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Age of Danger: Keeping America Safe in an Era of New Superpowers, New Weapons, and New Threats

  • Published
  • By Andrew Hoehn and Thom Shanker

Age of Danger: Keeping America Safe in an Era of New Superpowers, New Weapons, and New Threats by Andrew Hoehn and Thom Shanker. Hachette Books, 2023, 360 pp.

The authors of Age of Danger: Keeping America Safe in an Era of New Superpowers, New Weapons, and New Threats bring a respectable combination of experience and knowledge to address the ever-changing power landscape facing the nation and world. Andrew Hoehn is senior vice president and director of research at the RAND corporation, and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. Thom Shanker is the director of the Project for Media and National Security at George Washington University, and former national security and foreign policy editor for The New York Times’ Washington Bureau.

The book is separated into four parts. “Part I: How We Got to the Age of Danger” is divided into two chapters. In introducing the age of danger, Hoehn and Shanker pose two questions given the $1.25 trillion (at the time of publishing) national security price tag that taxpayers shoulder with little insight into how their money is spent. How is it possible that our public institutions seem unprepared and get it wrong on so many critical issues so often? And, if our fabulously expensive national security machine is not working, what is to be done?(3)

Age of Danger concludes that over twenty years of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with eyes focused primarily on Afghanistan and Iraq, resulted in a national security mechanism that was initially built for a Cold War with the Soviet Union and later modified for counterterrorism but is no longer able keep up with changing security threats. The authors aptly state what should be obvious. “As we move past the Forever Wars to face new threats, it is even clearer that the future needs a seat at the table” (12).

In describing the national security apparatus in the second chapter, Hoehn and Shanker take a simplified approach, breaking it into two separate “machines.” The “warning machine” is based inside the intelligence community, significantly involving the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The “action machine” is made up of a large and expensive set of systems that include the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and DHS. Age of Danger details how each “machine” works together, or should work together, to address the threats identified in subsequent chapters.

“Part II: Great Power Rivalries and the New Superpowers,” consists of two chapters, identifying China and Russia as the two major threats on a superpower level, emerging and traditional, respectively. Regarding China, the authors detail how the singular focus on anti- and counter-terrorism efforts diverted resources from the Pacific region to support United States Central Command throughout the GWOT and allowed China to continue to build a formidable military, almost unnoticed. The lack of attention saw China grow into a world economic and military power, on par with the United States and Russia. Hoehn and Shanker make it clear the growth was not a secret in Washington but was viewed more of a “tomorrow problem” that failed to garner the attention the fight against terrorism and counterinsurgency commanded. The fact that China is the United States’ largest trade partner with one of the world’s fastest growing economies also led to a hope in Washington that they would fall in line as a cooperative partner and not a direct military competitor, attributing to the “wait and see” attitude toward their rapid growth and expansion. Age of Danger correctly labels China as the United States’ primary pacing threat, militarily and economically.

Russia has long been a top adversary of the United States, before and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Age of Danger does an effective job describing the threat posed by Russian leader and former KGB agent, Vladimir Putin, and his desire to restore Russia to its old Soviet-era glory. While not as militarily or economically strong as in the past, Hoehn and Shanker’s interview with retired Brigadier General Peter Zwack produced a quote that sums up the Russian threat perfectly. “Even on a bad day, they are the country that can take us off the planet, and we them, in about twelve hours. Full stop. They are going to look for every edge in this gray zone, to chop us down, weaken us, subvert us, because they know they can’t win or survive on an equal playing field with us” (178).

The third part of Age of Danger, “Part III: New Weapons and New Threats,” consists of four chapters. The first focuses on biological threats. The authors detail the three kinds of severe biological threats recognized by the national security establishment: naturally occurring pandemics that primarily affect humans; biological error, where a genetically altered organism could escape from a laboratory or mutate, wreaking plague on plants, animals, or humans; and deliberate bioterrorism. Hoehn and Shanker note how warnings from organizations like the National Institute of Health (NIH) were ignored by the government during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in devastating consequences. (227)

The second chapter in the section is devoted to cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. While acknowledging fears of a “cyber–Pearl Harbor,” the authors note it is difficult to compare cyber weapons to other weapons of war, particularly nuclear weapons. The third chapter of the section is dedicated to drones and other unmanned vehicles. The authors detail the proliferation of drone technology from a once American-led innovation to a world-wide industry, with military and civilian applications. The final chapter in the section, “Storms – Everything, Everywhere, All at Once,” is likely the most controversial with the stark divisions surrounding climate science. Hoehn and Shanker do a thorough job detailing the rising threats of climate change to civilian populations and military installations and missions. To sum up the government’s approach to climate change, the authors quote senior strategist and board member at the Center for Climate and Security, Sherri Goodman, who aptly said, “You’ve got a planet that’s like a patient who’s been diagnosed with cancer, but you keep smoking, even though you know you’ve got cancer. You’ve got the diagnosis, but you’re still smoking” (313).

The final part, “Part IV: What is to be Done?”, has a single chapter titled, “Retooling the Machine for the Age of Danger.” Based on the chapter title, one would hope for a comprehensive framework of solutions necessary for the monumental task of retooling the national security apparatus to effectively mitigate future threats, but the final chapter serves more as a summary of the book than solutions.

While Hoehn and Shanker do an excellent job detailing what they believe to be the current and future threats facing the national security community, I would have also expected Age of Danger to include Iran and North Korea as current and future threats, given their histories of weapons proliferation, nuclear weapons ambitions, and contributions to regional instability. Despite these omissions, the book is compelling and is a great resource for anyone who has interest in national security and the national security apparatus. The book is well organized and easy for the reader to follow, from the layperson to expert. The subject matter is presented in a method that compels the reader to consider their own “what ifs.” Since publication, there have been many changes in the government and military, none more visible than in the “warning machine” and regarding climate change. It would be interesting to know how Hoehn and Shanker might change their interpretations given the current administration.

The most telling quote in the book, and the one that likely best answers the main question as to why the national security apparatus gets things wrong so often comes from former Department of Defense under-secretary for policy, Eric Edelman, who said, “The reason we get things wrong so much in national security is because it is really [EXPLETIVE] hard” (13).

George Orr

"The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense."