Injecting Influence: What “Sputnik V” Teaches Military Planners About Modern Propaganda Published May 12, 2025 By Lt. Col. Emily Ladd and Dr. Robert Hinck Maxwell AFB -- In August 2020, Russia announced that it had registered the world’s first COVID-19 vaccine, named “Sputnik V.”[1] The announcement marked the beginning of a strategic global information campaign; one that used the vaccine not merely as a medical product but as a tool of geopolitical influence, public diplomacy, and propaganda. At the heart of this campaign was a dual-track disinformation strategy in which Kremlin-backed media spread false claims about the dangers of Western vaccines while amplifying favorable coverage of Sputnik V to bolster Russian influence with foreign nations.[2] An early example of this occurred in July 2020, when the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) disseminated disinformation through radio, newspapers, and local television, falsely alleging that a U.S.-led vaccine trial in Kharkiv resulted in the deaths of Ukrainian volunteers, including military personnel.[3] LPR media further promoted conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 originated in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) controlled laboratories on Ukrainian territory. Both efforts supported Russian interests to delegitimize the Kyiv government by portraying Ukraine and the U.S. as negligent and exploitative while casting Russia as a more trustworthy alternative.[4] Social media too proved pivotal in Russia’s offensive to promote Sputnik V. Sputnik V’s official Twitter account waged a bold campaign of “vaccine diplomacy” mocking Western regulators, discrediting critical media reports, and amplifying diplomatic praise with a flood of emojis and hashtags.[5] Reflective of the Kremlin’s broader strategy of weaponizing information to destabilize trust and dominate the narrative battlefield, Russian social media messaging extended beyond official channels to include a network of online proxies, influencers, and purportedly independent medical experts from countries like India, Pakistan, and Brazil each of which echoed pro-Sputnik narratives while casting doubt on Western vaccines.[6] Russia’s global rollout of the Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine illustrates how modern information campaigns extend beyond traditional military or political messaging. While the DOD has made some advances in specifying the principles for planning, coordinating, and executing the employment of information during joint operations, including an increased focus on the role of narratives in shaping perceptions, US information operations remain narrowly focused on using information activities in support of military operations.[7] Russia and China, in contrast, continue to employ a whole of government approach that actively leverages the IE to shape global perceptions in service of their national interests.[8] As former CIA department chief for Russia, Karen Monaghan, warns “Information operations against our near-peer competitors must be much more strategic, involve a lot more critical thinking about what are our goals, [and] what are we really trying to do.”[9] To develop a greater strategic understanding of the threats posed by U.S. adversaries in the IE, this study examines how Russia’s Sputnik V campaign was constructed and deployed by drawing upon core concepts from Jacques Ellul’s theory of propaganda. Ellul’s model provides military planners with a practical lens for understanding adversary narratives and disinformation techniques. For U.S. strategists and policymakers, our analysis highlights the growing importance of propaganda literacy as a core competency in today’s contested information environment, the strengths and limitations of propaganda messaging, and the importance of tailoring messages to promote narrative resonance to neutral, partner, ally, and adversarial audiences. Ellul’s Typologies and Russia’s Strategic Adaptation Although the character of our IE may have changed, the nature of informational influence has not. Political warfare, information operations, and propaganda have been used for millennia with their current application in today’s environment merely adapting to include digital disinformation strategies.[10] Returning to an assessment of fundamental propaganda techniques can therefore provide a more enduring and useful model for US policymakers and strategists to understand the ways and means by which adversarial actors shape foreign audiences. Jacques Ellul’s germinal work on propaganda offers such a blueprint and sheds light on why Russia’s information strategies often outperform media campaigns led by the U.S. and other Western democracies. According to Ellul, propaganda encompasses techniques of psychological influence and organizational partitioning of groups to envelop individuals with the goal of sparking action. In this regard, propaganda seeks to place individuals into a specific frame of reference by furnishing them with reasons, justifications, and motivations that incentivize action along pre-determined ends established by the propagandist. This includes consideration into the ways (mediums of communication), means (elements of messaging), and ends (type of action desired) through which propaganda targets specific audiences.