Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs --
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Abstract
Taiwan remains a flashpoint for conflict in the Indo-Pacific, where the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively employs cognitive warfare to reshape Taiwanese perceptions. Targeting media content, public opinion, and national identity, the PRC seeks to prepare the way for annexation—an approach reminiscent of Russian actions preceding the 2014 seizure of Crimea. Will Taiwan follow Crimea’s path? This article examines election opinion polls in Taiwan to illustrate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) methods from 2020 to 2023 and their impact on US–Taiwan relations. The study finds that counter-cognitive warfare has recently evolved into what this author terms “rhetorical labeling tactics,” with actors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait crafting and promoting narratives to influence public political views.
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Cognitive warfare (認知作戰)—a component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategy of “unrestricted warfare” (超限戰)—targets human perception, attitudes, and decision-making through information manipulation, propaganda, and psychological operations to achieve strategic objectives. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) describes cognitive warfare as an effort “to sway the subject’s will and change its mindset. . . . Psychologically, the PRC is trying to cause mental disarray and confusion, in order to weaken fighting will and determination to defending ourselves.”
Traditionally, military forces have served as the first line of national defense, protecting states from external threats. However, rapid technological advancements now allow adversaries to bypass conventional defenses by manipulating media and other information channels to shape public opinion. In Taiwan’s case, the CCP integrates media and commercial activities to spread propaganda, including narratives promoting “America Skepticism” (疑美論) to weaken US–Taiwan relations.
At times, accusations of cognitive warfare serve a strategic purpose by reinforcing negative perceptions of a nation, thereby justifying specific policies or actions against it. Observing recent statements and actions by Taiwan’s leaders, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—the governing party that holds Taiwan’s current presidential administration—wields resistance to CCP cognitive warfare as a strategic weapon. Rather than merely countering misinformation, the DPP has adopted proactive tactics—developing cross-platform content strategies, leveraging algorithmic influence, and encouraging institutional and grassroots participation. This shift transforms ideological defense into a competitive initiative. While largely beneficial, these measures require careful management to prevent unintended consequences.
The Evolution of Cognitive Warfare Strategies
Cognitive warfare aims to shape how individuals evaluate issues or events, often without the person’s own awareness. This strategic operation relies on propaganda and narrative control, operating at the intersection of cyberwarfare, information warfare, and psychological operations to influence cognitive and decision-making processes. The CCP propaganda machine consistently adheres to the “mouthpiece theory” (喉舌理論) inherited from the Soviet Communist propaganda system. Since Mao Zedong’s era, the CCP has mandated that all media and propaganda channels serve as the Party’s mouthpiece, reinforcing its policies and safeguarding its interests. As Mao wrote in How China Can Win, “Even if one cannot immediately defeat a more powerful enemy, by rallying the masses to one’s side and persisting, it’s possible to gradually turn the tide against unfavorable odds.”
By 2011, Mainland Chinese scholars Zeng Huafeng(石海明) and Shi Haiming (曾華鋒)had recognized the potential of cognitive warfare and expanded its conceptual framework. Their work examined its application, from shaping public opinion in peacetime to influencing decision-making in wartime—consolidating internal support, undermining enemy resolve, and winning over neutral parties. By 2014, Chinese Communist scholars introduced the concept of “brain supremacy,” marking a shift from information warfare to intelligence warfare. This evolution emphasized securing an advantage in cognitive speed and processing, often termed “intelligence supremacy.” Ultimately, cognitive warfare aims to influence or alter the target audience’s behavior. (See fig. 1, below)
Figure 1. The evolution of CCP cognitive warfare strategies. (Source: created by the author.)
Influence Efforts Directed at Foreign Media
Grounded in these theoretical insights, the CCP continues to implement and refine these strategies, adapting them to advancements in modern technology. Both domestic and international social media platforms serve as critical tools for crafting and disseminating narratives that promote CCP influence. These platforms also enable the generation and spread of divisive content, deepening social fractures. To co-opt and infiltrate foreign media, the CCP employs three primary strategic approaches.
The first, known as “building a boat to go to sea” (造船出海), relies on direct control. The CCP establishes its own professional international news organizations and cultivates media talent, ensuring control over television channels, radio stations, and newspapers through majority ownership. This approach allows the Party to shape the narrative from within.
A second approach leverages economic influence to pressure independent media with business ties to China. By exploiting financial dependencies, the CCP encourages self-censorship, compelling media outlets to avoid reporting unfavorable news.
The third, referred to as “borrowing a boat to go to sea” (借船出海), involves using existing foreign platforms to disseminate CCP-approved narratives. This strategy relies on public figures or established Western media outlets to frame China’s messaging in a manner that resonates with international audiences. By enlisting local pundits and social media influencers with loyal followings, the CCP ensures that its narratives reach target audiences in a credible and effective manner.
