PHASE ONE: BLINDING THE EAGLE--PLA COUNTER-SPACE OPERATIONS IN A 2027 TAIWAN REUNIFICATION CAMPAIGN Published Jan. 11, 2026 By Lt. Col. Kenneth Bell, USAF INTRODUCTION: This paper examines a notional near-future campaign scenario in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launches a rapid and overwhelming counter-space campaign during the opening phase of a larger operation to forcibly reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Set in 2027, the campaign -- presented from the perspective of a Chinese Joint Staff Department (JSD) war planner -- is designed to disable or severely degrade US space capabilities in a single 24-hour window. Drawing upon publicly available primary sources along with secondary source assessments of PLA doctrine, organizational reforms, and emerging capabilities, this paper outlines a realistic sequencing of operations aimed at “blinding” US and allied forces before the first shot is fired in the conventional domains. Of note, though real-world PLA operations planning has few terminology parallels to Western concepts of phased operational approaches or the Ends, Ways, and Means model, we will still use some of this Western nomenclature for the practical purpose of clarity for the most probable consumer of this work, the Western war planner, or strategic policymaker. This perspective is not meant to endorse PLA doctrine, but rather to emulate its logic in a way that allows US and allied planners to anticipate and mitigate it. By inhabiting the adversary’s mindset, we gain sharper insight into the sequencing, tempo, and thresholds which might define such a future contingency scenario. This sort of lens is increasingly necessary as China pursues strategic ambiguity and “gray zone” campaigns to defy conventional deterrence models. OPERATIONAL MANDATE AND PLANNING FRAMEWORK The JSD and PLA, acting under the strategic direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), have been tasked to plan a preemptive campaign to forcibly reunify Taiwan with the mainland. In alignment with the Party’s guidance on the “National Defense in the new era,”1 we recognize that the operational environment is no longer defined solely by the movement and employment of ships and missiles, but by the control and denial of the space and electromagnetic domains of warfare. Thus, before the first missile is launched in our joint firepower strike (JFPS) campaign or the first amphibious battalion lands ashore,2 we must first win the war above the battlefield. Despite its geographic distance from the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. maintains a dense global architecture of satellite ground-stations, and space-based capabilities enabling real-time intelligence collection, global command and control (C2), and rapid intervention in defense of Taiwan across the hemispheres. This architecture must be blinded, degraded, or destroyed. Beyond military imperative, this larger operation contributes to a much greater political objective of achieving swift and decisive reunification, thereby demonstrating the Party's resolve and strengthening its legitimacy both domestically and on the world stage. To seize the initiative, we have designed a rapid, overwhelming counter-space campaign plan intended to neutralize or cripple US space capabilities within a critical 24-hour window. This ‘first phase’ is not a supporting element of the conventional reunification and/or counter-intervention campaign -- it is a prerequisite for success. Through coordinated action across our PLA’s newly formed Aerospace, Cyberspace, and Information Support Forces,3,4 we aim to achieve a decisive disruption or destruction of US overhead (space-based) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), Position Navigation and Timing (PNT), Space Domain Awareness (SDA), and communications assets across all segments of the space domain: the on-orbit segment, ground control nodes, and the link segments connecting them. This approach is firmly rooted in our long-standing doctrine of “active defense,” which sanctions preemptive and offensive operations when war is judged to be inevitable. As articulated in our campaign doctrine, “seizing information and air superiority” are key objectives to deny the adversary initiative and freedom of action in the early stages of offensive campaigns in a conflict.5 This plan outlines the logic, sequencing, and intended effects of the counter-space campaign, focusing on the three sub-phases which will precede kinetic operations against Taiwan. Our aim is simple: if we can blind the eagle, we can break its claws -- before it ever takes flight. II. CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC LOGIC (ENDS AND MEANS) The overarching end-state objective (ends) of the counter-space campaign is to blind and paralyze US and allied military forces before they can effectively respond to our eventual JFPS, maritime blockade, and Joint Island Landing Campaigns (JILC) against Taiwan. If executed properly, this campaign aims to delay