This article examines how China has been building a wide variety of ISR systems to provide its forces with enhanced capabilities, including systems that we must expect will be available for military use even if nominally civilian. China has said its policy of military-civil fusion will include the outer space and maritime domains; so, we must assume that all the surveillance resources PRC civilian agencies have will be integrated into crisis/wartime military ISR.
In the face of a changing and resilient challenge, Washington must adopt a strategy and policy that are novel, flexible, and equally resilient. This new policy must be based upon informed analysis and assessment of North Korean intentions and what can and cannot be reasonably expected of the regime. This approach, titled strategic engagement, aims to continue deterrence and pressure but simultaneously adopt a policy of engagement and openness to negotiation on a wider range of fronts separate from nuclear weapons, including the economic, cultural, scholastic, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and civilian.
For years, Southeast Asia has become more reliant on China, striking a Faustian bargain, wherein they accept Chinese investments in return for acquiescence to Chinese hegemony and a commitment not to criticize its central government. In 2021, the Biden administration must take bold diplomatic, messaging, military, and economic actions to curtail Chinese influence and coercion in the region. Many of these actions can begin immediately and will benefit both Southeast Asia and the United States for years to come. Failure to solidify the US role in Southeast Asia will result in China becoming inextricably entrenched in the region and embolden Beijing to take even more aggressive actions against American allies and interests.
This article examines how a network of recreational bike trails can become a tool to generate strategic surprise. The Republic of Korea, by the simple act of building recreational trails and tangibly rewarding citizens who use them, has begun to ready generations of robust, skilled defenders, a uniquely surprising strategy of defense and a transport system nigh invulnerable to interdiction.
This article focuses not on the how we arrive at armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, nor how the battle is fought, but rather seeks to provoke thought and discussion about the aftermath, in any number of war-termination scenarios. For arguments sake, we posit there is armed conflict, likely involving the full myriad of forces from the United States, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China, and may or may not include allies, partners, or other third nations.
Commanders must look beyond the single event or operation, understand how their decisions affect the overall campaign within the gray zone, and then measure and accept risks accordingly.
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the developments in Xinjiang, it is vital to track and identify the effects of the Belt and Road Initiative and COVID-19 on Beijing's repression of China's Uyghur minority.
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