LEADING DISTRIBUTED TEAMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Distributed teams are a foundational element for today’s Air Force Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and global operations in support of combatant commands and coalition commanders are executed regularly by geographically separated teams. In the 25th Air Force more than 29,000 total force Airmen serve at 75 locations around the globe executing ISR missions for the joint force. Lt Gen David Deptula, former Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR, described this environment as a “rapidly evolving paradigm, called distributed ISR operations, links platforms and sensors, forces forward, and human ISR warfighting experience around the globe in ways that make networked combat operations routine.” Leading in a globally distributed teams environment can prove extremely challenging for myriad reasons and this environment – geographically separated and highly interdependent teams – calls for leadership theory and practice that match this paradigm.

Historical Battle Networks

Published April 22, 2026

TOPIC SPONSOR: HAF A5SM

Analyze battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike, including their evolution, effectiveness in previous conflicts. What operational approaches have been implemented by different militaries using these battle networks? How efficient or adaptable were they? What organizational concepts did these militaries adopt to deploy their battle networks? What implications did this have on their command structures and resource allocation?

Bellavia, CDR Andrea R., "Extending the Reach: How the Carrier Can Integrate the MQ-25A to Complement Distributed Maritime Operations," AFGC thesis, 2026.
- Answered by Bellavia's contextualization of modern distributed systems through a review of how historical battle networks evolved in response to shifting threats, particularly during World War II. She notes that pre-WWII surface battle doctrine favored physical concentration of battleship formations due to the limited range of ship fires, but the introduction of radar and fast carrier task forces allowed individual carriers to operate independently and disperse while striking multiple targets simultaneously. To apply these historical lessons to modern air warfare, Bellavia supports transitioning from platform-centric thinking toward Networked Force Packages (NFPs). Drawing on the Marine Corps' MAGTF construct, she argues that the Navy should organize the carrier air wing, MOC, and special operations forces as an integrated system of sensors, command nodes, and strike platforms to generate greater operational capacity and efficiency.