HomeWild Blue YonderArticlesArticle Display


The views and opinions expressed or implied in WBY are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

The Emergence of an Air and Space Superpower: China’s Continuing Revolutions

  • Published
  • By Lt Col Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR (Ret)

Over the last two generations the People’s Republic of China has matured from the wheelbarrow age into an industrial and economic superpower and, increasingly, a military superpower. As a major part of its ‘great rejuvenation’ China has conducted a massive--and continuing--program of military modernization. It has deployed much more capable weapon systems that provide vastly more offensive and defensive capability against both neighboring states and the United States. A central part of China’s military modernization consists of multiple simultaneous and interlocking revolutions in air and space capability. Any one of these is a major program; when combined, the total is staggering. They have pursued the following:

  • A revolution in precision-guided long-range conventional missiles, including anti-ship ballistic missiles
  • A revolution in advanced military combat aircraft
  • A revolution in support aircraft
  • A revolution in unmanned air systems
  • A revolution in space support systems, especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
  • A revolution in air defense
  • A revolution in antisatellite systems
  • A revolution in shipborne aviation
  • A revolution in nuclear weapons

We have been witnessing the emergence of an air and space superpower. Ominously, there is no reason to believe they have either completed their modernization or can’t continue their buildup.

China as an air and space superpower

Over the last two generations the People’s Republic of China has matured from the wheelbarrow age into an industrial and economic superpower and, increasingly, a military superpower. As a major part of its ‘great rejuvenation’ China has conducted a massive--and continuing--program of military modernization clearly aimed at making it a military and nuclear superpower. It has deployed much more capable weapon systems that provide vastly more offensive and defensive capability against both neighboring states and the United States. They have exhaustively studied the American way of war and have concluded that it is immensely powerful but potentially brittle, meaning it has a variety of key vulnerabilities that, if attacked, could badly cripple or even collapse the entire system. They have heavily concentrated their strategy and systems to target these vulnerabilities. Since American military strategy is critically dependent on air, space, and naval power, the central requirement of Chinese wartime military strategy is to neutralize that power. The Chinese efforts to do this have several overlapping aspects of both offense and defense that, together, at a minimum call for more and more ambitious defense-in-depth (commonly called ‘anti-access/area denial) of the Chinese mainland and as far into the western Pacific as they can reach. Functionally speaking, this program translates to a goal of military dominance of the western Pacific [hereafter WestPac] in what must be considered a strategic revolution in at least the region. They have succeeded to the point that the days of unquestioned American military superiority over China are ending if not already over, and American ability to deter them is now at best uncertain if not dangerously inadequate.

A central part of China’s military modernization consists of multiple simultaneous and interlocking revolutions in air and space capability. These include:

  • A revolution in precision-guided long-range conventional missiles, including anti-ship ballistic missiles
  • A revolution in advanced military combat aircraft
  • A revolution in support aircraft
  • A revolution in unmanned air systems
  • A revolution in space support systems, especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
  • A revolution in air defense
  • A revolution in antisatellite systems
  • A revolution in shipborne aviation
  • A revolution in nuclear weapons

Any one of these is a major program; when combined, the total is staggering:

A revolution in precision-guided conventional missiles, including anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Although Taiwanese air bases and American air bases in South Korea and at Misawa in northern Japan are hardened, all other American and allied bases on the First Island Chain (Japan, the Ryukyu Island chain south of Japan, which includes Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines) are close to China, few in number, unhardened (and even hardened facilities are not necessarily proof against modern precision guided munitions), and usually lightly defended, especially against ballistic missile strikes. This is particularly the case with Okinawa.[1]  The mountainous geography and dense population of most of the region 200 potential dispersal bases, and, as a rule, these dispersal bases face similar or more problems than main operating bases, since, along with not being hardened or defended, they would need resupply with munitions.  All this makes them especially vulnerable to short-warning-times (i.e.: missile) attack. The Chinese know this, of course, and have deployed a large force of increasingly sophisticated conventional tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, mostly under the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), for use against land targets and, increasingly, ships. When deployed in adequate numbers, this force could give them the potential capability to stage a comprehensive integrated conventional surprise attack against American and allied air and naval bases in WestPac.

Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs—with a range up to 1,000 kilometers). The Chinese have a force of 900 conventional SRBMs of various types, although past reporting  (DoD in 2019) estimated the force as potentially as large as 1,500 missiles. However, their force of launchers is significantly smaller (250 launchers, each carrying one missile.) In addition, the Chinese Navy (the People’s Liberation Army Navy—PLAN) and the Chinese Air Force (the People’s Liberation Army Air Force—the PLAAF) are developing the 2PZD-21/CM-401/KD-21 missile, which may possibly be used against land targets. While historically their SRBMs were short-ranged (most could reach Taiwan but not Okinawa) China has steadily deployed upgraded missiles with longer range and precision guidance.[2] With longer ranges they can target Taiwan from deeper inside China or reach more distant targets, such as American and Japanese bases on Okinawa, which are 400+miles/600+km off the Chinese coast. It also means any offensive counter missile effort will be even more difficult than it might be otherwise,

Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs). In addition to the SRBMs just described, China has developed several types of MLRS of varying ranges. Only fragmentary information about the number and capabilities of these systems is available in open sources, and although they can launch tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) along with rockets, whatever TBM deployments have been made are evidently not counted in the SRBM figures. If/when deployed in sufficient numbers, they could potentially supplement--or replace--PLARF SRBMs in an attack against Taiwan, which would free up SRBM launchers and missiles for use against other targets. 

