Close Air Support: Case Studies on the Integration of Air Power on the Battlefield. Edited by Harry Raffal and John Alexander. Helion and Company, 2025. 256 pp.
Harry Raffal and John Alexander seek to address an important gap in scholarship that considers the development of close air support (CAS) in relation to its battlefield effect. The book uses almost a dozen case studies to support this thesis, spanning from the advent of close air support in World War I to the experiences combatting al-Qaeda and Boko Haram.
The editors work to clarify confusion about the subject. Although friendly close-in airpower has frequently been described in terms like “flying artillery,” such terminology hinders an effective understanding of what really constitutes close air support. Likewise, official concepts and doctrinal terms change, as witnessed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s inclusion for a time of “battlefield aerial interdiction” (p. 20). Raffal and Alexander remind readers that supporting fires can be divided into “deliberate” fires for when preplanning is possible and “dynamic” fires for when the requirement stems from an emergency (p. 235). Close air support is far better suited to the latter, since supporting fires can generally be met “by the ground force’s organic fire support,” whereas emergencies must be addressed expediently often making airpower the better option (p. 235).
Close Air Support makes clear that CAS can be extremely important and even decisive in enabling tactical success, supporting or even saving beleaguered units during a crisis. Historical cases have demonstrated that meaningful and effective close air support is not possible unless and until air superiority has been achieved—a contested air environment precludes the kind of presence needed to perform such support. Close air support is well described as being “just one air power mission. . . dependent on other roles, most notably control of the air and reconnaissance” because worthwhile close air support must not be precluded by enemy counterair and reconnaissance-derived intelligence is a precondition to more effectively understand how to identify and strike targets (p. 22). The editors acknowledge that this precondition often leaves ground personnel frustrated by what they may interpret as being bereft and ignored despite danger.
Coordination and communication are also necessary preconditions for effective interservice actions, including close air support. Such undertakings require smooth and effective collaboration across organizations, and these kinds of skills easily fade unless they continue to be practiced. That said, in postwar times of budget constraint, each respective service is prone to focus on its own missions for which skills can be preserved in-house. The book’s authors note explicitly that the lessons of past experiences have had to be repeatedly relearned in new conflicts, a pattern found in several of its excellent case studies. The selected cases reflect a conscious interest in exploring examples of military history across time and geographic regions.
The use of close air support spans many wars in the past century, leaving many examples to choose from. British historical cases enjoy a particular prominence, with three chapters considering different aspects of British close air support during World War I, a contrast of British and Japanese airpower in Malaya during 1942, and an evaluation of the handling of British close air support in the 1982 Falklands War. The prioritization of British examples does not preclude an insightful consideration of US theorist William C. Sherman’s post-World War I perspective on ground attack aviation, nor a survey of Nigerian close air support in its wars against Biafran separatists, other militants, or Boko Haram. The chapter analyzing the US Army’s exploration of armed helicopters before and during the Vietnam War is a particularly interesting case. The US Army’s abbreviated development of “aerial rocket artillery” units as part of air assault formations points to the cleft between the definition of close air support for both ground and air organizations, including whether CAS should be seen specifically as “flying artillery” in contrast to the traditional airpower definition (p. 159).
The chapters draw on a rich array of secondary sources and archival records for evidence, and the case studies are interesting, relevant, and thoughtful. Ongoing wars are difficult for historical study because, while relevant, they are obscured by the fog of war, potential classification of materials, and unpredictable outcomes. In the book’s conclusion, Raffal and Alexander briefly address Russia’s war in Ukraine, including uncrewed aerial systems, in a cogent and well-reasoned manner. Close air support remains a valuable part of the mission set for airpower, contingent on air superiority, which the editors observe has not been gained by Russia nor Ukraine. The struggle for air superiority will be costly in a future great power conflict. Close Air Support should be on the shelf of military historians, airpower practitioners, and other critical thinkers.
Dr. Nicholas Michael Sambaluk