The Case for A.C.E Infrastructure in EUCOM Published March 8, 2022 By Maj Matthew Crowley, Maj Carissa Deeney, and Maj Adam Potter Wild Blue Yonder -- The following essay was researched and written 12 months ago as a coursework requirement at Air Command and Staff College. While was prescient in its predictions of Russian aggression and challenges facing an Allied response, hopefully the suggestions contained therein for the execution of Agile Combat Employment in response to such threats prove equally valid. General Eisenhower said, “In preparing for battle…plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”[1] In designing future responses to Russian aggression planners must look to the past. Based on Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent doctrine revision listing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its top national security threat, contemporary sources, including a 2020 RAND study, predict that future Russian aggression will involve inserting an occupying ground force along NATO’s eastern border, deploying anti-air defenses, and making demands of NATO, which may include the withdrawal of United States (U.S.) forces from Norway or Poland.[2] In such a scenario, escalating hostilities may lead to targeting of Main Operating Bases (MOB) in European Command (EUCOM) resulting in degraded, denied, or destroyed aircraft generation and command and control capabilities. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational construct augmenting MOBs with a network of forward operating locations (FOL) and additional landing sites to facilitate dispersal and short-term operations complicating adversary targeting and providing “an arsenal of options for Allied combat.”[3] This concept has been repeatedly tested in the geographically-dispersed islands of the Pacific in exercises such as Rapid Raptor whereby four F-22s landed in an austere location with support equipment and personnel carried by a C-17.[4] However, planning and conducting ACE in the contiguous landscape of Europe presents a different problem. An examination of three critical categories of infrastructure including airfields and force employment, ground support, and communications architecture demonstrates that utilizing existing Joint and Allied airfields and support capabilities, maximizing prepositioned stocks, and leveraging distributed transportation and communication networks is the best way for the United States Air Force (USAF) to employ ACE in EUCOM. Introduction to ACE Infrastructure Requirements As a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Range Forces Treaty in 2019, which banned land-based missiles with ranges between 310 – 3,400 miles, a planning assumption for ACE is that all European bases can be targeted and engaged by Russia.[5] This lends urgency to the need for rapid deployment capability for aircraft strike packages. According to Joint All Domain Doctrine (JADO), “ACE-resilient basing plans consist of main operating bases with significant passive and active defenses, a network of FOLs used for dispersal and short term operations, and a series of additional landing sites used for refueling and reloading.”[6] ACE publications focus on rapid response capability and launching missions from “additional landing sites” assuming these locations are austere with little or no supporting infrastructure, thus necessitating the coordinated airlift of equipment, fuel, munitions, and personnel to sustain dispersed fighter aircraft.[7] Such publications deemphasize specific logistics requirements, such as Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) and fuel pumps and hoses, needed to perform basic aircraft transient alert (refuel only) or launch and recovery (refuel and rearm) operations. Airfield and Force Employment Infrastructure for ACE Infrastructure requirements rapidly increase with the number of participating aircraft and the sustainment duration at a designated location. Several characteristics captured in airfield assessments are listed on the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Form 174 which must be considered. These items include but are not limited to: runway length, weight bearing capacity, weapons and fuel storage, flight line security, personnel bed-down, secure work areas, parking Maximum Operating on Ground (MOG), MHE/aerial port working MOG, weapons storage/loading/arming zones/personnel/equipment, communications, air traffic control, aircrew staging, maintenance personnel and equipment, and instrument lighting and Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) for inclement weather launch and recovery. Any item that is insufficient or not organic to the airfield equates to a larger demand for personnel and equipment and rapidly increases the force “footprint.” The result is a corresponding decrease in ability to rapidly unload, setup, perform operations, tear-down, and forward deploy, which is inconsistent with the imperative of ACE “to have a more lean, agile, and lethal force.”