[11] First, for propaganda to take hold, the target audience must be surrounded by all available facets of media. This includes vertical (top-down) and horizontal (peers) channels with each usable medium offering its own particular way of penetrating individuals’ cognition. Effective propaganda therefore operates not sporadically but continuously, leaving no part of the intellectual or emotional life of individuals alone. In doing so, propaganda modifies the opinions and attitudes of its target audiences such that it furnishes them with a complete system for explaining the world; one that supports the propagandist’s desired goals.[12] Second, propaganda operates by manipulating powerful symbols. Rather than attacking pre-established beliefs head-on, propaganda attaches itself to pre-existing emotions and ideas to alter or divert its target audiences’ behavior. This occurs through both irrational and rational messaging. Irrational messaging stokes one’s anxieties and fears while rational messaging supplies individuals with factual information shaping social problems individuals face to which the propagandist offers purported solutions. In this regard, propaganda obtains action without demanding consistency in attitudes by placing individuals in ambiguous contexts allowing the propagandist to channel the target audiences’ need for solutions/resolutions for specific problems.[13] Finally, Ellul makes a distinction between two types of propaganda efforts: agitation and integration. Agitation propaganda seeks to dissolve or undermine existing patterns of behavior. It prompts rapid, often violent action, by arousing feelings of frustration and aggression to disrupt existing relationships or commonly held frames of reference. Propaganda of integration, on the other hand, promotes social cohesion through conformity by prompting individuals to accept symbols of authority, including shared narratives or myths dictating patterns of communal behavior. Importantly, these two forms of propaganda are not mutually exclusive; agitation propaganda can prompt immediate action but is often short lived; thus, long term success often relies on re-integrating individuals into a common framework for normal, coordinated action to occur.[14] Taken together, successful propaganda requires detailed knowledge of one’s audience, the ability to disseminate messages using a variety of media, and tailored messaging. In the case of Russia’s Sputnik V campaign, Moscow proved to be an adept propagandist by employing official channels and proxy actors to tailor and disseminate a variety of messages strategically blending techniques of agitation/integration, vertical/horizontal channels, and rational/irrational messaging.[15] We detail each of these three efforts below before turning to the operational limits and strategic consequences of the campaign and the implications for U.S. strategists and policymakers. Vertical vs. Horizontal Techniques Russia strategically employed both vertical and horizontal propaganda techniques to promote Sputnik V and undermine Western vaccine narratives, calibrating its communication strategy to suit each target audience's authority structures, media ecosystems, and social dynamics. Russia employed vertical propaganda to amplify its Sputnik V messaging, a top-down communication strategy driven by authoritative figures, state institutions, and official media channels.[16] This approach relied on endorsements from political leaders, government agencies, and aligned media outlets to frame the vaccine as credible and geopolitically significant. In Latin America, for example, Argentine President Alberto Fernández publicly received the Sputnik V vaccine and praised its effectiveness. Russian state media heavily promoted this symbolic act to signal global acceptance and scientific legitimacy.[17] In Africa, Egypt served as a key case study, where high-level diplomatic agreements and state-led endorsements of Sputnik V—amplified by Egyptian and Russian media—framed the vaccine as a symbol of bilateral cooperation, scientific progress, and geopolitical alignment.[18] Russia also used press releases, diplomatic statements, and televised agreements to project the image of Sputnik V as a humanitarian achievement and a testament to Russian technological leadership. By controlling the message through official channels, vertical propaganda allowed the Kremlin to shape elite discourse, influence foreign policy decisions, and present Russia as a benevolent alternative to Western powers. In doing so, Russia advanced its national objectives by strengthening diplomatic alliances, expanding its geopolitical footprint, and positioning itself as a leader in the global South amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously, Russia deployed horizontal propaganda to amplify its Sputnik V messaging through peer-to-peer communication and influencer-driven content across social media platforms. Unlike vertical propaganda, this approach relied on the credibility and relatability of non-government actors—such as paid influencers, anonymous accounts, and self-proclaimed medical experts—to spread pro-Sputnik V narratives in a manner that appeared organic, apolitical, and culturally embedded.[19] Favorable content surfaced in unexpected digital spaces, including beauty tutorials, reaction videos, and lifestyle blogs, often subtly incorporating vaccine messaging into entertainment or health-related themes.