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Acuna, Maj. Fernando Suito, "The Missing Link: A Path Forward for Integrating Remotely Piloted Aircraft within Joint All-Domain Operations," AFGC thesis 2025.
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This paper addresses what the Air Force must prioritize to modernize legacy airborne surveillance platforms to survive in an era of expanding adversary anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The author argues that the Air Force must shift away from permissive-environment assumptions and prioritize modernizing Group V remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs), such as the MQ-9 Reaper, by investing in sensor integration, advanced autonomy, onboard processing, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities like radar warning receivers and defensive jamming. By reducing their reliance on vulnerable satellite communications and expanding their multi-domain sensing and relay roles, modernized RPAs can increase their survivability, complicate the adversary's targeting processes, and remain operationally relevant in highly contested environments.
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Arnold, Maj. James, "The Aging Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft Fleet in United States Indo-Pacific Command: The Challenges and How to Face Them," AFGC thesis, 2025.
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Addresses what the Air Force must prioritize by highlighting the urgent need to modernize its aging Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) fleet, such as the RC-135, E-8, and E-3, to counter the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing territorial claims in the South China Sea. To survive and advance in this increasingly contested environment, Arnold recommends the USAF prioritize a fleet-wide update, potentially replacing older Boeing 707 airframes with more modern, reliable Boeing 767s, and combining ISR missions into unified platforms to overcome current capability shortfalls. This modernization is deemed vital to ensuring senior leaders have the consistent and reliable intelligence necessary to navigate near-peer threats and maintain decision advantage without falling victim to intelligence gaps.
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Barcus, Colin V., "Slighting Without Winning: Analyzing CCP Narratives Regarding US ISR Operations in the Indo-Pacific," SAASS thesis, 2022.
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Addresses the context of adversary aggression short of war and the potential risks to civil aviation. Barcus notes that China employs dangerous military maneuvers—such as fighter jets executing barrel rolls near U.S. P-8 aircraft and naval vessels directing lasers at reconnaissance assets—as part of a broader, non-kinetic coercive strategy to push U.S. forces out of the region. Furthermore, Barcus highlights that U.S. ISR platforms occasionally change transponder "hex codes" to obscure their identities, a practice the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) heavily criticizes by arguing that electronically impersonating civilian airliners creates severe safety hazards and risks mistaken identity shoot-downs. To survive and mitigate escalation in this environment, the U.S. military must strictly adhere to safe and lawful practices to deny China propaganda victories, while recognizing that these dangerous, "grey zone" actions are deliberate strategies to achieve Chinese objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.
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Claypool, Capt. Andrew H. "Chinese UAV Integration: A New Era of Maritime Deterrence in the South China Sea," AFGC thesis, 2025.
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This paper explains how the People's Liberation Army (PLA) uses uncrewed systems as an effective maritime deterrence strategy to pursue territorial claims and coerce neighbors in the South China Sea while remaining deliberately below the threshold of armed conflict. To counter China's "grey zone" tactics and expanding battlespace awareness, the author argues that the U.S. must modernize its approach by adopting a persistent forward posture that leverages long-endurance ISR assets (like the MQ-9 and RQ-4) hosted by allied partners. Furthermore, the paper stresses that the U.S. and its allies must accelerate the development of counter-UAS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—blending electronic warfare, cyber disruption, and kinetic solutions—to successfully mitigate the PLA's aggressive, low-threshold aerial provocations.
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Combs, Cullen, "China Raising the Stakes in the South China Sea: Preventing Freedom of Navigation of the Bomber Task Force," GCPME thesis, 2022, 47 pgs.
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Addresses how the CCP pursues aggression in states of conflict less than war by asserting unlawful sovereignty over the South China Sea and constructing fortified military outposts on reefs to control air and sea lines of communication. While Combs does not focus explicitly on modernizing airborne surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, he highlights the risk to these assets by referencing incidents where Chinese fighters have aggressively intercepted U.S. reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace, such as the 2001 EP-3 collision. To survive and counterbalance this expanding adversary battlespace awareness, Combs argues the Air Force must prioritize Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) through the Bomber Task Force, executing less predictable freedom-of-navigation missions to challenge China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats without escalating to open war.