These MLRSs include the B-611, a system with a half-ton warhead. With a reported range of up to 280 km, it could target much of Taiwan, especially northwestern Taiwan, if launched from coastal sites. If equipped with a satellite navigation system, it may have an accuracy of less than 30 meters. In addition, the PLA has recently started deploying another MLRS system, the PHL-16 or PCL-191, which can launch rockets with a range of up to 350 km, which would put most or all targets on the west coast of Taiwan within range, or Fire Dragon 480 TBMs with a reported maximum range of up to 500 km, which would put the entire island within range. China has also developed the WS-2 WeiShi MLRS, with a range of up to 400 km, but it may be intended for the export market. An additional Chinese MLRS, the PHL-03, has been reported by the Chinese press as being able to target moving sea targets 100 kms away. If correct we must expect other MLRS rockets to be given similar capabilities.

Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs—with a range of between 1,000 to 3,000 km). In 2025, the Chinese were reported to have deployed 1300 MRBMs on 300 launchers. No detailed information is available as to missile types: presumably most are DF-21s, although DF-17/CSS-22s are being deployed, equipped with hypersonic warheads. and DoD has reported that DF-21s are being replaced by DF-26 IRBMs. We should note that the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) is a variant of the DF-21 MRBM, and no information is available as to whether ASBM launchers and missiles are counted in these overall totals. The Chinese have claimed that the DF-17 also has an ASBM role. We should also note that some sources report that the DN-2/SC-19 antiballistic missile (ABM)/antisatellite (ASAT) system is a modified version of the DF-21 launched from a mobile launcher, and no information is available as to whether these systems are included in the DoD figures for launchers or missiles.

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs—with a range of between 3,000 to 5,500 km, which puts Guam within range). In 2025, the Chinese were reported to have deployed 550 DF-26 MRBMs on 300 launchers. The DF-26 has an ASBM variant, and no information is available as to whether these systems are included in the DoD figures for launchers or missiles. They are reportedly deploying the DF-27, with a possible range of up to 8000 KM, a hypersonic glide capability, and an ASBM variant.

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)

            In addition to conventional land-attack ballistic missiles, the Chinese are deploying antiship ballistic missiles. The Chinese have evidently tested these systems against targets in the South China Sea, and, as previously noted, the Chinese claim to have tested the PHL-03 in an antiship mode. The primary ship targets for the immediate future will undoubtedly be US aircraft carriers at sea, although if/when the US Navy expands its concept of Distributed Lethality to include land attack missions it may drastically complicate and increase Chinese targeting requirements.

No public information is available as to current Chinese deployments of ASBMs. Past reporting (2020) put the force of DF-21D ASBMs as 30 launchers, and of DF-26 ASBMs as “…at least a dozen…” launchers at an inland base. This was about the same number of ASBM launchers as was reported several years earlier,[3] which may indicate China considers the number deployed as adequate or that these are an interim deployment to be replaced with more effective missiles. As previously noted, the DF-17 is reported to have an ASBM capability.

China has also developed an air and ship-launched ASBM version of the reportedly hypersonic 2PZD-21/CM-401/KD-21. It is evidently carried by the H-6K, an upgraded Chinese-built variant of the Soviet-designed TU-16 BADGER medium bomber, which reportedly can carry at up to four missiles. It has also been integrated into the Type 055 cruiser. Further, the Chinese are reported to be developing another ASBM, the CH-AS-X-13, which is air-launched from the H-6N.

Land attack cruise missiles (LACMs)

China has deployed a large force of ground-launched LACMs that could also be used to attack WestPac targets. In 2025 DoD estimated this force at 300 long range (more than 1500 km) LACMs (although past DoD estimates assessed the force to be as large as 540 missiles) on 150 transporter/erector/launchers (TELs). These are a mix of CJ-10/DH-10s, DH-10As, and CJ/DH-100s.

LACMs can be launched by platforms other than TELs, although as of late 2025 there is no public information as to the numbers of such deployments, and using such missiles in wartime would obviously require interservice coordination. The primary alternative launchers are PLAAF H-6 medium bombers. The H-6K can carry up to six CJ-20s, the air-launched version of the DH-10.[4] The Chinese were reported to have 102 H-6Ks in the PLAAF inventory in early 2023,[5] and may have completed production of the aircraft.[6] In addition, the H-6M version of the H-6, of which the PLAAF was reported to have had 29 in early 2023,[7] can carry two CJ-20s.[8]Other potential launch platforms include PLAN surface ships and submarines, and potentially shipping containers on civilian ships. They have also recently been experimenting with installing vertical launch  systems on cargo ships, although the role of the missiles they would carry is presently unknown.

Future Missile Developments

The PLARF has continued to deploy additional missile units (11 brigades between May 2017 and early 2020) although these may include ICBM units as well as conventional missile units.  They are continuing to deploy improved conventional missiles with longer ranges. This means we must expect that the missile threat will continue to increase over time, especially since the missiles and the launchers cost less than the measures necessary to counter them. As yet little information is available to their ultimate planned deployment numbers or how fast they will be deployed.

Finally, there is the ominous possibility the Chinese have deployed non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads on some of their missiles. This would convert those weapons into a much greater threat, since their effects.would cover a much larger area than conventional explosives. The North Koreans have reportedly tested a non-nuclear EMP warhead on a missile. If the North Koreans can do it we must assume the Chinese can do it.

A revolution in advanced military combat aircraft.

In recent decades the PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) have replaced most older fighter aircraft with newer designs with vastly improved offensive and defensive capability. In 2024 DoD estimated China had more than 1300 4th generation fighters, and they are reportedly building over 120 fighters per year.  These aircraft include;

The number of designs, and that as a rule there are multiple variants of each type of aircraft, shows an impressive design and technology base for present and future combat aircraft. The substantial (or impressive) numbers of aircraft being produced simultaneously indicates a major production capability.

Coupled with these is the development and deployment of the full spectrum of precision guided munitions.

A Revolution in Support Aircraft

            Historically China has had small forces of transport aircraft, air-air tankers, and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. This has seen significant change in recent years.