China’s Cognitive Warfare Strategy against Taiwan: Techniques and Implications
China’s propaganda tactics employ a multifaceted strategy to shape perceptions and influence decision-making, carrying significant implications for businesses and media organizations. This approach integrates information control, propaganda dissemination, and narrative shaping. Military actions, such as regular air force incursions into Taiwan’s airspace, further reinforce these efforts and amplify their impact.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leverages business ties to China to pressure independent media into removing content unfavorable to the Party. This economic influence often leads Taiwanese media organizations to self-censor sensitive topics, including the Tiananmen Massacre (or “6-4 Incident,” 六四事件), the Falun Gong (法輪功) religious group, and the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama (達賴喇嘛), in order to maintain access to the Chinese market. Over time, this self-censorship establishes editorial norms that dictate “what can be said” and “what cannot be said” in news reporting.
A striking example of these tactics in action is the case of the Want Want Group, a Taiwanese business conglomerate. Originally a food manufacturer, the group expanded into media by purchasing the China Times in 2008 and merging with China Television (CTV) and Chung T’ien Television (CtiTV) in 2009—a move that aligns with the CCP’s “building a boat” strategy. The influence of this strategy became evident during Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill protests, when Want Want’s media outlets labeled protesters as “rioters,” while other, less CCP-aligned outlets described police brutality as the actions of “mad cops.” This case illustrates how the economic incentives of the Chinese market increasingly shape the behavior of Taiwanese conglomerates seeking to balance cross-strait interests with their media operations.
Through investments in media companies, China has significantly expanded its ability to manipulate information and deploy official media to promote narratives aligned with CCP objectives. This strategy has shaped public discourse on several key issues.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese state media and affiliated accounts actively promoted claims on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, alleging that the virus originated in the United States. These campaigns heavily relied on both the “borrowing boats” and “building boats to go to sea” strategies to amplify their reach and influence global perceptions.
A similar approach emerged during the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests. Twitter identified and dismantled a network of accounts linked to mainland China that had deliberately spread disinformation to discredit protesters and inflame political discord. By infiltrating global social media platforms, China sought to shape international opinion and weaken support for the pro-democracy movement.
Skepticism toward the United States also surfaced as a prominent theme in Taiwan, particularly in the lead-up to the 2024 election. In 2021, narratives critical of US policies gained traction, including claims that American demands—such as requiring Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to build factories abroad—would harm Taiwan’s economy. Additional allegations suggested that US pork imports containing ractopamine posed significant health risks. Although the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ultimately secured victory in the January 2024 election, analysts note that Taiwan’s opposition parties have increasingly steered public discourse toward skepticism of the United States.
The Impact on Taiwan, the United States, and the US–Taiwan Relationship
The CCP’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan influences multiple aspects of society, including military force structure, US–Taiwan relations, public understanding of cognitive warfare, political trends, and presidential election outcomes. Analyzing internet trends and key events over time reveals how these narratives have shaped discourse.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, as Taiwan prepared to receive its first batch of Moderna vaccines, a widely circulated narrative suggested that Taiwan had exchanged military purchases and semiconductor chips for vaccines. However, Taiwan’s early success in pandemic prevention made this claim difficult to sustain.
In February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sparked anxiety in Taiwan. Almost immediately, online narratives blamed the war on alleged US and NATO “provocations,” reinforcing the idea that the United States was the primary source of global instability, war, and destruction.
Figure 2. Analyzing the impact of three issues: The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, and Taiwan Presidential Meetings with U.S. Political Leaders. (Source Yu, Chih-Hao. "Anti-US Skepticism and Their Origins." Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), November 8, 2023. https://iorg.tw/a/us-skepticism-238#h2-8. Modified by author.)
In May 2021, after US President Joe Biden announced the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the so-called “Taiwan destruction narrative” emerged. This narrative asserted that Taiwan’s participation in the framework was part of a broader US strategy to turn Taiwan into a battlefield.
In August 2022, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan coincided with large-scale Chinese military exercises around the island. Online discourse claimed that Taiwan itself had provoked the crisis and was responsible for its own growing entanglement in potential conflict.
By late October 2022, news of TSMC’s upcoming ceremony for transferring equipment to its Arizona factory fueled claims that the United States was “hollowing out” Taiwan. Narratives accused the United States of exploiting Taiwan’s resources and talent while preparing to abandon the island altogether. In 2023, similar claims resurfaced in response to reports that Speaker Kevin McCarthy might visit Taiwan, reinforcing fears of Taiwan’s so-called “Ukrainization” and portraying the United States as an instigator of war.
