Introduction and Strategic Context
Over the past twelve months, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has deepened a force structure built around four services, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force; and four strategic arms, including the newly established Aerospace Force responsible for military space operations. This restructuring is explicitly intended to improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint, all‑domain operations and informationized warfare in contingencies ranging from Taiwan to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Beijing’s 2024 reform dissolved the former Strategic Support Force and reassigned its space units to the PLA Aerospace Force, which was formally established on 19 April 2024 and presented in Chinese and foreign reporting as one of the world’s few dedicated military space services. In parallel, Chinese doctrinal publications and official commentary continue to describe air, missile, naval aviation, and space capabilities as mutually reinforcing tools for deterrence, coercion, and, if necessary, high‑intensity regional conflict.
PLA Air Force (PLAAF): Strategic Reach and Signaling
The PLA Air Force has used the past year to underscore its role in long‑range deterrence and strategic signaling, particularly through bomber patrols and joint flights with Russia near Japan and the Korean Peninsula. These activities are framed in Chinese and Russian statements as routine elements of an annual cooperation plan, but regional governments interpret them as demonstrations of growing Sino‑Russian defense coordination.
On 9 December 2025, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that Chinese and Russian aircraft had conducted their tenth joint strategic air patrol over the East China Sea and western Pacific, prompting South Korea to scramble fighters as Chinese and Russian aircraft entered and exited its air‑defense identification zone. The following day, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported a related long‑range patrol in which Russian Tu‑95 bombers and Chinese H‑6 bombers, escorted by J‑16 fighters, flew a circuit between Okinawa and Miyako, further highlighting the air component of the Sino‑Russian strategic partnership.
Closer to Taiwan, the Republic of China Ministry of National Defense recorded repeated PLA sorties into Taiwan’s southwestern air‑defense identification zone in 2025, including an 8 June incident with eleven PLA aircraft and seven PLAN vessels operating around the island. These flights, often involving H‑6 bombers, fighter aircraft, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, serve both training and coercive signaling roles by normalizing PLA presence near Taiwan. PLA joint ‘combat readiness patrols’ around Taiwan, involving multiple aircraft types and naval vessels, have become routine and are explicitly framed by Chinese sources as warnings against ‘Taiwan independence’ and external interference. In early April 2025 the PLA Eastern Theater Command organized joint exercises around Taiwan involving army, navy, air force, and rocket force elements, with missions including combat-readiness patrols, strikes on sea and land targets, and blockade-style ‘key area and key strait’ control.
PLAAF has also expanded its expeditionary profile through joint exercises with partners beyond East Asia, most notably the first‑ever “Eagles of Civilization‑2025” bilateral air exercise with Egypt. Held from mid‑April to early May 2025 at an Egyptian air base, the drill involved Chinese J‑10 fighters, Y-20, and YU-20 deploying thousands of kilometers from home bases to fly mixed formations and conduct air‑to‑air and air‑to‑ground training with Egyptian aircraft, signaling both PLAAF’s growing reach and Beijing’s interest in defense ties with Arab partners.
PLA Navy Aviation and Carrier‑Based Air Power
Over the past year, the People’s Liberation Army Navy aviation arm has marked major milestones in the development of carrier‑based air power, centered on the new electromagnetic‑catapult carrier Fujian (CV‑18). Chinese and foreign defense observers view Fujian as a key platform for extending China’s naval aviation reach beyond the first island chain and narrowing qualitative gaps with U.S. carrier strike groups.
In May 2024 Fujian returned from an initial sea trial that tested propulsion and power systems, and by mid‑2025 Chinese state media reported that the ship was accelerating follow‑on trials, including catapult tests essential for fixed‑wing carrier aviation. By September 2025, video released by the PLA Navy and state media showed J‑15T and J‑35 carrier fighters and the KJ‑600 airborne early‑warning aircraft conducting electromagnetic catapult launches and arrested landings from Fujian, confirming that China has entered an advanced phase of integrated carrier‑air‑wing trials.
These developments in naval aviation, combined with routine PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan and growing far‑seas deployments in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, indicate that China is on the cusp of fielding a more capable carrier aviation force able to support sustained blue‑water operations.