[20] In regions such as Latin America and South Asia, influencers on TikTok and YouTube framed Sputnik V as safe, effective, and accessible while concurrently casting doubt on Western vaccine options.[21] By mimicking grassroots enthusiasm and leveraging platform algorithms, Russia manufactured the illusion of authentic public support and broadened its informational reach into spaces less susceptible to state censorship or scrutiny. This use of horizontal propaganda advanced Russian national objectives by circumventing formal diplomatic channels, building influence among digitally active populations, and eroding confidence in Western-led health initiatives—thus enabling Russia to compete for soft power in contested regions without direct state confrontation. Rational vs. Irrational Messaging Russia strategically employed both rational and irrational propaganda to promote Sputnik V and discredit Western vaccine narratives, tailoring its approach to the informational environment and cultural context of each target audience. Rational propaganda, which appeals to logic and empirical reasoning, was used to frame Sputnik V as a scientifically credible and technically advanced product.[22] In February 2021, The Lancet published peer-reviewed interim trial results indicating 91.6% efficacy for Sputnik V, lending the vaccine significant scientific legitimacy.[23] Although the publication met editorial standards, experts raised concerns about the lack of raw data, statistical irregularities, and the broader political context in which the study was conducted—raising questions about the reliability and transparency of the findings.[24] Nevertheless, the Russian government and affiliated media amplified the Lancet article as indisputable evidence of the vaccine’s superiority, transforming selective scientific validation into a strategic messaging asset.[25] The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) bolstered this effort through frequent press releases framed in technical language, emphasizing global partnerships, comparative efficacy, and logistical advantages over Western alternatives.[26] In countries like India and the United Arab Emirates, where regulatory approval was politically sensitive, these data-driven appeals helped position Sputnik V as a legitimate and practical alternative, reinforcing Russia’s credibility among policymakers and health professionals.[27] By portraying itself as a leader in biomedical innovation, Russia used rational propaganda to advance key national objectives: enhancing global influence, penetrating foreign health markets, and contesting Western dominance in pandemic response narratives. In parallel with its rational messaging, Russia extensively employed irrational propaganda to promote Sputnik V, targeting emotions, identity, and cultural memory to influence behavior at a subconscious level.[28] Unlike the data-heavy, technocratic communication favored by the United States and the European Union, Russia’s approach was more flexible and emotionally resonant—designed to embed the vaccine within national narratives and everyday cultural life.[29] In Mexico, upbeat pop songs emphasizing family and protection were paired with bright vaccine imagery, framing Sputnik V as a symbol of hope and safety.[30] In Argentina, state-aligned media invoked historical figures such as Eva Perón, portraying the vaccine as an extension of national sovereignty and resistance to foreign—particularly U.S.—influence.[31] Similarly, in Nigeria and Mali, religious leaders incorporated spiritual songs, blessings, and religious imagery into pro-vaccine messaging, allowing Russian-aligned narratives to leverage trust in spiritual authority and embed support for Sputnik V within culturally resonant frameworks.[32] These emotionally charged and symbolically rich narratives often proved more persuasive than the West’s sterile, information-heavy communication strategies. By tapping into local identities and shared cultural values, irrational propaganda enabled Russia to bypass political skepticism, cultivate favorable public sentiment, and position itself as a culturally attuned, benevolent actor—thereby advancing national objectives of soft power projection and strategic influence, particularly across the Global South. Agitation vs. Integration Propaganda Russia strategically employed both agitation and integration propaganda in its Sputnik V campaign, selecting each approach based on the target audience’s political alignment and existing sentiment toward the Kremlin to either destabilize adversaries or reinforce loyalty among allies. In nations with strong anti-Russian sentiment or firmly pro-Western governments, the Kremlin relied on agitation propaganda—a strategy intended not to persuade but to provoke tension, stoke anger, and foster a pervasive sense of injustice.[33] In Ukraine, where public opinion remains deeply hostile toward Russia, state-backed messaging deliberately employed incoherent and contradictory narratives to disrupt the information environment.[34] These narratives sought to portray truth as subjective, erode public trust in institutions, discredit the Ukrainian government, and intensify societal polarization. A prominent example of this tactic involved the dissemination of anti-Western tropes through pro-Kremlin news outlets and social media influencers, who falsely claimed that the United States had engineered COVID-19 as a bioweapon and conducted lethal virus experiments in Ukraine and China.