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Japan–India Strategic Evolution in the Indo-Pacific: Partnerships, Security, and Regional Order

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  • By Dr. Kamakshi Wason & Dr. Satoru Nagao

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Abstract

Japan and India have undergone a profound strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific, driven by shared concerns over China’s growing assertiveness. Once distant partners, the two nations have deepened their security ties through joint military exercises, technology transfers, and coordinated regional policies. India’s traditional wariness of military alliances has softened, leading to greater engagement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue while maintaining strategic autonomy. Japan, historically restrained in defense cooperation, has adjusted its policies to accommodate India’s approach, fostering deeper collaboration in maritime security, antisubmarine warfare, and infrastructure development. This article examines the evolving Japan–India partnership, emphasizing its implications for regional stability, defense modernization, and multilateral cooperation. As China’s assertiveness continues to escalate, Tokyo and New Delhi’s alignment will shape the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape, providing a model for flexible, issue-based security partnerships among middle powers navigating the complexities of great-power competition.

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The strategic posture of the Japan–India partnership in the Indo-Pacific has undergone a fundamental transformation in the twenty-first century. This shift marks a decisive break from both nations’ traditional approaches to regional security, driven by China’s growing assertiveness and the imperative for robust security alliances. This article examines how Japan and India’s evolving relationship, engagement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and comprehensive approach to regional security reflect a calculated response to shifting geopolitical dynamics. While Japan’s impetus for closer ties with India stems from the Chinese threat, India has demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to forge stronger security partnerships and play a more active role in shaping the regional security architecture—all while maintaining its core principle of strategic autonomy.

Japan: Beyond Historical Connections

The most striking manifestation of this strategic shift is the fundamental reassessment of Japan’s and India’s perceptions of each other. Once characterized by minimal engagement during the Cold War, their relationship has evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing security cooperation, infrastructure development, and technological collaboration. The historical context makes this transformation even more remarkable. Cold War alignments and geographical distance kept their ties underdeveloped for decades, despite enduring cultural linkages through Buddhism and historical moments of goodwill, such as Japan’s support for India’s independence movement under Subhas Chandra Bose and Justice Radhabinod Pal’s lone dissenting opinion at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

The speed and depth of this transformation since 2000 have been extraordinary.1 The partnership now spans strategic technology transfers, tangible military collaboration, and symbolic gestures that reinforce institutional ties. Annual summit meetings between prime ministers, frequent “2+2” dialogues between foreign and defense ministers, and coordinated statements on regional security underscore the growing depth of engagement. The two nations have formalized agreements to share sensitive military intelligence and defense technologies, and their respective armed forces—army, navy, and air force—have conducted joint combat exercises. Moreover, joint weapons development initiatives, such as unmanned ground vehicles and the Unicorn-class naval radar system, have already gained traction.

India–Japan security cooperation, particularly within the Japan–United States–Australia framework, has advanced at an unprecedented pace. This shift is particularly significant given Japan’s historically restrictive defense policies, which limited security collaboration to its alliance with the United States. Equally noteworthy is the persistence of pacifist sentiment within segments of the Japanese public, which continues to oppose military entanglements. Meanwhile, India’s deepening security engagement with Japan marks a sharp departure from its traditional reluctance to form close military partnerships with major powers. This evolving dynamic signals a broader realignment of Indo-Pacific security architecture, with Tokyo and New Delhi positioning themselves as pivotal actors in maintaining regional stability.

The China Challenge

Shared concerns over China’s growing assertiveness have been the primary catalyst for the deepening Japan–India partnership. Beijing has intensified its naval and air operations around Japan, including in the East China Sea, the waters surrounding Taiwan, and the South China Sea.2 Simultaneously, China has significantly expanded its military footprint along the disputed India-China border, constructed infrastructure in contested areas, and increased its naval activity in the Indian Ocean since 2000.3 The scale of this challenge became unmistakable during the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes—the first deadly confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in more than four decades.