[8] To conduct operations in such austere environments, the USAF relies on scalable Contingency Response Forces (CRF) and Global Air Mobility Support System assets, which, when deployed by rotary and fixed wing tactical airlift platforms, facilitate unprepared airfield usage and enable Air Mobility Support Operations.[9] Such a response, however, is predicated on a Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) requirement for an Air Base Opening (ABO) or Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) operation that is designed to service a maximum of two C-17, or equivalent, aircraft and associated passengers and cargo continuously over a 24-hour period.[10] In order to provide C2, In-Transit-Visibility (ITV) of cargo, minimal maintenance thru-servicing, minimum security for aircraft loading and personnel bed-down, and enough aerial port capacity, a full-size Contingency Response Group (CRG) is required.[11] Airfield and Force Employment Infrastructure Challenges, Risks, and Costs A full-size JTF-PO accomplishing the Force Module 1 task of opening an airbase requires approximately 200 Joint/Interagency personnel and the equivalent of sixteen C-17s of airlifted cargo and personnel.[12] Only five in-garrison CRGs exist in the USAF, only one of which is on alert for USTRANSCOM JTF-PO at a given time due to the heavy demands on personnel readiness, training, equipment maintenance, and preparation.[13] Given the limited amount of CRF, the cost and complexity of staging multiple ABOs, the robust multi-modal transportation network available in Europe, and the number of Joint and partner military bases with established infrastructure and security, it is imperative for ACE planners to designate the latter as FOLs. This approach reduces the cost of transportation and the risk of mission degradation by performing launch and recovery operations at unimproved landing sites.[14] In addition to existing Joint and Allied infrastructure, the USAF can leverage NATO partner capabilities to build and augment FOLs and additional landing sites in support of ACE. In fact, as of 2020, EUCOM is pursuing additional infrastructure upgrades and agreements in Eastern Europe to secure access to partner nation airfields.[15] Furthermore, Joint teams such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (SEABEEs) can rapidly prepare larger runways, parking ramps, and personnel bed-down facilities. The Logistics Combat Element of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), which is similar to USAF’s CRG, can also open and operate airfields to facilitate ACE. In a hostile environment, these Joint partners can facilitate Joint Forcible Entry and airfield seizure via paratroop delivery or ground seizure by an Army Brigade Combat Team or Marine Expeditionary Unit.[16] Utilizing existing bases and FOL buildup or seizure are solutions to the challenge of establishing airfields for ACE. Another challenge facing U.S. and Allied aircraft is obtaining diplomatic clearance and over-flight permissions to access FOLs and landing sites. A host nation’s approval places its facilities and population at risk of being targeted by hostilities. In a 2018 meeting of defense ministers NATO officials acknowledged this threat saying Russia had been “testing its ability to carry out cyber attacks in the Baltics,” one example of which was the disruption of Latvia’s mobile communications networks in late 2017.[17] Whether Allied countries fear similar retribution or wish to remain neutral during hostilities, the potential denial of over-flight or landing permission necessitates a distributed network of additional landing sites to provide options to overcome these challenges during ACE operations. Ground Support Infrastructure for Agile Combat Employment ACE requires access to fuel, munitions, and ground support equipment for aircraft and personnel, however, the application of ACE in Europe should not rely heavily on sustainment by air given the robust infrastructure interconnecting Allied countries. The NATO Central European Pipeline system (CEPS) links 35 depots, military and civil airfields, refineries, and seaports assuring the capability to transfer jet fuel, gasoline, and diesel fuel. This state-of-the-art system contains multiple redundancies, a capacity of 317 million gallons, and a Military Priority Clause, which guarantees priority of supply to military forces during a conflict.[18] Additionally, given the number of Fuel Exchange Agreements and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) the U.S. has with European countries allowing U.S. military aircraft to be serviced, on-load liquid oxygen (LOX), and refuel with minimal coordination at host nation military installations ostensibly designated as FOLs, the supply of quality-assured fuel at U.S. standard price (that is, tax-free) is essentially guaranteed. In lieu of sufficient prepositioned fuel stores, Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP) provide deployable equipment and trained personnel capable of launching and recovering aircraft for “the employment of aviation units in combat.”