[35] While Russia had little expectation of persuading Ukrainians to accept Sputnik V, the use of agitation propaganda advanced broader Russian national objectives by destabilizing a hostile neighbor, weakening public confidence in Western health interventions, and complicating efforts to mount a coherent national vaccine strategy. In this context, agitation propaganda proved effective—not because it convinced audiences of a specific narrative, but because it destabilized the information space and amplified distrust. In countries with favorable views of Russia, the emphasis shifted to integration propaganda, which seeks to stabilize and align public sentiment with the regime’s goals.[36] Serbia, where pro-Russian sentiment is historically strong, became a key target for this approach. Social media platforms in Serbia were saturated with emotionally resonant messaging that framed Sputnik V not merely as a vaccine but as a symbol of Slavic solidarity and enduring friendship.[37] This narrative was reinforced at the state level. During a nationally televised ceremony marking the launch of domestic Sputnik V production, President Aleksandar Vučić publicly credited Russian scientists and President Vladimir Putin for their support.[38] The broadcast was subsequently amplified by Serbian bot networks, increasing its reach and embedding the message across digital platforms.[39] By reinforcing positive perceptions of Russian scientific capability and portraying Moscow as a generous and reliable partner, this propaganda advanced Russian national objectives by deepening bilateral ties, expanding its influence in the Balkans, and positioning itself as a viable alternative to Western power structures. In this ideologically receptive environment, integration propaganda proved highly effective—consolidating public trust, fostering support for Moscow’s geopolitical agenda, and bolstering the perceived legitimacy of Russia’s vaccine diplomacy. Operational Limits and Strategic Consequences The Sputnik V campaign initially appeared to be a resounding success. Touted as a triumph of Russian science and soft power, the vaccine was aggressively promoted with emotionally resonant messaging, favorable media coverage, and confident claims of superiority over Western alternatives. In the early stages, this approach gained traction abroad—particularly in countries eager for vaccine access—and briefly positioned Russia as a global biomedical leader. However, this success proved ephemeral. The propaganda surrounding Sputnik V began to unravel when confronted with production shortfalls, delivery delays, inflated pricing, and corruption allegations.[40] Ironically, the same tactics used to discredit Western vaccines—spreading doubt, obscuring facts, and privileging emotion over evidence—fueled widespread vaccine hesitancy within Russia itself, where trust in state institutions was already fragile.[41] As domestic vaccination rates stagnated, the campaign’s credibility suffered abroad as well. This trajectory illustrates a central insight from Ellul, who argued that propaganda thrives in mediated environments where audiences are disconnected from direct experience and rely heavily on images, symbols, and official narratives.[42] But the illusion becomes harder to sustain once individuals come into contact with the practical consequences of those narratives—whether in the form of public health outcomes, vaccine access, or institutional performance. In the case of Sputnik V, propaganda gave way to public skepticism as real-world experience with the vaccine—its availability, administration, and comparative efficacy—failed to live up to the promoted image. Moreover, the campaign’s shortcomings highlight a key theme in contemporary disinformation scholarship: propaganda cannot compensate for the absence of trust and transparency, especially in domains like public health, where outcomes are immediate, tangible, and personal.[43] Russia’s approach, which substituted state-managed spectacle for open scientific validation, faltered precisely because it lacked the institutional credibility and global confidence required to sustain influence over time.[44] Western states, by contrast, were ultimately able to produce effective vaccines through transparent, collaborative, and verifiable means. The rapid development of mRNA vaccines created a performance-based standard that exposed the weaknesses of Russia’s vaccine narrative.