Transport aircraft

            Until fairly recently the Chinese had a limited strategic airlift capability, centered mostly around a modest number (figures vary considerably, from 20 to as many as 35[20]) of Il-76s purchased from Russians and Ukraine. However, China is now deploying the Y-20 transport, an aircraft roughly comparable in size to the US C-17, although the range and carrying capacity of the initial versions were considerably less. (Early versions could carry a maximum load of about 55 tons, less than the C-17’s 85.5 tons.  Improved engines on later versions presumably increase both the range and payload.) As of early 2025 they had evidently deployed more than 60 aircraft. While the Chinese Government has not announced the number to be procured, in 2014 they identified a requirement for 400 such aircraft, and in 2016 the manufacturer called for more than 1000. Other sources claim the Chinese may only procure about a hundred and then procure a larger, more capable transport.

            In the past the main Chinese tactical airlift consisted of a small number of turboprop Y-8s, a Chinese version of the Soviet AN-12. As of 2025 they had as many as 80 such transports. More recently, they have deployed about 24 Y-9s, a larger redesigned version of the Y-8 intended to be a C-130J equivalent.  They have also started testing a larger four-engine turboprop transport, possibly called the Y-30.

            For the longer term, we must also note that China has declared the intention to build a world-class commercial aviation industry, although so far they are still in the initial stages.  They have just started producing the C919 airliner, after 15 years in development and heavily dependent on imported components. They had planned to produce 30 in 2025, but actually produced only 15, presumably indicating problems with production. The Chinese media claims they have over a thousand on order. The C919 is roughly equivalent to an older model Boeing 737 or an Airbus 320, which probably makes it unsuited to be anything but a niche military platform.  They are developing the C929, a widebody transport similar to a Boeing 787 or an Airbus 350, that is supposed to enter airline service late in this decade, and designing the C939, a jumbo jet intended to be equivalent to the Boeing 777. They may be starting to design a supersonic transport, the C949. Over time, a large airliner fleet could  potentially be used to build a Chinese equivalent to the American Civil Reserve Air Fleet, where civilian airliners can be mobilized for military support.

Air-air tankers. Historically China had only a small force of tanker aircraft. They are reported to have approximately 24 H6U and H6DU modified BADGERS and three IL-78 tankers.[21] However, the H-6 tankers cannot refuel many PLAAF fighters.[22] Recently they have started production of a tanker version of the Y-20 transport, the Y-20U/YY-20. and they evidently had deployed the first major unit (regiment or brigade) by late 2021.[23] As of early 2025 an estimated 17 aircraft were in service. In addition, Y-20 transports may be used as tankers.

AEW&C aircraft. China is making a major effort into researching and producing such aircraft. As of early 2023 they had deployed at least 60 such aircraft of various type. These include;

A revolution in Unmanned Air Systems (UAS)

The Chinese have conducted extensive development of unmanned system, including unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). As with manned combat aircraft, there may often be multiple parallel designs from different institutes targeting the same role, but even if the Chinese do not actually produce all the designs, it indicates a impressive UAS technology base. It should be noted that the systems discussed in the following sections are undoubtedly not a comprehensive list.

 Information on actual Chinese UAS unit deployments remains fragmentary. Past reports (from 2016) indicated UAS were widely deployed and they were reported to have created four UAS brigades by 2018.[25] The PLAN has UAS regiments assigned to the Eastern Theater Navy and to the Southern Theater Navy. No information is available as to what systems the PLAN regiments use, but a likely possibility is the medium-altitude, long endurance (MALE) WZ-10 Wing-loong/Yilong/Pterodactyl, which, depending on the variant of the Wing-loong on which it is based, is reportedly roughly equivalent to either the American Predator or Reaper. In the November 2024 Zuihai airshow the Wing Loong-X naval warfare UCAV was displayed, and was reportedly equipped for a variety of roles, including anti-submarine warfare, ISR, and electronic warfare. It is also reportedly capable of launching AAMs and antiship missiles.

The Chinese have deployed at least two reported analogs to the American high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) Global Hawk. These are the WZ-9/Divine Eagle, reportedly a radar system, which started flight testing before 2018, and the Xianglong/Soaring Dragon, which was  first deployed in 2021. In addition, they are developing the large JiuTian/High Sky UAV, which has eight external hardpoints and a reconfigurable weapons bay that will allow it to fulfill a variety of mission, including launching and controlling a swarm of up to 200 microdrones. It started testing in late 2025.

The Chinese have developed multiple designs for the medium-altitude, long endurance (MALE) systems for the ISR and attack roles. These include the previously described Wing-loong, the BZK-005/Long Eagle, operational since 2013, the CH-5, roughly equivalent to the American Reaper and which may be primarily for export, the ASN-229a, and the CH-9, which the Chinese press reports is equipped with artificial intelligence, can control other drones, and is intended to cooperate with manned aircraft. In addition, in the past the Chinese were working on the WJ-600, a high-speed UAS supposedly with stealth features, advertised in an ocean-reconnaissance role,[26] and supposedly intended to hunt U.S. aircraft carriers, and the DR-8, a supposedly supersonic UAS also reportedly intended to be used for searching for aircraft carriers. The current status of the last two systems is unknown.

In addition, the Chinese are reportedly deploying the WZ-8, a supersonic reconnaissance UAS launched from an H-6M medium bomber.

The Chinese may also be developing large unmanned stealth fighter aircraft. Two such possible designs were displayed in the September 2025 parade. They revealed more details than is usually the case for mock-ups, and had serial numbers such as those marked on operational PLAAF units. At present it is unknown if they are actually being fielded.

The Chinese are also developing UAS for transports, most recently the Tian Ma-1000, which had its first flight on 12 January 2026.

In 2019 China was reported testing surveillance aerostats over the South China Sea. No information is available on the current status of the program, but the Chinese press has recently claimed that a stratospheric airship equipped with and advanced infrared system can detect stealth aircraft as far as 2000--two thousand--kilometers away, with a network of such airships able to cover blind spots.

Finally, the Chinese are deploying nominally civilian drone fleets, such as the one being deployed by the Ministry of Natural Resources for surveillance of oceanic areas, especially the South China Sea, that we must expect to be at the disposal of the Chinese military if and when needed. 