China’s actions present direct security threats to both Japan and India. For Japan, Chinese incursions in the East China Sea and its expanding military presence endanger critical maritime routes and regional stability. For India, Beijing’s infrastructure expansion and military build-up along the Himalayan frontier pose an immediate, territorial challenge to its sovereignty. This convergence of strategic threats has forged a strong foundation for Japan–India security cooperation, breaking down traditional barriers to closer alignment. In a historic move, Japan issued a statement in 2017 explicitly opposing unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by force, signaling support for India during the Doklam standoff—its most direct stance on a military confrontation since World War II.4

Yet, reducing the Japan–India relationship to mere China containment would be an oversimplification.5 The partnership has developed its own strategic logic, extending beyond shared concerns over Beijing. In particular, India sees Japan as a reliable partner in its modernization efforts, especially in infrastructure and defense technology. Japan’s investments in India’s northeastern regions, including major road and connectivity projects, illustrate the broader scope of their collaboration.

The alliance also enhances both nations’ strategic flexibility in dealing with other major powers, particularly the United States. For Japan, engagement with India allows for a more diversified security approach beyond its reliance on Washington. For India, cooperation with Japan aligns with its principle of strategic autonomy, enabling it to balance relationships with other global powers while reinforcing its position in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The Quad Multilateral Security Framework

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who championed the concepts of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific, saw cooperation with India as essential to counterbalancing China’s expanding influence in the region.6 Japan’s position within the Quad has remained relatively clear. Its 2022 National Security Strategy explicitly designated China as a top-tier “challenge” and reaffirmed Tokyo’s commitment to maintaining and strengthening a “Free and Open International Order” through Quad partnerships.7

India, however, has approached the Quad with a distinct strategic calculus.8 Initially wary of joining any arrangement that might be perceived as an overtly anti-China alliance, India has gradually embraced the Quad as a flexible mechanism for advancing its regional priorities. This evolution reflects a broader recognition that preserving regional stability requires innovative multilateral frameworks beyond traditional bilateral partnerships.

The Quad provides India with several strategic advantages. First, it enables New Delhi to uphold its strategic autonomy while coordinating responses to regional challenges. Second, it enhances India’s access to intelligence-sharing networks and cutting-edge military technology. Third, it offers an alternative platform for infrastructure financing, countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Most importantly, the Quad allows India to play a central role in shaping the regional security architecture without being bound by formal alliance commitments. Recognizing India’s priorities, Japan has tailored its Quad engagement to align with New Delhi’s strategic interests, reinforcing the coalition’s adaptability and long-term viability.

Land Border Security

If China devotes substantial resources to its border with India, it must divide its military budget to address both the Indian and Japanese fronts simultaneously. The security dynamics of the India-China border and the maritime tensions in the waters surrounding Japan are inherently linked. Since 2020, particularly after the Ladakh clashes, the situation along the India-China border has undergone a significant transformation.

India’s evolving approach to border security reflects a broader reassessment of its strategic posture. The violent confrontations in Ladakh in late 2020 marked a turning point, prompting India to adopt a more comprehensive approach to securing its frontier. This shift has led to an accelerated infrastructure push, enhanced military capabilities, and improved surveillance measures.

A key focus has been the construction of advanced military infrastructure in forward areas, including all-weather roads and upgraded airstrips capable of supporting rapid troop deployment. India has not only developed specialized high-altitude warfare capabilities but has also integrated cutting-edge surveillance technology to monitor Chinese movements more effectively.

As India has reinforced its land border defenses, its security cooperation with Japan has expanded beyond maritime engagements to include air operations. Before the 2020 clashes, India hosted multinational naval exercises with Quad members, such as Malabar and Milan. However, by 2022, India had taken the unprecedented step of allowing US land forces to conduct joint exercises near the India-China border. In 2023, for the first time, India hosted US B-1 bombers at an airbase capable of striking deep into Chinese territory. In 2024, India further expanded its defense cooperation by hosting Tarang Shakti, a multilateral air combat exercise involving all Quad members. While India’s military drills with the Quad have traditionally focused on naval cooperation, this air force engagement has bridged the gap between maritime security and land-based strategic concerns—an evolution that aligns with Japan’s broader security approach.

