Welcome to Indo-Pacific Affairs, a podcast devoted to tackling the wicked problems facing policy makers, academicians, military leaders, and others in the Indo-Pacific region. Affiliated with Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers, and the Air Command and Staff College’s eSchool, the podcast features interviews with the top names in academia, government, and think tanks from around the region.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in this podcast are those of the participants and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update has highlighted new and accelerated drivers that indicate a changing and less benign strategic environment. In this light, using effective processes to prepare for new challenges is a critical task for defense planners. Feasible Scenario Spaces is an embryonic tool that may be instrumental in military scenario planning. To be effective, however, it needs to be further evolved to embrace the potential for unconventional threats, including the emerging primacy of information warfare in future conflict.
s article explores the future of Sino-Japanese relations while situating them in India’s perspective and evolving strategic out-look. It evaluates the tensions and turfs in Sino-Japanese ties based on the ups and downs in their relationship in the historical and contemporary times with a distinct focus on the East China Sea as a region of immense strategic importance for their political affirmations. It further examines a revisionist China’s grand strategy and advancing military and naval capabilities and the development of a nonpacifist Japanese power, to argue that Sino-Japanese ties will only become more turbulent in the near future. The article sets this discussion within the context of a more assertive, post- Galwan India that has pursued deeper security partnerships with Indo- Pacific countries, especially Japan, to map New Delhi’s Indo- Pacific calculus as Sino- Japanese ties undergo change.
The impact of Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea is broad, and these claims are not likely to change in the near future. The PRC will not easily relinquish claims to land it considers part of its sovereign territory—especially when those lands extend China’s military and economic reach hundreds and thousands of miles into the lucrative region. China’s claims of sovereignty appear valid when viewed from the CCP’s unique viewpoint but fail when those views and assumptions are not shared. The conflict between Beijing’s refusal to relinquish the PRC’s claims, and the likelihood that those claims will be rejected by the international community, will result in continued legal, diplomatic, economic, and military competition and conflict in the region.
This article contends it is time for Pakistan to take a realistic stock of the ground realities of post-imbroglio Kashmir.
While debate surrounding the official formation of the Quad will undoubtedly continue and all instruments of power across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum will be in play, this article will articulate steps that will be required for the Quad to effectively execute deterrence through the lens of military, hard-power solutions. The questions this research seeks to answer are: What will it take, in terms of strategy, investments, and will, for the Quad to credibly deter the rise of an Indo-Pacific hegemon, and how can the Quad collectively provide a military deterrence solution by 2030? Different from previous research, this article will look to provide tangible solutions and demonstrate how the Quad nations can provide that path to deterrence.
To develop their space sectors, Taiwan’s and South Korea’s space agencies intervene differently. This is despite the developmental state literature indicating that the agencies’ ideologies, mechanisms, and preferences will be similar. This article recounts the literature’s expectations about the two agencies. It then reviews what the two agencies are actually doing to develop their space sectors. This article ends by discussing the implications of the two agencies’ differences for stakeholders in Taiwan’s and South Korea’s space sectors and identifying questions to guide future research that builds off this article’s findings.
As the national security apparatus continues to shift toward great-power competition, there is still a significant lack of understanding about the nature of the current competition and how the armed forces can engage within the strategic reality. This article outlines the road to competition with China, as well as the nature of the struggle, to provide clarity on the challenge such competition poses. Within that context, this article provides recommendations for how the military can translate the strategic concepts found within the National Defense Strategy into more tangible actions.
The negotiation process on North Korean nuclearization is stalemated and no change seems likely anytime soon. This stalemate demonstrates the failure of the US policy, a very dangerous situation particularly in view of the absence of any viable American strategic approach to the issue, the ensuing divisions among allies, and lack of a coherent approach to North Korea. Continuing the policy of strategic patience, which would be Washington’s default position if no further progress occurs, is doomed to fail. Therefore, the United States must simultaneously enhance alliance cohesion while pursuing a credible negotiating proposal. This article lays out the reasons why that stance is needed now and is becoming more urgent. Such strategic approach can lead to better negotiated outcomes that would not only bring about denuclearization and North Korean security but also promote a new, more stable, equilibrium in Northeast Asia.
The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.