The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War by Mark Galeotti. New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 2023, 256 pp.
Warfare has become too expensive and resource intensive, so powers are now utilizing less costly weapons while utilizing agreements and law against their adversaries. Mark Galeotti argues in The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War that the “world order” has been undergoing a drastic change in stability as now there is a permanent state of undeclared and even unnoticed warfare.
Mark Galeotti, a British historian, Russia security affairs expert, and prolific writer and researcher has written many books about transnational crime organizations and Soviet/Russian wars. His expansive experience and criticism of Russia led the government to ban his entry into the country in 2022. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, his weekly podcast In Moscow’s Shadows has become the go-to reference for understanding how the Russian government reacts and why. Galeotti’s strength is his systematic approach to topics and understanding the interconnected nature of conflict.
This provocative work challenges the basic assumptions of conflict in that he states powers now are weaponizing the space below the threshold of conflict and turning to more non-traditional methods to challenge others. Russia has used propaganda with memes, hashtags, and fake news as a weapon (p. 32). China manipulates the international legal system through sandbar islands in the South China Sea to expand jurisdiction (p. 152). Most importantly, Galeotti highlights throughout the book the strong emphasis of transnational criminal organizations to accomplish national interests.
He argues military policymakers, planners, and operators need to stop thinking of war as a discrete yes/no conflict status between adversaries, and instead understand that conflict is a continuum of competition between all powers (state and non-state), either ally, neutral, or adversary. Due to the high consequence and expensive nature of modern warfare, powers are now competing against everyone in the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) domains.
Galeotti says, call it hybrid warfare, gray space warfare, or modern warfare, it is the process whereby powers operate below the threshold of traditional warfare but weaponize traditionally non-conflict areas (p. 14). Russia, China, Iran, and others have been operating in this space well below conflict thresholds committing acts that destabilize, scare, and confuse not only the state but the populations. The goal is to not fight the adversary but find operating spaces in domains and compete against your adversary to draw them to a standstill. Conflict does not fully encompass the realm of possibilities powers do with each other.
He admits this book is an over-opinionated work and that it is not meant to be all encompassing; Galeotti is too tough on the work. There are, though, a few things that would have made this work even better. This book will have one asking what defines “conflict” and how does this really differ from “Phase Zero” operations. JP-0 and JP 5-0 no longer specifically define Phase Zero operations nor is there an approved DOD definition, but it has been understood to be the activities to shape “the pre-conflict battle zone” or “a complex, long-term grand preventative strategy” actions (aka deterrence) to prevent war. Operating questionable maritime shadow fleet operations in the loopholes of international maritime treaties or utilizing criminal organizations to destroy logistical hubs of Ukrainian allies are conflict related. Ultimately though, the primary goal of these activities is to coerce or deter Western powers from taking actions. Galeotti argues that these actions are not necessarily a campaign but a reactionary response to sudden changes in the geopolitical landscape. This nuanced discussion delineating these differences would help US and NATO military planners to understand the difference in his ideas.
The key to understanding Galeotti’s thesis is to accept that competition is always ongoing even in the Phase Zero space. For example, can a cyber-attack against a state’s government websites or banking systems reach the threshold of conflict? The NATO Alliance agrees that certain cyber actions do trigger Article 5 protections even if there is no massive loss of life. He would argue that this type of attack, below the threshold of conflict response, is open competition and not simply just a messaging tool for deterrence. Expanding this topic would provide US military members some challenges perhaps to our military doctrine.
The reframing of conflict through the lens of competition does help us better understand that there will always be escalation outside of a military setting. In the post-9/11 world, the US has relied too much upon the M of DIME as our strategy has had a heavy reliance on military conflict and competition. This work will drive readers and strategists to develop an integrated escalatory competition plan across all domains. This DIME integrated model of escalatory management, even below employment thresholds, will allow a better whole of government deterrence posture in a multi-polar world.
Reframing the intensity of conflict into a continuum of competition also begs the question of the impacts to nuclear deterrence and integrated conventional/nuclear warfare. Nuclear deterrence is precipitated upon non-conflict actions keeping actions below employment threshold. There are many actions nuclear powers take below the conventional and nuclear thresholds that are both kinetic and non-kinetic that could be included in the hybrid warfare discussion. Galeotti acknowledges his argument was not geared towards nuclear deterrence or weapons, yet his model would provide a fresh perspective to 80 years of nuclear deterrence and strategy. Further integrating nuclear deterrence across DIME domains will further strengthen a model that is in need for fresh perspectives in 21st century competition.
Galeotti’s standpoint effectively describes the modern international relations environment that has developed in the post-Cold War world. This book will better help the reader understand how in the multi-polar world and discussions of “spheres of influence” how powers look to compete with adversaries or allies in any operating space, they can gain an advantage over each other. This field guide will open the reader’s aperture and have them ask questions and spark discussions on how this construct affects escalation management to and including nuclear competition.
Lieutenant Colonel Travis “Pred” Halleman, USAF