US and allied intervention efforts for at least two weeks, creating a critical window to achieve operational objectives ashore, and to establish irreversible political and military momentum. By targeting the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) backbone of American joint operations, we aim to sever the connective tissue of the adversary’s force projection model (Means).6 This logic is not new -- it is the natural evolution of our “active defense” doctrine, which prioritizes seizing the initiative when conflict is deemed inevitable. In the words of the seminal Science of Military Strategy, the PLA must “use proactive offensive actions to force the enemy to fight on the battlefield we preset, use our good methods, engage in the process we envision, and lead the battle to develop in accordance with our wishes.”7 US reliance on space systems for early warning, intelligence gathering, navigation, and joint force coordination constitutes the most significant vulnerability which can be negated with an active defense. This dependency has only deepened as US forces have optimized themselves for network-centric operations and global reach. Figure 1. – Current Conditions vs End-State Conditions Operational Approach Artifact Our target set includes all three segments of the US space architecture: the on-orbit platforms [including Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), early-warning Overhead persistent Infrared (OPIR), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) constellations], the ground segment [satellite control facilities, data relay terminals, and Space Surveillance Network (SSN) nodes)], and the link segment (uplinks, downlinks, and crosslinks that bind the system). Civilian commercial Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations -- such as Starlink and Iridium -- also warrant targeting due to their proven dual-use military role in tactical communications redundancy. These systems complicate traditional escalation thresholds and offer adversaries rapid resiliency. Their inclusion in the target set reflects both doctrinal flexibility and strategic necessity.8 Success in this first phase will not only render US sensors blind and shooters mute -- it will also fracture allied confidence, disrupt coordination, and allow the PLA to shape the battlespace unchallenged. “Destroying or paralyzing key nodes in the enemy’s operational system of systems,”9 as our campaign guidance notes, is not a luxury -- it is a prerequisite III. SUB-PHASES OF THE COUNTER-SPACE CAMPAIGN (WAYS) The counter-space campaign will unfold across three tightly sequenced sub-phases: 1) Reconnaissance and Pre-Positioning; 2) Preemptive Fires and Denial; and 3) Sustainment and Deception -- executed within a 24-hour window. Each phase builds on the momentum of the last, culminating in full spectrum degradation of the adversary’s space-based capabilities across all segments. These sub-phases will primarily leverage counter-space assets developed under our "Assassin's Mace" weapons acquisition doctrine, reflecting our leadership's directive to prioritize key technological advancements -- “catchup in some areas and not in others” -- and develop capabilities that exploit adversary vulnerabilities -- to build “whatever the enemy fears.” This focused approach, emphasizing asymmetric advantages, is crucial for achieving decisive results throughout the campaign.10 A. SUB-PHASE 1: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE AND PRE-POSITIONING: D-MINUS 7 TO H-HOUR In the week prior to the initiation of hostilities, the PLA will carry out extensive target development and position key assets for rapid execution. The Aerospace Force (ASF) will coordinate orbital surveillance to verify satellite elsets (standardized orbital parameters used to calculate a satellite’s location at any given time), while the Information Support Force (ISF) will lead the mapping of uplinks, downlinks, and control nodes. Particular emphasis will be placed on identifying vulnerabilities in link segments and isolating commercial LEO traffic of dual-use concern. Simultaneously, the Cyberspace Force (CSF) will surge malware infiltration operations against US and allied satellite ground stations. These intrusions will focus on terminal systems and satellite control software associated with ISR, GPS, and SATCOM constellations. Notably, systems operated by commercial entities like Iridium, OneWeb, and Starlink will be prioritized given their utility in recent US operations and their integration with Indo-Pacific joint force structures. Co-orbital satellites already positioned in close proximity to US overhead assets will quietly maneuver into ideal “parking” positions for proximity operations. Debris field generation will also be initiated through kinetic Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) weapon “testing” against defunct Chinese satellites in both LEO and geostationary graveyard orbits to complicate US space domain awareness (SDA) sensors. To our adversaries, these