Understanding Readiness in Airpower Published July 1, 2026 By Lt Gen Tom D. Miller, USAF (Ret) The readiness of airpower is pivotal to the security of the United States. Air Forces do many things, but if they are not effective at aviation, they are not an Air Force. Readiness is a single word which is often misunderstood and, if not clarified, can lead to incorrect conclusions and, worse yet, ineffective actions. In airpower, much senior leader focus is appropriately on availability which is absolutely vital to be ready. World events show the accelerating pace of technological advancements which necessitate modifications to fielded fleets to be ready. Those maturing capabilities must exist in sufficient capacity to both train aircrew and prosecute sustained combat operations at the response speed for which airpower is uniquely fitted. Airpower’s pivotal role in our nation’s security is clear, and a wholistic understanding of readiness in airpower, which requires intellectual investment, is a paramount responsibility of military, civilian and elected leaders in our national defense. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Kenneth Wilsbach, emphasized that readiness is the first responsibility in his opening message to the Air Force stating “our shared purpose is simple and enduring: to fly and fix so we are ready to fight.”[1] In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee he stated that, “Readiness is the ability to generate combat power quickly, operate in contested environments, and sustain operations over time.”[2] The Chief succinctly codified what is needed to be ready in a dangerous world where the risks are very real and the pace is quickening. I will offer a repeatable and understandable way to consider the complex contributors to that single and all-important word, readiness. Before offering those components, it is worth considering “how” to think about readiness in the first place. The Rubric It is important to consider how to think about readiness because where you start can have a big impact on what you conclude. Having a clear understanding of what is meant when someone says “readiness” really matters. If the architecture is not understood by both parties, the exchange will, at best, only give you part of what you are looking for, and at worst, prompt you to confidently forge ahead with a false sense of mastery in understanding something that may well be narrowly factually correct, does not characterize what was truly sought. There is a formal data system designed to capture that state of readiness from units across the United States military. Military and civilian professionals in national defense will be familiar with the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), which uses objective data and a commander’s judgment to measure personnel, supply, equipment status, and training to obtain the readiness for a unit. DRRS is well recognized, and numerous initiatives aim to improve it to gain greater fidelity from the inputs of individual units when assessing readiness for joint force operations. While the information technology system for capturing readiness is not the focus of this discussion, the importance of word choice both inside and outside of that system is very much something that leaders across the board should consider carefully. Definitions by the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and the Services are vital to any student of the subject of readiness, and they are an essential foundational starting point. Careful review of terms and the context for their use is warranted because the officers, senior non-commissioned officers and civilians doing the work in those organizations have specific definitions in mind when they present status, advocate for process change and resources, and work to determine what is required to prepare for a fight. While definitions and terms may not be as exciting as the lethal capabilities military forces possess to defend national sovereignty, they are the necessary first step. Chief Wilsbach captured a layered and complex subject within a single sentence in a way that is clear to the recipient. But how does a leader or a serious student of this subject take that crisp statement and apply it to the vast expanse of the United States military airpower. Like many things, breaking down a complex concept into subcomponents can be useful and then granular examples can provide clarity. Whether you are deeply experienced in this field, or beginning your journey of understanding, I recommend a short and insightful book by Richard Betts from the early 90s titled Military Readiness…Concepts, Choices and Consequences.[3] His framing of readiness was a seminal piece of work and provides structure on how to consider readiness that has remained valuable for decades. His first category, Operational Readiness, describes the immediate fighting capability of currently active units. This includes personnel fill levels, equipment condition, training status, ammunition and materiel on hand. Operational readiness is very visible and is quantifiable. The second type of readiness in Betts’s work describes Structural Readiness as the composition and quantity of the force. How many wings, squadrons, and importantly for an airpower conversation, how many aircraft exist in the inventory. This category is also very quantifiable; it gets at force structure and “how much” of that force structure you have versus detailing immediate readiness of those units to employ effectively in combat. The final category Betts presents, Mobilization Readiness, which he argues is the most neglected category. This is the ability to expand the force in crisis and includes Reserve and Guard mobilization, training throughput and industrial surge capacity. The book was written shortly after the Gulf War, while a still large US military was shedding force structure in a post-Cold War budget reduction environment. The decades following the publishing of his book would see significant demands on the US military with post-Gulf War no fly zones, Bosnia, Kosovo and then at the turn of the century September 11th and the years to follow in Afghanistan and Iraq. While it was written many years ago, the framing he laid out was incredibly insightful and has been utilized by many in the profession. A more recent work that is specific to Airpower is, the Mitchell Institute paper titled, “Winning the Next War: Overcoming the USAF’s Capacity, Capability and Readiness Crisis” by Col (Ret) John Venable and Joshua Baker.