Beyond military coordination, Japan and India have deepened their collaboration in advanced technology and intelligence sharing—critical components of their modernization efforts. Joint initiatives in artificial intelligence, space, and cyber defense have gained momentum, reinforcing their strategic alignment in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

Maritime Strategy

China’s expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean poses a direct strategic challenge to Japan, compelling Tokyo to strengthen its partnership with India to counterbalance Beijing’s growing influence. India’s rising naval power offers Japan a critical opportunity to reinforce Indo-Pacific security.

India’s evolving maritime posture reflects its increasing confidence in securing the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s expanded naval operations—including submarine deployments and port construction in strategically located nations—have driven India to enhance its naval capabilities, fortify island territories as strategic outposts, and improve marine domain awareness.

Crucially, India has moved beyond unilateral responses, building a network of security partnerships to share the burden of maritime defense. Among these, cooperation with Japan has been particularly significant, evident in joint naval drills, intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime patrols. This networked approach not only reinforces India’s dominant position in the Indian Ocean but also ensures that regional security responsibilities are distributed among like-minded allies.

A key vulnerability in India’s naval capabilities remains antisubmarine warfare. China’s submarines threaten India’s sea lines of communication, its nuclear ballistic submarine fleet, and, by extension, its strategic deterrence. In contrast, Japan’s navy has developed world-class antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Recognizing this synergy, a 2017 joint statement explicitly highlighted Japan’s commitment to cooperating with India in antisubmarine operations.9

Beyond military collaboration, Japan has played a vital role in developing India’s maritime infrastructure. Tokyo has supported the modernization of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—critical to controlling access to the Malacca Strait. Additionally, Japanese firms have laid fiber-optic cables between mainland India and the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, enhancing communications infrastructure. Some analysts suggest that Tokyo and New Delhi are also working together to deploy undersea detection sensors, with initial cooperation already underway in the Indian Ocean.10

As China continues to expand its maritime reach, the Japan–India partnership has grown from ad hoc coordination into a structured and strategic collaboration—one that strengthens the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific and reinforces both nations’ ability to counter emerging threats.

Key Arguments and Strategic Implications

United by shared concerns over China’s assertiveness, Japan and India have deepened their strategic cooperation. However, their approaches diverge in key respects. Japan seeks to strengthen the Quad as a security-oriented framework to counter China’s growing influence, whereas India remains committed to its policy of strategic autonomy and avoids formal military alliances. Recognizing these differences, Japan has adjusted its position to align more closely with India’s perspective, fostering a partnership that balances flexibility with shared strategic interests.

India’s evolving security posture offers critical insights into the country’s broader strategic recalibration. First, New Delhi has demonstrated a sophisticated ability to form security partnerships that expand its strategic options rather than constrain them. The Japan–India relationship exemplifies this approach, illustrating how India engages in deep security cooperation while preserving its independent decision-making.

Second, India’s response to China’s aggression has shifted from a reactive stance to a comprehensive strategy that integrates military modernization, infrastructure expansion, and strategic partnerships. This marks a decisive departure from its traditionally cautious approach to regional security challenges.

Third, India has signaled a greater willingness to take on a leadership role in shaping regional security architecture, particularly in the maritime domain. This growing strategic confidence not only enhances India’s ability to project power but also reinforces its commitment to providing viable alternatives to China’s regional influence.

As a result, Japan has adapted to India’s strategic outlook while continuing to encourage New Delhi’s deeper involvement in balancing China’s expansionism. Rather than pushing India toward a rigid alliance framework, Japan has fostered a partnership that respects India’s strategic autonomy while reinforcing the broader security architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed the Indian Parliament, he articulated Japan’s strategic vision with clarity: “A strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.”11 This statement encapsulates Japan’s commitment to deepening security cooperation with India, a trajectory that is becoming increasingly evident. As part of its newly established Official Security Assistance program, Japan plans to provide drones to like-minded countries, including India. Beyond this, Tokyo is prepared to supply heavy machinery for infrastructure development in border areas and to support India’s regional security network by donating radars, patrol boats, and aircraft to neighboring nations. However, Japan has made clear that such initiatives will proceed in close coordination with India, ensuring that New Delhi’s strategic preferences guide these efforts.

