Strategic Ambiguity and Patience: A Holistic Strategy to Sustain Peace Across the Taiwan Strait in this Decisive Decade Published July 14, 2025 By Lt. Col. Jia Wei Yeo Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- Introduction According to the 2022 National Security Strategy of the United States (U.S.), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the “most consequential geopolitical challenge” to its national interests.[1] Taiwan is regarded as the most dangerous flashpoint for conflict between the U.S. and the PRC. Recently, tensions over Taiwan have risen, raising the prospect of a direct conflict between the U.S. and PRC that could bring catastrophic outcomes of this great power competition (GPC).[2] Nevertheless, the PRC and the U.S. are not doomed to be adversaries or to engage in tragic confrontations. The peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are paramount to U.S. vital national security interests.[3] To this end, Taiwan is the fundamental starting point where both nations must seek mutual agreement and compromise to foster global stability and enduring cooperation. There is a need to develop a coherent strategy to address the most consequential challenge in this most perilous decade.[4] The crux of a coherent strategy lies in policy [ways and means] for preserving and enhancing the U.S.’ long-term vital interests [ends].[5] Background The U.S. adopts a “strategic ambiguity” policy in dealing with the Taiwan issue and upholds its longstanding One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and Six Assurances.[6] The PRC has repeatedly called the Taiwan issue the “core of its core interests” and the “first red line” that must not be crossed in U.S.-PRC relations.[7] This understanding has preserved peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for the past decades. Nevertheless, the PRC’s expanding military capabilities and assertive behavior, coupled with deterioration in cross-strait relations, have posed a significant threat to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Likewise, the U.S. has adopted an increasingly provocative stance toward Taiwan. Then-President Biden made multiple commitments to protect Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression against the country.[8] The proposed Taiwan Policy Act’s agenda of designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” is also perceived by the PRC as an increasing erosion of the U.S. support of the One China policy.[9] Both the PRC’s coercive behavior and the U.S.’ increasingly provocative rhetoric toward Taiwan are destabilizing and may result in inadvertent escalation. Preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait must be the U.S.’ paramount priority, given its importance to national security. The U.S. must pursue a strategy utilizing its instruments of national power to maintain the policy of strategic ambiguity and strategic patience to preserve peace and security across the Taiwan Strait.[10] The logic underpinning this strategy is to prevent entrapment for the U.S. by creating uncertainty about its military commitment to Taiwan, and in turn, buys time for the U.S. to exercise strategic patience as it gradually erodes PRC’s military advantages and political will to invade Taiwan. Leveraging the DIME Instruments of Power Diplomacy is arguably the most crucial instrument of power to be leveraged to maintain strategic ambiguity and enable the U.S. to exercise strategic patience. An active defensive diplomacy approach can help to avoid war across the Taiwan Strait.[11] The One China policy is the cornerstone of the diplomatic tool. The U.S. officials should refrain from any symbolic provocation that does not alter the objective balance of power between the U.S. and PRC.[12] U.S. officials should also avoid politically beneficial but strategically detrimental Taiwan pronouncements. For example, recent appeals for clarity in the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan undermine deterrence more than they strengthen it. More importantly, the U.S. must refrain from shifting toward strategic clarity, such as providing greater security assurances to Taiwan, as it could embolden Taiwan to pursue independence. Doing so will provoke the PRC to become more aggressive toward Taiwan, potentially hastening a Chinese invasion. The U.S. should undertake the détente approach and utilize high-level diplomatic discourse to engage the PRC candidly to minimize the risk of misjudgment or unintentional provocation. This will provide both the U.S. and the PRC with diplomatic rooms to exercise patience regarding the Taiwan issue.[13] The U.S. should also consider negotiating with the PRC to issue a new joint communiqué to express its willingness to reduce arms sales to Taiwan contingent upon the PRC’s continued commitment to a peaceful resolution. Such diplomatic maneuvers will lead to rapprochement between the two nations, dampen the PRC’s anxiousness toward Taiwan, and regain its patience in pursuing peaceful reunification. U.S. diplomats at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) should work with Taiwan officials to ensure Taiwan does not upset the status quo.