China is reportedly working on at least three, possibly five, stealthy UCAV designs.

One of these, the GJ-11 Mysterious Dragon/Fantasy Dragon (previously called the Sharp Sword), is evidently nearly operational.  While supposedly intended primarily for reconnaissance, it reportedly can carry two “2000 pound-class guided weapons” and has satellite communication capability so that it can be used at extended range. It may also be under test in Chinese efforts to develop to develop an unmanned wingman, along with at least another drone, the FH-97A.

The second stealth UCAV design is the CH-7, which is reported to be in flight testing. The third design is the supersonic Anjian (Dark Sword). First reported several years ago, its current status is uncertain. The fourth is the CS-5000T, flown at the 2024 Zhuhai airshow, although it may be a technology demonstrator. The possible fifth design is a recently reported large system that may be an experimental unmanned bomber possibly designated the GJ-X.

An additional UCAV threat comes from what must be considered a likely emerging revolutionary technology extensively used in Ukraine--drones. Although unlikely to be effective against hardened targets such as runways or aircraft shelters due to small warheads (the Iranian Shahed 136 warhead is 40 kg or less), they are likely to be effective against unsheltered aircraft (as demonstrated by Ukraine in Operation Spiderweb), personnel, and SAM sites. They can collide with aircraft, act as small flying bombs, drop undetonated explosives that would need to be disarmed, and/or crash or scatter scrap on runways.[27] They might also be used to exhaust defenses. China would likely use two categories:

In the past China’s UCAV inventory may also have included several hundred obsolete combat aircraft; reportedly at least 200 retired J-6s (called the J6W) and some J-7s fighters were converted into drones or UCAVs.[28] No information is available as to their current status.

.A revolution in space support systems

China has established itself as a space power second only to the United States. Of critical military relevance are its developments in three key areas: navigational satellites; ISR satellites, and communications satellites. In addition, China is developing low-cost boosters, which is a revolutionary development in space technology. They are also developing reusable boosters.

Navigational satellites

China has deployed the Beidou (“Compass”) system as a rival to the American Global Positioning System. It started launching the first satellites of the system in 2000, and the system was officially declared operational for worldwide service in July 2020. In some ways, it is superior to the GPS system, since it offers text message capability. Reportedly it has 65 active satellites. The Chinese have also deployed extensive backup navigation systems.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.

China has developed and deployed constellations of military and dual-use satellite reconnaissance systems, whose technology is frequently if not generally world-class.  These include the extensive military Yaogan (“China remote-sensing satellite”) constellation, with electro-optical imagery satellites, synthetic aperture radar satellites, and electronic intelligence satellites.[29] The most recent Yaogan launch was Yaogan 50-1, launched in January 2026. China has also deployed reconnaissance satellites in geosynchronous orbit. These include the TJS—12, launched in December 2024, which joined Yaogan-41, launched in December 2023, multiple Gaofen 13s, most recently launched in early 2023,  and a synthetic aperture radar satellite, the Ludi Tance 4-01, launched in August 2023. As part of their TJS [Tongxin Jishu Shiyan—“Communications Technology Test”] system, they have deployed a network of four satellites, the “Four Heavenly Kings,” into geosynchronous or highly elliptical orbits to maintain comprehensive surveillance of critical areas.

Supplementing these are nominally civilian satellite systems that can be expected to be available for military use as required. These include the Jilin-1 satellite constellation, which had 117 satellites as of March 2025, with 300 satellites planned, with a reported current revisit time of as little as 10 minutes and are planned to be linked by laser communications. Chinese companies are also deploying the Siwei satellite constellation, with nine satellites currently deployed of a planned constellation of 28 optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, and the Nuwa SAR constellation, with 12 satellites deployed of a planned 114. In addition, in 2019 the Chinese Academy of Sciences started to deploy a series of nominally civilian satellites (reportedly called the Hainan satellite constellation system) to maintain a real-time watch on the South China Sea.  It is supposed to ultimately include six optical satellites, two hyperspectral satellites, and two radar satellites. At least two additional constellation of imagery satellites are planned: the Chutian system, built by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC) which started deployment in 2024 and is intended to be  more than 300 optical, radar, hyperspectral, and infrared satellites by 2030; and a constellation of 200 satellites is planned by the Chang Guang Satellite Technology Company.

Communications satellites

            China has the largest fiber optic network in the world (64.32 million km claimed in early 2024) but the military will still need satellite communications for mobile military systems, for mobile operations, for operations in remote areas of China not well covered with fiber optics, for the large part of China that is mountainous, and for operations in areas at any significant distance from China, as well as for commercial use.

            China has deployed an extensive series of communications satellites, most of them designated as various series of ChinaSats. The ChinaSat-1 and ChnaSat-2 series are reportedly military communications satellites. ChinaSat-3A, launched in June 2024 and ChinaSat-4A, launched in August 2024, may also be military comsats. ChinaSat-4A is reportedly the first of a new series of military satellites.

China has also deployed a network of five Tianlian data relay satellites in geosynchronous orbit. These are reported to be equivalent to American Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS).

In addition, Chinese companies have extremely ambitious plans to deploy communications/satellite internet/data relay satellites, which, in keeping with China’s civil-military integration, will undoubtedly be subject to military use when needed. These include four constellations and multiple megaconstellations of thousands of satellites.:

The constellations are the following:

The multiple megaconstellations are:

No information is available as to whether or how the PLA will be able to access these constellations, a problem the US military continues to have.

A revolution in air defense:

            China has extensively deployed modern long-range SAMs and advanced radars as part of their integrated air defense system (IADS). When deployed along the Chinese coast, on offshore islands, or on ships, these systems could potentially reach well beyond China’s coastline.

