Col Peter Goldfein and Wing Cdr André Adamson present the concept of the Trilateral Strategic Initiative (TSI) and its objective of furthering trilateral cooperation. The authors argue that the TSI and its steering group are a compelling model for improving the coherence of international airpower. The initiative reflects the vision of the air force chiefs of the United States, France, and United Kingdom to increase trust and integration among their services and to advocate for airpower. In the absence of a bureaucratic framework, the TSI is steered by collaboration among the strategic thinking cells of each service’s air staff, which includes officers from all three nations. Together, they identify the means to improve interoperability. They also debate airpower concepts to feed the thinking of senior leaders and to spawn cooperation at operational levels. The article considers the historical and cultural convergences among the three air forces as well as countervailing tendencies that allow the initiative to fully realize its potential as an enabler of the trilateral development and employment of airpower. The authors also note the role of the initiative in informing debate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finally, they consider the applicability of this approach for broader cooperation, including its place in a joint context.

Prof. Robert Ehlers addresses the waxing and waning for almost 70 years of the calls for an end to the independent US Air Force and the absorption of its component parts into the other military services. However, during the past 15 years, attacks on the utility of the Air Force—and thus its retention as an independent service—have become increasingly strident. This article takes an opposing view based on the continuing utility of airpower across the entire range of American grand strategic aims and supporting policy efforts. Although Ehlers discusses the importance of airpower as part of a balanced combined-­arms force in conventional wars and its often-­overlooked effectiveness in other kinds of armed conflicts, the article focuses on how the Air Force and the many assets it employs have proven particularly effective in helping policy makers achieve strategic aims short of armed conflict. This relatively little-­discussed dimension of the service’s contributions to our country’s sec

The level of interests, level of resources, and strategic culture all factor into explaining the differences and similarities between military operations by France and the United States in Africa, contends Prof. Stephen Burgess in this article. While both constructivist and realist perspectives are necessary for comparative analysis, the argument in this article is that strategic culture and attitudes towards risk, as well as the differences in perceived spheres of influence, are more insightful than the realist perspective in explaining the different ways that France and the United States chose to intervene in Africa. The Powell Doctrine and casualty and risk aversion explain why the United States is less willing to intervene directly militarily in Africa; however, the relatively lower level of US interests in Africa as compared with Southwest Asia must also be taken into account. In addition, the US military has an organizational culture of winning, while the French military is accustomed to messy outcomes, which also explains the differences in interventionism. The prepositioning of French forces in Northwest Africa increases the likelihood that they will be used in operations. The prepositioning of US forces in Djibouti has not led to direct military intervention in Somalia, even as the capital and country were on the verge of falling to violent extremists. However, the extensive use of US special forces in Somalia and Northwest Africa has begun a process of convergence with the French military posture.

Maj Ryan McCaughan, USAF, analyzes the challenges associated with an airlift in sub-­Saharan Africa, how the United States and partners have attempted to address these issues in the past, and why those attempts have been insufficient. A qualitative research methodology has been utilized to show that the status-­quo model of support has proven insufficient and expensive and only through a comprehensive, coordinated approach, which aligns the efforts of the United States, the African Union, US industry, capable African partners, and other interested Western nations, will this problem finally be resolved.