[4] The paper provides a detailed analysis and insightful historical comparisons between readiness of today and readiness when the Air Force faced the Soviet Union. The comprehensive analysis is worthy reading for airpower leaders and those responsible for resourcing airpower readiness. 2. The Components of Readiness Some leaders reading this article have had the experience of testifying before Congress. In my experience, whether testifying in an unclassified public hearing, or a closed session at various higher levels of classification, I found that in the vast majority of cases, members of Congress wanted a straightforward way to understand the very complex issues at a granular level so they can make decisions on legislation. Having a repeatable way to approach the complex subject of readiness with subcomponents that comprise the overall concept is helpful when having a short tabletop discussion or an in-depth multi-hour briefing. While Bett’s framework for readiness is quite valuable, the unique characteristics of airpower merit a tailored description of its elements to ensure an accurate evaluation. To address those unique characteristics, I will present three components I utilized to describe readiness during my service in uniform. When considering airpower readiness, there are three components that constitute the overall concept: the capability, the capacity, and the responsiveness of the force to execute what the nation requires as illustrated below. Capability -The first component of readiness is the capability needed to achieve the desired effect. Capabilities can be viewed in many forms but essentially it is the descriptor for “what” can be done. It might be a technological capability such as low observability for a radar cross section, or an active electronically scanned array radar. It might be a proficiency or skill level of a pilot to employ sophisticated tactics which requires extensive training. It might also be the capability to achieve the effect at a place of your choosing like launching a bomber for the United States and flying to the other side of the planet to strike a target with significant payload and returning to home station without landing until the mission is complete. Often the desire is for the very highest end capabilities. Exquisite capabilities, especially in the technical space, are very costly and if a calibrated approach is not taken you can price yourself out of enough mass to be effective, more on this in the capacity discussion. While not always popular, a range of capabilities at both the high and low end can serve a nation well. A very insightful senior leader asked if you could Uber with a Corvette. The respondent hesitated but said, yes, he guessed it was possible to Uber with a Corvette anticipating the logic trap to follow. If you only have Corvettes, you will have to Uber with them, go to the hardware store in them, go to the doctor’s office in them and yes go fast in them. Knowing how many sports cars, pickup trucks and sedans you need is important so that your resources are utilized in the right mix of capabilities and you do not burn through the life cycle (and associated costs) of your high-end capabilities on an operation that does not absolutely require it. Capacity - The second component of readiness is the quantity or scale of forces and outputs available to accomplish assigned missions. Capacity is a function of how much force structure there is, but for combat effectiveness it is how much of that force that can be generated for mission execution, and for how long it can be sustained. As previously mentioned, a very common measurement utilized by the military departments and Congress is the Mission Capability Rate of aircraft. Mission Capability Rate (MC) is a measure of time a unit possessed aircraft can fly and perform at least one assigned mission set. Since it measures only the aircraft possessed by a flying unit and does not count aircraft not available because of modification or depot maintenance it only informs part of the picture. While a rate can be useful it may not give an adequate indication of combat power capacity needed by a commander to execute an assigned mission. The Air Force has taken an important step in setting the number of aircraft (not a percentage) that is needed to be ready in various types of weapon systems. Brigadier General Laidlaw, Air Combat Command Director of Operations, provided a great description of the Readiness Informed Metric during the readiness panel at the AFA Warfare Symposium.[5] He clarified that all the other measurements are still valid but to communicate effectively ACC thought it was vital to pick a recognizable, impactful and quantifiable measurement that is understood at every echelon. A unit commander can only generate aircraft on their ramp, the aircraft that are “possessed” by the unit. When making decisions about fleet utilization, Air Force leaders consider Mission Capable Rate but also the broader picture of utilization potential for the entire fleet which is captured by a measurement coined Aircraft Availability Rate (AA). Senior leaders that understand the driving factors for non-availability for the entire fleet in the AA rate and put that in context for the units possessed aircraft capacity in the MC rate gain a much more accurate perspective on the health of their aviation forces and the optimal actions needed to improve. The weapon system (aircraft) example above is pivotal but is not the only type of capacity that must be synchronized for airpower to be ready as an effective deterrent or to achieve victory in combat. The number of skilled aviators, sortie generation maintainers, both high and low-tech munitions inventories, fuel and a myriad of other contributors determine the true capacity of an airpower force. The most significant rethinking on capacity is likely needed for Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). The Air Force is aggressively driving the development and then fielding of CCAs to provide affordable mass and flexibility by an unmanned platform. To be affordable, CCAs will likely not have the same maintenance manpower requirement and will not fly a daily flying schedule like manned aircraft. This raises an important set of questions on calculating the capacity