Geoeconomic Constraint and Strategic Autonomy in Mongolia: The Taming of the Steppe’s Wild Horse Published July 22, 2026 By Lt. Col. Christian Leighton Mongolia, once the center of the largest contiguous land empire under Genghis Khan, retains a national identity grounded in independence, resilience, and a nomadic warrior tradition symbolized by the horse.[1] The image of the wild Mongolian horse, free, enduring, and self-reliant, remains central to this identity. Today, that freedom faces mounting constraint. Landlocked between Russia and China, Mongolia operates within an increasingly compressed geopolitical space. Economic dependence on China and energy reliance on Russia systematically limit its strategic maneuverability.[2] Although US public discourse often overlooks Mongolia, it holds quiet strategic significance in great-power competition. It is a democratic state positioned between two authoritarian powers, where sovereignty is constrained less by military threat than by economic dependence.[3] The horse, deeply embedded in Mongolian culture and military history, symbolizes mobility and autonomy. As a traditional proverb observes, “a Mongol without a horse is like a bird without wings.”[4] This ethos now stands in tension with Mongolia’s strategic reality. Geography and asymmetric economic dependencies have narrowed its freedom of action and converted external influence into a persistent form of constraint. Landlocked between China and Russia, Mongolia operates within a constrained strategic environment defined by structural dependence. Reliance on Chinese markets and transit routes, combined with Russian dominance in energy supply, limits its freedom of maneuver and shapes political decision-making. In this context, the influence of its neighbors reflects a gradual “taming” of Mongolia’s strategic autonomy. This analysis draws on research conducted through the Air War College’s Regional Security Studies program. It incorporates academic study, primary-source analysis, field observation, and engagement with civilian and military leaders during a March 2026 visit to Mongolia. This situates Mongolia’s security challenges within the broader framework of regional power competition and structural constraint. Although observers often associate Mongolia with the legacy of Genghis Khan and its nomadic warrior heritage, its contemporary strategic condition remains underappreciated beyond specialist circles. This lack of attention constrains the external awareness and engagement needed to expand Mongolia’s strategic options.[5] Mongolia’s relevance lies not only in its history, but in its position as a democratic state between China and Russia, where economic dependence, energy vulnerability, and restricted access impose persistent limits on sovereignty.[6] Greater public and policy awareness matters because sustained attention can shape diplomatic prioritization, deepen economic engagement, and reinforce Mongolia’s Third Neighbor policy, thereby widening the space in which it can preserve autonomy and strategic choice.[7] In practice, Mongolia’s security environment is defined less by conventional military threats than by the steady influence of economic dependence and external leverage. Mongolia does not face an imminent military threat. It faces a slower, more durable form of pressure: geoeconomic dependence. This condition shapes political behavior, narrows strategic choice, and creates a competitive environment in which states exert influence without force. Any serious assessment must therefore examine how economic dependence translates into political constraint and, in turn, defines Mongolia’s strategic options. This essay proceeds in four parts. It first examines Mongolia’s economic and security challenges as the foundation of its strategic environment. It then analyzes the political limits of the Third Neighbor policy, with particular attention to the tension between sovereignty and external influence. Next, it assesses how structural reliance on China and Russia constrains Mongolia’s strategic flexibility. Finally, it offers recommendations for how the United States can support Mongolia through coordinated military engagement, interagency coordination, and the deliberate use of soft power. Background Mongolia, a Central Asian state of roughly 3.5 million people, is a functioning democracy situated between China and Russia.[8] Its primary security challenge is not military invasion but deep economic dependence on China, which creates structural vulnerabilities that can weaken its democratic system. If that system erodes, China and Russia will expand their continental influence in Northeast Asia, with direct implications for US interests in strategic competition, democratic governance, and regional access. Sustained US engagement, therefore, remains essential to preserving Mongolia’s autonomy.[9] Mongolia operated as a Soviet-aligned communist state from 1921 until its peaceful democratic revolution in 1990. The subsequent transition unfolded alongside the withdrawal of Soviet economic and security support.[10] Today, Mongolia maintains a parliamentary system with a prime minister who leads the government and a president who directs foreign policy and serves as commander in chief. The Mongolian People’s Party and the Democratic Party have alternated power peacefully, reinforcing institutional continuity and democratic legitimac.[11] Mongolia stands out as the only former communist state in Asia to consolidate democracy in the post-Soviet period.[12] Yet it now faces a strategic inflection point. Its vulnerabilities are not new, but they are converging. Geography continues to constrain its ability to balance between China and Russia, while limited economic diversification sustains its condition as a politically connected but economically exposed small power.[13] Although Mongolia’s national security strategy emphasizes equilibrium through its Third Neighbor policy, this balance is becoming harder to maintain. External partnerships have not offset the structural dominance of China and Russia. As a result, Mongolia faces a narrowing set of strategic options that will shape both its autonomy and the durability of its democratic system.[14] The current trajectory will either reinforce that system or gradually erode it.[15] Political Constraint Through Economic Leverage From a political perspective, Mongolia maintains cordial relations with both China and Russia, yet its geographic position makes sovereignty preservation its central strategic challenge.[16] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia recalibrated its foreign policy to balance Moscow and Beijing while expanding ties with external partners through its Third Neighbor policy.[17] By deepening political, economic, and security engagement with the United States and other partners, Mongolia sought to reduce Russia’s historical influence while offsetting China’s expanding economic leverage. Although Beijing and Moscow rarely frame their activities in Mongolia as overtly competitive, both remain sensitive to Western involvement.[18] The Third Neighbor policy therefore serves as Mongolia’s principal instrument for preserving strategic autonomy while managing pressure from its immediate neighbors.[19] Mongolia’s primary vulnerability emerges from the political effects of deep economic dependence on China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.[20] The Third Neighbor policy has expanded diplomatic flexibility but has not mitigated structural constraints. China’s dominance over export markets and transit corridors creates persistent leverage that shapes political decision-making without direct coercion. Russia retains influence through legacy infrastructure and its position as Mongolia’s primary energy supplier.[21] These dependencies directly condition Mongolian policy. They narrow the range of feasible options, discourage confrontation with Beijing, and expose Ulaanbaatar to coercive signaling through trade restrictions or energy disruption.[22] Over time, this dynamic does not produce sudden loss of sovereignty. Instead, it drives gradual erosion through accumulated concessions and constrained choices.[23] The United States supports Mongolia’s security primarily through sustained diplomatic engagement, promotion of democratic governance, and reinforcement of the Third Neighbor policy, all without extending formal security guarantees. High-level interactions signal this commitment. On May 30, 2025, Secretary Rubio spoke with Foreign Minister Battsetseg to advance economic cooperation and broader strategic alignment, underscoring US support amid pressure from China and Russia. Official US statements marking Mongolian national holidays have reinforced this message by emphasizing Mongolia’s sovereignty and stability.[24] Congressional initiatives, including the proposed Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Act, seek to expand bilateral economic ties and reduce structural dependence. At the same time, US diplomatic assistance programs target institutional resilience by strengthening the rule of law, legislative capacity, and democratic governance. These efforts function as political instruments that bolster Mongolia’s resistance to external coercion despite the absence of formal alliance commitments.[25] The US–Mongolia State Partnership Program, established in 2003, complements these initiatives by deepening defense cooperation and building long-term institutional trust. Taken together, these measures reflect a strategy of indirect support. Rather than displacing Chinese or Russian influence, the United States seeks to widen Mongolia’s strategic space and reinforce its ability to act with autonomy.[26] Structural Dependence and Strategic Vulnerability Mongolia’s structural dependence stems from persistent economic fragility. Its economy relies heavily on coal and copper exports, leaving it exposed to commodity price volatility. Although the International Monetary Fund projects 6.0 percent GDP growth in 2025, this increase reflects a surge in coal shipments rather than durable structural reform. Inflation remains elevated, household debt continues to rise, and roughly 30 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Pre-election fiscal expansion further heightens macroeconomic risk. Mongolia possesses substantial reserves of coal, copper, and other critical minerals, yet export concentration undermines their strategic value. China absorbs the overwhelming majority of these exports, while Russia supplies most petroleum imports. This dual dependency reinforces Mongolia’s economic exposure and limits its ability to diversify. Efforts to expand Third Neighbor partnerships have not yet altered this pattern in any meaningful way.