The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences?
What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?
- Beers, Lt. Col. Shannon, "Lobbying Gone Wrong Contributes to 346 Deaths," AF Fellows portfolio (Georgetown), 2025, 20 pgs.
- Beers illustrates the fatal risks of increasing reliance on automated technology at the expense of human autonomy through Boeing's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). To avoid the costs and delays associated with simulator training for the new 737 MAX, Boeing engineered MCAS to automatically push the aircraft's nose down based on a single angle-of-attack sensor input. Crucially, Boeing deliberately omitted MCAS from the flight manuals, stripping the pilots of their autonomy and awareness of the system's existence. When the system received erroneous sensor data, pilots were overwhelmed by automated nose-down commands and contradictory cockpit warnings they had never been trained to understand or override. Beers argues this tragedy demonstrates that aircraft should not be designed to secretly override human control, nor should they rely on perfect human performance in a crisis to mitigate preventable technological flaws.
- Conley, Lt. Col. David E., "Perfecting Boyd's Loop: Artificial Intelligence Enhancing the Tactical Edge," GCPME thesis, 2024, 53 pgs.
- DeHenre, Rena "Reyna," "Military Decision Making and Adversarial Machine Learning Attack," SAASS thesis, 2022, 73 pgs.
- Gates, Maj. Justin M., "A Strategic Analysis of Advanced Technologies in Air Force Aviation Risk Mitigation," AFGC thesis, 2025, 46 pgs.
- Gates identifies pilot complacency, overreliance on automation, and the degradation of manual flying skills as severe risks associated with increasing technological reliance. He illustrates these negative consequences using the Air France 447 crash, where a sudden loss of airspeed data caused the autopilot to disconnect, leading to catastrophic situational awareness failures because the pilots were ill-equipped to abruptly assume manual control. To mitigate these risks and ensure pilots maintain appropriate autonomy and control over the aircraft, he recommends revising Crew Resource Management (CRM) programs to heavily emphasize manual flight proficiency through scenario-based training. Furthermore, he suggests the Air Force adopt a standardized emergency decision-making framework, similar to Delta Air Lines’ Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM), to reduce ambiguity and human error during high-workload transitions from automated to manual flight.
- Vahle, Maj. Mark W., "Opportunities and Implications of Brain-Computer Interface Technology," ACSC paper, 2018.