The Art of Protracted War: A Taiwanese Insurgency the Maoist Way and the US Department of Defense’s Role

The United States and China are locked in a struggle for global hegemony, and a decisive battle over Taiwan could shape the outcome. Taiwan represents two competing futures: one that upholds the rules-based international order and the principle of self-determination, and another that accelerates the spread of autocratic values and the erosion of global freedoms. The stakes for US strategic and ideological interests have not been this high since the Cold War.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan remains the final obstacle—not only as a strategic position for projecting power into the Western Pacific and undermining US alliances but also as a threat to the CCP’s grip on power. If Taiwan remains independent, it signals the persistence of democratic ideals in China’s sphere of influence.¹ Consequently, the CCP has made Taiwan’s reunification a priority, whether through coercion or force. Failure would delegitimize the regime, derail its long-term strategic goals, and could even threaten its survival.²

Given these risks, the CCP would commit fully to Taiwan’s conquest. According to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine, a Joint Island Attack Campaign would involve deploying up to a million troops to gain complete control of the island.³ Given the PLA’s numerical advantage over Taiwan’s forces and the complexities of US intervention against a nuclear-armed peer, China might achieve initial success.⁴ The PLA could also consider nuclear brinkmanship—either by detonating a device preemptively to deter US intervention or by escalating against US forces and allies during a counteroffensive.⁵ A conflict of this scale would likely trigger a global economic depression, given the deep interdependence of the world’s two largest economies.

Despite these risks, the United States should support Taiwan in waging asymmetric warfare under the threshold of armed conflict to undermine a PLA occupation. Avoiding full-scale war would preserve global economic stability and prevent nuclear escalation. Whether Taiwan resists through an asymmetric or conventional strategy, the objective remains the same, but the latter would impose significantly greater costs on US national interests. Therefore, pre-invasion preparations should focus on strengthening anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) measures to deter China.⁶ If deterrence fails, however, Taiwan must adopt an alternative strategy to counter a PLA occupation.

Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War provides a framework for weaker forces to wage a war of attrition against superior occupiers. He advocated leveraging a defender’s strengths against an invader’s weaknesses, a strategy he successfully employed against Japan in World War II. Taiwan, with US support, can adapt Mao’s strategy to inflict severe costs on the PLA, forcing the CCP to reconsider its occupation or risk everything it has worked toward for decades. Taiwan’s post-invasion strategy should incorporate Mao’s key principles of protracted war: drawing the enemy into unfavorable terrain, trading space for time, exploiting the environment, mobilizing domestic and international support, and executing a three-phase insurgency.⁷ If Taiwan applies these principles effectively over a prolonged conflict, it can undermine the PLA’s occupation and secure its sovereignty.

Draw the Enemy in Deep and Trade Space for Time

Mao’s first two principles form the foundation of any protracted insurgency: drawing the enemy deep into one’s territory and temporarily ceding space to buy time for long-term success.⁸ By forcing an invader to extend its logistics lines, a defender can exploit home-field advantages and selectively engage the enemy at critical points. China used this strategy against imperial Japan, drawing Japanese forces deep into its vast interior, where asymmetric tactics slowly bled the invaders.

Though Taiwan lacks China’s geographic depth, the 100-mile expanse of ocean between the two presents a formidable obstacle.⁹ This natural barrier complicates not only an initial PLA invasion but also the long-term sustainment of an occupation. The Taiwan Strait’s unpredictable weather and rough seas further restrict amphibious operations, realistically limiting invasion windows to just two months out of the year.¹⁰ Taiwan can turn these challenges to its advantage. Amphibious invasions rank among the most complex military operations, and sustaining an occupation in a distant, hostile territory is even more daunting. By compelling the PLA to commit ground forces far from home, Taiwan can create the conditions for its long-term failure.

Time amplifies the challenges of warfare, especially during an occupation. War favors the defender when drawn out, as protracted conflicts strain the aggressor’s domestic politics and economy. Sun Tzu warned in The Art of War that “there is no instance of a country having been benefited from prolonged warfare.”¹¹ For Taiwan, a drawn-out war presents existential risks, but China faces a different dilemma: a prolonged campaign undermines its national interests and risks internal unrest. Taiwan must exploit this, stretching the conflict out until China concludes that occupation is unattainable and not worth the cost.

While China conducts some counterinsurgency training in preparation for a Taiwan invasion, its focus remains largely on counterterrorism tactics—targeting Taiwanese leadership and key enablers during stability operations.¹² PLA writings suggest China draws inspiration from US battles in Baghdad and Fallujah, viewing them as models for quick, decisive victories against insurgents.¹³ Yet history offers little support for this optimism. Russia’s faltering campaign in Ukraine is a stark reminder of the rarity of swift triumphs. Since 1500, Western powers have found that wars are far more likely to spiral into protracted struggles than to end in rapid conquests.¹⁴ Taiwan must harness this reality and force China to confront the futility and staggering costs of occupation.

