The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), until 2016 known as the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), is the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ground-based strategic missile service. It is equipped with a wide range of nuclear and conventional missiles, including short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. It has significantly expanded in size and capabilities since being upgraded to a full service in 2015 adding a range of new weapons systems and at least 11 new missile brigades, the majority of which are likely nuclear-capable.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a nuclear power since 1964, when it successfully detonated its first atomic weapon. Since then, the PLASAF/PLARF has served as the PRC’s primary nuclear deterrent force. While the PLA has begun building up a credible nuclear triad in recent years, the PLARF and its ground-based nuclear force remain by far the largest and most capable component of that triad.
This report offers insight into the organizations tasked with managing the PLARF’s nuclear warhead stockpile. This includes the units responsible for storing, guarding, testing, and transporting the PLARF’s warheads. It traces, so far as publicly available sources allow, the journey of these warheads from the central stockpile, buried deep in the Qinling Mountains in Shaanxi, to the PLARF’s regional operations Bases, and then on to individual missile brigades and battalions. Where possible, it answers questions about how, where, and by whom warheads are stored: Who is inspecting these warheads? Who is guarding them? Who is moving them from one facility to the next? If an emergency occurs, who responds? In doing so, this report builds upon, and is indebted to, previous work on the topic by Mark Stokes at the Project 2049 Institute.
This research was not at all straightforward, given PLA secrecy, especially toward any matter related to its nuclear capabilities. Even when these units and their mission are obliquely discussed in publicly available sources, they are almost always cloaked in innuendo. For example, PLA sources rarely use the word “warhead” [弹头 or 战斗部]. Rather, they will use euphemisms such as “special equipment” [特装] or “national treasure” [国宝], words which can have multiple meanings based on context. These difficulties were further compounded by a recent crackdown on open sources of information that has intensified in the last two years, forcing researchers to piece together scattered scraps of information to build a cohesive narrative. Details were especially scant at the Base and brigade levels, and virtually nonexistent regarding the PLARF’s recent drastic expansion of silo-based ICBMs, leaving a number of unsatisfying gaps in the research.
Even so, this report shines new light on how the PLARF manages its nuclear stockpile. It begins by discussing the central stockpile outside Baoji, known as “Hongchuan” describing the storage and testing of the warheads. It then discusses the various support units which ensure that the warheads are safely stored and regularly tested, properly guarded by air defense, electronic countermeasures, and physical security, and transported by road, rail, or air. It also looks at which units would communicate with other PLARF units and respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. Finally, the report examines how warheads would be stored and tested after they are transported to the PLARF’s operations Bases, as well as how they are then transported to each of the Base’s nuclear brigades for final launch.
Click here for the full report