While Japan’s policy direction is explicit, the more dynamic factor is India’s evolving stance—a shift that Tokyo carefully respects. Looking ahead, several factors will determine the effectiveness of India’s strategic approach. Maintaining military modernization efforts while managing fiscal constraints will be critical. Equally important will be India’s ability to strengthen institutional security frameworks, particularly within the Quad, while preserving its commitment to strategic flexibility.

India’s expanding strategic capabilities reflect a pragmatic response to the region’s shifting power dynamics. Challenges remain, particularly in balancing military modernization with complex diplomatic engagements. However, India’s trajectory signals growing confidence in its ability to shape regional security rather than merely react to it. To navigate these challenges effectively, India must continue to cultivate partnerships with Japan while maintaining the flexibility necessary to safeguard its strategic autonomy.

The implications of India’s evolving strategy extend beyond its immediate security interests. The Indo-Pacific remains a theater of great-power competition and fluid security dynamics. How India manages to sustain regional stability while advancing its strategic objectives will play a decisive role in shaping the broader regional order. Its success—or failure—will influence how other middle powers approach similar security dilemmas. More significantly, India’s ability to strike a balance between strategic independence and substantive security cooperation could serve as a model for other nations seeking to maintain sovereignty while forging strong defense ties in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

Amid these shifting dynamics, one constant remains: China. The more assertive Beijing becomes, the more Japan and India find common cause in counterbalancing its influence. In this sense, China itself is the most powerful catalyst for closer Japan–India strategic cooperation.♦


Dr. Kamakshi Wason

Dr. Wason serves as the Global Chief Operating Officer and Director of Academic Programmes at the Tillotoma Foundation. She also heads the New Delhi Office, Tillotoma Foundation. She is a noted practitioner of Track 2 Diplomacy. Her research interests include diplomacy, defense, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific.

Dr. Satoru Nagao

Dr. Satoru Nagao is a nonresident fellow at Hudson Institute, specializing in US–Japan–India security cooperation. He is also an associate professor at the Institute for International Strategy of Tokyo International University. He earned his PhD from Gakushuin University in 2011 for his pioneering research on India’s military strategy and holds multiple research and advisory positions across Japan, India, and Sri Lanka.


Notes

1 Satoru Nagao, “Rapid Development of India-Japan Cooperation: Its Chance and Challenges,” in Routledge Handbook on South Asian Foreign Policy, ed. Aparna Pande (New York, Routledge, 2022), 248-265.

2 Ministry of Defense of Japan, "China's Activities in the South China Sea," October 2020.

3 Satoru Nagao, "The Japan-India-Australia 'Alliance' as Key Agreement in the Indo-Pacific," ISPSW Strategy Series (September 2015).

4 "Doklam stand-off: Japan backs India, says no one should try to change status quo by force," The Times of India, August 18, 2017; Satoru Nagao, "What is Japan's Role in the Indo-China border conflict?" Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies (October 2017).

5 Aparna Pande, From Chanakya to Modi: The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2017); Aparna Pande, Making India Great: The Promise of A Reluctant Global Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2020).

6 Shinzo Abe, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond," Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe

7 Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan, “National Security Strategy,” December 2022

8 Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Evolution of India-Japan Ties: Prospects and Limitations," in India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership, ed. Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 15-40.

9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-India Joint Statement: Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific," September 14, 2017.

10 Abhijit Singh, "India's 'Undersea Wall' in the Eastern Indian Ocean," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, June 15, 2016.

11 Shinzo Abe, "Confluence of the Two Seas" (speech, Parliament of the Republic of India, New Delhi, August 22, 2007), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.

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