will be reminiscent of our 2007 testing event.11 Concurrently, a misinformation campaign will be launched to portray this activity as routine testing and to preemptively frame any US or allied response as escalatory and unprovoked. As PLA doctrine emphasizes, reconnaissance and information operations in peacetime provide the basis for decisive action in wartime.12 This preparatory phase sets the conditions for a seamless transition to Phase 2 at the moment of initiation. B. SUB-PHASE 2: PREEMPTIVE FIRES AND DENIAL: D-DAY (H-HOUR TO H+6) At H-Hour, coordinated hard and soft-kill effects will be delivered against the most critical targets in the US and allied space architecture. The ASF will execute launches of direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons -- both traditional SC-19 variants13 and more advanced systems such as the DN-2 or DN-3 (a road-mobile DA-ASAT derived from the DF-21 missile)14 -- targeting early-warning OPIR and ISR satellites in LEO and geosynchronous orbit.15 Co-orbital ASAT systems will begin proximity operations and mechanical grappling to disable additional satellites without creating substantial debris in orbital regimes most useful to our own constellations.16,17 Ground-based directed energy weapons will be used against satellites with known vulnerabilities to achieve laser dazzling or thermal damage, particularly in LEO. These attacks will be synchronized with ground and space-based jamming operations, to affect imaging and signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems.18 The CSF will simultaneously execute a coordinated campaign of offensive cyber-attacks against US and commercial satellite operators, targeting systems such as Starlink, SES, and Intelsat. These efforts will be coupled with high-powered ground-based jamming focused on uplinks from US military and civilian SATCOM infrastructure in Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa, and Australia. At this stage all SATCOM and GPS jammers in our inventory will activate in overlapping cycles, using physical mobility and frequency hopping techniques to avoid targeting while complicating US navigation warfare (NAVWAR) mitigation efforts. As McCauley notes, “electronic jamming is conducted against enemy sensors, guidance systems, and communications.”19 Sub-Phase 2 also includes major propaganda and information warfare operations, launched across multiple fronts, to obscure the PLA’s role in the attacks and sow confusion among US and allied command networks. These coordinated preemptive actions combined with disruptive information warfare will restrict the adversary’s battlespace awareness for decentralized execution -- a hallmark feature of the American way of war. C. SUB-PHASE 3: SUSTAINMENT & DECEPTION: D-DAY (H+6 TO H+24) In the final sub-phase of the 24-hour campaign, our objective is to sustain the denial of adversary capabilities while increasing ambiguity and complicating response timelines. Ground and space-based jamming systems will continue to emit dynamic signals in the US Indo-Pacific command theater, targeting reconstitution efforts and satellite control handoffs. Co-orbital assets will execute aggressive maneuvers against US and allied satellites conducting SDA and battle damage assessments. Debris from initial ASAT testing events, along with phase 2 strikes will all be used as a strategic obstruction, particularly in key orbital lanes, while Chinese diplomatic channels continue frame all of these events and the associated debris as accidental or unintended – an ambiguity tactic in PLA operations. To further complicate SDA, our high-value on-orbit platforms will begin executing deliberate delta-V maneuvers on an hourly basis to overwhelm US space tracking, and attribution capabilities while making proportional counter-space retaliation near impossible. Simultaneously, PLA deception units will deploy ‘ghost satellites’-- small, maneuverable platforms engineered to replicate the electromagnetic signatures of other satellites to further mislead orbital assessments and draw US responses away from real targets.20 Cyber operations against SSN infrastructure will continue, focused on degrading space-track data integrity and the flow of actionable intelligence to warfighters. The adversary’s SSN will simply be overwhelmed if still functioning at all. PLA dominance in the navigational warfare environment will be asserted through use of Beidou-based PNT, ensuring continued support to follow-on joint operations. This final phase ensures adversary forces remain blinded, confused, and lost while our conventional forces proceed to exploit the window of advantage. These operations, consistent with PLA theory, remain “non-linear, and asymmetric.”21 IV. CAMPAIGN EFFECTS AND LINK TO FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS If executed as planned, the counter-space campaign will leave the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific theater tactically disoriented, strategically paralyzed, and politically divided. Furthermore, the