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The Office of Sponsored Programs also oversees the AU Research Topics List, which is comprised of questions given to Air University by organizations with the USAF and other DoD organizations. To facilitate the iterative process of research, each question also includes a list of relevant work that has been recently researched by AU students and is hosted in the AU Library's databases.

We accept topic submissions on a continual basis. If you would like to submit a topic, please contact us at AUResearch@au.af.edu. Be sure to include a short title, the question(s), the name of the organization or commander requesting the topic, and a POC with their contact information. You may also include a short background paragraph to provide context to the question(s).

Papers attached to these links represent AU student work which has been cleared by our Security and Policy Review process.  We have many more papers on relevant topics awaiting review.  Please contact OSP and we will pull and prioritize clearing papers useful to your questions and mission.

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Research Topics & Paper Repository

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • China's critical cyber vulnerabilities

    What are the critical cyber vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the CCP/PLA? What are critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Chinese military networks? (US Cyber Command)

  • China's Global Expansion

    How does China's global expansion impact the aerospace domain?  (CASI)

  • China's Soft Power/Economic Power Approaches

    Analysis of China's use of soft power, particularly its use of economic power. (CASI)

  • China's TTPs for cyber incidents

    What are CCP/PLA tactics, techniques, procedures, and standard operating procedures for military and civilian government responses to cyber incidents? How do CCP/PLA cyber teams cooperate with each other? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Air Defense

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Conventional Precision Strike

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - EW and Network Operations

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Non War Military Activities

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Space Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Support to Ground or Maritime Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Policies

    What are China's national-level policies that are directly related or partially overlap with the aerospace industry or domain? (CASI)

  • Chinese Civil-Military Relations

    What is the balance of civil-military relations in Chinese strategy? (OSD)

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese leadership tasking cyber-actors

    How does CCP/PLA senior leadership task the various cyber-actors: government and proxies? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Naval Capabilities

    Analysis of PRC's naval capabilities. (CASI)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Presence in Region

    How does the PRC and PLA view U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific region? (CASI)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historic PRC–Taiwan Provocation Cycle

    Provide a historic analysis of PRC military provocation toward Taiwan through the lens of politics (US administration, PRC leadership, TWN leadership), PRC military capabilities, US regional posture, economic context, and information environments. (PACAF)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Meteorological Challenges and Dependencies

    What are the meteorological challenges and dependencies that a PLA combined arms assault on Taiwan would face? (557 WW) 

  • PLA Morale

    What is the overall state of morale within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • PLA Political Work

    How does the PLA conduct political work? How does the PLA perceive political work contributing to force effectiveness? (CASI)

  • PLA's Acquisition System

    How effectively can the PLA's acquisition system translate requirements into delivered systems? (CASI)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • PRC's "Military Civil Fusion" strategy

    Analysis of PRC's "Military Civil Fusion" strategy. How does the MCF support PLA operations in aerospace domains? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Russia's Cyber TTPs

    What are Russia's security services cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)? What are the trends in Russian cyber actor TTPs? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Commercial Support of Cyber Operations

    How does Russia use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • What is the Russian Way of War?

    Analyze the Russian way of war. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Policy Goals

    What are Russia's goals regarding NATO? The EU? (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Long-Term Strategy

    Does Moscow have a long-term strategy? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Regime Stability

    How does Putin protect the regime? How will Putin manage domestic threats to regime stability? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on Nuclear Deterrence

    Do losses in conventional weaponry during the invasion of Ukraine push Russia to be more likely to use nuclear weapons in the future? (8 AF)

  • Russian Businessmen

    What is the level of influence of prominent businessmen in Russia? How do they serve Putin's interests? Russia's interests? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Views on Cyber Operations

    What are Russia's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for conducting cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Russian Expeditionary Operations

    How and why does Russia execute expeditionary operations? Analyze Russian expeditionary operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • What is Russia's Theory of Competition?

    Analyze Russia's Theory of Competition. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • What Russian Defense Industry Initiatives Lead to Competitive Advantage?

    Analyze Russian defense industry initiatives. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • What is the Russian concept for use of nuclear forces?

    What is the Russian concept for the use of nuclear forces? (Strategic and tactical) (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Russian Domestic Stability's Impact on National Security Decision Making

    What impact does Russia's domestic security have on its national security decision-making? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Iran-Russia Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Iran? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Critical Vulnerabilities

    What are the systemic weaknesses of the Russian state? What are the critical vulnerabilities within its military's operations and systems, as well as logistics and sustainment? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russo-Turkish Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Turkey? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military Leadership

    What is the decision-making process of senior Russian military leaders? What is the Russian system of command and control? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

     

  • Russian Unconventional & Counter-Unconventional Warfare

    What are the Russian approaches and capabilities regarding unconventional and counter-unconventional warfare? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military Morale

    What is the morale of the Russian military? What is the role of Russian military leadership? What impacts its will to fight? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military as an Operational/Strategic Learning Organization

    How does the Russian military function as an operational/strategic Learning Organization? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

     

  • Reconstitution of Russian Military

    How will the Russian military reconstitute itself in the future? What future threats does it pose? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • How are Russia's military and security forces postured?