need, operating concepts, and funding profiles for this new approach. It is natural to think first of the capacity of the fighting unit which you need to generate, fight and regenerate to fight again. An underpinning aspect of tactical capacity is how long that force can sustain combat operations over time which is often constrained by the industrial capacity to keep up with demand. That demand for industrial facilities, skilled workforce, and materiel availability can rapidly become the pacing item for how long the force can be sustained. Capability is what the force can do, capacity is how much of that capability can be applied to achieve the desired effect. There is a third component to airpower readiness which is more challenging to measure than the first two is that of responsiveness. Responsiveness -The third component of readiness is about time. Responsiveness for the unit of action to deploy, employ and the time required to regenerate those forces after each employment. Understandably, there are many factors which dictate the speed required for a given activity. The speed to mobilize a large versus small unit and the associated physical personnel and equipment is a significant factor. Of airpower’s many attributes for warfighting effectiveness, responsiveness is a standout performer. Whether it is the speed at which a combat aviation unit can launch from home station and employ directly into combat or rapidly moving and refueling the joint force across the globe, responsiveness is in the DNA of airpower. The lack of responsiveness in the industrial base was illuminated by COVID, and the war Russia is waging against Ukraine. In particular, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated how challenging it is for traditional production to occur because of lack of capacity as exemplified by herculean efforts that was required to increase 155 howitzer round production. As the tactics changed and the emergence of drones at scale changed the battlefield dynamic, the responsiveness of a non-traditional military industrial base has shown that speed at scale is not only possible but essential in modern warfighting. Additive manufacturing, low-cost attritable drones, and loitering munitions produced in a distributed industrial base lacking massive facilities and centralized workforce showed how responsiveness can fill a gap when traditional capacity is absent. An Airpower Specific Example – If a priority is to be ready to counter a drone threat from an airborne platform, it would be important to know that you have a capability that can detect low flying drones as with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. It is important to know that you have the capacity to meet the threat as measured by a sufficient number the aircraft (not a percentage) and trained aircrew with appropriate magazine depth of munitions to counter that threat. Finally, it is important that the force is responsive enough as exemplified by the ability to rapidly deploy and be immediately combat effective to meet the Joint Force Commander requirements. Arthur Herman’s Freedom’s Forge[6] is often, and with good reason, referenced when talking about the nation’s industrial base’s ability to produce the systems needed to wage and win a war. Often that discussion is focused on the capacity that was leveraged in World War II, building bombers in automobile manufacturing plants. The industrial capacity lesson is an important one and provides a stark warning as much of the manufacturing capacity the United States relies on for its products are no longer inside our borders. Recent events indicate that it is starting to shift in a positive direction. I will argue that one of the compelling lessons from this book is on the responsiveness that national leadership and the commercial industrial base in the United States exemplified. They did not let perfect be the enemy of completion, they prioritized speed over exquisite, and they had the authority to act and then acted with speed. American industrial capacity was important, there is no doubt, but the responsive nature in which it produced was a key element of success. There are multiple meaningful measures of capability, capacity and responsiveness to assess readiness. Because of the depth and complexity of each and the turbulent state of global security, there are some foreseeable pitfalls to watch out for when assessing any aspect of military readiness. Be Mindful of Key Pitfalls Overcomplication Leads to Confusion – In the attempt to convey the depth of knowledge and context that detailed practitioners are challenged with in readiness, many times a deluge data and indicators are showered on decision makers in a myriad of metrics. When there is a vast array of metrics to choose from, different entities choose from the buffet of options and draw different conclusions which might lead to optimizing for different outcomes and often leads to frustration. Picking a North Star metric that efforts across multiple organizations can synchronize actions to is important. The Major Commands in the Air Force are now setting that North Star metric for their weapon systems. It was important to the Air Force to clarify the number of aircraft (versus a rate) to specify how many aircraft need to be ready to execute the mission. As General Laidlaw stated, the other measurements still have great value and leaders in various roles will still assess the health of the entire system by multiple measures of performance, but the clarity of a single metric synchronizes efforts and communicates effectively with senior leaders at all echelons. Disregarding the Political Implications – A purist might say that any discussion of military readiness discussions should be completely void of politics. While one of the key strengths of the United States military is to remain non-partisan in its advice and execution, that is different from being blind to the fact that national defense and the treasure needed to resource military readiness will always be a subject of great concern for elected officials and political appointees. It is important to understand the political environment in which political leaders authorize, appropriate, and make national decisions. It is possible to understand that environment without becoming political, and a great number of military leaders very successfully do that in service to our nation. An example of