Building an Air Force: The Air Corps and the Formation of US Airpower by Phillip S. Meilinger. Cambridge University Press, 2026, 330 pp.
Dr. Phillip S. Meilinger has spent much of his adult life researching and writing about the development of airpower in the United States and abroad. He is a key voice in modern airpower theory, providing both historical context and forward-looking strategic insights that continue to influence military doctrine and education. A first-class revisionist author, he thrives on challenging conventional truths and widely held myths. With a critical eye and a passion for uncovering overlooked perspectives, he seeks to reinterpret history and established narratives, offering fresh insights that provoke thought and inspire deeper understanding. This is his trademark, as manifested in recent publications such as Limiting Risk in American Wars (2017) and Thoughts on War (2020). His most recent book, Building an Air Force (2026), is no exception and a most welcome return to airpower proper and the Shakespearian dictum that “what is past is prologue:” the importance of historical context in understanding the present and planning for the future.
Most studies tracing the factors that have shaped airpower in the United States have given great credit to a group of aviation pioneers and theorists who recognized the potential of airpower to change the nature of war. With the exception of Billy Mitchell and Hap Arnold, most of these individuals were graduates of or instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), where both faculty and students formulated the doctrines governing airpower. Especially important among these doctrinal studies were ideas about the role that bombers and, to a lesser degree, pursuit or fighter aviation, would play in future combat. The generally accepted thinking has been that the doctrine proposed and taught at ACTS drove the development of aircraft types and their capabilities on the verge of World War II.
In Building an Air Force, Meilinger suggests that other trends and occurrences may have had a greater impact on the direction taken by airpower during the inter-war years than the doctrine taught at ACTS. A quick scan of the book’s list of contents gives the reader a preview of the roles played by a variety of different, but inter-related, influences. Meilinger provides an in-depth examination of the role played by technology in advancing the airborne platforms being built. Outside factors and events such as air races, the rise of civilian airline travel and the US Army’s funding profile for the Air Corps shaped aircraft development during the inter-war years. He presents concrete examples of how the emergence of several new technologies was critical to building the aircraft that would be needed during future wars. Prominent among these were aircraft engines, with the debate centering on air-cooled versus liquid-cooled engines. Another dispute focused on whether the gear-driven or bleed air driven turbocharger would better meet the needs of a force that would fight at high altitudes.
Meilinger details the evolution of airframes from wooden structures with fabric-covered surfaces to all-metal surfaces and structures. His research includes an examination of the role played by the aircraft manufacturing companies from a business perspective and their reluctance to depend solely on government contracts, since the government’s funding priorities could change with little or no notice. The Air Corps lacked consistent and coherent programs due to inadequate funding from the Army staff and organizational deficiencies such as a failure to coordinate contracting functions with development and procurement authorities.
One of the more valuable and helpful aspects of this book is the way Phil Meilinger presents the material. He lays out the facts revealed by his research in each discussion of technological, organizational or personnel issues. He then summarizes the impact of these developments on the overall advancement of airpower. The last chapter of the book complements this approach by capturing the content of the preceding chapters in a concise and informative discussion. In Meilinger’s words, the book reveals “what factors resulted in the building of an air force in the United States. There were many such factors, but underlying most of them is the rock-solid reality of technology” (232).
In sum, Meilinger argues that American airpower evolved through adaptation rather than deliberate design. Doctrine influenced thinking, but technology, economics, procurement systems, and human judgment were more decisive. Rooted in a cultural faith in technology, airpower emphasized achieving strategic effects while minimizing human risk. Its development reflected incremental innovation and close cooperation among scientists, engineers, industry, and military leaders, shaping an air force defined as much by constraint and circumstance as by strategic intent.
Phil Meilinger has done an important service to the airpower profession by bringing together these multiple contexts to explain the activities involved in building the Army Air Forces which would fight World War II and become the predecessor of the United States Air Force (USAF). The book should be of interest to all airpower professionals who seek to gain a deeper understanding of their past as well as encourage thinking of how to further improve the USAF, organizationally, institutionally, culturally and conceptually in the current environment where inadequate funding and rapid technological advances are shaping a new way of war.
General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, 1994–1997