[19] A 2019 FARP demonstration involved a MC-130J, Commando II transferring fuel to an F-35A, Lightning II.[20] This capability is significant as several European allies, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Italy have procured or are in the process of sourcing F-35 aircraft which have stealth and sensor-fusion features that make it capable of penetrating Russian air defenses to gain significant combat advantages in the opening salvo against a Russian threat.[21] Ground Support Infrastructure Challenges, Costs and Risks Wet-wing defueling, or transferring fuel from fixed wing aircraft fuel tanks of an aircraft into a truck or another aircraft, is a mission traditionally conducted by special operations forces and requires specially trained aircrews due to the increased risk. In fact, JP4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water, asserts that although the seven support aircraft types are all capable of performing wet-wing defueling, “transporting fuel by air greatly increases operational costs and safety risks” and “limits the airlift available for other requirements.” This refueling method overcomes the challenge of fuel non-availability but should only be conducted if no other delivery means, such as truck resupply or host-nation support, can meet operational objectives.[22] As for the rearming aspect of FARP operations, a recent RAND study on Agile Combat Support force package modules highlights that air-to-ground munitions “require significantly more personnel and equipment” than air-to-air munitions.[23] Transporting these munitions by air and landing with enough on-board fuel to conduct wet-wing defueling is also dangerous and requires specified runway capabilities and host nation approval, therefore strategic pre-positioning of these munitions significantly reduces costs and the risk to the Airmen and aircraft. One alternative to prepositioned munitions assets is deploying Tactical Ammunition Rapid Response Packages (TARRP). Located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, this unique capability includes the assembly, preparation, and palletization of munitions for rapid delivery. This shortens lead-times and offers a solution to overcome complexities in airlifting, assembling, and loading munitions at FOLs or alternate landing sites.[24] The 173rd Airborne Brigade is the U.S. Army Contingency Response Force in Europe and exercises battalion-level deployment procedures such as convoy operations with U.S. allies, recently with the Slovenian Armed Forces in Exercise Lipizzaner.[25] As hostilities escalate, another option is for the 173rd to deliver munitions by convoy from secure stockpiles to pre-designated FOLs and additional landing sites, and provide a security team if necessary. Waiting to move “preferred munitions,” including Hellfire missiles and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), until the eve of combat prevents them from being targeted at the outset of hostilities exemplifying Clausewitz’s notions of “tactical” and “strategic reserve,” by retaining the capability to “prolong and renew the action,” and “holding a force in readiness for an emergency,” respectively.[26] Providing basing for a force as a result of dispersal from MOBs requires adaptive basing options. JADO doctrine recommends the development of organic and theater sustainment options and pre-positioned materiel caches to support these efforts.[27] Additional Deployable Air Base Systems (DABS) which include vehicles, tents, medical supplies, and airfield repair equipment that allow the USAF to rapidly set up a base, are currently being procured by United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) to “bolster American airpower in Europe,” with the goal of placing ten of the twenty-four kits by 2021.[28] In 2020, the U.S. Army also “right-sized” and modernized it’s prepositioned stock (APS) located in Poland and subsequently conducted Defender Europe, a division-sized exercise to test location suitability and equipment operability of assets conveniently located an hour away from the Army V Corps in Poznan.[29] These assets provide a solution for short-notice bed-down requirements as they can rapidly forward-deploy by ground or air in multi-modal configurations to augment existing personnel infrastructure at FOLs and landing sites during ACE operations. Communications Architecture ACE planners must also consider ways to assure C2 during hostilities with Russia. The proliferation of space systems has rapidly extended lines of communication enabling successful C2 nearly everywhere operations are conducted, to include austere environments.