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF): Capability Growth and Political Headwinds
Open‑source assessments continue to portray the PLA Rocket Force as central to China’s anti‑access and area‑denial posture, with large inventories of conventionally armed short‑ and medium‑range ballistic missiles and land‑attack cruise missiles designed to threaten bases, ports, and naval forces across the western Pacific. U.S. and allied reporting emphasizes that PLARF complements PLAAF and PLAN aviation by providing rapid, long‑range precision strike options against regional targets, complicating U.S. and partner operational planning in a crisis.
PLARF units also played a prominent role in the April 2025 “Strait Thunder‑2025A” exercise around Taiwan. Chinese official commentary on the April 2025 Eastern Theater Command drills around Taiwan notes participation by rocket units in joint fire‑strike missions, including simulated strikes on key targets and blockade operations.
At the same time, China’s missile and aerospace industrial base has come under strain from an expanded anti‑corruption campaign that has swept through the Rocket Force and related defense enterprises led by the Central Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Commission and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. A November 2025 study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited by Reuters, found that revenues at China’s major military firms declined in 2024 as corruption probes and leadership purges disrupted arms contracts and procurement, raising questions about timelines for some advanced missile and space programs.
We nonetheless judge that despite short‑term disruptions, sustained growth in China’s defense budget and political commitment to modernization mean that PLARF’s long‑term trajectory remains upward, albeit with greater central oversight and potential delays in selected high‑end systems.
PLA Aerospace Force and Space Operations
The establishment of the PLA Aerospace Force in April 2024 created a dedicated organizational home for China’s military space missions, including launch operations, on‑orbit support, and space‑based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and communications. Chinese defense commentary describes the Aerospace Force as a key enabler of joint operations, providing a space‑based information backbone for precision strike, maritime domain awareness, and strategic early warning.
In the last twelve months China has continued intensive crewed and uncrewed space activity supporting both national prestige and military‑relevant capabilities.The Shenzhou‑18 mission, launched on 25 April 2024 aboard a Long March‑2F from Jiuquan, delivered three taikonauts to the Tiangong space station for a six‑month stay that included multiple spacewalks and numerous scientific and technological experiments.
In October 2025 China launched the Shenzhou‑21 mission, sending a three‑member crew, including the country’s youngest astronaut to date, on the seventh crewed mission to Tiangong since its completion in 2022 and achieving a national record by docking with the station in roughly three and a half hours after launch. The mission also carried small mammals to orbit for life‑science experiments and was accompanied by official statements that China plans to land astronauts on the Moon by 2030, underscoring the dual civilian and strategic importance of its human‑spaceflight program.
These crewed missions occur alongside continuing satellite launches that expand China’s constellations for communications, navigation, and remote sensing, which in turn provide critical support to PLA joint operations and the Aerospace Force’s future role in space control and space‑support missions.
China’s Aerospace Industrial Base: Strengths and Stresses
China’s aerospace industrial base is anchored by large state‑owned conglomerates such as the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, which together develop and produce ballistic and cruise missiles, launch vehicles, aircraft, and space systems for both civilian and military users. Over the last year this sector has faced both steady demand from PLA modernization and headwinds from anti‑corruption investigations, tightening export controls, and growing scrutiny from foreign governments concerned about technology transfer and military‑civil fusion.
The SIPRI‑linked study reported by Reuters in late 2025 highlighted that revenues at major Chinese defense firms, including AVIC, Norinco, and CASC, declined in 2024 even as global arms revenues rose, in part because corruption probes slowed contract approvals and forced leadership changes. Nonetheless, the same analysis concluded that Beijing’s long‑term commitment to advanced naval fleets, hypersonic missiles, drones, and space systems means that aerospace and missile manufacturers are likely to recover, albeit under stricter political oversight and financial discipline.
China’s broader space‑industry strategy, articulated in state policy documents and white papers, identifies the space sector as “new infrastructure” and a pillar of national rejuvenation, linking investments in launch capability, satellite constellations, and deep‑space exploration to wider industrial and technological goals.
