Optimal C-UAS and Missile Defense Capabilities

What is the optimal mix of C-UAS and Missile Defense capabilities across Air Force bases to ensure protection and continued ability to meet Homeland Defense, Strategic Deterrence, and Power Projection requirements.

• Acosta, Capt. Alan A., "The Drone Dilemma: Leveraging Existing Technologies to Counter the Threat of Low-Cost Combat Drones," AFGC thesis, 2024, 42 pgs. 
  • Acosta answers the question by evaluating existing C-UAS technologies to recommend a layered counter-drone strategy that ensures USAF operational readiness and power projection in contested environments. He asserts that an optimal mix relies on early detection paired with electronic warfare (EW) for long-range disruption and kinetic systems for close-in threats. Specifically, Acosta's analysis highlights the Raytheon Coyote system as a highly versatile and effective kinetic option to integrate into this mix for neutralizing both individual drones and swarm attacks.
• Adams, Lt. Col. Nicholas, "Killing Drones, Saving Bones: Cost Effective Counter-Small UAS Options for an Agile Force," AFGC thesis, 2024, 44 pgs. 
  • Adams addresses the optimal mix of base defense capabilities by arguing for a layered, cost-effective combination of kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS systems to protect Air Force personnel, infrastructure, and assets. To ensure the USAF can sustain power projection via Agile Combat Employment (ACE), he recommends a mixed approach: utilizing cheaper air-to-air weapons to defeat larger (Group 2 and above) UASs, while deploying ground-based systems equipped with multiple sensor types and both kinetic and non-kinetic kill mechanisms to counter smaller (Group 1) UAS threats.
• Caldwell, Lt. Col. James T., "Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control: Requirements to Distribute Missile Defense Information to the Tactical Edge," AWC SSP, 2021, 28 pgs. 
  • This paper addresses the missile defense aspect of the query by emphasizing the need to protect both forward-deployed operational forces and homeland targets from peer competitor asymmetric missile strikes. Instead of prescribing a specific mix of hardware, Caldwell argues that the key to defending these bases and enabling power projection is a robust CJADC2 architecture capable of fusing multi-domain sensor data and distributing it to shooters at the tactical edge to ensure decision-making at the speed of relevance.
• Davis, Maj. Donald A., "Emerging Fronts: A Systematic Approach to Identifying and Addressing Homeland Defense Vulnerabilities," AFGC thesis, 2023, 64 pgs. 
  • Davis addresses the homeland defense requirement by arguing that the United States has left its homeland defended by antiquated systems designed for a bygone era. While it does not calculate an optimal mix of C-UAS and missile defense systems, the paper explores how the U.S. must modernize its strategic defensive posture through a systematic approach to counter emerging hybrid and gray-zone threats from near-peer adversaries.
• Daviscourt, Capt. Joshua, "COTS and Space Based Missile Defense," SOS AUAR, 2021, 11 pgs. 
  • This paper touches on strategic deterrence and missile defense by examining the broader context of air base defense against hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced ballistic missiles. It references the need to rethink Army and Air Force roles and functions regarding air base defense, highlighting that modernizing missile defense is essential to countering long-range threats and maintaining the viability of America's nuclear triad and strategic deterrence.
• Heistuman, Tom J., "Dusting Off the Defensive Playbook: Analyzing Cold War Defensive Strategies for Modern Threat Environments," SAASS thesis, 2024.
  • Heistuman answers the question by examining how the Air Force can protect its highly valuable, irreplaceable bomber fleet—which is the cornerstone of both strategic deterrence and power projection—from advanced long-range missile and air threats. Recognizing that large main bases are no longer sanctuaries, the author argues that the optimal defense mix cannot rely solely on active interceptors. Instead, the military must combine active defense systems (such as kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare, and directed-energy weapons) with passive measures like hardening and the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) dispersal strategy. By integrating these defenses, the Air Force can alter the adversary's cost-benefit calculus and ensure the survival of the assets required to project power and maintain deterrence.
• Hlavin, Maj. Scott, "The Air Force's Lack of Ground-Based Air Defenses is Our Achilles' Heel," AF Fellows, 2023, 3 pgs. 
  • Hlavin addresses the broader missile and air defense component by arguing that the USAF cannot rely solely on the Army for point and missile defense at its bases. To ensure the protection of forward bases and the continued ability to project power, Hlavin recommends an organizational and materiel shift where the USAF partners with the Marine Corps to acquire organic Ground-Based Air Defenses (GBAD)—specifically the MADIS Mk1 and Mk2 systems—to establish a resilient defensive posture.
• Kirk, Lt. Col. Troy A., "Review of Operation Inherent Resolve: Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and the Pursuit to Develop a Counter System," AWC SSP, 2020, 34 pgs. 
  • Kirk addresses the question by exploring the critical need to integrate C-sUAS into the broader Air Base Air Defense (ABAD) mission to protect physical aerodromes and deployed forces. The author points out that the rapid proliferation of drones has created a dangerous doctrinal gap between high-end Defensive Counterair (missile defense) controlled by the Joint Force and localized base self-defense. To ensure the Air Force can maintain air superiority and power projection, Kirk recommends that the Air Force take full ownership of the ABAD mission by deploying scalable, sensor-agnostic command and control systems that fuse both kinetic and non-kinetic C-sUAS effectors, thus bridging the gap between countering small drones and traditional missile defense.
• Klokun, Capt. Anton A., "BBP on Mobile Counter-UAV Weapon Technology," SOS AUAR, 2023, 3 pgs. 
  • Klokun touches upon this question by emphasizing the necessity of mobile counter-UAV systems to meet the 2022 National Defense Strategy's priority of defending the homeland against growing multi-domain threats. The author evaluates the Air Force Research Laboratory's Tactical High Power Operational Responder (THOR)—a directed-energy microwave system—as a base defense weapon capable of defeating drone swarms. To optimize base protection and safeguard critical infrastructure, the paper recommends further research and development into fully mobile C-UAV systems that can be easily deployed alongside military forces, ensuring that U.S. bases remain secure enough to continue supporting broader strategic and homeland defense requirements.
• Palchick, Lt. Col. Jesse C., "Countering First Person View Small Unmanned Aerial Systems with Airborne Electromagnetic Attack," AWC SSP, 2025, 49 pgs. 
  • Palchick contributes to the C-UAS mix discussion by proposing an Airborne Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Attack (AEA) solution specifically designed to counter First Person View (FPV) small UAS threats. By conducting a red-team analysis, the author evaluates how this non-kinetic AEA capability fits into the DoD's limited resources and broader strategic goals—such as the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy—ensuring it serves as an enduring, strategic layer of base defense rather than a short-lived technological niche.
• Smith, Maj. Ian A., "ACE With Spades: Air Force Civil Engineers and the Challenges of Enabling Agile Combat Employment," AFGC thesis, 2024, 58 pgs. 
  • This paper discusses how to protect Air Force bases and maintain power projection in contested environments, noting that active missile defense systems like terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles can be employed to defend forward operating sites against anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats. Because the availability of these active defense systems may be limited, the author emphasizes that an optimal base defense strategy must also heavily incorporate passive defense measures—such as camouflage, concealment, and deception—executed by civil engineers.
• Tedder, Capt. Nathan L., "Research and Development Strategy: Next-Generation Technology Defeat Mechanisms," SOS AUAR, 2021, 7 pgs. 

