This article compares the roots and perspectives of civilizational thinking in three cases (China, Russia, and India) to chart the complex interplay between the rise of domestic “civilizational factions” among a state’s intelligentsia and non-Western elites and the subsequent effects of this thinking on each state’s behavior and strategic posture in the realm of its external affairs. Through rigorous cross-comparative examination and process-tracing along the defined parameters, this case study seeks to contribute to the nascent scholarly literature on the emerging civilization-state phenomena, offering some conclusions on how the emic repackaging of ancient historical epistemologies under hypermodern frameworks may go on to redefine plurilateral order throughout the dynamic twenty-first century and beyond.
This article examines the political, military, and economic dynamics of the great-power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific and how it has impacted the American alliance structure since the beginning of the Cold War. The author reviews the rise of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) following the demise of the American-sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, and the challenges facing the United States in establishing a new multilateral defense treaty organization to confront growing Chinese military assertiveness in the region. The author then compares three potential alliances structures to advance American interests in the region with an eye toward current and emerging strategic landscapes.
South Korea’s perception of China’s role in both the denuclearization and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula has in part shaped the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) current unwillingness to align itself with the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, especially due to the significant effects Sino-US tensions have on Beijing’s strategy toward the Korean Peninsula. In particular, Seoul remains concerned that outright alignment with the United States against China could exacerbate the Korean Peninsula’s position in Sino-US strategic competition. For South Korea, this carries the risk of both Seoul’s diminished influence in the pursuit of Korean denuclearization amid Sino-US tensions as well as a reduction of Beijing’s prospective support for Korean unification under the ROK’s lead.
The United States must accept a fundamental reality: the policy of forcing the Kim regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons program in exchange for sanctions relief is untenable. It is no closer to achieving results than it was in 2010, even while the DPRK produces long-range missiles and plans to develop tactical nuclear warheads. The failure of trade sanctions exhibits the need for a new strategy to deal with the DPRK and its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the United States should use multilateral talks to negotiate incremental deals that produce tangible results and build trust. Put simply, an enforceable security guarantee, achieved through mutual peace declarations, will help normalize the DPRK’s international relations so that it can undergo economic reform and emerge as a legitimate global partner. Such measures are more likely to attain results that all partners can agree on and could, at a minimum, result in a moratorium on future nuclear production and development. Only then can talks of the DPRK’s complete denuclearization be possible.
This article attempts to explain what makes India behave the way it does in its approach to the Indo-Pacific, a behavior that one Indian analyst prefers to call “evasive balancing.” The answer to such a behavior, this article contends, is found in the balance of power or, more specifically, in India’s considerable power asymmetry relative to the United States and China in addition to the decreasing power gap between the United States and China. India’s economic and military growth puts it below the United States and China in the hierarchy of differing capabilities, and China has been reducing its power gap with the United States.
The time has now arrived to recalibrate India’s rise as a geopolitical and strategic power for the liberal international order. How can India’s policy choices fit in President Joe Biden’s “America Is Back” foreign policy?
Volume 04 Issue 3 - Summer 2021
Washington must develop a wider, more comprehensive vision of the North Korea problem now, the North Korea problem then, and the best direction in which to take the North Korea problem moving forward. This key first step that Washington must take before establishing a promising North Korea policy is best accomplished by, in essence, thinking like a North Korean—or carefully considering the issues from the North Korean perspective to better gauge and understand their scope and value within negotiations. Understanding how North Koreans think regarding economic, social, military, and other critical issues will better equip negotiators to avoid the diplomatic errors of the past and better understand—for better or for worse—the validity of negotiations with North Korea moving forward.
The manuscripts contained in this package present a record of the grand strategic viewpoints of students at the Air Command and Staff College for the 2021 academic term. Each manuscript is a response to the final exam prompt for the International Security I core course, The Context of International Security. The course presents various academic perspectives regarding international security, with a focus on US national security and the US national interest, as well as the tools at its disposal for the attainment of security and interests.
The rise of China in the twenty-first century marks the end of unipolarity. The United States must meet the challenge of a resurgent China while maintaining its own status in the international system. It is in the United States’ best interest to pursue a strategy that avoids violence with China, while maintaining US hegemony in the western hemisphere and status as a superpower. To accomplish this, the United States has two imperative tasks: it must accept the end of unipolarity, and it must start using constitutive power to foster a rising China that behaves in accordance with internationally established norms.
Welcome to Indo-Pacific Affairs, a podcast devoted to tackling the wicked problems facing policy makers, academicians, military leaders, and others in the Indo-Pacific region. Affiliated with Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers, and the Air Command and Staff College’s eSchool, the podcast features interviews with the top names in academia, government, and think tanks from around the region.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in this podcast are those of the participants and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
This article examines how Taiwan’s enhanced military defenses have increased its capacity and capabilities to resist Chinese military threats, despite some drawbacks, and has thus contributed to the cross-Strait security’s stability.
The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.