China’s Commercial Space Sector: Launch, Constellations, and Services
Alongside its state‑owned aerospace conglomerates, China has cultivated a rapidly growing commercial space sector that includes private or quasi‑private launch companies, satellite manufacturers, and data‑service providers. Since the mid‑2010s Beijing has encouraged private investment in launch and satellite services through policy initiatives that frame commercial space as a strategic emerging industry.
In May 2025 the private firm Landspace successfully launched six satellites into orbit on the fifth flight of its methane‑fueled Zhuque‑2 series, demonstrating the maturation of reusable and clean‑propellant technologies within China’s commercial launch sector. Other firms, such as Galactic Energy, have continued to fly the solid‑fuel Ceres‑1 rocket family, which by early 2025 had completed more than a dozen successful missions placing dozens of small satellites into orbit from both land and sea launch sites.
Commercial satellite operators have likewise expanded, with Chang Guang Satellite Technology’s Jilin‑1 remote‑sensing constellation surpassing one hundred satellites by mid‑2025, making it one of the world’s largest commercial Earth‑observation systems. Chinese media report that Jilin‑1 can revisit many locations on Earth dozens of times per day, providing high‑resolution imagery for clients that may include both civilian customers and government agencies.
China Great Wall Industry Corporation and other companies have increased exports of satellites and space services, including the delivery in early 2025 of an intelligent remote‑sensing satellite, IRSS‑1, to an Omani customer, illustrating how commercial space ties contribute to Beijing’s broader diplomatic and economic relationships. More broadly, the commercial space industry has been explicitly identified in recent economic‑work conferences and government reports as a strategic growth sector, and Chinese officials have signaled plans to map civil‑space infrastructure development out to 2035.
International Cooperation, Military Sales, and Joint Exercises
China’s expanding air, naval, and space capabilities are increasingly embedded in a network of international exercises and defense relationships, particularly with Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and selected European and Latin American partners. These activities provide operational experience, signal political alignment, and create new markets for Chinese arms and space services.
In March 2025 China, Russia, and Iran conducted the Maritime Security Belt‑2025 trilateral naval exercise near Chabahar in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean, practicing anti‑piracy drills, search and rescue, and naval combat maneuvers aimed at protecting sea lines of communication. Russian and Iranian reporting framed the exercise as part of a broader effort to counter Western pressure and deepen defense cooperation among the three states, even as analysts cautioned that the partnership remains one of convenience rather than a formal alliance.
China’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia expanded with the third iteration of the Blue Sword naval drills in Saudi waters in late 2025, where Chinese and Saudi forces conducted joint training over several weeks at King Abdulaziz Naval Base in Jubail. Saudi and Chinese statements highlighted the exercise as evidence of deepening strategic ties and growing interoperability between their navies’ special‑operations and boarding units.
Beyond the Middle East, China has pursued security engagement with European partners such as Serbia, including joint exercises and arms sales that signal Beijing’s willingness to cooperate militarily with states outside the NATO framework. At the same time, Chinese and Brazilian institutions have launched new joint space projects, such as a radio‑astronomy laboratory linked to the BINGO telescope, that showcase how space cooperation complements China’s broader diplomatic outreach.
Challenges and Strategic Implications
Taken together, developments in the PLA Air Force, Rocket Force, Navy aviation, and Aerospace Force over the past year confirm that China is steadily improving its capacity to project power and impose costs on adversaries across multiple domains. At the same time, the anti‑corruption campaign in the defense sector, the technical complexity of advanced carrier aviation and space systems, and the possibility of miscalculation during increasingly frequent joint drills and close air and maritime encounters all underscore that China’s rise as an air‑ and space‑power is neither linear nor without risk.
For external observers, the key analytical challenge is to distinguish between demonstrative activities intended primarily for signaling, such as high‑profile joint air patrols and trilateral naval drills; and quieter structural changes in force organization, industrial capacity, and space infrastructure that may have more lasting strategic effects. As China’s aerospace and commercial space sectors continue to mature, the boundary between civilian and military capabilities will become even more porous, complicating efforts by other states to assess Chinese intentions and design effective responses.
Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney
Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute
Click here for the PDF of the full report