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Conatser, Lieutenant Commander Brian P., "Digital Eyes in the Water: Using Unmanned Technology to Gain an Asymmetric Advantage in the South China Sea," GCPME thesis, 2023, 37 pgs.
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Examines how adversaries pursue aggression in states of conflict less than war and how unmanned technology can bridge resulting ISR gaps. Conaster explains that China purposefully operates in the "grey zone" using paramilitary maritime militias and civilian-disguised fishing fleets to harass foreign ships (such as the USS Impeccable) and aggressively expand its territory without triggering a conventional military response. To modernize reconnaissance and counteract this less-than-war aggression, Conaster recommends the U.S. prioritize the use of commercially available Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). These unmanned platforms would provide a continuous, cost-effective, and stealthy ISR presence to document and deter China's covert maritime activities, filling critical intelligence gaps if China targets U.S. satellites or forces traditional manned aircraft out of the region.
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Crawford, Capt. Cody, "Attritable Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Concepts and Employment," SOS AUAR, 2022.
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Outlines how the Air Force must physically modernize its airborne surveillance to survive expanding adversary battlespace awareness. Crawford argues that the Air Force's historical reliance on exquisite, multi-billion-dollar ISR platforms is a critical vulnerability against peer threats equipped with advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. To modernize, the Air Force must prioritize developing "Attritable ISR"—mass-produced, low-cost autonomous systems like drone swarms and high-altitude balloons that can provide persistent coverage even if space-based capabilities are neutralized. Deploying these inexpensive, attritable assets forces adversaries to expend their limited and expensive surface-to-air or air-to-air munitions to counter them, creating a "magazine gap" and granting the U.S. a tactical advantage in conflicts short of or leading into war.
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Deaton, Jeremy, "Building Bridges, Not Islands: Strategies to Deter Chinese Aggression in the South China Sea," GCPME 2023, 41 pgs.
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Focuses on why adversaries pursue aggression short of war and how to deter it, explaining that China utilizes gray-zone tactics—such as island building and harassing regional fishing vessels—because it operates on a realist assumption that the U.S. and ASEAN nations lack the resolve to forcefully stop them. Rather than escalating to conventional conflict, Deaton recommends the U.S. counter this aggression through economic deterrence by establishing a reciprocal A2/AD presence in the "second island chain" (working closely with the Philippines). By threatening China's own economic prosperity and navigational access in this second chain, the U.S. can force a mutually beneficial balance of power that incentivizes China to halt its territorial aggression in the South China Sea.
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De Garmo, Captain Andrew, "BBP and Slides on Swarming in a South China Sea Conflict," SOS AUAR 2023, 3 pgs and slide deck.
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Addresses how the Air Force can survive and advance in contested airspace by advocating for the use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms to counter the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the South China Sea. To protect high-value, vulnerable assets like AWACS, KC-135 tankers, and 5th-generation fighters, the USAF must prioritize deploying large numbers of low-cost, interoperable drone swarms that act as a protective and deceptive shield. These swarms directly counter expanding adversary battlespace awareness by deliberately overwhelming, saturating, and jamming enemy surveillance networks and missile forces, allowing the U.S. to project power and maintain air superiority in highly contested environments.
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Fritz, Maj. Matthew H., "China's Irregular Mace: An Undetected War with the US," AFGC thesis, 2024.
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Explores why adversaries pursue aggression in states of conflict less than war, arguing that the PRC intentionally uses a modernized Irregular Warfare (IW) and gray-zone strategy to advance its geopolitical goals. Because open hostilities with a nuclear-capable peer like the U.S. carry devastating risks, China employs overt and covert tactics—such as expanding island-reefs in the South China Sea and leveraging the cognitive domain—to gradually shape the environment, challenge U.S. hegemony, and achieve political objectives without provoking a conventional military response. The paper warns that the U.S. military's obsolete definition of irregular warfare leaves it ill-equipped to recognize and respond to this "faits accomplis" strategy, allowing China to successfully leverage asymmetric aggression below the threshold of armed conflict.
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Germano, LCDR Jessica C., "An Analysis of Potential American Strategies Against China's Expanding Influence in the South China Sea," GCPME thesis 2023, 37 pgs.
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Analyzes China's strategy of using aggressive actions below the threshold of war, such as militarizing artificial reefs and ignoring international tribunal rulings, to gradually alter the rules-based international order. To curtail this expanding influence, Germano asserts that the U.S. must heavily leverage economic pressure (by decreasing reliance on Chinese imports) and dramatically strengthen coalitions with Indo-Pacific nations. While not specifically addressing the technological modernization of airborne ISR, Germano argues that the military must relentlessly continue Air Force overflights and Navy Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) directly over disputed features to professionally but firmly reject China's excessive territorial claims.
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Hall, LCDR Jonathan, "Establishing a New Norm: Airpower in the South China Sea," AF Global College, 2024, 49 pgs
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Details how China’s artificial island-building, deployment of advanced surface-to-air missiles, and use of maritime militias deliberately challenge U.S. reconnaissance aircraft (like the P-8 Poseidon and Global Hawk) using electronic warfare, jamming, and aggressive fighter intercepts. To survive and maintain ISR and strike capabilities in this increasingly contested environment, the Air Force must prioritize decentralized logistics by establishing Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) that allow aircraft to operate flexibly without relying on vulnerable large bases. Additionally, Hall concludes that because the PRC uses these gray-zone tactics to incrementally normalize its territorial claims without triggering open war, the U.S. must abandon its overly cautious de-escalation policy and assertively expand its airpower presence and unannounced Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to deter further Chinese expansion.
- Holston, Joel S., "Building the Neighborhood Watch: Partnered Integration of Airborne ISR for Indo-Pacific Competition, " AFGC thesis, 2024.
- Addresses both the modernization of AISR and the role of adversary aggression short of war, noting that despite hostile interceptions and increasing vulnerability, AISR remains crucial for exposing and deterring gray-zone activities without escalating to open conflict. To survive against China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the paper argues that the Air Force must pivot away from relying solely on large, exquisite, and vulnerable legacy platforms. Instead, the U.S. should prioritize developing and sharing low-cost, expendable, autonomous, and swarming small uncrewed airborne systems (sUAS) with regional partners, which can maintain data linkages and survive in sufficient numbers to detect targets even in highly contested or electromagnetic-denied environments.
- Kirklin, Russell J., "It's a 'We Said, Xi Said' Kind of Situation: Analyzing CCP Perceptions of US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea," SAASS thesis, 2020, 105 pgs.
- Highlighting the CCP's pursuit of advancing its territorial waters and airspace, this paper documents incidents of Chinese aggression toward U.S. reconnaissance assets, specifically detailing the continuous radio harassment of a U.S. P-8A Poseidon over the South China Sea in 2015. The author demonstrates that China utilizes aggressive warnings and the rapid militarization of artificial islands as coercive mechanisms short of war to establish artificial territorial boundaries that contradict international law. The paper underscores that the CCP actively uses these gray zone actions to incrementally consolidate physical control over disputed areas, which forces the U.S. to carefully execute Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to contest these claims without sparking a larger conflict.
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Krogh, Maj. Kyle, "Conflict Escalation via Unmanned Aerial systems in a Hybrid Warfare Context," AF Fellows (Argonne National Laboratory), 2020.
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This paper addresses why adversaries pursue aggression in states of conflict less than war, explaining that competitors like China, Russia, and Iran operate in the "gray-zone" to exploit ambiguity, deny attribution, and achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale conventional military response. The author cites specific incidents of aggression against U.S. reconnaissance assets—such as Iran's shootdown of a U.S. RQ-4 drone and China's threat to treat drone interceptions as acts of war—to illustrate how adversaries use unmanned systems to cautiously escalate conflicts, test boundaries, and subvert international norms. To counter these subversive tactics, the paper suggests the U.S. must actively compete in the gray-zone, improve interoperability with allies, and understand escalation dynamics to prevent catastrophic miscalculations.
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Martin, Jeremy A., "Dispute Resolution with Chinese Characteristics: People's Liberation Army Legal Warfare and Chinese Legal Culture," SAASS 2023.
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Directly examines the PRC's strategy of utilizing unsafe intercepts and paramilitary harassment against U.S. and allied reconnaissance assets as a form of "legal warfare" below the threshold of armed conflict. Martin explains that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) deliberately pursues aggression in states of conflict less than war—such as flying within 10 feet of a U.S. RC-135, performing barrel rolls over P-8s, and utilizing maritime militias to obstruct vessels—to incite a reaction and subsequently frame the U.S. as the aggressor violating international law. The PRC pursues these aggressive, gray-zone tactics because they successfully allow China to project military presence, assert sovereignty over disputed areas like the South China Sea, and divert foreign militaries while maintaining the pretext of self-defense and avoiding the massive costs of conventional war.