Between 2022 and 2023, then-President Tsai Ing-wen(蔡英文) met separately with Speakers Pelosi and McCarthy. Following these visits, Chinese military activities around the Taiwan Strait intensified, coinciding with a surge in narratives such as the “source of chaos (混亂的根源)” (framing the United States as the root of global conflicts), the “false friend (錯誤的盟友)” (alleging that the United States profits from Taiwan while no real support), and the “abandonment Taiwan narrative(放棄台灣論)” (claiming that the United States views Taiwan as a pawn and will ultimately desert it). The phenomenon of Weibo and Chinese official media leading in popularity is also evidence that these narratives were first disseminated from China (see fig. 3).
Figure 3. The Internet Presence, When Tsai Ing-wen’s Meetings with US House Speakers in 2022 and 2023. (Source Taiwan Information Environment Research Center [IORG], "8 Suspicious Narratives and Dissemination Behaviors Related to PRC Military Exercises After the Tsai-McCarthy Meeting," IORG Weekly Report no. 41, May 23, 2023, https://iorg.tw/da/41#h2-5.)
The Impact on the US–Taiwan Relationship
Taiwan’s relationship with the United States has long been central to public discourse, shaping the island’s democratic trajectory and its role within global democratic alliances. However, the spread of “America Skepticism” threatens this relationship by fostering negative perceptions of Taiwan’s democratic governance and international partnerships. Manipulative narratives—often misleading or deliberately distorted—erode the quality of public discourse and weaken trust in democracy. The CCP remains the primary external force behind these efforts.
Despite these challenges, growing public satisfaction with governance since 2020 and the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests, which exposed the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, have strengthened Taiwan’s national identity. This shift has helped counteract the influence of anti-U.S. rhetoric. However, even as US–Taiwan relations continue to deepen, skepticism toward the United States remains present in Taiwan’s information environment. This persistent narrative underscores the urgent need for enhanced media literacy among Taiwanese citizens to navigate an increasingly complex and contested information landscape.
Taiwan’s Methods of Resistance against Cognitive Warfare
Taiwan has adopted a multifaceted approach to counter the People’s Republic of China’s cognitive warfare, with both civil society and government initiatives playing key roles. In the digital age, anyone can publish or share content, leading to the widespread circulation of false, misleading, or deliberately fabricated information. In response, grassroots efforts such as the Kuma Academy (黑熊學院, “Black Bear Academy”) have emerged to promote social media literacy. Additionally, “internet armies” are often active on various social media platforms, identifying disinformation and propaganda as “Chinese operations.”
To combat the spread of false information, Taiwan has developed a robust network of online fact-checking platforms, including Cofacts. By analyzing headlines and content, Cofacts employs artificial intelligence to assess the credibility of information. Platforms such as Snopes, FactCheck.org, and Cofacts provide users with accessible tools to verify news reports and detect falsified images, videos, or accounts. A study by Stanford University found that individuals who use fact-checking tools are significantly less likely to share false information. For the general public, mastering these resources and recognizing deepfake technology are essential skills in defending against misinformation.
To counter disinformation and cognitive warfare from the mainland, Taiwan’s government has tasked the National Communications Commission (NCC) and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) with overseeing media mergers and acquisitions—particularly cases involving mainland Chinese entities seeking control of Taiwanese companies. The NCC employs a consensus-based system to evaluate complex cases, but its cautious approach and limited authority have drawn criticism. The premier has notably remarked that “nobody can control it, and it controls nothing,” highlighting concerns over the NCC’s inability to curb PRC influence in Taiwanese media or effectively combat disinformation.
The NCC faces a persistent dilemma: expanding its regulatory authority risks accusations of overreach, while excessive restraint leaves it ineffective. Striking a balance between regulatory power and functional oversight remains the central challenge, as Taiwan seeks to defend its information environment without compromising democratic principles.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice’s Cognitive Warfare Research Center stands as a crucial pillar in the defense against CCP information warfare. Operating with precision and vigilance, the center is tasked with countering the spread of disinformation and safeguarding the integrity of Taiwan’s democratic processes. By deploying advanced techniques to identify and neutralize false narratives, the center plays a vital role in maintaining an informed populace and ensuring that the public discourse remains free from malign foreign influence. In this digital age, where information can be as potent a weapon as any, the center's efforts are indispensable in the ongoing struggle to preserve truth and democracy.