[30] Since the 1990s, the U.S. has operated largely uncontested in the Command, Control and Communications (C3) domain and thus focused on net-centric systems and cyberspace versus increasing C3 capabilities in a contested electromagnetic environment. Conversely, China and Russia have focused their efforts and investments in the ability to reduce U.S. C3 superiority across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Unfortunately, U.S. development of C3-enabling capabilities has primarily been independently conducted within individual military departments resulting in Joint interoperability issues, duplication of efforts, and wasted time and fiscal resources.[31] Given these challenges, senior leaders around the USAF, to include Lt Gen Charles Moore, of U.S. Cyber Command, assert that the U.S. must prepare to conduct operations without instantaneous global communications, which is also an assumption of the ACE framework.[32] JADO Annex 3-99 recommends the issuance of mission-type orders, which is guidance issued to the lowest levels of an organization enabling operators to understand and achieve the Joint Force Commander’s intent, in order to overcome degraded C3 environments occurring during ACE operations.48 Although increasing training for this type of scenario can improve proficiency, the Department of Defense (DoD) also must invest in protecting C3 superiority and joint inter-operability. Fortunately, the DoD has developed a C3 Modernization Strategy that will allow ACE missions to proceed more effectively by improving communications in the areas of beyond-line-of-sight communications (BLOS), 5G infrastructure, tactical communications systems, agile EMS operations, and interoperability in the mission partner environment. Communications Architecture Challenges, Costs, and Risks The EMS is a complex and constrained environment that is increasingly congested by friendly, neutral, and adversary technologies, rendering systems such as satellites and ground links increasingly vulnerable. To overcome these challenges, Artificial Intelligence (AI), can be employed to maximize U.S. Joint and Allied ability to operate across the EMS by speeding up the prioritization of users and increasing data sharing across the spectrum.[33] Additionally, AI is integral to optimizing Primary Alternate Contingency Emergency (PACE) planning for intermodal transportation networks. Currently, systems with automated or user-controlled PACE plans that include satellite communications (SATCOM), cellular/wireless, and/or wired transport use a failover methodology from the primary down through the emergency plans. AI will enable real-time analysis that automatically switches to the best communications path while accounting for potential interference to other users based on prioritization data.[34] Assuring BLOS communications is another challenge that must be overcome as this capability is primarily provided by SATCOM and thus increasingly vulnerable and adversely affected by weather and terrain in Europe. SATCOM can remain a primary capability through the employment of a distributed enterprise architecture that uses a combination of U.S. military, Allied, and commercial satellites increasing the likelihood of availability and achieving efficiencies. Even with a distributed architecture, SATCOM cannot be guaranteed during a future conflict with near peer adversaries. Therefore, the US and Allies must invest in High Frequency Global Communications and airborne relay systems such as the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) and Radio Frequency (RF)-SATCOM links to ensure cross-domain communication across strategic and tactical levels.[35] Such capabilities are an operational imperative to overcome the challenge of dispersed Joint and Allied units between MOBs, FOLs, and alternate landing sites. For ACE operations to be maximally effective, tactical level systems need to be designed with scalability, security, redundancy, interoperability, simplicity, and Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) in mind.[36] A deployable communications suite package designed for rapid deployment via support aircraft will need to minimize SWaP, at the cost of performance, be the simplest of systems, as a trained communications expert may not accompany them, and be designed to require little more than a power source and Local Area Network (LAN) ports. Once again, given the robust ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the EUCOM theater, a mobile communications vehicle, such as those used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a reasonable alternative due to its self-contained power source which will not occupy valuable space on a cargo aircraft. The USAF should adopt DHS’s model of strategically pre-positioned vehicles across Europe allowing rapid forward deployment to FOLs and additional landing sites in a predetermined amount of time.[37] These vehicles provide a robust but temporary system that can be extended across an austere location through the use of Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) radios or Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s Fixed Wireless at a Distance effort.