[27] Mongolia’s geography places it squarely between Russia and China, both of which pursue influence through distinct but complementary objectives. China prioritizes economic integration. It seeks reliable access to Mongolian mineral resources, a stable upstream supplier, and deeper incorporation into China-centered trade networks. Since 2013, China has absorbed between 86 and 92 percent of Mongolia’s exports, including nearly 90 percent of its mining output, while supplying roughly one-third of its imports. This imbalance generates significant leverage. Dependence on Chinese transit infrastructure, particularly access to Tianjin port, further entrenches that advantage. Chinese investment and financing tighten the linkage between Mongolia’s economic performance and Beijing’s strategic interests.[28] Russia’s influence, while diminished, remains strategically relevant. Moscow seeks to preserve Mongolia as a geopolitical buffer and to prevent exclusive Chinese dominance. It retains leverage as Mongolia’s primary energy supplier and through residual influence in transportation infrastructure, security cooperation, and longstanding political ties. However, Russia’s economic position has eroded over time. Chinese imports surpassed Russian imports in 2013, and Russia’s broader economic instability continues to constrain its regional role. Even so, Mongolia must still balance Beijing’s economic dominance against Moscow’s enduring leverage.[29] The United States competes in this environment indirectly. It does not seek to replace Chinese or Russian influence but to dilute their structural advantages without triggering overt confrontation. China’s leverage derives from its position as Mongolia’s primary export market, its control over critical transit routes, and its financing of extractive industries. Russia maintains coercive potential through its near-monopoly on energy supply.[30] In response, the United States promotes economic diversification through development assistance, proposed preferential trade access, and cooperation on critical minerals and energy within the framework of the Third Neighbor policy.[31] These efforts aim to expand Mongolia’s strategic options rather than displace existing dependencies. However, US economic engagement remains limited when compared to China’s market access and Russia’s control over energy flows.[32] This disparity constrains Washington’s ability to rebalance Mongolia’s external dependencies in the near term. Economic competition in Mongolia therefore centers on reshaping structural dependence rather than replacing it. The result is a constrained middle ground in which US diversification efforts operate against entrenched Chinese and Russian dominance.[33] US–Mongolia cooperation on critical minerals reflects this approach. It focuses on improving Mongolia’s capacity to map, extract, and process rare earth resources while developing alternative export pathways, not on displacing China as the primary market.[34] US support in the energy sector follows the same logic. Efforts to modernize infrastructure and expand renewable energy aim to reduce long-term reliance on Russian supplies, but they do not eliminate that dependence in the near term.[35] Security Implications of Economic Constraints Mongolia’s primary security challenge is not military invasion but economic dependence that produces political constraint. China dominates its export markets and transit routes, while Russia retains leverage through energy supplies and infrastructure ties. These asymmetric dependencies narrow Mongolia’s strategic options and expose it to coercive pressure. The country’s strategic space is constrained not by force, but by economic leverage that shapes political outcomes and erodes autonomy.[36] These pressures carry direct military implications. Mongolia maintains a small force oriented toward peacekeeping operations (PKO) rather than territorial defense, which limits its ability to deter external pressure independently. As a result, it relies on diplomatic balancing through the Third Neighbor policy to diversify partnerships while avoiding provocation of China and Russia. This approach preserves a degree of freedom of action, but only within a constrained strategic environment.[37] The implications for US national security are significant. Mongolia represents a rare democratic state positioned between two authoritarian powers. If its autonomy erodes, China and Russia will expand their continental influence, weaken democratic norms, and constrain US access in Northeast Asia. A resilient Mongolia, by contrast, advances US objectives by reinforcing a free and open Indo-Pacific and complicating adversarial dominance.[38] US–Mongolia cooperation presents both opportunity and constraint. Mongolia seeks deeper engagement through its Third Neighbor policy, yet geography and political sensitivity limit what that engagement can achieve. An effective US approach must therefore prioritize economic diversification, targeted security assistance, and calibrated engagement. The objective is not to detach Mongolia from its neighbors, but to strengthen its capacity to remain sovereign under pressure.