China has been a major buyer of advanced Russian SAMs. These include the SA-20,[30] S-400s/SA-21, and they are reported to have an interest in buying the S-500. China has also produced their own advanced long-range SAMs based on Russian designs. These include the HQ-9 (Chinese-built SA-10, with a claimed range of up to 300 kilometers) along with the follow-on HQ-9b, the HQ-15 (Chinese version of the SA-20[31]), and the HQ-18 and HQ-22 (Chinese-built variants of the SA-12).[32]

China has also produced a variety of shorter-range tactical SAMs. In addition, the Chinese have developed the DK-10, which uses a SAM version of the PL-12 AAM along with several other missiles.[33]

Parallel to this, the PLAN is steadily deploying modern ships that can carry advanced SAMs.  This included eight Type 055 guided missile cruisers as of early 2024, with another six reportedly nearing completion, and the PLAN may be planning more than 24 by the late 2020s. Each is capable of carrying up to 112 HHQ-9s (naval HQ-9s) in vertical launch systems (VLS). Further, their Type 052D air defense destroyers, evidently in mass production (as many as 35 having been launched by the end of 2025), carry up to 64 HHQ-9 missiles in VLS. If the Chinese deploy these ships within the land-based SAM envelope as a forward line of defense (and can integrate their SAM systems with the land-based IADS) it will potentially extend the reach of the IADS even further offshore. The PLAN coastal defense force has been reported to include air defense brigades, and it is reasonable to expect they would be interoperable with shipboard SAM systems. However, in 2023 the PLAN transferred three of its air defense brigades to the PLAAF, which over time may disrupt coordination with PLAN ships. No public information is available as to whether other air defense units remain under PLAN command.

We should expect a further increased SAM threat in the future as the Chinese purchase and/or duplicate the capability of other advanced Russian SAM systems. (We must assume the Chinese have the technological base to duplicate anything the Russian can build.) The 40N6 missile of the Russian S-400 system has a range of up to 400km/250 miles, and a missile from the Russian S-500 system has reportedly intercepted a target 299 miles/481 km away. Beyond those, the Chinese press claims China is developing a SAM system with a range of more than 2000 [two thousand] km/1243 miles.        

            Chinese air defense radar systems include a wide variety of radars of increasing sophistication that claim to be able to detect stealth aircraft, including a quantum radar. In addition, the Chinese have deployed or have been reported working on multiple advanced antiaircraft sensor systems. They have claimed to have deployed passive sensor systems, which reportedly operate by tracking aircraft using signals transmitted from sources such as television broadcasts and radio transmissions. The Chinese press claims that the Chinese are using artificial intelligence to network radars to defeat jamming.

            Finally, China is making a major effort to build defenses to protect against mass drone attacks on critical targets. Their intended systems seek to integrate advanced anti-UAS radars, electro-optical systems, AI-driven sensor fusion, electronic warfare, and directed energy weapons.

In addition to air defense, the Chinese are working on a multitier ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, partially based on variants of Russian missiles. The upper tier of this system is the DN-3, a hit-to-kill system tested most recently in 2023. The next tier is the HQ-19. Possibly based on the Russian S-400, it is evidently similar to the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), although supposedly with longer range and higher speed,  and intended to intercept IRBMs. The HQ-9 is also reportedly capable of intercepting tactical ballistic missiles,[34] as in the HQ-18.[35]

The Chinese are developing at least two other BMD missile systems; the naval HQ-26, reportedly equivalent to the US Navy’s SM-3,[36] and the HQ-29, reportedly equivalent to the tactical BMD-capable US Patriot PAC-3.[37]  The Chinese also claim to have tested the SA-20 to intercept tactical ballistic missiles.[38]

In 2019 China signed an agreement with Russia to transfer BMD technology to China, but so far the actual technology transfers have evidently been limited. However, senior Chinese and Russian military leaders are continuing to meet on the subject, most recently in November 2025.

Regarding future development, since the Chinese technology base has largely caught up with that of the U.S., we must assume that the Chinese will be able to at least match whatever success America has with the Golden Dome missile defense system. The Chinese are starting to research similar concepts.[39]

A revolution in antisatellite (ASAT) capability:

            The Chinese have recognized for years that space systems are a critical American asset and a major potential U.S. vulnerability. While they reportedly prefer soft-kill mechanisms such as cyberattacks or jamming to disable satellites, considering them less escalatory,[40] they have developed and are continuing to develop a wide variety of hard-kill ASAT systems and dual-use technology with ASAT potential. Their ASAT capability probably already exceeds that of the USSR in the Cold War.

      In 2023 the PLA organized Base 37, intended to identify, track, and undoubtedly provide targeting data on, foreign space objects. It is now part of the part of the PLA Aerospace Force.

China has deployed several systems intended for sensing and tracking objects in orbit—space domain awareness. They have established the Space Observation Surveillance and Identification System (SOSI), which relies heavily on satellites--at least 10 and probably as many as 18 as of December 2024—for space situational awareness. In late 2025 they launched two experimental Shijian-29 satellites for technology demonstration of on-orbit tracking. In addition, the Chinese press has reported Chinese companies are planning to deploy at least two nominally civilian orbital systems for tracking satellites, which will undoubtedly be available to the Chinese military as required. The first of these is the Xingyan  (Star Eye) space situational constellation, which will have 156 satellites  when fully deployed after 2028. The second is the Guangshi constellation, which launched the first of 24 satellites in September 2025.

A revolution in shipborne aviation

            The PLAN is deploying an aircraft carrier force. The first of these was is the reconditioned former Russian Varyag.  Rechristened the Liaoning, it is now used primarily for training.

The Chinese have constructed two other conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, the Shandong, which has a similar tonnage and design to the Liaoning, and the recently commissioned Fujian. While the Liaoning and the Shandong launch aircraft with a ski jump, which limits the weight of aircraft that can take off, the Fujian is equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which means it can launch larger and much heavier aircraft. They are currently building a fourth carrier, expected to be nuclear. Reportedly they are planning for a force of nine carriers by 2035.

