Strategic Studies Quarterly

Volume 13 Issue 3 - Fall 2019

  • Published
  • Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL
  • Why De-escalation Is Bad Policy

    Why De-escalation Is Bad Policy

    W. Michael Guillot

    Has de-escalation become the goal of US power and the default position to such an extent that many policy makers, advisors, and pundits are self-deterred by the thought of military escalation? 

    Comment on Article

  • The Shadow of Exit from NATO

    The Shadow of Exit from NATO

    John M. Schuessler and Joshua R. Shifrinson 

    Historically, US alliance relations have been characterized by more uncertainty—and less restraint and reassurance; but is NATO, and the US broader alliance network, robust enough to survive?

    Comment on Article
  • Strategic Cyber Deterrence

    Strategic Cyber Deterrence: The Active Cyber Defense Option 

    by Scott Jasper
    Reviewed by Stephen Bucci

    The book Strategic Cyber Deterrence: The Active Cyber Option is particularly relevant today in the face of the continuing challenges for America from the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, and the North Koreans. While many feel cyber deterrence is unattainable, Professor Scott Jasper of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, shows quite clearly that we can in fact get there, if we open our intellectual aperture. This is a subject of ever-increasing relevance to the physical and digital security of the nation, as well as America’s wider national interests. 
  • The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

    The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

    by Matthew Kroenig
    Reviewed by Todd C. Robinson 

    In 1984 Robert Jervis published a wide-ranging critique of American nuclear strategy entitled The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, in which he argued that much of the thinking by nuclear strategists and decision makers within the US federal government had, over the previous decades, been based on a flawed understanding of the nature of both nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. He suggested that the United States need only possess the ability to retaliate against the Soviets to deter them from launching a surprise attack on the United States or its allies.
  • China's Future

    China's Future

    by David Shambaugh
    Reviewed by Tunchinmang Langel 

    Adam N. Stulberg and Lawrence Rubin discuss the Great Power competitions and regional rivalries of today. The concept of strategic stability remains a touchstone for scholars and policy makers attempting to understand the complex role played by nuclear weapons in contemporary international affairs. But it also remains devilishly difficult to define, negotiate, and implement between today’s nuclear rivals.



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