[38] Whether through an air, space, or vehicle-operated system, the challenge of assuring C3 for ACE operations can be overcome utilizing an AI-controlled PACE plan including SATCOM, cellular, and wired transport paths for redundancy and resiliency as part of a distributed network. Additional Research Recommendations for ACE Operations Ace publications also refer to potential shifts in organizational and training paradigms to facilitate ACE. The latter involves creating “multifunction personnel” qualified to perform a variety of tasks at FOLs reducing the number of personnel accompanying the aircraft.[39] If multi-function Airmen remain a focus of ACE, a fully-developed operational requirement and training program must be funded and fielded. With respect to the former, JADO Annex 3-99 advocates the past concept of Composite Air Strike Forces which integrated various types of aircraft and associate airmen in one unit that deployed together with one commander capable of conducting combat independently.[40] If designed to easily integrate with Joint and NATO partners, this approach offers a potential solution to overcome the challenges of disruptions in C2 communications, streamline command authorities, and allow air forces to achieve “localized superiority” in an contested environment, and thus warrants further research. Conclusion: USAF Needs Joint Partners, European Allies, and Investments for ACE General Eisenhower also said, “When you are in any contest, you should work like there is always…to the very last minute…a chance to lose it.”[41] Having fought a prolonged air and ground war in Europe, he understood the need to find efficiencies while also retaining a rapid, agile response capability. Utilizing existing bases as FOLs and leveraging support agreements and ground transportation networks instead of airlifting fuel and munitions to alternate landing sites reduces the cost and risk of force employment. Additionally, the prepositioning and augmenting of wartime stocks and equipment, such as DABs, MHE, and mobile communications vehicles, and leveraging existing Joint and Allied partners increases the USAF’s efficiencies while cultivating the ability to rapidly respond to future Russian aggression. While most ACE publications focus on rapid response capability and operating at austere locations, which increases cost and risk, these efforts can be optimized by collaborative infrastructure investment in a distributed C3 network, employing additional agile capabilities such as FARP and TARRP at alternate landing sites, and augmenting existing CRG forces or reorganizing and training forces to be more agile. Although some planners may assume the USAF cannot rely on European Allies during future cross-domain hostilities, Clausewitz asserts, “a defender’s allies [are] his ultimate source of support.”[42] Therefore, in the case of ACE, the USAF must rely on Joint and Allied infrastructure, support capabilities, and investments to overcome the unique challenges of establishing and equipping FOLs in Europe in order to win against Russia. Lieutenant Colonel Carissa D. Deeney is an Air University Fellow and an instructor in the Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). She completed the ACSC In-Residence program in May 2021 as a Distinguished Graduate. Prior to ACSC, Lt Col Deeney was the Operations Officer at the 731st Air Mobility Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea and, most recently, served as an instructor at Officer Training School (OTS), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. She has held positions at various echelons from squadron to headquarters and deployed three times in support of counter-narco terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and OPERATION IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM. She graduated from Ball State University with a Bachelor of Science in Psychology and received her commission in 2007 from OTS as a Logistics Readiness Officer. Lt Col Deeney also earned a Master of Business Administration from Webster University as well as a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University. Major Adam W. Potter was a member of Air Command and Staff College’s AY21 class and is the Director of 11th Wing Plans and Programs at Joint Base Anacostia Bolling. Maj Potter is responsible for ensuring a smooth and successful first-ever Joint Base lead service transfer from Navy to Air Force and serves as the primary liaison between the 11th Wing and over 70 mission partners as well as supporting all airmen in the national capital region. Major Potter, a native of Baltimore, Maryland, graduated from Norwich University in 2007. Throughout his career, he has served in a variety of positions across four MAJCOM/DRUs (AFMC, ACC, AETC, AFDW) as well as a tours at the White House Communications Agency in Washington, DC and HQ ISAF, Kabul