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  • The Assurance Imperative: Forward Presence in the Indo-Pacific

    As Beijing continues to assert itself through malign operations, activities, and investments in the economic, political, and military realms to undermine the international rules-based order—ironically the very rules-based order that has enabled China’s rise and which has rescued tens of millions from tyranny and lifted billions out of poverty—the United States must retain a robust, interoperable, and forward-present force that assures America’s vast array of allies and partners and deters China from undermining the free and open Indo-Pacific.

  • Comparing Space Agency Intervention in Taiwan and South Korea

    To develop their space sectors, Taiwan’s and South Korea’s space agencies intervene differently. This is despite the developmental state literature indicating that the agencies’ ideologies, mechanisms, and preferences will be similar. This article recounts the literature’s expectations about the two agencies. It then reviews what the two agencies are actually doing to develop their space sectors. This article ends by discussing the implications of the two agencies’ differences for stakeholders in Taiwan’s and South Korea’s space sectors and identifying questions to guide future research that builds off this article’s findings.

     
     
  • Strategic Surprise from the Bike Trail: The Republic of Korea and the Bicycle

    This article examines how a network of recreational bike trails can become a tool to generate strategic surprise. The Republic of Korea, by the simple act of building recreational trails and tangibly rewarding citizens who use them, has begun to ready generations of robust, skilled defenders, a uniquely surprising strategy of defense and a transport system nigh invulnerable to interdiction.

     
     
  • North Korea: Nuclear Threat or Security Problem?

    The negotiation process on North Korean nuclearization is stalemated and no change seems likely anytime soon. This stalemate demonstrates the failure of the US policy, a very dangerous situation particularly in view of the absence of any viable American strategic approach to the issue, the ensuing divisions among allies, and lack of a coherent approach to North Korea. Continuing the policy of strategic patience, which would be Washington’s default position if no further progress occurs, is doomed to fail. Therefore, the United States must simultaneously enhance alliance cohesion while pursuing a credible negotiating proposal. This article lays out the reasons why that stance is needed now and is becoming more urgent. Such strategic approach can lead to better negotiated outcomes that would not only bring about denuclearization and North Korean security but also promote a new, more stable, equilibrium in Northeast Asia.

     
  • Path to Nuclear Weapons: Balancing Deterrence, Preemption, and Defense for South Korea

    The US–Republic of Korea alliance has been crucial to South Korean security policy calculations, especially the component of extended nuclear deterrence. Recent Special Measures Agreement negotiations on sharing military cost suggests that the price for US extended deterrence is likely to increase in the years to come. In addition to the cost of the US–ROK alliance being put in the spotlight, North Korea’s insatiable appetite for nuclear weapons, including missiles of all ranges, arguments for South Korea’s nuclear weapons development and armament are surfacing in Seoul as they did in 2016 when North Korea conducted nuclear tests. This article examines policy options for South Korea by examining costs and benefits of the extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons armament. Unless there is a crisis situation shocking enough to completely change the game and lead to disruption of the alliance relationship and its structure, or a change in North Korea’s level of violence and animosity, the shared values and goals between South Korea and the United States will make the nuclear path cost-prohibitive for South Korea.
  • Japan Cancels Aegis Ashore: Reasons, Consequences, and International Implications

    In June 2020, the Japanese government canceled the planned construction of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense sites. This decision was unexpected for many in the security establishment. However, considering the circumstances and warning signs in previous months, the decision should not have been a surprise. In fact, Japan’s reversal on the Aegis Ashore sites may indicate a larger shift in defense priorities for the country and potentially signal a transitional trend with implications beyond Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Volume 03 Issue 3 - Fall 2020

    Volume 03 Issue 3 - Fall 2020

  • Fresh Whole Blood for the Near-Peer and Immature Theater Conflict: Closing a Critical Gap

    The concept of operations for blood supply to US forces is urgently needed in the event of a transition to hostilities in Korea. This article provides a framework to enable readily available fresh whole blood to bridge the critical time gap between the first shot being fired and plausible execution of current medical supply plans that rely on functional air and sea supply chains.
  • The United States and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific after COVID-19

    To illustrate why South Korea should be crucial in US Indo-Pacific policy after the pandemic, this article first outlines the limitations to Seoul’s participation under the current US approach and how South Korea’s contributions toward the same goals as the United States are currently undervalued. It then outlines why the needed changes to the US regional approach after the coronavirus will be most effectively pursued by greater cooperation with South Korea—or at the very least better recognizing Seoul’s positive role in the region.
  • Volume 03 Issue 2 - Summer 2020

    Volume 03 Issue 02 - Summer 2020

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The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.