 This study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision makers and combatant commanders. Major General Dunlap’s assessment of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency—which regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, groundcentric perspective—is an impressive and influential document, skillfully addressing many difficult COIN issues.
This study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision makers and combatant commanders. Major General Dunlap’s assessment of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency—which regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, groundcentric perspective—is an impressive and influential document, skillfully addressing many difficult COIN issues.
    
        
        
            
 
Author • Maj Gen Charles J Dunlap Jr., USAF
 
Year • 2007
 
Pages • 115
 
ISSN • 1537-3371
 
AU Press Code • AP-1