[14] Under President Tsai, the previous administration tactfully avoided overt pro-independence initiatives. In contrast, the current administration under President Lai has signaled a more assertive posture toward China, though it continues to exercise a degree of restraint.[15] If it continues to adopt a more aggressive stance to upset the status quo, U.S. diplomats should privately voice their objections or concerns to the Taiwanese government and negotiate with its officials to pursue a more nuanced approach. It is imperative that Washington convey its admonition to Beijing via diplomatic channels to preserve the credibility of American assurances. Conversely, Washington should prohibit high-level official visits to Taipei without a compelling reason. Notwithstanding, the growing domestic desire for Taiwan's independence offers an opportunity for the U.S. to seek tripartite negotiations to find a modus vivendi to maintain the peace across the Taiwan Strait, with Singapore potentially acting as the mediator.[16] Strategic ambiguity requires U.S. diplomats to be deft and tactful when executing statecraft and diplomatic maneuvers. As such, the U.S. should contemplate overhauling its diplomatic corps, given that the current appointments for ambassadorships frequently favor individuals who have donated to presidential elections.[17] With a more professional diplomatic corps, the U.S. can effectively utilize its diplomatic power to foster closer strategic alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby strengthening its position as a deterrent against Chinese aggression. Active defensive diplomacy only works if the U.S. leverages its information instrument of power to espouse the policy of strategic ambiguity with creditability. The strategy will only succeed if the U.S. rhetoric consistently aligns with its One China policy. The U.S. should refrain from using language that may be interpreted as contradictory to its longstanding One China policy, such as designating Taiwan as a “non-NATO ally.” Communicating the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan will reaffirm the PRC’s worries that the U.S. supports Taiwan's de jure independence and, in turn, increases its political will to invade Taiwan. It is imperative for the U.S. to unequivocally reaffirm to the PRC that it has no intention of endorsing Taiwan's independence. Due to its commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. should communicate that its arms sales to Taiwan are mainly for Taiwan to maintain its self-defense capability.[18] The U.S., being the leading advocate for democracy, should consistently communicate that its policies aim to protect Taiwan's democracy, not its de jure independence. The pro-democracy rationale for Washington's conditional military commitment to Taiwan may not sit well with Beijing. However, the PRC leaders are more inclined to perceive this stance as credible if the pro-democracy narrative is consistent. Official U.S. communications must avoid exhibiting symbols of Taiwan's sovereignty or designating Taiwan as a nation or an ally. Military cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries must remain low-key. The U.S. should advocate its adherence to the One China policy via public channels such as international news broadcasting to mitigate the Chinese misperception of the erosion of the U.S.’ One China policy. The U.S. government should also cooperate with Taiwan as part of a multilateral effort among democracies to develop strategies to combat PRC disinformation, malign influence, and strengthen societal resilience. For example, the U.S. can consider working with Taiwan to enact Artificial Intelligence (AI) legislation to mandate chatbots or “deepfake” software to clarify that what people see is generated by AI. The U.S. should leverage and strengthen the existing international order to constrain the PRC’s options and erode its political will to invade Taiwan. U.S. leaders should consistently communicate its “red line,” which is the outbreak of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. must also reassure the PRC that forgoing military options does not mean it will lose Taiwan. With this, the U.S. can raise China’s reputational costs and garner strong international support to oppose Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. Despite the push for a peaceful resolution, the U.S. must intensify its efforts to enhance its military capacity and regain military superiority over the PRC to deter conflict across the Taiwan Strait and be prepared to respond to any contingency, in line with the 2022 National Defense Strategy.[19] The PRC has grown increasingly capable of mounting a potentially successful assault against Taiwan and has eroded U.S. military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. However, such military advantages over Taiwan and the U.S. are expected to expire by the next decade. Over the past decade, the U.S. military has embarked on a series of military modernizations that will develop the requisite capabilities to overcome its handicap in a conflict with the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region.[20] For example, the U.S. has invested heavily in enhancing its long-range strike capabilities, such as the B-21 Raider and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile.[21] Specifically, the B-21 will provide the U.S. with the “capacity to sink 300 warships within 72 hours,” providing credible conventional military deterrence.[22] Many of these modernization efforts will become operational toward the end of the 2020s.[23] However, this presents a potential security dilemma. The PRC might interpret enhancements to U.S. offensive capabilities as a signal of malign motives, leading to potential escalation. Strengthening U.S. military capabilities should be presented as its longstanding commitment to maintain the existing rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.[24] The U.S. must also reassure the PRC that it has no intention of utilizing its future superiority to undermine Beijing's fundamental security interests by advocating for Taiwan's de jure independence. Si vis pacem, para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war) should be the organizing principle of this strategy. Considering the finite U.S. defense resources and the increasing gun-or-butter competition, the U.S. might not have sufficient resources to sustain deterrence against the PRC for a prolonged period.[25] The U.S. must continue re-optimizing its military force posturing in the Indo-Pacific region, potentially reducing its commitment in Europe.[26] Other than shifting the balance of its global force deployment toward the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. should also consider optimizing its current force structure to optimize military funding further. For example, the U.S. Navy has eleven carrier strike groups (CSG) that rack up an annual $13 billion in operating costs alone.[27] Mothballing some of the CSGs will not undermine its national security, as the U.S. should focus on long-range strike capabilities. In fact, it is in the PRC’s national interest for the U.S. to be wasteful in defense spending.[28] The U.S. should also invest in asymmetrical technologies to enhance its offensive and defensive capabilities in the non-kinetic and space domains. These investments will enable the U.S. to disrupt the PRC’s core military strategy to achieve information dominance at the onset of military conflict.[29] This seeks to undermine the PRC’s sense of control and disabuse its belief in its ability to seize the initiative. Therefore, increasing U.S. military superiority seeks to deter PRC aggression long enough for its eventual catch-up to minimize the window of vulnerability in this decisive decade. Strengthening economic ties with the PRC will be critical for preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Despite the need to protect the U.S.’ technological advantages and national security through the enactment of industrial policies like the CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. has significant geoeconomic potential to balance openness and security.[30] Economic cooperation creates mutual vulnerabilities and incentivizes all parties to maintain stable relations. Despite the U.S.’ tariffs on Chinese imports and export control rules on advanced semiconductors, the U.S. and Chinese economies remain deeply interconnected. Given the PRC’s current economic situation, it will likely seek to improve relations with the U.S. through economic cooperation. This was evident when President Xi expressed his desire to lure back American investors and businesses during his visit to San Francisco in November 2023.[31] This presents an opportunity for the U.S. to calm the waters and demonstrate its commitment to maintaining cordial ties. The U.S. should undertake a cooperative approach toward the PRC and further deepen the economic interdependence between the two economic powerhouses. For example, the U.S. can pursue membership in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank to display its commitment to a cooperative approach with the PRC.[32] Interdependence can be strategically leveraged to reduce the adversary’s political will to pursue military aggression and deter conflicts. As such, the U.S. must prioritize deterrence over competition in the economic domain. The U.S. should fortify Taiwan against the PRC’s economic coercion by reducing its economic dependence on the PRC, which remains Taiwan’s largest trading partner.[33] The U.S. should pursue a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan, diversify its supply chains in critical sectors such as energy, and build resiliency in the global semiconductor manufacturing sector under the ambit of the Taiwan Relations Act. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act has sparked $200 billion in investments for U.S. semiconductor production, which will help to further create strategic ambiguity from the PRC’s perspective.[34] Given the U.S.’ reduced reliance on Taiwan for semiconductors, the PRC might perceive a diminished impetus for the U.S. to endorse Taiwan's quest for independence. This could enhance the credibility of the U.S.’ One China policy. The approval of Foreign Military Financing to support Taiwan’s defenses is also another right step to hasten Taiwan’s build-up of its self-defense capabilities.