    Analyze the posture of Russia's military and security forces. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • What is the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations?

    Analyze the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Views on Deterrence, Escalation Management & Conflict Termination

    What are the Russian views and theories of deterrence, escalation management, and conflict termination? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Are Nukes Still the Answer?

    Why should we still invest and employ nuclear weapons? No other country has shown the tangible will to utilize nuclear weapons. We all stay postured due to other countries Can we disarm to win? What would be the effect if the U.S. would be the first country to disarm?

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • China's Soft Power/Economic Power Approaches

    Analysis of China's use of soft power, particularly its use of economic power. (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Presence in Region

    How does the PRC and PLA view U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific region? (CASI)

  • Civil Resistance in the Future Operating Environment

    How can the U.S. Government influence dissident population groups engaged in civil resistance in foreign countries? (JSOU)

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Decision Timelines

    With the advent of modern strategic weapons, does current planning and decision timelines still hold true, or do the US Strategic Forces need to rethink, and adapt to the newest strategic threats? (8 AF)

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Deterrence in Era of Nuclear Proliferation

    How has increased nuclear proliferation affected the deterrence strategies and postures of the US and regional powers? (HAF A5SM)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • DLOs on converging capabilities

    In what ways from both a conceptual and modeling/simulation standpoint can we start to include DLOs that exercise converging capabilities to effectively compete with our adversaries in the information environment? (16 AF)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

    Is extended deterrence provided by tactical nuclear weapons worth the cost? (AF/A10)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Great Power Competition in Africa

    Explain the advantages and disadvantages Great Powers have garnered from their involvement in Africa in the past and how their actions compare to Russian and Chinese involvement today. (J2) 

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historic Case Studies of US Allies Neglecting Treaty Obligations

    What are the historical examples (case studies) of where U.S. allies have not lived up to treaty obligations (and why)? (AFWIC)

  • Historic PRC–Taiwan Provocation Cycle

    Provide a historic analysis of PRC military provocation toward Taiwan through the lens of politics (US administration, PRC leadership, TWN leadership), PRC military capabilities, US regional posture, economic context, and information environments. (PACAF)

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Historical Uses of Information in War

    What are the long-term trends in the role and value of information in warfare? How has it shaped conflicts historically? (HAF A5SM)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • Impact of Autonomous Systems on Multinational Air Operations

    How will the rise of autonomous systems affect multinational air operations? (AFWIC)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Lawfare on Warfare

    How are legal strategies reshaping the traditional paradigms of warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Conventional Arms on Nuclear Deterrence

    How do advanced, long-range conventional weapons fit into the nuclear spectrum and what influence do they have on an adversary's willingness to escalate a conflict? (AFGSC/A2)

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Interoperability, Interdependence, and Integration in Combined Operations with Allies and Partners

    What is the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners? Analyze the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners. (AF Futures)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Lessons Learned from the Cold War

    Deterrence Factors Ignored over the Last 35 Years

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Foreign Influence in Hegemonic Powers

    What variables measure decreasing and/or diminishing foreign influence in a hegemonic power? (AFWIC)

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • National ROE in Mosaic Warfighting Concept

    How will a mosaic warfighting concept account for national ROE in a near-peer conflict? (AFWIC)

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Operations in Space

    Analyze various elements concerning the conduct of space operations. (SPOC/2SWS/DOC & 1 SOPS & USSF/45MSG) 

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • Point-to-Point Cargo

    Evaluate alternatives for space-based cargo delivery, balancing mission needs with the storage/delivery cost in terms of energy resources and manpower.  What size cargo deliveries provide the most return on investment?  Should supplies be pre-staged on orbit or launch-on-demand.  

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Reconstitution of Russian Military

    How will the Russian military reconstitute itself in the future? What future threats does it pose? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Reflections in the Information Environment

    How do we accurately and meaningfully measure Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) in the Information Environment? How can we best measure the 'influence' of Information Warfare on an adversary actor? (616 OC) 

  • Resourcing the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    AFGSC supports 3 of the four NDS Defense Priorities; however, is that reflected in how AFGSC is resourced (manning, money, etc.)? Comparing how MAJCOMs are resourced will determine how adequately the DAF has aligned weights of effort and resourcing with stated priorities and where there is room for improvement and rebalancing.