nature of these attacks will result in little to no human casualties creating dilemmas for allied proportional response at this stage. The rapid degradation of US space-based ISR, communication, and positioning services will produce cascading effects across the entirety of their C2 infrastructure. With sensors blinded and networks severed, the adversary will be unable to coordinate a coherent or timely response to our follow-on operations. At the operational level, this phase will neutralize the US advantage in joint force synchronization, effectively delaying its intervention capacity by at least two weeks. This delay will be decisive. The primary effect is the creation of a permissive window to initiate JFPS operations without a substantial, timely response. In addition to conventional targets (airfields, ships etc.) precision missile strikes will also target US and allied satellite ground stations, communications hubs, and SDA sensors in theater. Without space-enabled early warning or over-the-horizon targeting, US forces will face a severe risk-to-force dilemma. Reinforcement or escalation -- particularly via long-range bombers or maritime expeditionary forces -- will be delayed or deterred due to the inability to confirm targeting data, poor PNT performance, and lack of secure communications. This effect extends across the Indo-Pacific, from USINDOPACOM headquarters in Hawaii to forward-operating locations in Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. The second key effect is the operational insulation of the maritime blockade and JILC phases. Taiwan’s capacity to communicate with external actors will be restricted, while GPS degradation will significantly limit both military and civilian situational awareness. In this environment, the Eastern Theater Command will initiate blockade enforcement and littoral suppression with reduced interference. Cyber-attacks against Taiwan’s telecom and satellite links will further disrupt domestic cohesion, potentially facilitating rapid military gains and creating psychological pressure on the political leadership in Taipei.22 Additionally, the paralysis of ISR and communications will magnify psychological effects on Taiwan’s civilian population. In the absence of trusted satellite data, external reporting, or real-time international support, public morale will erode rapidly. Information vacuums create fertile ground for cognitive domain operations, and we will exploit these gaps through continued cyber-messaging, controlled narratives, and manufactured confusion. This accelerates the strategic shock value of our opening campaign and constrains Taipei’s political options. Moreover, the paralysis of US and allied intelligence networks may inhibit attribution and reduce political cohesion within the U.S.-Japan alliance and the broader Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The counter-space campaign will generate uncertainty, leaving key regional players unsure of the scale, attribution, or timing of PLA actions. Sustained ambiguity through concurrent disinformation and diplomatic shaping will delay or degrade multilateral coordination and reduce the appetite for direct confrontation. Ultimately, the effect of the counter-space campaign is not merely tactical -- it is strategic. It underwrites the entire joint campaign for reunification. As McCauley describes in PLA campaign doctrine, “deep attack groups or detour combat groups strike key targets in the enemy’s rear area” to paralyze and isolate front-line defenses.23 In the space domain, the “rear area” is relative -- and our strike will sever the adversary’s strategic lifeline before they even reach the theater of operations. Figure 2. Phases of Campaign vs Lines of Effort Operational Approach Artifact V. ANTICIPATED US RESPONSES AND MITIGATIONS Despite the precision and intensity of our counter-space campaign, we must assume the U.S. will not remain inert. The PLA must anticipate and account for both immediate and adaptive countermeasures from US and allied forces. While we assess initial kinetic and non-kinetic actions will create a decisive window of advantage, the resiliency and redundancy built into the US space architecture -- particularly in the commercial sector -- requires sustained suppression and adaptive follow-on operations. The most immediate technical response will likely come from the US Space Force’s rapid reconstitution capabilities. These include pre-positioned launch-on-demand systems from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Wallops Island, and potentially allied launch sites in Australia or Japan. These launches could be used to deploy replacement ISR assets, gap-filling SATCOM payloads, or even small-scale constellations intended to restore degraded capabilities. To mitigate this, we will maintain surveillance on known launch sites and consider follow-on kinetic or cyber-attacks against key terrestrial launch infrastructure or telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) nodes. Beyond its own