In FY08, following the Minot/Barksdale and Taiwan incidents, Congress recognized deficiencies in DoD/Air Force nuclear operations and took action. This was the first instance of direction to the SecDef “to place greater emphasis on strategic and nuclear weapons policy and management.”
Over the next eight years, numerous reports outlined measures the DoD and Air Force should take to prevent similar incidents. However, it took those eight years of Air Force nuclear mission "management" before Congress stepped in again to update Chapter 805 of Title 10, incorporating Section 8040 (now 10 USC 9040)—requiring CSAF, under SecAF’s authority, to oversee the safety, security, reliability, effectiveness, and credibility of the nuclear deterrence mission.
Also, in FY16, Congress providing additional direction to the AF to consolidate nuclear deterrence responsibilities under a single general officer-led MAJCOM, overseeing nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and command-and-control infrastructure. This congressional intent led to the establishment of AFGSC. Unfortunately, over time, many of AFGSC’s responsibilities under AFMD 63 and other directives have been altered or diminished. Despite Congress consistently stepping in—especially with Sentinel—AFGSC still lacks the full authorities, responsibilities, and delegations envisioned in FY16 to function as the MAJCOM Congress intended.
Resources: Chapter 805 of Title 10, incorporating Section 8040 (now 10 USC 9040); AFMD 63; NDAA