[39] Geography ultimately sets the outer boundary. As a landlocked state bordered by China and Russia, Mongolia offers limited access for US forces, and large-scale force projection is not a viable option. This reality reinforces the need for nonkinetic tools. The United States should sustain a calibrated approach centered on security cooperation, institutional capacity building, and soft power. These instruments do not resolve Mongolia’s structural constraints, but they expand its room for maneuver and help preserve its strategic autonomy.[40] Recommendations Recommendation #1: Continue to support Mongolia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Objective: Strengthen Mongolia’s military capability and international legitimacy The United States should reinforce Mongolia’s Third Neighbor policy by deepening support for its role in United Nations PKOs. This approach strengthens both military capability and international legitimacy without provoking China or Russia.[41] US engagement through US Pacific Command (PACOM), the Alaska National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), and key allies, should remain focused on sustaining a Mongolian force deliberately oriented toward PKOs.[42] Mongolia’s participation in UN peacekeeping reflects a deliberate and sustained strategic choice. In 2002, it ranked 82nd of 89 contributing countries and deployed only four military observers. Since then, it has expanded its contributions significantly, achieving a level of participation disproportionate to its size and capacity. By 2026, Mongolia ranks among the top troop contributors globally and has placed within the top ten in recent years. This trajectory demonstrates that Mongolia uses peacekeeping as a strategic instrument. It converts limited military capacity into multilateral engagement, international legitimacy, and defense diplomacy. Peacekeeping allows Mongolia to build partnerships, enhance interoperability, and elevate its global profile, all while avoiding direct alignment against its neighbors.[43] Mongolia seeks to expand its leadership in training, certifying, and deploying forces for UN peacekeeping operations, positioning PKO as a central pillar of its international engagement. US support should align with this objective by integrating diplomatic and financial tools. Diplomatically, the United States should advocate for expanded Mongolian participation within UN frameworks. Financially, it should prioritize training, institutional capacity, and infrastructure development, particularly at the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Center.[44] This approach yields strategic effects that extend beyond military capability. Mongolia’s focus on peacekeeping enhances its international legitimacy and reinforces the Third Neighbor policy by deepening partnerships beyond China and Russia. It allows Mongolia to translate limited military capacity into diplomatic influence while avoiding provocation of its neighbors. Sustained US and allied support ensures that Mongolia remains a capable and interoperable partner. It also represents a low-cost, high-impact means of advancing both regional competition and broader security objectives.[45] Recommendation #2: Continue US military participation in Mongolia’s joint exercises Objective: Maintain persistent military engagement to build interoperability and influence US participation in Mongolian joint exercises delivers high strategic return at relatively low cost. It advances military, diplomatic, and geopolitical objectives while sustaining engagement in a constrained geographic environment.[46] Exercises such as Khaan Quest enable competition through security cooperation, building multinational interoperability within a peacekeeping framework while avoiding escalation with China and Russia.[47] This approach strengthens a democratic partner and provides a consistent mechanism for operating below the threshold of armed conflict.[48] Khaan Quest has evolved into a central instrument of Mongolia’s defense diplomacy and Third Neighbor strategy. Established in 2003 as a bilateral US–Mongolia initiative, it now functions as a multinational, UN-oriented exercise involving a broad range of partners.[49] Conducted at the Five Hills Training Center, it prepares forces for deployment through realistic peacekeeping scenarios that emphasize interoperability, civil-military coordination, and the protection of civilians.[50] Participation reinforces Mongolia’s calibrated strategic approach. Although China and Russia have participated, typically through observers or limited contingents, the exercise remains focused on partner interoperability.[51] This structure allows Mongolia to expand multilateral engagement without signaling alignment with either neighbor, thereby preserving a balanced posture in a sensitive geostrategic environment. Khaan Quest enables Mongolia to convert limited military capacity into disproportionate international influence. By embedding the exercise within a UN peacekeeping framework, Mongolia strengthens partnerships with the United States and other third neighbors while avoiding escalation with China and Russia.[52] In this way, Khaan Quest serves as a recurring operational expression of Mongolia’s broader strategy: leveraging multilateral engagement and defense diplomacy to preserve strategic autonomy and enhance international legitimacy.