The Chinese are building an extensive suite of aircraft for their carrier air wings, including the J-15 and J-35 fighters, the KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft, possibly GJ-21 stealthy drones (the naval version of the GJ-11), and helicopters.

China is also building a force of amphibious warfare ships that can function as limited aircraft carriers—carrying helicopters and possibly drones. They have three Type 075 amphibious ships, with a fourth under construction, and the PLAN may be planning a class of eleven ships. These can carry up to 30 helicopters, and operate six on the deck at the same time. They are also constructing a new, larger class--the Type 076, which is reported to have a catapult and arresting gear, most likely for launching drones, although this might also give them the ability to operate manned combat aircraft like the J-35 in the future, although in smaller numbers than the full-size carriers.

            China has also recently undertaken at least three aviation-related experimental ship designs or modifications. In 2022 China launched a 2000 metric ton unmanned drone carrier that can operate subsurface, surface, and airborne drones, nominally for maritime research. More recently they have been building a ship that was originally suspected of being a light aircraft carrier or amphibious ship, but may be a platform for vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones or helicopters. It may also be an oceanic research vessel or for the Chinese Coast Guard. All of these would undoubtedly be available for PLAN use in wartime or emergency. In addition, they have been experimenting with mounting a modular electromagnetic system for launching fixed-wing drones from a cargo ship.

A revolution in nuclear weapons.

            Historically, China followed a strategy of minimum deterrence, with a small force of nuclear weapons, nearly all concentrated in land-based missiles, intended to deter attack and prevent hostile nuclear coercion. In recent years, however, China has undertaken a major buildup of nuclear weapons, with a deployment of more than 600 nuclear weapons in 2024. Although warhead production has reportedly slowed recently,  China is in the process of a major upgrade of its nuclear weapon production facilities and is still expected to reach over 1000 warheads by 2030. While in the past the primary Chinese nuclear force has been the land-based missiles of the PLARF, recently China has been expanding its strategic systems from a monad of land-based missiles to a triad, with missile submarines and bombers.

            As of 2025 DoD reported China had a force of approximately 400 ICBMs, with a mixture of mobile launchers and silos. Most of these are single warhead missiles, with a portion equipped with multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) payloads. (One estimate from early 2025 was 36 MIRVed missiles; 12 DF-5bs with up to five warheads and 24 DF-41s with up to three warheads each,[43]while other sources claim the MIRVed DF-41s have up to 10 warheads). They may be developing a new MIRVed ICBM, the DF-61, although it may just be an improved version of the DF-41. They are building three additional ICBM silo bases, with 320 silos, and they are also preparing several new bases for mobile missiles. They are also probably developing advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which the Chinese press claims they may be able to launch from orbital platforms, and a fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) system.  

So far they have deployed six Type 094 nuclear-powered missile submarines (SSBNs), each with 12 missile tubes,  and they have evidently started construction of a new class of SSBN, the Type 096, which the Chinese media says will have 24 missile tubes. They are expected to have a force of eight missile boats by 2030. The missiles being deployed are now JL-3s, which may have the range to reach American targets from waters close to China.  The Chinese are reported to keep at least one missile submarine at sea nearly continuously.

The third leg of the Chinese triad, strategic bombers, is still emerging. The H-6N bomber began operational fielding in 2020, and is capable of aerial refueling and carrying an air-launched ballistic missile, reportedly the CH-AS-X-13. Published reports indicate a small force of 20 aircraft.[44] In addition, the H-6K may also be able to deliver nuclear gravity bombs.[45] As previously noted, they are developing the H-20 strategic bomber.

China may be moving toward a launch-on-warning posture, for which accurate early warning is critically necessary. China has deployed a network of large phased array radar systems for early warning of ballistic missile attack, with four sites as of 2022. China has reportedly deployed early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit: their primary system is widely referred to as Huoyan (“Fire Eye”), and include various TJS satellites. In addition, in 2019 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would aid China in its development of early warning radars, including over-the-horizon radars.[46] Although no public information is available as to the support provided, access to warning data from Russian early warning radars is an obvious possibility.  In 2023, Putin called for expanding military cooperation with China to include satellites, which would presumably include early warning satellites.

Conclusions

As a major part of its ‘great rejuvenation’ China has conducted a massive--and continuing--program of military modernization clearly aimed at making it an air and space superpower. Their strategy has been to apply asymmetric warfare to conventional warfare. As previously noted, they have exhaustively studied the American way of war and have concluded that it is immensely powerful but potentially brittle, and they have concentrated their strategy and systems to target its vulnerabilities. Since the end of the Cold War with the USSR American military strategy has been critically dependent on air, space, naval, and technological superiority, and the central aim of Chinese wartime military strategy is to neutralize that superiority. The Chinese efforts to do this have had several overlapping aspects of both offense and defense that, together, at a minimum aim for more and more ambitious defense-in-depth. Functionally speaking, this program translates to a goal of military domination of the western Pacific in what must be considered a strategic revolution in at least the region. They have succeeded to the point that the days of unquestioned American military superiority over China are ending if not already over, and American ability to deter them is now increasingly uncertain.

