counter-drone strategies have been adopted to increase force protection, deny adversary surveillance, and attack through the employment of drones? How and to what degree did the use of drones by the adversary impact existing partner, coalition, and U.S. forces operating models? What old or newly adopted tactics, techniques, and procedures emerged to successfully confront adversary use of drones? How specifically did the use of high-technology drones during the recent conflict in the Karabakh region impact intelligence, fires, command and control (C2), and conduct of operations? What if any counter strategies emerged to mitigate the impact from the use of drones?
- Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost-Effective Counter Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," GCPME paper, 2024, 44 pgs.
- Acosta, Capt. Alan A., "The Drone Dilemma: Leveraging Existing Technologies to Counter the Threat of Low-Cost Combat Drones," GCPME paper, 2024, 42 pgs.
- Fogarty, Maj. Trennart M. Barillas, "Tilted ACE: Optimizing Mission-Ready Airmen for CV-22," AFGC thesis, 2025.
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Fogarty addresses counter-drone strategies by arguing that CV-22 formations must be equipped with organic, multi-layered defensive capabilities—specifically including counter-UAS kits and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)—when operating deep within enemy territory without larger force package support. He suggests that MRAs act as the subject matter experts for this ground-based defense, ensuring the effective employment of counter-drone systems to protect the formation during ground laagers. To streamline this strategy and guarantee interoperability across joint forces, Fogarty recommends the use of "Amazon-like" procurement portals for counter-drone equipment, which would lower the barrier to entry for individual units while ensuring that sensors and effectors seamlessly integrate into the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) network to detect, track, and mitigate threats.
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Godoy, Maj. Luis M., "UAS Threats in Asymmetric Warfare," AFGC thesis, 2025, 34 pgs.
- Godoy addresses this by proposing a comprehensive, layered counter-UAS strategy for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to mitigate the risks posed by Group 1 and 2 drones in asymmetric warfare. Grounded in the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, his strategy features five distinct layers: early detection and tracking through radio frequency (RF), radar, and optical sensors; AI-enhanced identification and classification; non-kinetic mitigation such as RF/GNSS jamming and cyber payloads to preserve tactical surprise; kinetic mitigation for direct, physical neutralization when non-kinetic means fail; and continuous assessment to dynamically adjust tactics based on telemetry and engagement data.
- Williams, Maj. Cody G. "Unlocking the Sky: Integrating Remotely Piloted Aircraft into the National Airspace System," AF Global College, 2024, 51 pgs.