[53] The United States should therefore sustain and deepen its participation in these exercises. Doing so reinforces interoperability, strengthens bilateral ties, and maintains a consistent platform for engagement in a region where access and influence remain constrained. Recommendation #3: Expand US-sponsored English classes Objective: Develop human capital and strengthen long-term institutional alignment The United States should expand English-language training and exchange programs as a low-cost, high-impact tool across the military, diplomatic, and economic domains. English proficiency directly improves interoperability in UN PKOs and joint exercises, increasing Mongolia’s effectiveness as a coalition partner. Military language instruction should prioritize officers, noncommissioned officers, and units tied to peacekeeping deployment and certification pipelines. Diplomatically, the United States should expand participation in the Fulbright Program, International Military Education and Training, and the International Visitor Leadership Program, while increasing exchanges for civilian and government leaders. These initiatives build trust, cultivate long-term networks, and reinforce Mongolia’s Third Neighbor policy by embedding it more deeply within Western institutional frameworks.[54] The United States should also expand Peace Corps programs focused on English instruction. Since 1991, approximately 1,500 volunteers have supported education and community development in Mongolia. Scaling this effort strengthens human capital, supports economic development, and extends US influence without a military footprint.[55] US universities, private-sector partners, and professional training institutions should complement these efforts by expanding English-language education and exchange programs.[56] Greater language proficiency reduces barriers to foreign investment, improves investor confidence, and facilitates integration into global markets.[57] Over time, these initiatives build durable people-to-people ties, strengthen institutional capacity, and anchor Mongolia more firmly within a network of partners beyond China and Russia.[58] Recommendation #4: Expand Soft-Power Cultural Media Engagements Objective: Strengthen Mongolia’s global presence and alignment with democratic partners The United States should leverage soft power in coordination with private-sector partners in film, music, and digital media to amplify Mongolia’s narrative, identity, and strategic relevance.[59] By working with Mongolian creators and supporting content that highlights its history, nomadic culture, and political resilience, the United States can elevate Mongolia’s global visibility and cultural reach. Narratives centered on Genghis Khan, the nomadic tradition, and Mongolia’s contemporary effort to preserve sovereignty between larger powers offer compelling material for international audiences. This approach advances several strategic objectives. First, it reinforces national identity and legitimacy, strengthening Mongolia’s Third Neighbor policy by deepening cultural ties with democratic partners. Second, it raises global awareness of Mongolia as a destination for tourism and investment, supporting economic diversification.[60] Third, it builds long-term affinity between societies, creating durable people-to-people connections that underpin diplomatic and security cooperation.[61] Practically, the United States and its partners should support co-productions, film incentives, cultural exchanges, and global distribution through digital and streaming platforms. Unlike traditional trade or military access, these channels are not constrained by Mongolia’s landlocked geography and can scale rapidly, enabling influence without reliance on routes controlled by China or Russia.[62] Digital connectivity reinforces this advantage. Investments in space-based internet infrastructure, including low-Earth-orbit satellite networks, can enhance Mongolia’s resilience and connectivity independent of Chinese transit systems or Russian-linked infrastructure, thereby expanding its autonomy in the information domain.[63] The greater advantage, however, lies in the information domain.[64] As a democracy, Mongolia can project its identity outward in ways unavailable to its authoritarian neighbors, using both social and traditional media to shape perception and attract engagement.[65] Its cultural heritage, peacekeeping contributions, and social indicators, particularly the prominent role of women in political and military leadership, provide compelling and scalable narratives for global audiences.[66] Mongolia has, at times, exceeded many established democracies in female parliamentary representation and has integrated women into its peacekeeping deployments, reinforcing an image of inclusivity and modern governance.[67] If effectively amplified, these narratives can generate sustained international attention that translates into tangible economic outcomes, including increased tourism, foreign direct investment, cultural exports, and deeper participation in global markets.[68] In this context, attention functions as a strategic resource. By shaping external perceptions, Mongolia can attract capital, expand partnerships, and strengthen the economic foundations of its sovereignty.