Afghanistan. Major Matthew Crowley was a member of Air Command and Staff College’s AY21 class and is Chief, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Pacific Air Forces, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI. Maj Crowley serves the PACAF Commander and Staff on all aspects of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, directing operational planning groups in development of courses of action, concepts of operations, and mission guidance for integration with USINDOPACOM and Joint Task Force staffs. He oversees the organization, training, and equipping of the 36th Contingency Response Group and advises COMPACAF/INDOPACOM on CRG employment. Additionally, he leads the PACAF execution of Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Continuity of Operations, POTUS movements, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and pandemic mitigations. Major Crowley was commissioned in 2008 from the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO, and earned his pilot rating at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX in 2010. He has served as a First Pilot, C-130E/H1/H3, and as an Instructor and Evaluator Pilot in the C-130J aircraft. Major Crowley holds a Senior Pilot rating with over 2,000 flying hours, 680 combat hours, and has deployed six times in support of overseas contingency operations. NOTES [1] Dwight Eisenhower, attributed in Richard Nixon’s, Six Crises, (Doubleday: 1962), accessed on 30 January 2020 at: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/ 9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00004005. [2] Anika Binnendijk, Gene Germanovich, Bruce McClintock and Sarah Heintz, “At the Vanguard: European Contributions to NATO’s Future Combat Airpower,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020) xi; Maj Gen Charles Brown, Jr., Brig Gen Bradley Spacy, Capt Charles Glover III, “Untethered Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing Are Keys to Airpower’s Success in the Antiaccess/Area-Denial Environment,” Air & Space Power Journal, Maxwell AFB, Vol. 29, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2015), 18; Jessica Kwong, “Russia Warns More U.S. Troops in Poland Could 'Lead to Counteraction' From Kremlin,” Newsweek (28 May 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-warns-us-expansionist-actions-poland-could-lead-counter-action-kremlin-946359. [3] Jason Lemon, “Additional U.S. Troops In Norway Could Bring 'Destabilizing' Impact, Russia Says,” Newsweek (14 June 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/us-troops-norway-destabilizing-russia-977834; Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Annex 3-99, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), Appendix B: Key Considerations for Agile Combat Employment, 08 Oct 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil, 1. [4] Maj Gen Charles Brown, Jr. et. al., “Untethered Operations,” 18. [5] Idrees Ali, U.S. tests ground-launched ballistic missile after INF treaty exit,” Reuters: Aerospace and Defense, 12 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-russia/u-s-tests-ground-launched-ballistic-missile-after-inf-treaty-exit-idUSKBN1YG287. [6] Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Annex 3-99, 1. [7] Maj Brad Echols, “Adaptive Basing for Air Forces: Theories and Challenges,” Strategem, 12 July 2020, https://www.stratagem.no/adaptive-basing-for-air-forces-theory-and-challenges/; Jennifer Hlad and Amy McCullough, “ACE-ing the Test: Westpac exercise stresses Agile Combat Employment,” Air Force Magazine, 1 May 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/ ace-ing-the-test/; Maj Gen Charles Brown, Jr. et. al., “Untethered Operations.” [8] Kimberly Underwood, “Moving Forward with Agile Combat,” SIGNAL Magazine, 18 June 2020, https://www.afcea.org/content/moving-forward-agile-combat/. [9] AFTTP 3-4.7, Contingency Response, 30 Sep 2017, https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/ production/1/lemay_center/publication/afttp3-4.7/afttp3-4.7cr.pdf; Joint Publication 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 5 February 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/ Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_17.pdf. [10] AFTTP 3-2.68, Airfield Opening, 30 September 2018, https://static.e-publishing.af. mil/production/1/lemay_center/publication/afttp3-2.68/afttp3-2.68.pdf . [11] AFTTP 3-4.7, Contingency Response, 30 Sep 2017. [12] AFTTP 3-2.68, Airfield Opening, 30 September 2018. [13] James E. Long, “Adequacy of Airbase Opening Operations Doctrine,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KA: 2006). [14] Joint Publication 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 5 February 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/ Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_17.pdf. [15] Maj Scott Adamson and Maj Shane “Axl” Praiswater, “With air bases at risk, Agile Combat Employment must mature,” DefenseNews, 