Mao recognized the strategic value of time. He argued that territorial losses in the short term do not determine victory, as long as they serve a greater objective. In anticipation of a possible US invasion of mainland China after the defeat of Japan and the Nationalists, he declared, “if Beijing is lost, it is not critical” and that they would “go to caves in the mountains between Beijing and Taiyuan and struggle with the enemy there.”¹⁵ Taiwan should adopt a similar mind-set, viewing temporary territorial losses as a means of sustaining an insurgency to accomplish its goals over the long run.

Taiwan’s military should first attempt to repel a PLA invasion with asymmetric tactics, employing anti-ship and anti-air missile defenses, sea mines, littoral obstacles, and cyber and electronic warfare to disrupt PLA command and control. However, if the PLA secures a beachhead or airstrip, Taiwan must be prepared to transition to Mao’s protracted insurgency model. Preserving combat forces and key equipment will ensure Taiwan retains the strength to wage a sustained resistance. This strategy will also enable Taiwan to eventually shift to the final phase of Mao’s protracted war theory, which will be discussed later.

Utilize the Environment to Its Fullest

Mao argued that once a stronger enemy is drawn into favorable terrain, the weaker force must fully exploit environmental advantages. While Taiwan has a small military, its geography offers an optimal battlefield for resistance. The island’s 770-mile coastline is largely inaccessible, three-quarters of its landmass is mountainous, and its dense urban centers further complicate movement. ¹⁶ These factors will severely restrict PLA maneuverability. A Taiwanese insurgency should capitalize on this by engaging PLA forces in the mountains, urban areas, littoral zones, and the broader information environment.

At the onset of hostilities, once Taiwan shifts to a Maoist insurgency model, its military should retreat into the mountains and embed within urban centers. Sun Tzu advised, if an enemy is “superior in strength, evade him” and “attack him where he is unprepared.”¹⁷ Taiwanese forces must prioritize preserving combat power through strategic withdrawals, and strike PLA units unexpectedly to prolong the conflict and disrupt stabilization efforts. Taiwan’s eastern mountain range will significantly hinder conventional PLA operations, making rapid pacification nearly impossible. The US learned this lesson in Afghanistan, where the Taliban leveraged mountainous terrain to sustain a two-decade insurgency against the world’s most powerful military. Taliban fighters used an extensive tunnel network to store equipment and evade capture—an approach Taiwan can emulate. The island already possesses an extensive underground system, built by imperial Japan during World War II to resist a US counter-invasion.¹⁸ Taiwan should expand and utilize these defenses in a prolonged conflict.

Although Mao’s strategy for protracted war against imperial Japan centered on rural resistance, Taiwan must not overlook its urban areas as critical battlegrounds. Urban warfare should be a core element of Taiwan’s defense. Most of the island’s 23 million people live in cities along the western coast, which will complicate PLA efforts to establish control.¹⁹ Urban warfare is inherently difficult, but when insurgents have both active and passive civilian support, occupation becomes even more perilous. Based on historical counterinsurgency precedents, China would likely need at least 600,000 troops just to pacify and secure Taiwan’s urban centers.²⁰ The US experience in Iraq underscores the challenge of occupying hostile cities, where insurgents can seamlessly blend into the civilian population, cache weapons, and strike at will. Although Taiwan lacks Iraq’s sectarian divisions, PLA forces will still face the standard array of urban insurgent tactics: ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, improvised explosive devices (IED), sniper fire, and indirect bombardments.

One potential complication for an urban insurgency is Taiwan’s extensive surveillance infrastructure. The island has an estimated 155,000 CCTV cameras, which PLA counterinsurgents could repurpose to track and identify resistance fighters.²¹ To mitigate this risk, Taiwan should develop a pre-invasion plan to disable or destroy key surveillance systems, ensuring insurgents retain freedom of movement.

From the mountains and urban centers, Taiwanese forces can also strike along the littoral zone, where the PLA Navy and its logistical supply chains will be concentrated. Sustaining a massive invasion force will require constant resupply by sea, making Chinese shipping a critical vulnerability. Disrupting these operations will slow the PLA’s ability to counter an insurgency, forcing it to divert resources to secure supply routes. The Houthi militants in Yemen have demonstrated how a weaker force can disrupt the shipping and military operations of stronger powers using relatively simple means, such as attack drones and small boats.²² Taiwan, however, should rely primarily on autonomous systems to conduct these attacks, as operating in the littoral zone will pose a high risk of detection. Ukraine has already shown the effectiveness of aerial and surface drones in targeting Russian naval assets.²³ Additionally, the US Navy is developing anti-ship swarm drones that could severely degrade PLA naval operations before and after an invasion.²⁴ Covertly deploying naval mines along key military shipping routes would further impede PLA logistics. By prioritizing unmanned and asymmetric methods, Taiwan can avoid direct naval confrontation while dealing devastating blows to Chinese supply lines—provided the PLA cannot locate or decrypt the systems controlling these attacks.