[69] This narrative-driven engagement creates pathways for growth and influence that are not bound by geography, allowing Mongolia to mitigate the constraints of its landlocked position.[70] The result is not unbridled freedom, but greater room to maneuver, where Mongolia’s “wild horses” can still run far enough to generate engagement, influence, and economic opportunity. Conclusion Mongolia’s strategic identity draws from a legacy of resilience and independence rooted in its nomadic heritage and symbolized by the enduring image of the wild horse. Yet this identity now operates within a structurally constrained environment defined by geography and geoeconomics. Bounded by China and Russia, Mongolia confronts a persistent condition in which sovereignty is not challenged through overt military coercion, but steadily constrained through economic dependence and political influence. China’s dominance over trade and transit, combined with Russia’s enduring leverage in energy, creates a dual dependency that limits Mongolia’s strategic maneuverability. This imbalance is clear in practice. China absorbs the vast majority of Mongolian exports, while Russia supplies most of its petroleum imports.[71] Under these conditions, democratic erosion occurs not through abrupt disruption, but through sustained pressure that narrows political and economic autonomy.[72] If this trajectory continues, both China and Russia will expand their influence, weakening democratic norms and constraining US access in Northeast Asia. The United States has reinforced Mongolia’s sovereignty through political and economic engagement, primarily through support for the Third Neighbor policy, but it has not extended formal security guarantees.[73] Mongolia therefore remains politically supported yet strategically constrained.[74] Geoeconomic dependence remains the principal mechanism through which great-power competition shapes and constrains Mongolian sovereignty. Within these conditions, the central objective for both Mongolia and its partners is to preserve strategic choice. Geography rules out traditional military solutions as either feasible or desirable. The viable path forward lies in a calibrated approach that integrates security cooperation, economic diversification, and deliberate use of soft power.[75] US support for Mongolia’s participation in UN peacekeeping and multinational exercises strengthens institutional capacity and international integration without provoking its neighbors.[76] Complementary diplomatic, educational, and informational initiatives, including expanded English-language training and strategic media engagement, reinforce Mongolia’s autonomy and global positioning.[77] This approach does not seek to displace Chinese or Russian influence outright. It seeks to mitigate structural dependence and expand Mongolia’s range of options.[78] In doing so, it reflects a broader model of competition below the threshold of armed conflict, where economic and political instruments shape outcomes more persistently than military force. Ultimately, Mongolia’s enduring challenge is to preserve agency while navigating between great powers. It must remain sovereign and, to the extent possible, untamed, like the wild horses of its heritage, even as external pressures seek to narrow its range. Autonomy is not self-sustaining. It requires constant reinforcement. Left unattended, it will yield incrementally to the gravitational pull of more powerful states. The outcome will not be determined by geography alone, but by Mongolia’s ability, and that of its partners, to expand the space in which it can choose its own path. Lt Col Christian Leighton, a Massachusetts Air National Guard officer, is the Civil Engineering Readiness Branch Chief (NGB/A4O) at the National Guard Bureau and a 2026 graduate of the Air War College. In his civilian capacity, he is a career Foreign Service Officer and Special Agent with the U.S. Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service. [1] Christopher P. Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire (New York: Facts On File, 2004), 248–50; Morris Rossabi, Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1–22; and Michael Dillon, “Mongolia and the Mongols: Land, People, and Traditions,” in Mongolia: A Political History of the Land and Its People (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020), 1–22. [2] Mina Sumaadii and Alexandra Byrne, “China and Mongolia: The Limits of Sheep and Tea Diplomacy,” International History Review 47, no. 1 (2025): 144–46; and Maria A. Blackwood, Mongolia, CRS In Focus IF10926 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2025), 2–3. [3] Sergey Radchenko, “Mongolia Hangs in the Balance: Political Choices and Economic Realities in a State Bounded by China and Russia,” in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier, ed. Gilbert Rozman and Sergey Radchenko (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 127–30; Khurelbaatar Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice: The Case of Mongolia,” International Studies Review 26, no. 1 (2024): 6–8; and Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46. [4] Mongolian proverb; see also Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, 248–50. [5] Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia, 