[35] It is crucial that Taiwan rapidly shore up its defense and resiliency, and the U.S. can play a key role in leveraging its geoeconomic power through investment policy and financial aid to Taiwan. There are three risks associated with this strategy. First, if the U.S. maintains strategic ambiguity despite the increasing PRC’s aggression and assertiveness toward Taiwan, it may undermine U.S. credibility in its ability to protect its allies and partners. However, the recent U.S. security pledge to Ukraine and Israel may reassure its allies and partners that the U.S. is committed to supporting them in a contingency. Furthermore, exercising strategic patience might signal weakness and encourage increased coercive Chinese actions toward Taiwan. Conversely, strategic patience is required to strengthen the deterrence effort, as the PRC may not have the casus belli to launch military aggression beyond the current gray zone actions against Taiwan. Washington and Taipei should align their diplomatic maneuvers to a mutually beneficial result and alleviate Beijing's mistrust of any unequivocal efforts toward Taiwan's independence. Lastly, pivoting military posturing to the Indo-Pacific region may undermine the U.S.’ credibility as the global leader in the liberal international order, particularly in Europe. Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO could pave the way for a gradual withdrawal from the U.S. current military posture in Europe.[36] The U.S. should also explore other measures, such as arms sales to NATO members, to enhance the alliance's self-sufficiency. Conclusion Preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is crucial for safeguarding U.S. vital national security interests. The hard truth is that Taiwan's pursuit of independence does not serve the U.S. vital interests, risking activating the PRC’s “red line” and escalating into a potentially catastrophic great power conflict. Both the U.S. and the PRC wish to avoid war at all costs. Given the increasing tension surrounding Taiwan, the U.S. must endeavor in good faith to revive the embers of the U.S.-PRC rapprochement vis-a-vis Taiwan. Therefore, the U.S. must maintain its strategic ambiguity policy toward Taiwan across its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power. In turn, this will not antagonize the PRC to pursue military options, and the U.S. will be able to take advantage of the ambiguity to exercise strategic patience and buy sufficient time to gradually erode the PRC's military advantages and political will to invade Taiwan within this decisive decade. Nonetheless, despite the U.S.’ demonstration of strategic ambiguity and patience, only time will tell whether the PRC will maintain its forbearance in pursuit of peaceful reunification. Notes The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents. Lt Col Jiawei Yeo is an instructor in the Department of Security Studies at the Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), deployed under the Military Personnel Exchange Program. Lt Col Yeo, an Air Warfare Officer (Air Battle Management), from the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is also a qualified operational instructor. He completed the ACSC In-Residence program in May 2024 as a Distinguished Graduate and was awarded the Commandant’s Award for Academic Achievement and Commandant’s International Officer Award. Prior to ACSC, Lt Col Yeo held operational and staff positions at various echelons from squadron to HQ RSAF. Most recently, he served as a branch head in the recently established Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS). Lt Col Yeo holds a Bachelor of Business Administration (Tourism and Hospitality Management) from Nanyang Technological University and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University. [1]. Joseph Biden, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: White House, 2022), 11. [2]. According to a U.S. DoD report, a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait would result in thousands of casualties and jeopardize more than $2 trillion in global economic activity, igniting a global economic depression. See Jim Garamone, “U.S. Strengthening Deterrence in Taiwan Strait,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 19, 2023; Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, 2nd ed., (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 22-23. [3]. Biden, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 24. [4]. Haddick, Fire on the Water, 127; Gabriel Collins and Andrew S. Erickson. “U.S.-China Competition Enters the Decade of Maximum Danger,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, December 2021, 3. [5]. Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Texas National Security Review, Volume 2 Issue 1, November 2018, 55 – 56; Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018): 19 - 23. [6]. The One China policy recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China but only acknowledges but did not endorse Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of the PRC. See Susan V. Lawrence, Taiwan: The Origins of the U.S. One-China Policy, Congress In Focus IF12503, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 27, 2023); Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell, Taiwan: Political and Security Issues, Congress In Focus IF10275, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2023). [7]. “Taiwan Is at the Core of China’s Core Interests - Chinese Defense Minister,” Reuters, November 22, 2022; “China’s Xi Tells Biden: Taiwan Issue Is ‘First Red Line’ That Must Not Be Crossed,” Reuters, November 14, 2022. [8]. Kevin Liptak and Brad Lendon, “Biden Again Says US Forces Would Defend Taiwan against Chinese Aggression,” CNN, September 19, 2022. [9]. Rupert Hammond-Chambers, “Special Commentary: The Taiwan Policy Act Flames Out.” US-Taiwan Business Council, March 7, 2023. [10]. The instrument of national power is often referred as ‘DIME’ (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, JDN 1-18, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 April, 2018), vii. [11]. A diplomatic strategy of active defense anticipates trends and attempts to either redirect them or to turn to advantage. See C. W. Freeman, Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997,) 73 – 74. [12]. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Biden Says We’ve Got Taiwan’s Back. But Do We?,” The New York Times, May 27, 2022. [13]. Freeman, Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, 123. [14]. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a non-profit corporation through which the policies and programs of the President of the United States and government agencies with respect to Taiwan are carried out. AIT is entrusted with maintaining the economic, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people in Taiwan. See “Policy and History,” American Institute in Taiwan, Accessed 10 December, 2023. [15]. United States Institute of Peace, “Taiwan’s New President Faces Tensions with China and Domestic Division.” June 6, 2024. [16]. Singapore was selected as the venue to host the historic meeting between the PRC President and Taiwan President in 2015. See “One-Minute Handshake Marks Historic Meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-Jeou,” The Straits Times, last modified January 19, 2016. [17]. Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy, (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2020), 123; Campaign Legal Center, The Donor-To-Ambassador Pipeline – Why America’s Key Diplomats Are Often Wealthy Political Donors, May 2023, 5. [18]. The Taiwan Relations Act is a policy of the United States that aims to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly economic, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other people of the Western Pacific area. See "H.R.2479 - 96th Congress (1979-1980): Taiwan Relations Act," Congress.gov, April 10, 1979. [19]. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 7. [20]. Haddick, Fire On The War, 128 – 130. [21]. “The B-21 Raider, the Air Force’s New Nuclear Stealth Bomber, Takes Flight for First Time,” CBS News,” November 10, 2023; Alexandra G. Neenan and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Defense Primer: LGM-35A Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, CRS In Focus IF11681, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2023). [22]. Haddick, Fire on the Water, 181. [23]. “Meeting China’s Emerging Capabilities Countering Advances in Cyber, Space, and Autonomous Systems,” NBR Special Report No. 103, December 2022. [24]. Biden, National Security Strategy, 37-38. [25]. Haddick, Fire On The Water, 217 – 220. [26]. Audrey Decker, “USAF Aims to ‘Re-optimize’ for Great Power Competition,” Defense One, September 11, 2023. [27]. Nick Danby, “Carrier Strike Groups Should Be Ready to Go Dark in Conflict,” War on the Rocks, August 29, 2023. [28]. Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy, 108. [29]. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023), VII. [30]. Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 202 – 203. [31]. Michael Martina, “Dining with US Firms at APEC, Xi Says China Is Ready to Be a Partner,” Reuters, November 16, 2023. [32]. Sandra Minkel, “Diplomacy under the Strategic Rebalance and a Look Forward,” in Avoiding the Trap: U.S. Strategy and Policy for Competing in the Asia-Pacific Beyond the Rebalance, ed. David Lai et. al., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018), 412, 428, 436. [33].“Taiwan – Market Overview,” International Trade Administration, 10 January, 2024. [34]. Since 2020, more than a dozen US businesses have pledged to invest roughly $200 billion in US semiconductor production. Furthermore, with strong US support, TSMC agreed to constructing a semiconductor production plant in Arizona, ultimately tripling its projected investment to $40 billion and adding a second site. See Don Clark and Ana Swanson, “U.S. Pours Money Into Chips, but Even Soaring Spending Has Limits,” The New York Times, January 1, 2023; Emma Kinery, “TSMC to up Arizona Investment to $40 Billion with Second Semiconductor Chip Plant,” CNBC, December 6, 2022 [35]. Kylie Atwood, “US Approves First-Ever Military Aid to Taiwan through Program Typically Used for Sovereign Nations,” CNN, last modified August 31, 2023. [36]. Jonathan Askonas, “With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the U.S. Can Finally Pivot to the Pacific,” Foreign Policy, July 12, 2022.