Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War by Eric Setzekorn. Naval Institute Press, 2023, 348 pp.
Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War offers much needed insight into a period of US foreign policy that is arguably overshadowed in academic literature by two events that effectively bookend it, the Korean War and the enhanced buildup to the Vietnam War. A scholar of Chinese and military history, Eric Setzekorn delivers a robust history of President Dwight Eisenhower’s East Asia Mutual Security Program (MSP) during his eight years in office.
With a name that was perhaps intentionally ambiguous, the MSP worked to build partner-force capacity in defensive forces, with economic and non-military institution-building as secondary focuses. Based on the logic that maintaining indigenous forces would be less expensive than deploying or stationing US forces, the MSP was designed so that the United States could reap the benefits of mutual security without full exposure to potential invasions by People’s Republic of China (PRC) forces.
Setzekorn’s argument is that the MSP is overlooked as a critical part of Eisenhower’s national defense strategy. Further, the program had a lasting and profound impact on both military and non-military institutions of the United States and its partner states that reveals possible strategies pursued by policymakers in consideration of current defense missions. The bulk of his analysis comes from MSP performance in five East Asian states that are examined in a roughly chronological order. Additional context on the program and its role in the Eisenhower administration is relayed through chapters that contrast it with the preceding Truman and subsequent Kennedy administrations, and analysis of dealings with a not always permissive Congress.
The strength of Setzekorn’s argument comes from his detailed archival research, which demonstrates that the MSP was not simply a backup policy to the nuclear deterrence also pushed by Eisenhower and that East Asia was to play a prominent role. This shift from Europe to Asia would be near immediate, with the first “Eisenhower budget” of fiscal year 1954 seeing Asia receive almost twice as much support as Europe (37). This increase in funding would continue throughout the administration, indicating how its proponents worked hard to win over detractors, public or official, to the MSP’s “strategic bargain” for Americans (44). This bargain was that indigenous forces cost less than stationed US forces but could possess adequate defense capabilities for mutual security. Setzekorn proves that cost per soldier financing was a large part of the calculus in Eisenhower’s approach.
In support of the argument for the program’s significance, the archives also show that the continued existence of the MSP would prevail through both domestic and foreign struggles that may have otherwise derailed a non-committed administration. In the external context, the MSP was able to navigate political upheaval, including military coups and the ousting of senior officers friendly to Americans at the whim of a leader. Perhaps the best indicator of the overall importance of Taiwan in Eisenhower’s security policy and the faith in the MSP to secure it was the fact that the US advising force was made to acquiesce to the efforts of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to overtly politicize the military. The creation of “political warfare officers” was a key component of this (84). It represented a dramatic departure for US officers, who argued the developing Republic of China military should mirror the US tradition of having no overt political status. Though American advisers and leadership voiced their objections of these political officers, whom they saw as detrimental to operations and a waste of resources, MSP efforts continued.
Domestically, it is clear that the MSP survived the shifting political climate of the US system, thanks to the full backing of the Eisenhower administration. As the general tide of support for military aid programs receded, the administration worked hard to defend its existence with committees, reports from favorable institutions, and admissions of the need for more general economic aid. Despite this challenge, the MSP would continue to exist and would even work to establish larger presences in East Asian states as the second term of Eisenhower unfolded.
Aside from the main objective of mutual security and alleviating the necessity of US forces, Arming East Asia demonstrates that civil-military institution-building—such as improved roadways and telecommunications capabilities—was an essential task of the MSP, which emphasized the professionalization of the officer corps of these states through US-style military education schools. Additionally, through the “defense support” category, large-scale improvements to infrastructure and other economic developmental areas could be made by the United States (37). In his conclusion, Setzekorn covers recent attempts by US administrations to build partner-force capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq and how the MSP can inform researchers who study these efforts. This forum is too limited to address these potential connections fully, but Setzekorn makes a compelling case for using the lens of the MSP when reviewing US efforts to build an Afghan fighting force.
Setzekorn’s history is not without limitations. Assertions of the capabilities of the created forces in deterring foreign invasion are difficult to verify. No major invasions befell the states discussed, although South Vietnam obviously capitulated to communist forces in 1975. As a “counterpart” to the nuclear deterrence strategy, the MSP remained a piece of the larger machinery (2). Comparatively, how it worked within this nuclear deterrence strategy remains underexplored in Arming East Asia. Further, as the PRC was the presumed adversary, China’s response to MSP efforts is not mentioned. Finally, the focus on external threats meant that internal security of the states was not the MSP’s main priority. As military coups and insurgencies were ongoing threats to the states, discussion of potential tradeoffs in a resource scarce environment would have been appropriate.
Despite these limitations Setzekorn’s Arming East Asia represents a valuable entry into study of the Cold War. Researchers of history, international studies, and military sciences will not regret this read. Even at its most basic form as a history of the early Cold War, the chronology covers oft-overlooked years that witnessed actions that would impact future flashpoints. Yet Setzekorn offers more by establishing the continuation of MSP-like priorities within the Defense Department and highlights the potential conflict between the United States and President Xi Jingping-led China that may see the use of the forces built some 70 years ago.
Edward Hubble