Beyond the physical battlefield, the information domain offers another crucial front. Taiwan must use it to shape global perceptions, rally domestic and international support, and undermine the CCP’s credibility. Given China’s record of repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, the PLA is unlikely to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign based on David Galula’s model of “protecting the people.”²⁵ Taiwan should focus on exposing PLA war crimes and disseminating this information globally to erode international legitimacy for the invasion.²⁶ Ukraine has successfully leveraged public outrage over Russian atrocities to sustain foreign military and economic assistance. Without the support of the United States and its allies, Ukraine would have struggled to maintain its war effort.²⁷ Taiwan must plan, train, and develop the infrastructure needed to wage an effective information campaign, ensuring it dominates the court of global public opinion.

While Taiwan’s primary objective in a protracted conflict should be to engender a withdrawal of PLA forces from Taiwan, the Taiwanese can amplify this effort by generating chaos internally in China. Taiwan should seek to disrupt China’s domestic stability to the point where the CCP is forced to reconsider whether Taiwan is worth the risk of internal upheaval. Mao himself advocated for targeting an enemy’s home front, arguing that China should encourage the “rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan” to weaken its ability to fight abroad.²⁸ For an authoritarian regime like the CCP, maintaining domestic order is paramount. If Taiwan can undermine public support for the invasion and exacerbate internal pressures, it could force the CCP into a strategic retreat—not because it was defeated militarily, but because it risked losing control at home.²⁹

Taiwan’s information campaign against the CCP may yield mixed results, given the regime’s historical resilience in the face of domestic upheaval. As an entrenched authoritarian government, the CCP has maintained power for over 70 years by tightly controlling public discourse through state-owned media and internet censorship.³⁰ It has also demonstrated a willingness to use force to suppress dissent, as seen during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, when 300,000 soldiers were deployed to crush demonstrations.³¹ Despite these challenges, Taiwan still has avenues to influence China’s information environment.

In the event of a PLA invasion of Taiwan, the CCP will likely pre-position People’s Armed Police (PAP) units—tasked with maintaining domestic stability—in key regions most prone to unrest.³² Each Chinese province has its own PAP unit, roughly the size of a light infantry division, reinforced by the CCP’s vast militia, estimated at eight million reservists.³³ This formidable force, combined with aggressive policing tactics, will likely deter large-scale protests. However, Taiwan does not need mass uprisings to sow discord. If it can ignite small, persistent pockets of domestic resistance, the psychological impact on CCP leadership could be profound. The constant specter of internal instability may erode confidence within the regime’s inner circle, forcing Beijing to look inward even as it wages war abroad.

As seen in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, hacktivism is likely to emerge as a key tool for undermining authoritarian control.³⁴ Taiwanese cyber actors, alongside sympathetic hacktivist groups, can disrupt Chinese state narratives and spread counter-messaging to challenge the CCP’s legitimacy. Taiwan could also pursue more direct efforts, covertly infiltrating mainland China to foment dissent among oppressed minority groups, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, who already resist Chinese rule.³⁵ While the CCP’s control mechanisms may limit the immediate impact of these efforts, they will nonetheless force Beijing to divert attention and resources toward domestic stability, complicating its ability to sustain a prolonged war.

No invading power is immune to the political strain of a protracted war, and China will be no exception. Taiwan should exploit every opportunity to expose fractures in the CCP’s rule, forcing China’s leadership to weigh the cost of continued aggression against the risk of internal instability.

Gain the People’s Support

Taiwan’s ability to sustain an insurgency will rest heavily on both active and passive civilian support. Mao recognized this as a cornerstone of protracted warfare, famously declaring that “the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.”³⁶ A Maoist-inspired insurgency strategy for Taiwan will hinge on the nation’s political will to sustain prolonged resistance against the PLA. Such a strategy would come at a steep cost—high casualties, economic devastation, and deep societal divisions between those committed to fighting and those advocating for an end to the war.³⁷ Unlike populations with a long history of insurgency, such as the Afghans, who have resisted foreign occupation for multi-millennia, Taiwan has not engaged in full-scale warfare for decades. The resilience of its people will be severely tested in the face of invasion.

