Caspar Weinberger and The U.S. Military Buildup, 1981–1985

Caspar Weinberger and The U.S. Military Buildup, 1981–1985 by Edward C. Keefer. Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, vol. X. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023, 768 pp.

The nine volumes of the Secretaries of Defense history series record the office’s formative years, spanning 1947 to 1985. Volume X, this most recent addition, is written by Edward C. Keefer, a well-known and respected historian and former editor of the State Department series, Foreign Relations of the United States. In this volume, Keefer documents Caspar Weinberger’s tenure. The author provides 18 chapters and an insightful chapter 19 entitled “Weinberger Legacy,” and includes appropriate citations, a bibliography, an index, maps, charts, tables, and diagrams to augment the endeavor. He presents an inspiring and remarkable history of the protagonist and the Department of Defense.

The history, replete with information from many classified sources not available to the general public, is a door to Weinberger’s reflections, management style, and often conflicting responses to crises. Furthermore, throughout the volume, the author compares the Democratic Carter administration to the Republican Reagan administration and records the massive shifting of priorities, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Mid-East, China, NATO, Allies, and force modernization. Finally, this volume can be labeled a companion to volume IX, in which Keefer documented the history of the previous defense secretary, Harold Brown.

Weinberger was no newcomer to the federal government. He had already served in the Nixon and Ford administrations as deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget and secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. This experience and close relationship with the incoming president, Ronald Reagan, were invaluable and undoubtedly assisted in his appointment. At their start, both he and Reagan were ready to improve the Defense Department.

Interestingly, the incoming Reagan administration criticized President Jimmy Carter and then-Secretary of Defense Brown for the perceived diminished status of the armed forces. Yet, the last two years of the Carter administration set a course for an expansive investment in modernizing American strategic and conventional forces while exploring arms limitation. Brown responded to the daunting challenge of offsetting Soviet quantitative strategic and traditional military advantages and arms limitations by judiciously using America’s ability to innovate and apply technology to weapon system design.¹

Meeting the challenge continued during this documented period, but there was an exceptional difference—Reagan and Weinberger were staunch believers in reaching or exceeding parity with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and less focused on arms limitation. Fortunately, both Reagan and Weinberger—recipients of the substantial investment in defense by the Carter administration—were able to modernize the military services, increase funding for research and development, and increase pay and allowances for federal employees. During their tenure, they began challenging the Soviet Union by building greater armed forces and improving strategic and conventional arms.

From 1981 to 1985, Weinberger tried to balance the need for an overwhelming military instrument, respond to foreign crises, and manage the massive federal agency. After selecting his deputies, military secretaries, and other officials to implement much of the DOD budget, Weinberger found his niche in dealing with foreign affairs and world crises. The federal DOD budget continued to rise, ending as a trillion-dollar war apparatus with more than six million people involved in defense-related positions.²

DOD outlays made possible the increasing use of technological advances, promoting equipment modernization, procuring advanced weapon system delivery vehicles, increasing personnel pay, and entering arms limitation talks. Modernization programs involved the Air Force B-52 bomber, several aging Naval battleships, and the Army M-1 tank. Funding significantly supported advanced weapon systems development such as the MX missile, B-1 bomber, Trident submarine, and Apache antitank helicopter. The military services turned away from the compulsive draft system to an all-volunteer force. The Defense Department, approaching arms limitations gradually, gave way to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) I and II and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Lastly, worldwide events pushed Weinberger in many directions. Keefer expertly reports on incidents in the Americas, Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest and Southeast Asia in eight chapters. The American response to the actions in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador is informative and revealing. While America’s response to Libya, Liberia, and Somalia deal with the lack of democracy, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt were encouraged to support strategic endeavors protecting the essential oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Keefer also dedicates entire chapters to both Lebanon and Grenada, with the former illustrated in a dismal picture of misguided attempts to end the conflict and the latter well documented as a successful rescue effort. The encroaching menace in the Middle East—particularly Iran—is also well discussed.

Furthermore, discussions of defense and support for China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines are revealing. The repatriation of Vietnam War casualties encouraged further interaction between Vietnam and the United States. Where Allies conflicted—as with the Great Britain and Argentina in the Falkland War—the Defense Department responded by supplying Great Britain while being neutral to Argentina.

The Weinberger legacy was that he was a defense advocate. Although only four chapters deal with the budget, all-volunteer force, acquisition and reform, and modernization, the author connects Weinberger to his self-acknowledged duty: foreign defense policy and DOD response, leaving DOD management to his deputies. At the end of his tenure, the Department was a trillion-dollar war machine ready to meet worldwide challenges.

Overall, Caspar Weinberger and The U.S. Military Buildup is well-written and supported. At 760-plus pages, it is not light reading. But readers can quickly scan two or three pages at the end of each chapter to determine Weinberger’s involvement and focus.

Dr. James A. Boyless, Major, USAF, Retired