Closing the Deterrence Gap in the Taiwan Strait

“Experts” insist that the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is low, while “Catastrophizers” warn of imminent conflict. These conflicting assessments result in contrasting recommendations. Whereas Experts recommend Taiwan focus on long-term resilience, Catastrophizers propose radical political solutions—such as the United States adopting a policy of “strategic clarity,” upending more than half a century of history.  This book explores the tension between these viewpoints, arguing that while Experts underestimate the risk of conflict, Catastrophizers propose solutions that are imprudent. To be strategic, responses to the threat of invasion must weigh resources, risks, and time. History and wargaming show that a series of modest adaptations—in Taiwan and the United States—can bolster deterrence and reduce the growing risk of conflict. This book features contributions from more than two dozen military officers showing how this can be done.