Reflections in the Information Environment

  • Published
  • By 616 OC

TOPIC SPONSOR: 616 OC

Information Warfare (IW) effects are largely non-kinetic and non-physical. How can we adapt MOEs and MOPs to account for the often non-tangible and non-observable nature of IW effects? A common problem is "proving the negative." If we leverage IW to influence an adversary and it prevents them from committing a given action, how do we know we prevented it? How do we accurately and meaningfully measure Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) in the Information Environment? What measurable factors exist that aren't accounted for in current models? How can we best measure the 'influence' of Information Warfare on an adversary actor?


  • Jenkins II, Maj. Kenneth M., "In Search of Will: How Has the Concept of Will Evolved in Conflict," SAASS thesis, 2025, 72 pgs. 
    • Jenkins answers this by noting that the Information Environment is now a primary mechanism for eroding morale, manipulating perceptions, and shaping national will long before a war begins, achieving effects that once required direct military action. Because "will" involves non-tangible aspects, Jenkins argues that influence can only be accurately measured by observing changes in an adversary's "empirical character"—their physical actions, behaviors, and reactions to intolerable conditions. He asserts that to successfully measure the influence of information warfare on an adversary's will, strategists must create MOEs and MOPs that link these unobservable psychological shifts directly to observable material and behavioral outcomes.
  • McFarlane, Maj. Brandon L, "Precision vs. Strategy: Evaluating the Joint Targeting Enterprise's Role in Achieving U.S. Long-Term Objectives," AFGC thesis, 2025, 42 pgs.
    • McFarlane criticizes the JTE's reliance on flawed, quantifiable performance metrics—such as "enemy combatants killed" or "targets struck"—arguing that they create a distorted picture of progress and act as a substitute for meaningful evaluation. He points out that current models fail to account for the most crucial factor in modern warfare: civilian harm, which actively undermines U.S. credibility, alienates local populations, and fuels insurgent recruitment. To meaningfully measure effectiveness, he recommends formally integrating "strategic-level impact assessments" into the targeting cycle. This would require dedicated teams to evaluate second- and third-order effects—such as civilian displacement, local political reactions, and adversary information exploitation—to ensure tactical strikes actually advance long-term objectives.