Using largely straight-line extrapolations, by 2030 China can reasonably be expected to have at least the following:

  • A large force of long-range precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles, including a substantial force of antiship ballistic missiles and precision-guided ballistic missiles able to reach the seas around China and threaten U.S. and allied bases at least as far away as Guam and possibly farther.
  • Combat air forces composed almost completely of reasonably new 4th and 5th generation tactical aircraft, with at least two types of fifth generation tactical aircraft and a large force of J-20s (Some estimates consider a production run of up to 1000 aircraft plausible [47]). the possible start of production for 6th generation aircraft, and a full spectrum of modern weapons, with increasingly long range, to go with them.
  • A much-enhanced force of support aircraft, with more sophisticated AEW&C aircraft and major increases in their air transport and tanker forces, which will, over the longer term, greatly increase their mobility/intervention capability both regionally and at longer ranges.
  • A major UAS and drone capability that can provide extensive ISR support and threaten bases in both the forward area and throughout the Pacific, including the United States.
  • A robust network of space support systems, including an ISR capability at least equal to that of the US.
  • A modern IADS covering the most important regions of China and extending well offshore, and possibly the start of deployment of BMD systems.
  • A significant (possibly major) ASAT capability and potentially a significant capacity for space warfare.
  • A significant force of aircraft carriers carrying a mix of UCAVs and fourth and fifth generation manned aircraft. They may also have a significant or major amphibious capability along with a significant or major airmobile capability, a subject not covered in detail in this article.
  • A much expanded nuclear capability, with a nuclear triad composed of strategic systems newer than those of the US, with at least half the warhead load of American strategic forces and probably a substantial force of tactical nuclear warheads, which will both enhance deterrence and enable expanded nuclear options at both the regional and intercontinental levels.
  • The economic and industrial capability necessary to support all this.
  • A research and development capability at least competitive with that of the U.S.

These capabilities combine to provide the Chinese with what must be considered revolutions both in aerospace technology and in military capabilities. At the level of individual systems, the equipment they are currently deploying or will be deploying in coming years is at least roughly equivalent to current American systems and may be equivalent to future systems.  We must also remember that American aerospace technology has largely plateaued for the last 30 years, and that the deployed forces of the U.S. and its regional allies in WestPac are mostly, and are likely to remain, at most updated versions of 1990s systems for at least the coming decade. The material and technological disadvantages the Chinese military has historically faced are largely gone. Meanwhile, our ongoing fiscal and political situations will make both recapitalizing our aging equipment and pursuing new technology enormously difficult.

If integrated and used effectively--admittedly very big ‘ifs’--these capabilities should be more than adequate to overwhelm Taiwan’s air and naval defenses,[48] even if the Taiwanese become much more dedicated to defending themselves, overcome political divisions stalling increased military spending,  and manage to get a handle on their massive internal security problem. (Whether China would be able to successfully invade the island may be another matter.[49]) All too plausibly, it will be enough to overwhelm existing American and Japanese base defenses on Okinawa and mainland Japan, pose at least a significant if not major threat to our bases throughout the Pacific and even in the continental U.S., and require that any American military counteraction to a regional Chinese military move will risk a major war.  It could give the Chinese escalation dominance in a conventional war with the U.S.

The Chinese have obviously undertaken a comprehensive development program of aerospace capabilities that reaches across the board. They are clearly continuing rapid and methodical modernization of their air, air defense, missile, power projection, ISR, and space capabilities. Further, although not covered here, we should note they are updating their C4ISR capabilities (C4IKSR to the Chinese, who include ‘kill” to the mix[50]) to build a system capable of joint net-centric operations and capable of providing real-time targeting for Chinese standoff weapons, including some degree of targeting for their ASBMs. For instance, the Chinese have recently tested the Intelligent Precision Strike System, which reportedly used UAVs’ real-time data to model the battlefield, track targets, devise strike plans, distribute firing information, and execute follow-up strikes. While they may have considered American force structure as a model to emulate in the past, they have clearly gone far beyond that. They intend to fight the war on their terms, not America’s. Any war we fight with China will not be a DESERT STORM; we must expect any such war to be extremely demanding and costly even if we win.

Implications--Building for future revolutions

Although significant parts of Chinese modernization remain dependent on foreign inputs,  we must expect that to change over time as their technology base continues to improve. Over time their designs have increasingly come from domestic Chinese sources. In any case, the number of new and modified aircraft and missile designs and prototypes being developed simultaneously is impressive, and indicates a large and competent design capability. Undoubtedly they won’t produce all the designs. But the fact that they can and will produce a significant part of them, and in substantial or large numbers, means that we are seeing the rapid emergence of a major military aerospace production power, which we must expect to rapidly become, if it is not already, at least the second largest in the world.

And given the will and resources, the Chinese have no obvious reason to stop at this point. China has shown the will and the ability to expend vast resources for decades on their military upgrade programs, and having invested such resources to catch up with the U.S., it would not be surprising to see them continue to invest to surpass the U.S. It’s hard to remember today that only a couple of decades ago Chinese air and space power, such as it was, consisted mostly of at best obsolescent 1960s-design equipment suited mostly for defense of Chinese territory.

Beyond their present economic power, with impressive speed China has become a scientific and technological superpower that is at least competitive with the U.S. in key areas. China aims for a dominant position in the technologies of the future, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, nuclear fusion, and quantum technologies, that are expected to dominate the future world technosphere. The Chinese are evidently making great investments in growing their scientific and technological base at a time when an ominously large portion of American opinion is skeptical of science if not openly hostile to it. We should take these efforts very seriously.[51] Beyond that, they have reached the point where we need to be concerned about the prospect of technological surprise. This is categorically NOT the time to be cutting research and development funding or making it more difficult to recruit foreign talent—we must expect the Chinese to eagerly exploit self-inflicted American wounds.

We must remember that they have done all this on an economy considerably smaller than that of the U.S. and, unlike the USSR, without unduly burdening their economy. While Chinese economic data needs to taken with at least a significant does of salt, we should expect their economy to continue to grow reasonably robustly. What will they be able to do if and when the size of their economy matches that of the U.S. and their military spending matches or surpasses that of the U.S. without having to pay American military manpower costs?

In conclusion, the days when the United States could take its status as the world’s premier air and space technology superpower for granted are probably over. Chinese has been building and continues to build forces to wage a very big and very grim war—unfortunately, one with very uncertain prospects for American success. Even if the Chinese do not risk an attack, military power casts a political shadow. Beijing, with a perception of at least regional military superiority in WestPac, is all too likely to be more assertive and less likely to be deterred in situations short of war, such as a blockade of Taiwan. The United States, the region, and the world may be entering an era in which deterrence of China may result less from Beijing’s perception of our strength than introspective knowledge of its own weaknesses.