[45] Had Western vaccine efforts faltered or been delayed, the Sputnik V campaign may have gained more ground. Instead, the Kremlin’s reliance on disinformation yielded only short-term geopolitical visibility and contributed to a long-term erosion of scientific and political credibility at home and abroad. Implications for U.S. Military Leaders Russia’s Sputnik V campaign reveals that propaganda is no longer confined to wartime deception or tactical psychological operations. It demonstrates how influence campaigns are now executed through a whole-of-government approach—blending public institutions, diplomatic channels, contracted private actors, and digital platforms to achieve strategic effect. Sputnik V was not merely a vaccine rollout but a narrative weapon. For senior U.S. military leaders, the key takeaway is clear: propaganda is persistent, adaptive, and globally networked—not an episodic or isolated tool of statecraft. This directly affects how the Department of Defense should approach strategic competition, deterrence, and influence operations. In an era where state and non-state actors exploit the information environment to shape perceptions, erode trust, and create ambiguity, military planners must treat propaganda as a standing feature of the operational landscape—not a discrete threat that appears after the first shot. Propaganda campaigns like Sputnik V therefore challenge U.S. national interests by undercutting trust in Western institutions, fragmenting alliances, and shaping international norms in ways that favor authoritarian governance models. These campaigns are part of a broader competition in the informational and diplomatic instruments of power, which are increasingly inseparable from military outcomes. When adversaries weaponize narratives to delegitimize U.S. presence abroad, disrupt partnerships, or discredit defense initiatives, they are not simply winning hearts and minds—they are shaping the battlespace. Importantly, the lessons of Sputnik V extend beyond vaccines. If adversaries can frame U.S. aid, presence, or intentions as self-serving or destabilizing—while offering their own version of “help” through tightly controlled narratives—they can outmaneuver U.S. influence in contested regions without engaging in open confrontation.. To counter this, U.S. military leaders must integrate information threat analysis into joint planning processes, develop counter-narratives rooted in transparency and credibility, and invest in partnerships that enhance information resilience among allies. Ultimately, the DOD must recognize that strategic competition now unfolds as much in the information domain as in the physical one—and that winning in this space requires not only tactical superiority but also narrative coherence, institutional integrity, and cultural fluency. Operationalizing Ellul’s Propaganda Typologies for the US Ellul’s framework provides a practical lens for military planners tasked with designing, executing, or countering influence operations. While current doctrine, such as the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE), offers a starting point, it remains overly generic and reactive. JCOIE often emphasizes platforms and delivery mechanisms but lacks the psychological nuance and narrative-focused analysis Ellul’s typologies provide.[46] Where JCOIE frames communication as a functional process, Ellul invites planners to assess underlying intent, emotional tone, and audience conditioning—key elements in modern influence operations. Ellul’s propaganda typologies—agitation vs. integration, vertical vs. horizontal dissemination, and rational vs. irrational appeals—and thus provides a more precise model for assessing threats and building proactive, adaptive campaigns tailored to specific audiences. Taken together, the application of Ellul’s framework provided here presents four implications for US strategic planners. First, understanding the difference between agitation and integration propaganda helps planners determine whether an adversary aims to disrupt or normalize influence. Agitative propaganda attacks demand a rapid response that bolsters public trust, reinforces institutional strength, and discredits inflammatory or false claims. For example, in response to Russian agitation propaganda during its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. could have used Ellul’s model to amplify messages about Ukrainian sovereignty and visibly support local mayors, territorial defense groups, and Ukrainian military units. In contrast, integrative propaganda—such as pro-Russian messaging in the Balkans that promotes a shared Russian identity—requires sustained counter-narratives. U.S. efforts could strengthen independent national identities through cultural programming, military exchanges, and public diplomacy that encourage long-term alignment with Western institutions. Second, understanding the difference between vertical and horizontal dissemination enables more precise targeting of propaganda networks. Vertical propaganda—pushed through state-run media—can often be addressed through diplomatic pressure, media sanctions, and the expansion of U.S. soft power platforms. For instance, in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. could have worked more aggressively with European partners to restrict the reach of RT and Sputnik while simultaneously boosting the visibility of credible, independent Russian-language content across contested regions. Horizontal propaganda, on the other hand—spread informally via influencers, bots, and peer-to-peer messaging—is more difficult to attribute and disrupt. Here, an Ellul-informed approach would prioritize network mapping, digital inoculation, and the mobilization of local voices to fragment disinformation ecosystems from within. In environments like the Sahel or Southeast Asia, the U.S. might have leveraged trusted local civil society actors and regional digital influencers to spread pro-democracy messages and expose the hidden agendas of authoritarian-backed narratives masquerading as grassroots opinion. Third, Ellul’s distinction between rational