How can the Joint Force generate options for policymakers that expand the battlefield without escalating response? An indirect approach to conflict with peer adversaries, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering these threats, and how would the adversaries react?
To operationalize these approaches, what preparations—active or passive—can be executed in campaigning oriented toward protraction in conflict? Specifically, how can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? Furthermore, how do strategic deception and information management shape these protraction options?
Ultimately, what activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum—in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.
- Bishop, Dalene, "China's Claim to the South China Sea: Legal Legitimacy, Historical Justifications and Geopolitical Implications," AFGC thesis, 2025, 41 pgs.
- Bishop identifies several indirect, non-kinetic approaches used to counter China's expansion, including legal arbitration through international courts, diplomatic mediation through ASEAN, and tactical FONOPs to demonstrate international maritime norms without escalating to open conflict. The PRC reacts to these indirect approaches with a hybrid strategy: it rejects international court rulings, delays binding Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations, and uses "gray zone" tactics—deploying coast guard vessels, fishing fleets, and maritime militias to harass foreign ships and assert de facto control over the waters without triggering a conventional military response.
- Davenport, Maj. Tyler, "Winning without Fighting: Lessons from China's Irregular Warfare Strategy," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Answered by Davenport's analysis of the necessity of "strategic patience" and persistent engagement to wage effective long-term campaigns below the threshold of open conflict. He explains that China's continuous use of non-attributable methods—including state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) hacker groups and maritime militias—allows it to wear down defenses and force adversaries to expend resources in multiple domains without crossing escalatory lines. Davenport argues that because democratic nations must balance election cycles, public opinion, and short-term budgets, they are structurally disadvantaged against China's long-term strategic vision. To generate resilient campaigning options, Davenport recommends that the U.S. shift from a reactive posture to a proactive, long-term campaign model. He proposes leveraging non-attributable partner operations, private-sector cyber defense integrations, and collective messaging in international forums to exert constant pressure on China, disrupt its strategic objectives, and force it to divert resources.
- Judd, Maj. Colby D., "Asymmetry in the West," AFGC thesis, 2025, 41 pgs.
- Judd argues that the United States cannot hope to succeed in a full-blown conventional war with China due to China's "home-field" advantage and overwhelming firepower. Instead, he asserts the US must embrace an indirect, asymmetric approach. To overcome these challenges, he highlights programs like "Replicator"—which relies on thousands of low-cost, unmanned airborne drones and suicide boats—and the use of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) to overwhelm Chinese forces asynchronously without risking expensive manned platforms or escalating to immediate total war.
- Schnell, Andrew T., "Building Blocs: Economic Sanctions on the People's Republic of China during the Early Cold War," SAASS thesis, 2025, 90 pgs.
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Schnell provides historical context for this question by analyzing the U.S. use of comprehensive economic sanctions and trade embargoes as an indirect approach to contain the PRC during the early Cold War. He details how the U.S. leveraged its economic influence over European allies to restrict China's access to military and industrial goods, eventually escalating to a total embargo during the Korean War. In reaction, the PRC deepened its reliance on the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc through "fraternal socialism" and barter-system economies to bypass Western financial networks. Schnell demonstrates that while this indirect economic approach successfully isolated the PRC from Western markets, it also forced China to adapt by integrating more deeply into a rival economic bloc, warning modern strategists that indirect economic pressure can unintentionally harden an adversary's resolve and reinforce alternative global alliances.