The willingness of the Taiwanese people to fight will hinge on several key factors, which can be examined through the lens of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. According to this theory, individuals are motivated in the following sequence: physiological needs, safety, love and belonging, self-esteem, and self-actualization.³⁸ At the most basic level, survival depends on essentials—potable water, nutritious food, and breathable air. Without these, higher-order needs like freedom and sovereignty become irrelevant.³⁹

This framework applies not just to individuals but to societies. Before a nation can fight for abstract ideals like liberty and sovereignty, it must first secure the life-sustaining necessities of its people. In the event of a PLA invasion, Taiwan’s most fundamental needs would come under direct threat. The island reportedly has only six months’ worth of food reserves—excluding rice—due to its heavy reliance on food imports and limited arable land for large-scale farming.⁴⁰ Given the PLA’s likely repression during hostilities, it is reasonable to expect that Chinese forces may restrict access to food and water to break the will of the Taiwanese people.

This harsh reality would force individuals to make a brutal choice: fight for their freedom or ensure the survival of their families. On a societal level, such deprivation could create a rift—dividing those willing to capitulate in the hope of stability from those resolved to resist.

Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that advanced societies with more to lose may respond to threats with “massive, society-changing violence.”⁴¹ Ukraine provides a striking example. Despite decades of relative peace, Russia’s invasions—first in 2014 and then in 2022—transformed Ukraine from a modernizing nation into a wartime society. The assault on its sovereignty spurred widespread resistance, uniting civilians and soldiers alike in defense of their homeland.

Taiwan may face a similar reckoning. The battle for its future will not rest solely on military strategy but on the resilience of its people—where the struggle for survival meets the unyielding pursuit of freedom.

Sustaining support for an insurgency—both actively and passively—will be critical. Despite concerns over political will, recent polling suggests that nearly three-quarters of Taiwanese favor either maintaining the status quo or full independence from China.⁴² Furthermore, surveys indicate that between 30 to 70 percent of the population would be willing to “actively resist an invasion.”⁴³ These figures suggest that, in the event of a PLA occupation, a significant portion of the population would rather fight than surrender their sovereignty.

Taiwan’s military should capitalize on passive civilian resistance, drawing from historical examples such as underground networks in occupied Europe during World War II. Civilians can assist by stockpiling weapons and supplies, gathering intelligence, and misleading PLA forces. Ukraine’s recent experience provides a modern precedent—Ukrainian civilians have played a crucial role in targeting Russian forces by relaying troop movements through social media platforms like Telegram, enabling Ukrainian forces to launch precise strikes.⁴⁴ Even if the PLA restricts internet access, Taiwanese civilians can still function as forward observers, relaying critical information through alternative communication channels.

Beyond civilian participation, active support for an insurgency would extend into Taiwan’s military and reserve forces. While Taiwan maintains a standing force of roughly 200,000 active-duty personnel, it also possesses nearly 2.5 million regular reservists and an additional 1 million nontraditional civil defense reservists.⁴⁵ This force structure enables Taiwan to engage in both conventional and asymmetric warfare. For comparison, during the height of the US surge in Afghanistan (2008–2011), a coalition force of nearly 400,000—including 100,000 US troops, 260,000 Afghan security personnel, and 50,000 NATO forces—failed to eliminate a Taliban insurgency with an estimated 200,000 supporters, of which 20,000 to 60,000 were its active fighters.⁴⁶ If Taiwan can effectively train and mobilize its 3.7 million active and reserve personnel for insurgent operations or direct support roles, it can ensure that the PLA remains entangled in a costly, indefinite conflict.

Gain International Support

Mao emphasized that securing international support is a fundamental requirement for sustaining an insurgency, as external backing provides the necessary logistical resources, weaponry, and training to resist a superior enemy.⁴⁷ Taiwan’s ability to wage a prolonged insurgency will depend on the support of the United States and its allies, particularly in providing material aid, intelligence, and tactical assistance. Ukraine’s experience offers a compelling precedent—following Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine successfully mobilized a coalition of more than 50 allied nations to sustain its war effort.⁴⁸ This international backing has enabled Ukraine to continue its asymmetric fight against a military once regarded as one of the world’s most formidable. Taiwan must similarly cultivate and expand its international support network to ensure the long-term viability of its resistance.

However, securing and maintaining this level of international backing will require navigating complex geopolitical realities. The United States, for instance, may face mounting pressure to scale back foreign aid to Taiwan if the war drags on—especially if it begins to strain the US economy, disrupt domestic stability, or collide with zero-sum political battles at home. The American response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights this challenge. Despite Ukraine’s military successes, public support in the United States has shown signs of erosion. A recent poll from 2023 to 2024 found that roughly 41 percent of US adults believed the country was spending too much on the war in Ukraine, fueling calls from some politicians to reduce aid.⁴⁹

This shift in sentiment illustrates a hard truth: even when an ally achieves battlefield gains, sustained foreign support is not guaranteed. Yet the same poll revealed that most Americans—across party lines—would back assistance to an ally under attack if that nation were part of NATO.⁵⁰ While the United States does not have a formal defense treaty with Taiwan, it remains a strategically significant partner and, in the eyes of many Americans, a country worth defending.