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Moore, Capt. Jacob, "Survivable and Adaptable Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in Peer Conflict," SOS AUAR, 2022.
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Highlighting the need for survivable ISR platforms against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this paper concludes that current U.S. aerial ISR aircraft will not survive a peer conflict due to China's expanding battlespace awareness and stealth capabilities. To advance capability, the author recommends the Air Force prioritize autonomous, attritable platforms, such as those being developed under the Skyborg program. By deploying a large volume of unmanned, autonomous wingmen equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) to quickly identify targets and adapt to enemy deception, the U.S. can overwhelm the adversary's targeting capabilities and maintain an adaptable ISR picture in contested skies.
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Strohmeyer, Col. Matthew D., "Commercial Space Remote Sensing and National Security," AF Fellow (CSIS), 2022.
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Discusses modernizing ISR to expose adversary aggression before it escalates into kinetic warfare. Strohmeyer notes that adversaries like Russia and China deliberately rely on "grey zone" activities below the threshold of armed conflict because it allows them to hide behind international blind spots and exploit the U.S. military's reliance on highly vulnerable, low-density government satellites. To advance its capabilities, the U.S. must prioritize integrating massive constellations of commercial space remote sensing platforms combined with Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms. AI can rapidly process vast amounts of commercial data to detect subtle anomalies in adversary "patterns of life," providing the necessary early warning to proactively deter and complicate adversary grey zone actions before they culminate in open war.
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Summers, Gilbert "Trey," "IFC in Evacuations, ACE and Freedom of Navigation Operations," ACSC elective paper (Intermediate Force Capabilities), 2024, 12 pgs.
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Addresses how U.S. forces should manage and respond to adversary aggression in the gray zone by fundamentally shifting how forces are trained and equipped for operations like Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and Agile Combat Employment (ACE). To successfully navigate scenarios short of war without unintentionally triggering a lethal armed conflict, Summers argues the military must prioritize the integration of Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs) and Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs). By equipping forces with tools like Long-Range Optical Interrupters, High-Power Microwave Vessel Stoppers, and acoustic hailing devices, commanders can determine adversary intent at a distance, disable hostile vessels, and safely de-escalate aggressive encounters in contested regions like the South China Sea.
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Taylor, Maj. Ryan J., "A Cresting Wave: Optimizing Dynamic Force Employment to Avoid a Defeat in the South China Sea," GCPME thesis, 2021, 59 pgs.
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Explores how the U.S. Air Force can survive and advance its capabilities against China's formidable A2/AD network and expansionist aims in the South China Sea. Although Taylor does not specifically single out the modernization of ISR platforms, he notes that China's advanced surveillance and integrated air defense systems place all U.S. aircraft—including command, control, and support aircraft—at severe risk. To survive this expanding battlespace awareness, Taylor argues the Air Force must prioritize Agile Combat Employment (ACE) to launch and recover aircraft from dispersed, unpredictable, and austere forward operating locations. By integrating Special Operations principles—such as secrecy, speed, and surprise—into ACE, the U.S. can successfully maneuver within China's A2/AD umbrella and raise the cost of Chinese aggression without triggering a nuclear response.
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Veenhof, Maj. Nick, "An Analysis of the East China Sea ADIZ and its Consequences," ACSC elective paper, 2020, 19 pgs.
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Directly answers how adversaries pursue aggression in states of conflict less than war by examining China's "salami slicing" strategy, which uses incremental changes—like the unilateral declaration of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)—to alter the status quo without triggering armed conflict. Veenhof argues that state-on-state reconnaissance and surveillance activities are vital because they promote stability by fostering "familiarity, trust, and confidence". To counter China's efforts to inhibit surveillance and exert sovereign control over international airspace, Veenhof asserts that the U.S. and its partners must prioritize continuing to fly military aircraft (including reconnaissance assets) through the ADIZ without complying with China's illegitimate demands, thereby pushing back against efforts to redefine international legal regimes.