TOPIC SPONSOR: HAF A5SM
The character of military competition in the air domain is rapidly changing, largely due to the growing sophistication of long-range strike systems, increasing detection capabilities of stealth technologies, and trends in instrumentation and passive detection infrastructure development. These factors are potentially increasing the vulnerability of air operations for the US and other nations that rely on airpower. Moreover, the current US superiority in air warfare could be impacted as the character of the air domain evolves.
How will current and future trends in military technology advancements impact air warfare? How will this evolution of air warfare impact the US's superiority in the air domain?
- Acuna, Maj. Fernando Suito, "The Missing Link: A Path Forward for Integrating Remotely Piloted Aircraft within Joint All-Domain Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Acuna details how Chinese and Russian Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) advancements—specifically long-range Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), multi-spectral sensors, and electronic warfare—have drastically increased the vulnerability of legacy RPAs. Because legacy RPAs suffer from large radar cross-sections, slow speeds, and reliance on continuous SATCOM emissions, they are easily targeted. To counter these threats, Acuna recommends modernizing existing fleets with Radar Warning Receivers (RWRs), defensive jamming, and advanced onboard autonomy to reduce their reliance on vulnerable satellite command-and-control (C2) links.
- Allen, LtCol Zachary S., "Invisible to the Drone's Eye: Leveraging New Concepts and Technology to Safeguard Marine Aviation against the Unmanned Threat," AFGC thesis, 2026. 40 pgs.
- Allen asserts that the era of American air dominance operating from secure, centralized bases is definitively over due to the proliferation of cheap, highly capable UAS. Because traditional air defense architectures were built for large conventional threats rather than the low, slow, and small signatures of drones, the modern battlefield is transparent and lethal. Any concentration of static aviation assets is exceptionally vulnerable to rapid targeting. To survive, forces must adopt continuous mobility, maintain low electronic signatures, and leverage Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) to complicate the adversary's targeting cycle.
- Anderson IV, Maj. Raymond A., Protecting the Human Link: Joint Terminal Attack Controller Survivability in the Age of Unmanned Systems and Advanced Air Defenses," AFGC thesis, 2026, 50 pgs.
- Anderson details how the convergence of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) proliferation, long-range precision fires (A2/AD architectures), and Electronic Warfare (EW) fundamentally disrupts traditional Close Air Support (CAS) operations. These technologies create highly contested battlespaces with persistent surveillance, which compresses the kill-chain decision window and leaves forward-positioned JTACs highly vulnerable to near-immediate detection and attack.
- Heistuman, Tom J., "Dusting off the Defensive Playbook: Analyzing Cold War Defensive Strategies for Modern Threat Environments," SAASS thesis, 2024, 116 pgs.
- Heistuman answers these topics by evaluating the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) scheme of maneuver as the necessary response to China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) network and long-range missile threats. He argues that the USAF can no longer rely on large, centralized main bases, which have become prime, lucrative targets. To address this vulnerability, he recommends that the USAF combine active and passive facility hardening with on-base dispersal and distributed operations. Distributing operations across multiple bases, while spreading aircraft out within those bases, forces China to expend significantly more of its finite munitions to successfully degrade US airfields.
- Judd, Maj. Colby D., "Asymmetry in the West," AFGC thesis, 2025, 41 pgs.
- Judd details how China's technological advancements in Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) architectures and space-based Command, Control, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) have neutralized traditional US air and naval supremacy. He specifically notes the threat of China's 490+ ISR satellites—such as the Yaogan-41 in geostationary orbit—which provide persistent targeting data against US assets in the Pacific. To counter these transparent battlespace technologies, Judd recommends modernizing Cold War-era strategies like Assault Breaker II, utilizing low-cost precision weapons to rapidly strike Chinese military infrastructure and sever their frontline communication before their A2/AD systems can eliminate US air assets.
- Perhala, Maj. Ryan A., "'Tactical Standoff': The Origins, Development and Evolution of the Hellfire Missile," SAASS thesis, 2023, 132 pgs.
- Podestà, Lt. Col. Alessandro, "The Concepts of Mass and Surprise in Future Air Wars," AWC Kenney Airpower Seminar Paper, 2024, 24 pgs. Winner of the AWC Douhet-Mitchell Airpower Trophy
- Schroeder, Gregory P., "Evolution in Air Force Electromagnetic Warfare Technology: An Evolutionary Framework for Air Force Electromagnetic Warfare Technology in Vietnam," SAASS thesis, 2021, 46 pgs.
- Sullivan, Maj. Daniel R., "A Tale of Two Theaters: The Combat Introduction of the A-26 Invader," SAASS thesis, 2023, 130 pgs.