Lt Col Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR, retired (BA, West Chester University; MA, Georgetown University; MS, National Intelligence University) is a retired career military analyst for the US Department of Defense and a lifelong student of China. His active duty assignments included three years with tactical air forces, including a year with a fighter squadron n in the Republic of Korea. His writings on China have appeared in Air & Space Power Journal, Journal of Indo=Pacific Affairs, The Wild Blue Yonder, The Mitchell Institute Forum, Seapower, and the Naval Institute Proceedings.  Lt Col McCabe is a graduate of Squadron Officer’s School and Air Command and Staff College. Thie article does not represent the views of any agency of the US Government.

 

[1] For an analysis of the vulnerability of American air bases on Okinawa, see LtCol Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR (Ret), “China’s Target for Today; the American Air Bases on Okinawa,” unpublished analysis, July 2022.

[2] The DF-15C was reported to have a terminally guided warhead as early as 2011. Ron Christman, “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corp,” Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein (eds), Chinese Aerospace Power (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2011) 309. Presumably other missile types have been similarly equipped.

[3] 2013 figure. Gerry Doyle and Blake Herzinger, Carrier Killer (Warwick, England, Helion & Company LTD, 2022) 34.

[5] Bradley Perrett, “A Guide to China’s Bomber Fleet,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16-29 Jan 2023, Vol. 185, #1, 40.

[6] Perrett, “A Guide to China’s Bomber Fleet,” 39.

[7] Perrett, “A Guide to China’s Bomber Fleet,” 40.

[9] Marco Barone (Ed), Military Technology Special Issue--World Defense Almanac 2023 (Monch Publishing Group, Meckenheim, Germany, 2024)  302,

[10] 160 J-11B/BS and 40 J-11BGs. The Military Balance 2025, (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2025) 244-46.

[11] The Military Balance 2025, 244.

[12] 24 Su-35s, 36 SU-27SKs, 40 Su-27UBKs, 24 SU-30MK2, and 73 SU-30MKKs. Barone (Ed), Military Technology Special Issue--World Defense Almanac 2023, 302, and The Military Balance 2025, 246.

[13] The Military Balance 2025, 246.

[14] Abraham Abrams, China's Stealth Fighter (Havertown, PA: Pen & Sword Books, 2024), 79 for combat radius and 53 for stealth.  The design specifications called for a radar cross section of less than .3 square meters.

[15] Different variants of the aircraft are used by different services. The J-35A variant is intended for land-based use and the J-35 for carrier use.

[20] The figure of 20 is from The Military Balance 2025, 246.

[21] David Axe, “China’s New Tanker,” Combat Aircraft, Vol 23, #6, July 2022, 41-42.

[22] They can’t refuel aircraft of the Su-27 family. David Axe, “China’s New Tanker,” 41.

[23] David Axe, “China’s New Tanker,” 40.

[24] The Military Balance 2025, 246.

[25] Kenneth Allen, Brendan Mulvany, and James Char, “Ongoing Organizational Reforms of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 44, #2, April 2021, 202.

[26] Bradley Perrett, “Pacific Projections,” Aviation Week, Aug 29/Sep 5, 2011, 67.

[27] Any scrap and crashed beetle bombs would have to be removed before pieces get sucked into an engine, since a small piece of junk can ruin a very expensive engine and ground a plane.

[28]  Richard Fisher, Chinese Military Modernization (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2010) 85.

[29] Information on the Yaogan satellite program is derived from the following sources: Eric Hagt and Mathew Durnin, “Space, China’s Tactical Frontier,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.34,# 5 (October 2011) 731-761; Dwayne Day, “Staring Into the Eyes of the Dragon,” The Space Review, 14 Nov 2011, ; Ian Easton,  China's Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations (Washington DC,  Project 2049 Institute, 2011)  Gosnold, “The Chinese maritime surveillance system,” SatelliteObservation.net, 20 Sep 2016,; and “Surprise Chinese launch of the Yaogan Weixing-31-01 mission,” NASA Spaceflight.com, 10 April 2018.

[30] Designated the HQ-10 by the Chinese. Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 31.

[31] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 34.

[32] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 37-38, 42.

[33] The PL-12 SAM has a range of up to 100 km. Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 2-3.

[34] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 9.

[35] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 39-40.

[36] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 43.

[37] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 44.

[38] Richard Fisher, China’s Military Modernization (New York, Praeger, 2010) 132.

[39] Steve Trimble, “Great Dome,” Aviation Week, Vol 187, #25, 22 Dec 2025-11 Jan 2026, 11.

[40] Jonas V. Berge and Henrik S. Hiim, “Killing Them Softly; China’s Counterspace Developments and Force Posture in Space,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 47, # 6-7, Dec 2024, 940-963.

[41] Xin, China Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 72.

[42] Andreas Rupprecht, “The Dragon’s Wings,” Combat Aircraft, February 2012, V.13, #2, 61.

[43] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2025,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,  12 Mar 2025,  Table 1.

[44] Kristensen et al, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2025” Table 1.

[45] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,  15 Jan 2024, Table 1 reported a force of 10 nuclear-capable H-6Ks.

[46] LPARs radar frequencies are line-of-sight, while OTH radar frequencies follow the curvature of the earth.

[47] Abrams, China’s Stealth Aircraft, 143.

[48] For a partial analysis of the threat to Taiwan, see LtCol Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR (Ret), “The Chinese Threat to Taiwan’s Air Force,” unpublished analysis, 2022.

[49] For an evaluation of the difficulty China would face in invading Taiwan, see Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat; Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Arlington, VA, Project 2049 Institute, 2017).

[50] Fisher, China’s Military Modernization, 112.

[51] See Tai Ming Cheung, Innovate to Dominate (NY, Cornell University Press, 2022) for a detailed study of the structure China has built for technological development.

 

Wild Blue Yonder Home