and irrational propaganda underscores the need to tailor messages to specific audiences. Rational messaging resonates with policymakers, international bodies, and technical experts but rarely spreads widely or shapes public perception. To compete in contested information spaces, the U.S. must pair credibility with emotionally resonant content that engages audiences. Countering irrational propaganda requires more than fact-checking; it demands compelling narratives that draw on cultural memory, local values, and emotional tone. Planners should incorporate trusted voices, symbolic imagery, music, and storytelling to undermine adversary messages. For example, in countering Sputnik V disinformation, U.S. vaccine diplomacy could have combined scientific transparency with personal stories from frontline workers and researchers—using testimonial videos to build a relatable, human-centered message—rather than relying solely on efficacy data. This balance of factual credibility and emotional resonance is essential, as perception often outweighs proof. Finally, planners should integrate Ellul’s typologies into operational planning, red-teaming, and influence assessments across combatant commands. Rather than focusing solely on message volume or platform saturation, Ellul’s framework guides planners to assess adversary intent, audience psychology, and delivery methods in a structured, mission-relevant way. Incorporating this model into exercises like RIMPAC, UNITAS, or African Lion would enable scenario development that anticipates propaganda, stress-tests allied narratives, and tailors counter-messaging techniques to local contexts. Red-teaming adversary narratives can help commanders understand how propaganda may undermine alliances, erode public support, and strain partnerships while keeping commanders aware of emerging media trends that may affect operational success. More broadly, embedding Ellul’s insights into campaign design strengthens the integration of influence activities with national security objectives and improves coordination across diplomatic, informational, and military instruments of power. Conclusion: Winning Without Losing Ourselves The Sputnik V campaign illustrates how propaganda can be employed across sectors and borders to shape global narratives and shift the balance of influence. Ellul’s framework provides military leaders with a systematic method to assess, counter, and design influence operations that are strategically coherent and culturally resonant. In today’s contested information environment, propaganda is not a supporting effort but a strategic domain. As such, propaganda literacy must become a core competency for planners, commanders, and senior decision-makers across the joint force. Whereas lessons can be drawn from adversary campaigns like Sputnik V, we must also prepare for vulnerabilities within our own information ecosystem. Emerging trends in domestic political communication—such as influencer-based engagement, emotionally charged messaging, and algorithm-driven amplification—are beginning to blur the boundaries between strategic communication and manipulation. If left unchecked, these dynamics risk weakening democratic norms and undermining the very communicative space the U.S. military seeks to safeguard. Should official U.S. messaging devolve into disinformation in service of political aims, rather than the public interest, it would mark a profound breach of institutional responsibility. Trust, once lost, is difficult to recover. Likewise, when the military retroactively edits or erases its own history for political convenience, it risks crossing from strategic messaging into manipulation. These actions erode the institution's moral authority and compromise the trust of the force and the public it serves. This challenge is not limited to internal dynamics. Strategic competitors closely observe these trends and may adopt similar techniques to manipulate global narratives in their favor. Monitoring these shifts is essential—not only to strengthen our own information posture but to anticipate how adversaries might seek to reframe the international environment through propaganda and digital influence operations. Maintaining the military’s role as a trusted communicator requires more than just disciplined messaging; it demands a commitment to transparency, ethical consistency, and operational adaptability. In an era of fragmented trust, narrative integrity is not a luxury but a strategic necessity. Ellul’s model fills important gaps in current doctrine by emphasizing the psychological, emotional, and cultural influence dimensions often overlooked in platform-centric planning. Looking ahead, Ellul’s typologies offer a valuable toolset for navigating future conflicts in the information domain. By embedding Ellul’s insights into doctrine, education, and campaign design, the U.S. military can more effectively navigate the complexities of modern influence warfare while upholding the standards that give its message enduring credibility. Lt Col. Emily Ladd is an active-duty Air Force Helicopter Pilot. She is currently an Air University Fellow at the Air War College. Her 2024–2025 research focuses on the connection between information warfare doctrine and military ethics. Robert S. Hinck (PhD Texas A&M University) is an associate professor of leadership at Air War College’s