Despite there being some doubts about the United States assisting Taiwan during a protracted conflict, other countries may also have similar doubts about sustaining aid to Taiwan. China’s status as one of the world’s largest economies and a key trading partner makes many countries hesitant to take a firm stance against Beijing. To persuade these nations to actively support Taiwan rather than remain neutral, Taiwan must frame the consequences of a PLA invasion in terms of their core national interests rather than relying solely on broad appeals to defending democracy.⁵¹ For example, estimates suggest that a Chinese invasion could cost the global economy approximately USD 10 trillion, due to supply chain disruptions, interruptions in international shipping, and a near-total halt in semiconductor production—an event that would trigger widespread economic instability and mass unemployment.⁵² Taiwan must clearly articulate how these economic consequences will directly impact individual nations and their domestic political stability, making the case that supporting Taiwan is not merely a moral imperative but a matter of self-interest.

In some scenarios, there may not be a choice for countries to withhold assistance without putting at risk the cohesion of collective defense agreements, thus reducing their own security. If China attacks the United States, for instance, Washington could seek to invoke NATO’s Article 5 for the defense of itself and Taiwan. Yet ambiguity remains. Would an attack on Hawaii or Guam, rather than the continental United States, trigger NATO’s commitment?⁵³ Would a non-kinetic cyberattack prompt NATO to action?⁵⁴ As the United States builds and maintains a coalition, China will actively seek to counter these efforts, using diplomatic and economic pressure to dissuade nations from backing Taiwan.

Should Taiwan fail to secure willing international backers, the United States may need to raise the stakes to ensure its survival. A more assertive strategy, leveraging economic and diplomatic tools, may become necessary. Washington could condition foreign aid on recipient nations’ material support for Taiwan or, more aggressively, impose tariffs and trade embargoes on those that refuse. However, such trade restrictions would likely exacerbate an already fragile US economy, particularly given the broader global recession a Taiwan conflict would precipitate.

If the US pursues an aggressive approach towards obtaining international support for Taiwan, this would carry with it long-term risks for American interests. Yet failing to contest China’s influence in this parallel war for global backing could prove even costlier. In the end, Washington may have little choice but to escalate its efforts—both to sustain the coalition and to endure the war itself.

In the event the United States and allies can provide long-term assistance to the Taiwanese, the US Department of Defense will be central to Taiwan’s ability to sustain a long-term insurgency and counter an occupying PLA force. While direct US military engagement with the PLA would risk large-scale conflict, Washington can still achieve its strategic objectives through indirect means. The RAND Corporation’s research for the US Army Special Operations Command outlines a framework for “strategic disruption,” in which US special operations forces (SOF) work to “delay, degrade, or deny an adversary’s ability to achieve core interests.”⁵⁵ This approach offers a model for supporting Taiwan without crossing the threshold into conventional war. Under this strategy, the United States would provide advanced weaponry and ammunition, train insurgent forces, conduct unconventional warfare operations, engage in covert resupply and smuggling efforts, share critical intelligence, and establish secure communication networks for resistance forces. By leveraging these tools, the United States can sustain Taiwan’s war effort indefinitely while avoiding direct military confrontation with China, ensuring a prolonged and costly occupation for the PLA.

Between 2014 and 2024, the United States provided Ukraine with more than USD 70 billion in military aid, including training, logistical support, and a vast arsenal of weaponry: over 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 4 million artillery shells, 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems, 3,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and coastal defense anti-ship missiles.⁵⁶ While this may seem like a substantial investment, it has yielded significant strategic returns for the United States. By proliferating asymmetric weapons, Washington has enabled Ukraine to blunt Russian military advances at the tactical level. Strategically, this support has physically contained a major near-peer adversary, degraded Russia’s military and economic power, undermined its global standing, and strengthened NATO. This model of proxy warfare should be applied to Taiwan.

Training will be another critical pillar of US support for a Taiwanese insurgency. Over the past two decades, nearly all US combat experience has revolved around understanding, countering, and dismantling insurgent and terrorist networks. While the results of these conflicts have been mixed—ranging from the rapid collapse of Afghanistan’s government after a 20-year war to the successful dismantling of ISIS’s territorial control—counterinsurgency has become a core competency of the US military. This expertise should be incorporated into a broader strategy with Taiwan. The alternative—a prolonged, large-scale conventional war against China—would be far more costly and would not exploit US asymmetric advantages.