this distinction is navigating the challenge of providing an assessment of readiness in an unclassified environment through budget submission and open testimony. It would be shortsighted for military leaders to not recognize the political dynamics at play when resourcing decisions are made in the public forum. Many of those leaders work extensively outside of the public domain to provide well thought out and actionable follow-on assessments through classified engagements that prevent disclosure to our adversaries and meet the needs of elected officials. Change is too hard. For many, the thought of changing the ecosystem they have been a part of their entire professional life is just too much without a compelling case for making that change. Change is indeed hard, and it might be challenging to determine why the readiness approach that has been used for the last 35 years, and by most observable measures has served us well or at least not bitten us with failure, needs to change. The United States has a storied history of changing its military readiness after a cataclysmic event occurs, there are many historical examples that come to mind. The difference now is the pace of change, low cost of very effective technical capabilities, and multitude of aggressors makes waiting for the cataclysmic event no longer a valid approach, if it ever was. The United States has the ability to change, it now needs to have the will to change. It has been said many times that change is hard, but irrelevance and defeat are harder and that is certainly the case with the stakes in airpower readiness. 4. Recommendations Be a continuous student of readiness - If you are serious about national security, your time is well served probing, challenging and assessing the validity of how readiness is measured. Readiness is multifaceted and deserves in-depth study by emerging and even long seasoned senior leaders. I started with a recommendation to read Richard Bett’s book. His work remains relevant today, as modern militaries wrestle with readiness in light of peer adversaries, technological change, and budgetary choices. Those focused on the readiness of the United States military have many demands on their time but need to remain intellectually very curious on this particular subject. I have observed a number of very accomplish and extremely smart individuals who find it hard to imagine they do not know something within the discipline in which they have spent years. It is hubris and it can bite all of us, even the well-intended leader, but good intentions do not result in combat victory. Stay hungry to learn. Tailor the readiness requirement of the United States Military to match the strategy of the Department of War…and then follow it. A good strategy will illuminate the most vital readiness requirements. Use the components of readiness to clarify what the most important capabilities, capacity, and responsiveness needs are to achieve national objectives. A calibrated requirement brings clarity, but it will also bring friction from those not prioritized. Resourcing constraints will always drive risk in meeting the requirements for national defense. The risk is there either way, so make it an informed risk…specified by senior leaders and not a result of a smattering of unsynchronized activities. Align resources for the readiness requirements to achieve the DoW strategy. This also sounds so deceivingly simple. Prioritizing resources for the readiness that will achieve the objectives of the strategy is very challenging but it is possible. Resourcing should not be a peanut butter spread even with the aforementioned political constraints. Importantly, we should not telegraph the details to our adversaries. While the top level strategy is public, how the effects are achieved should be opaque to a would be enemy. The Department of War, Combatant Commanders and the Services could expand the briefings they give to key members of the Authorization and Appropriations Committees on the most valued priorities. They could also read in the CEOs of key providers and show them the priority, make it profitable for their companies if they produce to need and move on to someone else if they do not. The efforts the department has underway in this area are the most promising I have seen and I hope they continue. Experts can say what they may, but the bottom line is the only people stopping the United States from doing this…is ourselves. It is not a cyber attack or covert operation – we are the impediment and if we want to be truly ready as a nation to defend our way of life then we need to change. Conclusion - Thinking through how to think about readiness, leadership trades on the components of readiness, avoiding the easily anticipated pitfalls for readiness, and fundamentally changing the alignment of resources to the most vital readiness requirements all have a common thread…and the thread is discipline. Discipline to dive deep into understanding, discipline to not let the urgent overtake the important, and the discipline to stay aligned to the most vital priority when the noise of the national security environment’s many voices are yelling.Top of FormBottom of Form Lt Gen (Ret) Tom Miller is a senior advisor in aerospace and defense. He served in the Air Force for 34 years in field units across the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan and then served in a number of sustainment enterprise leadership roles including as the Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center. He culminated his military service as the senior logistician in the U.S. Air Force at the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force protection where he was responsible to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force for weapon system health. [1] 24th CSAF General Wilsbach’s First Letter to the Force, December 2025. [2] House Armed Services Testimony, Air Force Posture Hearing, April 2026. [3] Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness – Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1995). [4] John Venable, Col. USAF (ret) and Joshua Baker, Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability and Readiness Crisis (Arlington VA: Mitchell Institute, 2026). [5] Brig. General Brian Laidlaw, Readiness Informed Metrics, 2026 AFA Warfare Symposium. [6] Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II (New York: Random House, 2012).