12 November 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/11/12/air-bases-are-at-risk-without-the-agile-combat-employment-approach/. [16] AFTTP 3-2.68, Airfield Opening, 30 September 2018. [17] Christina Maza, “NATO Unveils Plan for Fighting Russia After Trump Administration Calls for More Planes and Ships,” Newsweek, 8 June 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/nato-unveils-plan-fighting-russia-after-trump-administration-calls-more-planes-967131. [18] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Central Europe Pipeline System,” accessed 30 January 2021 at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49151.htm. [19] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 31 August 2005), https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp1_02(05).pdf. [20] “F-35A maintainers, special ops team up for forward refueling,” 388th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, 28 February 2019, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1770522/f-35a-maintainers-special-ops-team-up-for-forward-refueling/. [21] Sebastian Sprenger, “European nations should shape their air-combat fleets to support the F-35, US analysts say,” DefenseNews, 22 October 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/ europe/2020/10/22/european-nations-should-shape-their-air-combat-fleets-to-support-the-F-35-us-analysts-say/. [22] Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine, 11 January 2016, Validated 30 November 2017, IV-6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/ jp4_03pa.pdf. [23] Patrick Mills, James Leftwich, John Drew, Daniel Felten, Josh Girardini, John Godges, Michael Lostumbo, Anu Narayanan, Kristin Van Abel, Jonathan Welburn, and Anna Wirth, Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts, RAND Corporation, RR-4200-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 30 September 2017), 47. [24] Senior Airman Omari Bernard, “18th Munitions Squadron Conducts TARRP,” Defense Logistics Agency, 12 December 2106, https://www.dla.mil/AboutDLA/News/NewsArticleView/ Article/1028019/18th-munitions-squadron-conducts-tarrp/. [25] Craig Hayes, “News From the Front: NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) for Commanders and Staff,” Center for Army Lessons Learned (April 2019), https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/STANAG.pdf. [26] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 210. [27] Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Annex 3-99, 2. [28] John Vandiver, “Air Force ‘base in a box’ plan delayed because of poor management, IG says,” Stars and Stripes, 2 January 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-base-in-a-box-plan-delayed-because-of-poor-management-ig-says-1.562847. [29] Jen Judson, “The US Army is adjusting its prepositioned stock for more than just war,” DefenseNews, 30 November 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020.11.30/the-us-army-is-adjusting-its-pre-positioned-stock-for-more-than-just-war/. [30] Headquarters United States Space Force, Space Force Publication, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, June 2020, 19. [31] Department of Defense, C3 (Command, Control, and Communications) Modernization Strategy, (September 2020), 2. https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/DoD-C3-Strategy.pdf. [32] Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Annex 3-99, 1-2. [33] Department of Defense, C3 Modernization Strategy, 2-4, 6-7. [34] George I. Seffers, “Army Eyes Artificial Intelligence for PACE Planning,” SIGNAL Magazine, (12 August 2020), https://www.afcea.org/content/army-eyes-artificial-intelligence-pace-planning. [35] Department of Defense, C3 Modernization Strategy, 13-14; Andrew Soine, et al., “Deployed Communications in an Austere Environment,” Air and Space Power Journal, (November-December 2013): 82-91. [36] Air Force CyberWorx Report [19-008] Agile Combat Employment. USAF Academy, CO: Air Force CyberWorx, November 2019, 4. [37] Department of Homeland Security, Mobile Command Vehicles, 14 August 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/mobile-command-posts. [38] Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Fixed Wireless at a Distance (Archived), accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.darpa.mil/program/fixed-wireless-at-a-distance. [39] Kimberly Underwood, “Moving Forward with Agile Combat,” SIGNAL Magazine; Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Annex 3-99, 2. [40] Maj James Moschgat, “The Composite Wing: Back to the Future!” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, (Maxwell AFB, AL: 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a425 511.pdf. [41] President Dwight Eisenhower, news conference, 27 September 1956, in Public papers of the Presidents of the United States (1972), accessed on 30 January 2020 at: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00004005. [42] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 373.