The United States has long conducted foreign internal defense training for partner nations, and a similar approach should be applied to Taiwan. Just as the British have trained over 10,000 Ukrainian fighters in the United Kingdom, the United States should train Taiwanese insurgent forces once hostilities have commenced.⁵⁷ Throughout the conflict, US forces could train Taiwanese civilians and military personnel outside of Taiwan, as well as foreign fighters willing to assist in the resistance. Covert transportation of these trained personnel back into Taiwan would bolster the insurgency. Ukraine, for instance, saw an influx of 20,000 foreign fighters joining its battle against Russia.⁵⁸ A similar level of commitment from the United States, its allies, and individual volunteers could ensure that Taiwan’s resistance remains well-trained, well-equipped, and sustained over the long term.

Beyond Taiwan, US SOF can play a critical role in disrupting Chinese logistics and economic interests that sustain the PLA’s war effort through conducting unconventional warfare operations. Chinese shipping routes and port infrastructure outside the First Island Chain will be particularly vulnerable to unconventional warfare.⁵⁹ Should an international consensus at the United Nations lead to a global trading embargo on China, seizing commercial vessels could become a viable mission for US SOF. However, such actions risk prompting reciprocal measures against US and allied shipping, increasing the likelihood of broader escalation. Even so, sustained unconventional warfare by the United States and its allies would impose significant long-term costs on the CCP and its strategic objectives.

The most critical area of support the United States can provide to sustain a protracted Taiwanese insurgency is covert resupply. During hostilities, Taiwan will be cut off from the outside world, meaning that food, supplies, weapons, and ammunition will not be overtly resupplied. The good news, however, is that Taiwan’s coastline runs over 770 miles long, so the PLA Navy will likely be unable to cover that much coastline to prevent insurgent resupply.⁶⁰ The U.S. Navy submarine force along with US SOF should use both autonomous and manned submarines to ferry across supplies, weapons, and newly trained fighters into Taiwan.

Though difficult, such operations have historical precedent. During World War I, Imperial Germany successfully employed merchant submarines like the Deutschland to bypass the British blockade and sustain its economy.⁶¹ More recently, transnational drug cartels have used submersibles to smuggle narcotics into the United States undetected, demonstrating the viability of stealth-based smuggling networks.⁶² By leveraging similar techniques, the United States and its allies could sustain Taiwanese resistance forces over the long term, ensuring that the PLA remains engaged in a costly and protracted conflict.

Unmanned aerial systems could also play a critical role in resupply operations. The US Marine Corps is actively developing drone-based logistics to sustain forces in the field. Short-range tests—transporting minimal payloads up to 7.5 miles—have already been proven successful. Efforts now focus on scaling this capability to move hundreds of pounds of weapons and supplies over greater distances, potentially up to 2,500 nautical miles.⁶³

Even if medium-range drone resupply—around 100 nautical miles—becomes viable before a PLA invasion and occupation of Taiwan, significant obstacles still remain. Given Taiwan’s distance from US and allied territory, drones will likely need to launch from naval vessels positioned relatively close to the island. That proximity presents its own risks. The PLA’s advanced air defense systems, including the HQ-9 and Russian-produced S-400, create a protective bubble extending hundreds of miles, posing a formidable challenge to drone operations.⁶⁴ To penetrate these defenses, stealth technology must be integrated into any aerial resupply platform operating near the Taiwan Strait.

Yet technological innovation and operational creativity could allow the US military to sustain Taiwan’s defenders. Advances in air and sea domains—combined with a concerted effort to outpace Chinese countermeasures—could make drone resupply a viable element of US strategy.

Effective intelligence-sharing between the United States, its allies, and Taiwanese insurgents will also be critical for sustaining resistance efforts. However, the primary challenge in wartime will be how to discreetly deliver intelligence to Taiwanese forces without detection. Taiwanese insurgents will likely operate in a severely degraded communications environment—at best, one heavily monitored by the PLA. To circumvent these constraints, they must adopt alternative communication methods beyond conventional digital networks. Ukraine’s success with Starlink has prompted experts to call for Taiwan to develop its own domestic satellite communications network, particularly given its reliance on just 15 underwater cables for global connectivity.⁶⁵ While this would provide an initial advantage, Taiwan must also account for the growing threat of anti-satellite technology, which could render such systems vulnerable.

To mitigate these risks, insurgents should employ a mix of secure, low-tech, and unconventional communication methods. Transmitting encrypted, fragmented messages across predesignated radio frequencies, combined with cryptic coded language, could help evade PLA surveillance.⁶⁶ Additionally, traditional courier-based messaging—using trusted individuals to physically relay intelligence during covert resupply operations—could prove highly effective. This method for instance, though slower, enabled Osama bin Laden to remain undetected for nearly a decade, demonstrating its viability in a high-risk environment.

