TOPIC SPONSOR: US Cyber Command
What are the strategic and operational goals and desired end states key foreign adversaries seek to realize through election influence and/or interference? What do key foreign adversaries perceive to be U.S. red lines pertaining to election interference, influence, and disinformation operations? How might foreign influence operations targeting elections graduate to interference and what are the most likely and most dangerous outcome scenarios? Do these scenarios differ by adversaries? How might key foreign adversaries using or intend to use synthetic media, artificial intelligence, deep fakes, cheap fakes, shallow fakes, and other new emergent technologies to interfere or improperly influence U.S. elections? How are key foreign adversaries engaging in languages other than English to influence U.S. policy, popular attitudes, or election discourse in ways favorable to the adversary?
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