assets, the U.S. may attempt to leverage allied space capabilities, including Australia's JORN radar network, Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System, and British small-satellite launch firms. The national origins of these capabilities make little difference to our contingency planning efforts if they support adversary intervention efforts. In response, we will preemptively target probable integration nodes and diplomatic chokepoints, seeking to isolate the U.S. operationally and politically. By disrupting shared PNT services and stoking fears of retaliation among more risk-averse allies, we aim to dilute coalition coherence before it solidifies. Another major vector of resilience lies in the U.S.’ integration with commercial LEO satellite networks -- most notably Starlink. These networks offer global, encrypted communications which have demonstrated high survivability through decentralized architecture and rapid satellite replacement as demonstrated in Ukraine.24 We assess Starlink’s ground-based control stations and key optical links will be hardened against conventional cyber intrusion (post Russo-Ukraine conflict), but we will continue to pursue persistent, distributed cyber operations designed to degrade network control and routing functions. Additionally, PLA units will execute localized spoofing and jamming of Starlink terminals in the Western Pacific to disrupt tactical communications. The U.S. may also employ offensive space operations of its own, though its public doctrine remains intentionally vague. We suspect less understood capabilities like the X-37B spaceplane or co-orbital rendezvous platforms may be employed in response, particularly against our own high-value ISR or missile early warning satellites. In response, we will execute maneuver profiles for all vulnerable Chinese satellites and elevate readiness levels for both co-orbital defenses and terrestrial space tracking and control. Our campaign design anticipates the need for ongoing maneuver warfare in orbit, leveraging stealth, deception, and mobility to sustain the denial effect.25 Politically, we anticipate the U.S. will attempt to mobilize global condemnation of kinetic ASAT usage. However, our doctrine emphasizes ambiguity, and our disinformation campaigns -- combined with early diplomatic narratives of “space debris incidents” and “communications anomalies” -- are designed to forestall immediate attribution. Moreover, the absence of mass casualties in this initial-phase, 24-hr counter-space campaign will complicate legal justification for retaliatory strikes, particularly from more risk-averse allies such as Australia or Japan. The goal is to create sufficient confusion and delay in decision-making processes across the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Five Eyes intelligence alliance to prevent consensus action. Furthermore, we anticipate the U.S. will escalate efforts to harden future constellations and pursue “responsive space”26 contracts with private industry. These trends were already evident following the Russo-Ukraine conflict. While such efforts may reduce our strategic advantage in future scenarios, they likely will arrive too late to influence the outcome of this campaign. As such, our emphasis must remain on tempo -- maintaining operational dominance and freedom of action through the critical 24-hour window and beyond. Finally, while confident in the overall efficacy of this counter-space campaign, we must acknowledge potential challenges from our own end. Our relative lack of experience in executing such a complex, multi-domain operation at this scale introduces inherent risks. Unidentified and unforeseen weaknesses in our C4ISR structure will undoubtedly come to the forefront. Furthermore, the adversary's own formidable cyber capabilities and sheer logistical reach pose a persistent threat to our C2 networks, requiring constant vigilance and adaptation throughout the campaign. VI. CONCLUSION Victory in the Taiwan theater will not be decided solely by tanks, ships, or missiles -- but by who achieves space superiority/dominance before the first kinetic blow is struck. The counter-space campaign outlined herein is not a peripheral supporting action; it is the opening salvo and the central prerequisite for operational success. In a battlespace shaped increasingly by information dominance, our ability to blind, paralyze, and confuse the adversary in the orbital domain determines whether our joint operations can proceed uncontested. Our doctrine of active defense demands that we seize the initiative. By striking preemptively across all three segments of the US space architecture -- on-orbit, ground, and link -- we create a permissive window for JFPS, maritime blockade, and JILC campaigns. By denying the adversary’s ability to “see, decide, and act,”27 we disable their capacity for timely intervention and undercut alliance cohesion at the moment of maximum strategic ambiguity. We do not require or expect to maintain space superiority indefinitely -- but we do not need to. We only need to hold the fleeting orbital high ground long enough to achieve irreversible facts on the ground. If we blind the eagle early, it will never take flight. Our strategy is not escalatory -- it is anticipatory. Our actions in space reflect the reality that space dominance is now a prerequisite for decisive terrestrial victory among peers. The window is narrow, the tempo is fast, and the prize is existential: national reunification under conditions of our choosing. Ultimately, space warfare in this context is not only a means of denial, but a tool of calibrated coercion. By achieving space dominance quickly and decisively, we aim to redefine escalation thresholds while asserting legitimacy over the battlespace. If successful, our actions will not only shape outcomes on Earth but also reshape perceptions of strategic leverage in the space domain itself. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Bell currently serves as Chief of Warfighter Integration within the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Force Readiness Division (A2FF) at Headquarters, US Air Force (HAF). His division ensures the readiness of USAF intelligence forces to provide timely and accurate intelligence support to operations worldwide. Lt Col Bell is a career intelligence officer, having held unique assignments in space operations, the Joint Staff, and multiple civilian intelligence agencies. He is also an adjunct Assistant Professor at the National Intelligence University (NIU) teaching graduate-level courses such as “Analyzing the Global Strategic Environment” and “China Military Capabilities and Strategy.” Lt Col Bell has previously published with SpaceNews Magazine and World Geostrategic Insights (WGI). He received his commission from Texas A&M University and completed graduate studies at The George Washington University and NIU. NOTES: State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in the New Era." (Defense White Paper) July 24, 2019. Ian Easton, China's Top Five War Plans. (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2019) Michael J. Dahm, "A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People's Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China's Strategic Support Force." China Brief 24, no. 9 (April 26, 2024). U.S. Department of Defense,“Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” 2024. December 18, 2024, 67. Kevin McCauley,“PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 24. Kenneth Bell, "From Kyiv to Taipei: Unraveling the Impact of Space on Military and Taiwan’s Daunting Prospects," SpaceNews Magazine, November 13, 2023. PLA National Defense University,“Science of Military Strategy,” 2020. Translated by China Aerospace Studies Institute. Chapter 13, pg. 278. Clayton Swope et al.,“Space Threat Assessment 2024” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2024), 12. Kevin McCauley, PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 51. Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 68–100. Weedon, Brian. “Chinese ASAT Test Fact Sheet.” Secure World Foundation, November 23, 2010. Kevin McCauley, “PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 24. Joseph Trevithick, "China Claims It Has Conducted a New Midcourse Intercept Anti-Ballistic Missile Test." The War Zone, February 4, 2021. Ankit Panda, "Revealed: The Details of China's Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test," The Diplomat, February 21, 2018. Clayton Swope et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2024,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2024), 10-12. Ibid. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats: Talking Points by Raji Rajagopalan (New York: United Nations, September 14, 2022). Todd Harrison, “Framework for Evaluating Space Weapons,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020. From Report: “International Perspectives on Space Weapons.” Kevin McCauley, “PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 26. SPARTA. "Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (CCD), Technique DE-0009." Aerospace Corporation. Last modified February 29, 2024. Kevin McCauley, “PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 51. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion,” Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022, 17. Kevin McCauley, PLA Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2020), 8. Oleksandr Stashevskyi and Frank Bajak, “They're Jamming Everything: How Secretive Electronic Warfare Shapes War in Ukraine,” The Times of Israel, April 12, 2022. Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2008. See Chap 2. “Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons.” Unshin Lee Harpley, "Two New Tactically Responsive Space Missions to Demo Maneuver in Orbit," Air & Space Forces Magazine, October 4, 2024 Brian R. Price, "Colonel John Boyd's Thoughts on Disruption: A Useful Effects Spiral from Uncertainty to Chaos," Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 1 (2023): 98–117.