Regardless of the specific approach, Taiwan’s insurgency can and must maintain secure lines of communication despite PLA efforts to disrupt them. By leveraging a combination of emerging technology and proven clandestine methods, Taiwanese resistance forces can ensure the continued flow of critical information, sustaining their fight against Chinese occupation.

Three Stages of Protracted War

Mao asserts that insurgencies progress through three distinct phases when confronting a superior adversary: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic counteroffensive.⁶⁷ However, movement through these stages is not linear; insurgents may shift between them based on current battlefield conditions, force disposition, resource availability, and broader strategic outlook.

The strategic defensive phase begins at the onset of conflict, during which insurgents trade space for time, preserving their forces while executing limited attacks. As the enemy weakens, insurgents transition into the strategic stalemate phase, consolidating territorial gains and preparing for a larger counteroffensive. The final stage, the strategic counteroffensive, occurs once the enemy is sufficiently degraded and nearing withdrawal. At this point, insurgents shift from guerrilla warfare to conventional-style operations, massing forces and maneuvering to force the enemy’s retreat. While guerrilla tactics dominate the early stages, Maoist doctrine emphasizes mobile and positional warfare as key elements of conventional engagements in the latter phase.⁶⁸

Taiwan may use this three-stage framework as a broad strategic guide, but it should not be viewed as a rigid blueprint for victory. Mao’s model, rooted in Clausewitzian theory, assumes that insurgents must ultimately achieve a decisive conventional military victory.⁶⁹ However, for a Taiwanese insurgency, an outright battlefield defeat of the PLA may not be necessary. The final months of the US war in Afghanistan offer a compelling counter-narrative: while the Taliban intensified attacks, it was not military pressure alone that forced the US withdrawal, but rather a collapse of domestic political will. If Taiwanese insurgents can sustain high levels of attrition against PLA forces over a protracted period, the CCP may face a similar dilemma.

As the Taliban famously remarked, “The Americans may have the watches, but we have the time.”⁷⁰ The same political reality could ultimately apply to China. If a Taiwanese insurgency can impose sustained costs and outlast the PLA’s resolve, Beijing may find its will to fight eroding long before achieving its strategic objectives.

Mao’s three stages of protracted warfare may not be easily discernible once hostilities begin. The battlespace will be shaped as much by the information domain as by physical combat. Basic battlefield realities—force numbers, troop dispositions, territorial control—will likely be obscured, manipulated, or outright fabricated. The PLA views information warfare as the foundation of modern conflict, essential for achieving decisional advantage.⁷¹ To that end, Beijing will aggressively disseminate a mix of truth, falsehoods, and exaggerations—both to the Taiwanese people and to the world—to shape perceptions of its success. The goal: to manufacture uncertainty about ground realities and obscure the insurgency’s true progress.

Artificial intelligence (AI) will further complicate this information environment, accelerating shifts between stages of conflict and injecting volatility into battlefield transitions. If neither side effectively degrades its adversary’s AI systems, both the PLA and the Taiwanese—assisted by the United States—will leverage AI to influence the pace of war. The Pentagon’s new Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control system (CJADC2) could give US and allied forces a decisive edge by integrating vast streams of battlefield data into a coherent picture of PLA movements.⁷² If Washington can securely transmit this intelligence to Taiwanese insurgents in real time, it will enhance their ability to target high-value PLA assets and disrupt critical support nodes. This could hasten Taiwan’s shift from stage two (strategic stalemate) to stage three (strategic counteroffensive) once insurgents are postured for coordinated strikes.

Stage one (strategic defensive), however, will be defined by chaos. Taiwanese forces will fight for survival against the PLA’s initial onslaught while struggling to establish secure internal and external communications, command cohesion, and a steady flow of material and intelligence support from the United States and its allies. This phase could take months, but its success will determine the insurgency’s viability. Patience will be essential—Taiwanese forces must build a resilient foundation before moving to the next phase. Without it, long-term success will be impossible.

Strategic Risk

As with any strategy, a thorough assessment of risk is essential. For policymakers, the challenge lies in weighing these risks against the expected outcomes of their strategic options. If Taiwan and the United States pursue a Maoist-inspired insurgency strategy, they assume a moderate level of risk by relying on low-intensity conflict as a means of defending Taiwan.

One significant risk is the decision to withhold conventional US forces from engaging the PLA directly, since they could plausibly play a decisive role in protecting Taiwan and shortening the duration of conflict. However, by avoiding full-scale combat, the United States mitigates the risk of global economic destabilization and removes any plausible justification for nuclear escalation. A full-scale US–PLA war would be fraught with uncertainty, as both sides would likely experience degraded command and control capabilities, making battlefield assessments and strategic decision-making more difficult. More critically, such a war would mark the first direct conflict between two nuclear-armed states, introducing the possibility that China might resort to the use of a low-yield or strategic nuclear weapon—either as a deterrent against US intervention or to stave off a decisive military defeat.⁷³

While an insurgency-based strategy lowers the probability of nuclear conflict, it does not eliminate it. China may take cues from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s threats of limited nuclear use successfully deterred direct Western intervention and initially restricted the flow of advanced weaponry to Kyiv.⁷⁴ Xi could adopt a similar posture, using nuclear brinkmanship to intimidate the United States and its allies into limiting their support for Taiwan.