Leadership and Innovation Institute. His research focuses on strategic narratives, international communication, and US-China relations. [1]. Vera Michlin-Shapir and Olga Khvostunova, The Rise and Fall of Sputnik V (New York: Institute of Modern Russia, October 2021), 7. [2]. Michlin-Shapir and Khvostunova, 36. [3]. Elise Thomas, Albert Zhang, and Emilia Currey, Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation: Pro-Russian Vaccine Politics Drives New Disinformation Narratives (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 2020), 1. [4]. Katrina M. Keegan, “Clarity for Friends, Confusion for Foes: Russian Vaccine Propaganda in Ukraine and Serbia,” Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review 3, no. 3 (April 2022), 2. [5]. Mark Scott and Carlo Martuscelli, “Meet Sputnik V.” Politico, April 1, 2021. [6]. İrem Özgül Furman, Kübra Burcu Gürel, and Fatih Burak Sivaslıoğlu, “As Reliable as a Kalashnikov Rifle”: How Sputnik News Promotes Russian Vaccine Technologies in the Turkish Twittersphere,” Social Media + Society 9, no. 1 (2023), 9; Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War,” New York Times, March 2, 2019; U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 5, 2023), 4, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/17/2003342901/-1/-1/1/2023-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-FOR-OPERATIONS-IN-THE-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT.PDF; Marianna Spring, "The YouTubers Who Blew the Whistle on an Anti-Vax Plot," BBC News, July 25, 2021. [7] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-04: Information in Joint Operations,” September 14, 2022, GL-5; Mark Pomerleau, “Why is the United States Losing the Information War?” C4ISRNET, October 5, 2020. [8] Global Engagement Center, “Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, August 2020); Global Engagement Center, “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 2023). [9] Pomerleau [10] Phillip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, Third ed. (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 2013); Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). [11] Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 61-62. [12] Ibid., 9-20, 79-83. [13] Ibid., 84-89, 112-116. [14] Ibid., 70-79. [15]. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 61-62. [16]. Ellul, 79-81. [17]. Reuters, “Argentine President Alberto Fernandez Receives Sputnik V COVID Vaccine – Official,” Reuters, January 21, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentine-president-alberto-fernandez-receives-sputnik-v-covid-vaccine-official-2021-01-21/. [18]. “Egypt Receives 210K Doses of Russia’s Sputnik V Anti-COVID-19 Vaccine,” Egypt Today, June 24, 2021. [19]. Ellul, 79-81. [20]. Klingová, 19. [21]. Matthew T. Page, Nigeria’s Ambivalence to Russia’s COVID-19 Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2022). [22]. Ellul, 84. [23]. Denis Y. Logunov et al., “Safety and Efficacy of an rAd26 and rAd5 Vector-Based Heterologous Prime-Boost COVID-19 Vaccine: An Interim Analysis of a Randomised Controlled Phase 3 Trial in Russia,” The Lancet 397, no. 10275 (February 20, 2021): 671–681. [24]. Enrico Bucci et al., “Re: Safety and Efficacy of the Russian COVID-19 Vaccine: Scientific Concerns and Missing Data,” The Lancet Correspondence, February 2021. [25]. Ewen Callaway, “Sputnik V COVID Vaccine Gathers Credibility—but Questions Remain,” Nature, February 2, 2021. [26]. Russian Direct Investment Fund, “The Russian Direct Investment Fund: On the First Anniversary of Sputnik V Registration – Official Data,” Sputnik V Vaccine, August 11, 2021. [27]. Russian Direct Investment Fund, “Sputnik V Vaccine Authorized in India,” Sputnik V Vaccine, April 12, 2021; “UAE Approves Sputnik V Covid-19 Vaccine for Emergency Use,” Pharmaceutical Technology, January 21, 2021. [28]. Ellul, 84. [29]. Darren Linvill, Patrick Warren, and David White, Russian Social Media Promotion of Sputnik V in Latin America (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2022). [30]. Paul Stronski, In Mexico, the Window on Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is Closing (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2022). [31]. Sputnik V (@sputnikvaccine), “Eva Perón, the wife of former Argentine President Juan Perón, looks on from a poster in a vaccination center where Argentina's President Alberto Fernández received Sputnik V,” Facebook, February 1, 2021. [32]. Ebenezer Obadare, “Russian Disinformation Popularizes Sputnik V Vaccine in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2020. [33]. Ibid., 71. [34]. Katarína Klingová, Sputnik V: Not Just a Vaccine—Narratives Travelling the Information Space (Bratislava: GLOBSEC, 2021). [35]. Global Engagement Center, “Russia’s Pillars,” 32–33. [36]. Ellul, 75. [37]. Keegan, 4-5. [38]. Government of the Republic of Serbia. “Production of Sputnik V Vaccine Starts in Serbia.” srbija.gov.rs, June 4, 2021. [39]. Keegan, 7. [40]. Scott and Martuscelli, “Meet Sputnik V.” [41]. Kier and Stronski, 2. [42]. Ellul, 146. [43]. Ibid., 20. [44]. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 6. [45] Alexander Lanoszka, “Disinformation in International Politics,” European Journal of International Security 4, no. 2 (2019): 245. [46]. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment, 25 July 2018, vii-xi.