248–50; Rossabi, Modern Mongolia, 1–22; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5–11. [6] Radchenko, “Mongolia Hangs in the Balance,” 127–30; Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy: Motives and Directions (New York: Routledge, 2019), 88–94; and Maria A. Blackwood, Mongolia: Political and Economic Relations with the United States, IF10926 (Washington: Library of Congress, 2026), 2–3. [7] Nye, Soft Power, 5–11; Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 6–8; US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Mongolia (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2022), 1–3. [8] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects 2024, “Total Population, Mongolia, 2023”; and Dillon, Mongolia: A Political History of the Land and Its People, 1–7. [9] Sumiya Chuluunbaatar, “Mongolia’s 2025 Political Earthquake,” The Diplomat, September 30, 2025, [10] Blackwood, Mongolia, IF10926. [11] Blackwood, Mongolia, IF10926, 1–2. [12] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Mongolia (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2025), [13] Radchenko, “Mongolia Hangs in the Balance,” 127–30; and Mendee Jargalsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Dilemma: A Politically Linked, Economically Isolated Small Power,” in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier, ed. Rozman and Radchenko, 153–55. [14] Government of Mongolia, National Security Concept of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Government of Mongolia, 2010), chap. 1–3; and Mendee Jargalsaikhan and Batmunkh Munkhtulga, Strategic Partners of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mongolia, 2022), 1–4. [15] Chuluunbaatar, “Mongolia’s 2025 Political Earthquake”; and International Monetary Fund, Mongolia: 2025 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report (Washington: IMF, 2025), 3–5. [16] Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mongolia and Mongolian Institute for Innovative Policies, Mongolian Geopolitics (Ulaanbaatar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mongolia, 2022), 20. [17] Dillon, Mongolia: A Political History, 159. [18] Sergey Radchenko, “Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia,” in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier, ed. Rozman and Radchenko, 122–24. [19] Radchenko, “Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia,” 111–13. [20] Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 6–8. [21] Dashdondog, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, 88–94; and Rossabi, Modern Mongolia, 212–20. [22] Dashdondog, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, 88–94. [23] Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 1–18. [24] “Secretary Rubio’s Call with Mongolian Foreign Minister Batmunkh Battsetseg” (press release, US Department of State, May 30, 2025); US Department of State, “Statement on Mongolia National Day,” July 10, 2025. [25] Blackwood, Mongolia, IF10926. [26] US Department of Defense, “Strengthening International Security Cooperation: Mongolian Armed Forces Visit Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies,” February 21, 2024; and US National Guard Bureau, “Alaska National Guard–Mongolia State Partnership Program Overview,” 2024. [27] Erin L. Murphy, “Mongolia: A Case for Flexibility in U.S. Economic Engagement,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 March 2024, https://www.csis.org/. [28] Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46; Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 6–8. [29] Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46; Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 6–8. [30] Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46; Enkhbaatar, “Hedging as Sovereignty-Driven Foreign Policy Practice,” 6–8. [31] Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Mongolia Water Compact”; Millennium Challenge Corporation, “MCC Mongolia Water Compact Enters into Force,” April 5, 2021; and U.S. Congress, Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Act, S.3368, 118th Cong. (2023). [32] Blackwood, Mongolia, IF10926. [33] Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46. [34] US Department of State, “Joint Statement on Advancing the U.S.–Mongolia Economic Partnership,” 2024; and “U.S. Discussed ‘Creative Ways’ to Help Landlocked Mongolia Export Rare Earths,” Straits Times, July 2023. [35] “Joint Statement on the U.S.–Mongolia Energy Dialogue” (press statement, US Department of State, 2024), https://mn.usembassy.gov/. [36] Blackwood, Mongolia, 2; and Sumaadii and Byrne, “China and Mongolia,” 144–46. [37] US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Mongolia, 1–3; and “Mongolia National Day: Statement by Secretary Marco Rubio” (press release, US Department of State, July 10, 2025). [38] US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Mongolia, 1–3; and Blackwood, Mongolia, 2–3. [39] Murphy, “Mongolia: A Case for Flexibility”; and US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Mongolia, 1–3. [40] Blackwood, Mongolia, 1–2; and US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Mongolia, 1–3. [41] United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors,” 2026; and United Nations, “Training for Peacekeeping,” 2026. 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