That said, Beijing is less likely to employ nuclear weapons in a low-intensity conflict. The greater uncertainty lies in how China would react if forced into retreat. Though unlikely, a scorched-earth scenario remains possible. In a final act of destruction, the PLA could sabotage Taiwan’s nuclear power plants or, in an extreme case, detonate a nuclear weapon to ensure that no one claims victory.⁷⁵ This risk exists whether the United States and Taiwan pursues conventional war or a protracted insurgency strategy.

Beyond the nuclear threat, China could retaliate against the United States through conventional military means for its support of Taiwan. To date, no modern war has resulted in a direct attack on the US homeland with advanced weaponry, largely due to the protective buffer of two vast oceans. However, China’s rapid military and technological advancements have eroded this geographic advantage. The United States now faces an array of potential disruptions—both to military operations and civilian life—if war breaks out. Beijing has developed intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US mainland, and advancements in hypersonic missile technology suggest an attack could occur within minutes.⁷⁶

Beyond kinetic strikes, China has already demonstrated its intent to target critical infrastructure through cyber warfare. The recent probing of vital networks in Guam underscores Beijing’s preparation for offensive cyber operations against both military and civilian systems.⁷⁷ The era of US immunity from the consequences of great-power war has ended. However, a limited-footprint approach to supporting Taiwan could mitigate the likelihood of significant attacks against the US homeland.

Even if China refrains from striking US soil, American military assets in the Pacific would remain at risk, even under an insurgency-based strategy. The PLA could attempt to interdict supply lines by targeting bases and logistics hubs critical to Taiwan’s sustainment effort. However, historical precedent suggests China would tread carefully. During the Vietnam War, both the Soviet Union and China openly armed and supplied North Vietnamese forces without provoking direct US retaliation.⁷⁸ If Washington and its allies calibrate their support below the threshold of armed conflict, China will have little justification for escalating beyond limited strikes.

Yet an insurgency-based strategy still carries risks beyond military retaliation. China will likely target US interests worldwide, recognizing Washington’s undeniable role in the conflict even if it remains below the threshold of war. Economic retaliation is one of Beijing’s most potent tools. China could impose trade restrictions, weaponize its debt holdings, or pursue broader economic coercion. However, fears of financial warfare are often overstated. Despite holding USD 850 billion in US debt as of 2023, Beijing has little leverage—its 2015 sell-off of USD 180 billion in US securities had negligible effects on the American economy.⁷⁹ Likewise, Chinese tariffs, import bans, or consumer boycotts would harm China as much as they would the United States, particularly when compounded by the inevitable Western sanctions that would follow an invasion of Taiwan.⁸⁰ Much like Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, China would find itself increasingly isolated—facing economic headwinds that could undermine its long-term strategic ambitions.

Finally, China could seek to undermine US domestic stability as a form of retaliation. Beijing may attempt to interfere in US elections or further sow distrust in the government—tactics it has already pursued. Evidence suggests China engaged in such efforts ahead of the 2024 US elections, though the long-term impact remains uncertain.⁸¹ While these operations have undoubtedly affected American society, an invasion of Taiwan would not necessarily grant Beijing greater success in this arena than it has already achieved.

At first glance, Mao’s model of insurgency may seem unappealing to Taiwan, given the immense difficulties of waging a protracted war under occupation. Yet, it remains the most viable path to denying the PLA a permanent foothold and ensuring Taiwan’s survival as a free and autonomous entity. If Taiwan and the United States can effectively exploit Chinese vulnerabilities while leveraging their own asymmetric strengths, they can impose significant costs on Beijing—potentially forcing the CCP to reconsider its commitment to a prolonged conflict. This shift in strategic calculus may not happen immediately, but over time, the burden of war could compel the CCP to ask itself whether Taiwan is worth the price of losing everything it has worked for over the past several decades. Insurgency, by its nature, is an art rather than a science—but if executed effectively, it could ultimately prove decisive in Taiwan’s favor.

CPT Andrew Faulhaber, US Army

Captain Faulhaber is a US Army officer who has served in numerous tactical and strategic positions in the military and US government. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Harvard University and a Bachelor’s from the Virginia Military Institute. He was most recently published in the Yale Journal of International Affairs.

The views expressed in this paper reflect the personal views of the author alone, and do not express the policy or opinions of the US Army or Department of Defense.