Domestic Political Controversies in Taiwan Surrounding Cognitive Warfare
The discourse on cognitive warfare requires a nuanced analysis of the tension between national security and democratic principles of free expression. Some scholars contend that claims of PRC-led cognitive warfare are overstated or driven by geopolitical interests, noting that information warfare and public opinion shaping are common tools in international competition. In some instances, governments may also use accusations of cognitive warfare to reinforce negative perceptions of a rival state, thereby legitimizing specific policies or actions taken against it.
This strategic communication landscape reveals that both the CCP and Taiwan’s governing DPP actively construct narratives to shape political perceptions. The challenge lies not in suppressing competing viewpoints but in fostering a political environment that encourages rigorous debate while upholding the democratic principle of open dialogue. Some critics argue that the DPP, when confronted with unfavorable narratives that threaten its political standing or policy agenda, reflexively labels dissenting messages as “cognitive warfare.” According to these critics, this approach aims to discredit the sources of negative information while avoiding deeper self-examination or substantive policy adjustments. Rather than addressing the root causes of public dissatisfaction, they contend, the DPP risks dismissing legitimate concerns under the pretext of countering foreign influence.
In response, the DPP maintains that its efforts to counter cognitive warfare are essential to safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic institutions. Officials argue that distinguishing between genuine domestic criticism and PRC-driven influence campaigns is crucial in an era of hybrid threats. The party also emphasizes its commitment to press freedom, pointing to Taiwan’s vibrant and competitive media landscape as evidence that opposition voices remain robust. While navigating the complexities of information warfare, the DPP asserts that its actions seek to reinforce public resilience against external manipulation rather than stifle legitimate debate. Nonetheless, as the discourse on cognitive warfare evolves, ensuring that counter-disinformation measures do not inadvertently suppress dissent remains a critical concern in Taiwan’s democratic governance.
Balancing Democratic Values and National Defense in the Ideological Battlefield
This analysis underscores that media functions as a battleground for ideological conflict, where narratives compete to shape public perception. Defending democracy in this space requires a strategic response, balancing the need to counter harmful disinformation with the fundamental commitment to free expression. Discussions on restricting certain speech must be evaluated through the lens of national interest, recognizing that legitimacy in any information struggle depends on safeguarding collective well-being. While democracy thrives on inclusivity, the unchecked spread of harmful ideologies can erode its foundations. Accusations of restricting free speech often come from those who feel their perspectives are under threat, highlighting the complexities of maintaining open discourse. Inaction in this contest risks ceding ground in the battle for public opinion.
Disinformation and conspiracy theories operate as weapons, embedding themselves in public consciousness when left unchallenged. Their spread is fueled by fear, uncertainty, and distrust in institutions. Effective countermeasures rely on transparency, factual accuracy, and reasoned dialogue—rather than outright suppression—enabling skeptical audiences to distinguish truth from falsehood over time. Just as military forces are trained to employ strategic force, cultivating a well-informed and engaged citizenry through open discussion fortifies democratic resilience. Encouraging critical thinking and national unity in the face of cognitive warfare strengthens society’s ability to defend its core values without resorting to censorship.
Conclusion
China’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan is a multifaceted and adaptive strategy that extends across international, regional, and commercial spheres. By leveraging Taiwan’s economic dependence, Beijing seeks to shape media narratives through strategic incentives such as market access, advertising revenue, and capital investments. These pressures affect both pro-unification and pro-independence outlets alike, contributing to an information landscape increasingly vulnerable to manipulation. This reality underscores the urgent need for stronger media literacy in Taiwan, equipping citizens with the tools to critically assess the information they consume.
At the corporate level, Taiwanese media owners with financial interests in China often engage in self-censorship on politically sensitive topics, aligning their editorial policies with Beijing’s broader communication strategies. In tandem, the CCP actively fosters skepticism toward the United States, attempting to weaken Taiwan’s confidence in its most crucial international partner. However, these efforts have faced growing resistance, particularly since the 2019 Hong Kong protests, which heightened public awareness of China’s coercive tactics and reinforced Taiwan’s commitment to democratic resilience.
Both the CCP and the DPP actively shape narratives to influence public opinion, reflecting the broader contest over Taiwan’s political future. As Taiwan navigates this evolving battlefield, the challenge lies in safeguarding democratic values while maintaining space for open debate. Strengthening critical thinking and media literacy will remain essential in countering cognitive warfare. Looking ahead, Taiwan must refine its defensive strategies by reinforcing regulatory oversight of media ownership, expanding public education on disinformation, and deepening international cooperation on information security. Continued research is vital to understanding the long-term impact of cognitive warfare on democratic societies and to developing countermeasures that preserve the free flow of information while resisting malign influence.
Commander Jeremy (Yen-ming) Chen, ROC Navy
Commander Chen is a Republic of China (Taiwan) Navy officer currently studying international affairs at Salve Regina University.
Notes