Stealth technology has transformed modern air warfare, providing the United States with a sustained operational advantage for over four decades. From its Cold War beginnings to its development in platforms like the F-117, B-2, F-22, and F-35, stealth has evolved into a system-of-systems capability that combines advanced engineering, mission planning, and operational expertise. As the U.S. improved both the technology and its deployment, other countries, particularly China, closely watched its progress and combat application, aiming to understand, counter, and replicate its advantages. These observations have not happened in isolation; they have been influenced by unique institutional viewpoints, technological limitations, and strategic goals that continue to shape China’s approach to stealth and counter-stealth systems.
Open-source PLA military writings and observations suggest Chinese views of U.S. stealth have been shaped by a mix of empirical observation, cognitive biases, and technological ambitions. This has led to a dual strategy focused on both countering U.S. low-observability capabilities and developing indigenous stealth platforms. However, these perceptions are often incomplete or skewed, leading to an overreliance on hardware solutions, an underestimation of U.S. operational adaptability, and a framing of stealth as a technical rather than an operational problem. Analyzing how these perceptions affect China’s integrated air defense systems, radar technology, and next-generation aircraft programs reveals both the strengths and vulnerabilities in the PLA’s approach, providing insights into the shifting balance of airpower in the Indo-Pacific. Open-source PLA analyses and commentary give limited attention to the intangibles of conflict, areas in which the United States has accumulated decades of operational experience.