  • This paper briefly addresses the C-UAS component of the query by referencing the Department of Defense's "Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy". It emphasizes the urgency of developing next-generation defeat mechanisms, warning that U.S. ground forces are currently dangerously unprepared for enemy drones, which presents a significant vulnerability for force protection.

• Tittinger, Maj. James E., "Preparing for the Rain: Defensing USAFE from Russia's Standoff Capabilities," AFGC thesis, 2025.
  • Tittinger addresses this question by evaluating the defense of United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) bases against the combined threat of Russian cruise missiles and one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA UAVs). The author argues that the Air Force's current over-reliance on counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) systems—a legacy of counter-insurgency operations—leaves bases vulnerable to larger standoff munitions, thereby threatening regional power projection. To achieve an optimal defensive mix, the paper recommends that the Air Force procure organic, layered kinetic and non-kinetic defenses capable of defeating threats up to the size of cruise missiles. Simultaneously, the Air Force must clearly delineate responsibility to the U.S. Army for employing strategic missile defense systems, like Patriot and THAAD, to protect critical infrastructure.
• Wright, Maj. Jeremy A., "Attack of the Drones! U.S. Military Application of Counter Small UAS Operations," AFGC thesis, 2025, 36 pgs. 
  • Wright explores optimal base defense strategies by analyzing lessons learned from recent conflicts in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh to identify critical gaps in current U.S. C-sUAS capabilities. He concludes that to successfully project power and defend against peer adversaries like China and Russia, the U.S. military must deploy a multi-layered defense mix that thoroughly integrates electronic warfare, kinetic measures, and passive countermeasures. Furthermore, he emphasizes that these scalable and cost-effective systems will only be optimal if they are paired with robust, joint training programs across all domains.