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Domestic Stability's Impact on National Security Decision Making

    What impact does Russia's domestic security have on its national security decision-making? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Expeditionary Operations

    How and why does Russia execute expeditionary operations? Analyze Russian expeditionary operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Policy Goals

    What are Russia's goals regarding NATO? The EU? (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Views on Cyber Operations

    What are Russia's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for conducting cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Size of Future Nuclear Force

    What does the nuclear force of the future need to look like in order to ensure deterrence holds in the current strategic environment? (AF/A10) 

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Components and Joint Special Operations Command

    How might the SOF service components (Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command) and Joint Special Operations Command best optimize themselves for strategic competition and integrated deterrence mission sets? Is there a need for new Joint Force training and exercises to determine or develop best practices for the integration of SOF and SOF enablers across services to best support mission requirements? What are the mission-critical capabilities for strategic competition and integrated deterrence within each SOF service component? Given each SOF service component’s unique capabilities, how might they best utilize new technologies? Do any of these capabilities require adjustments for optimal effectiveness in the current strategic environment? Are there requirements for new SOF capabilities that do not currently exist? If so, which SOF service component is best suited to meet each new requirement, and why?  

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Talent Management

    While talent management remains an enduring priority for SOF, the contemporary environment offers unique issues that the SOE must address. The end of the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of strategic competition mean that SOF may need to reprioritize its missions and capabilities. Are there operational and organizational paradigms that need to be reconsidered to better develop SOF for the challenges of the future operating environment? Who is the current SOF practitioner and how did that practitioner evolve? What are the key attributes of the future SOF professional, and do they differ from the key attributes from historical SOF professionals? If SOF must operate within an environment of strategic competition, how can they be encouraged to cultivate ‘strategic interest’ or ‘strategic empathy’ in the world early in their career progression? How does the DOD culture and system affect the individual and the individual’s ability to operate in the strategic environment? What enhancements in competency, cognition, performance, and total health could enable SOF to better navigate the changing human and technology landscapes within the current operational environment?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • Bridging Gap from Innovation to Sustainment

    What processes and procedures can help bridge the gap between innovation, distribution, and sustainment? (AFCEC/CB)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Can We Reengineer or Reconstruct Intelligence Sensor Data Flow Specifically for Network Performance, Operations, and Management Sensors?

    Can we reengineer or reconstruct intelligence sensor data flow specifically for network performance, operations, and management sensors?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - EW and Network Operations

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Personnel Management for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    How can USASOC optimize its personnel management systems to better recruit, retain, and develop highly skilled SOF professionals by adapting cutting-edge private-sector talent management practices, all while balancing SOF's unique cultural and operational requirements with the larger Army's standardized personnel systems?

  • Cyber Innovation Centers & Acquisitions

     How can cyber innovation centers blend into traditional requirement development and agile/traditional acquisition processes to produce short-term sustainable capability?  (ACC/A5K)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Develop Improved Assessments of Landing Weights

    Explore the effects on readiness and fiscal impact of excessive landing weight.  Mobility aircraft often land with excessive weight caused by carrying more fuel than required for the mission.  This topic seeks to understand the effects from a maintenance readiness perspective on short and long-term aircraft maintenance and sustainment, and how that relates to overall aircraft readiness and cost. (SAF/IEN)

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Directed Energy Weapons, the New Indiscriminate Threat?

    Should Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) be considered an emerging form of WMD? (AFTAC)

  • Disruptive Technology's Effect On Deterrence

    What effect does disruptive technology such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing have on deterrence? (AF/A10C)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • EiTaaS Tier 1 Maintenance Support

    How will 16 AF and the 688 CW conduct Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) Services for the Air Force Network-Unclassified (AFNET-U) when Tier 1 maintenance and operations for AFNET-U is contracted out to the private sector during the Enterprise to Infrastructure as a Service (EiTaaS)? (688 CW)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Emerging Technology's Threat to Nuclear Assets

    What capabilities and intent do adversaries possess to utilize advanced technologies to hold AFGSC assets at increased risk? (AFGSC/A2)

  • EMP Effects on Nuclear Arsenal

    What are the effects of EMP on nuclear weapons? What can be done to mitigate risk? (20 AF)

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Establishing Flexible Logistics

    The CSAF is looking for “initiatives focused on more agile, resilient, and survivable energy logistics—from bulk strategic supplies to deliveries at the tactical edge.” 

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Threasholds

    Analyzing how hypersonic weapon development impacts nuclear deterrence calculations and potential escalation pathways.

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of Technological Advancements on Air Warfare

    How will current and future trends in military technology advancements impact air warfare? How will this evolution of air warfare impact the US's superiority in the air domain? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impact on Deterrence by Emerging Technology

    What impact would the emergence and global diffusion of technologies with the potential dual-military ability to deliver strategic effects (e.g., biotechnology) have on the United States deterrence posture? (AF/A10)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Information Warfare Capabilities

    How should the AF and DoD organize themselves to optimize the development of Information Warfare capabilities? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Technology

    Intelligence has a role to play in the identification of emerging technologies and assessment of how they may be used by adversaries. Within the SOE, how can collaboration be encouraged between the intelligence practitioners and the technological specialists? How can SOF best couple bottom-up-driven intelligence and technology solutions with top-down-driven research and acquisition programs? While the technologies are different, the problems of collaboration between two different communities during historical periods of technological disruption may offer ideas to inform current efforts in these areas. Can SOF use case studies of the past emergence of disruptive technologies to transform for the future? How can SOF intelligence exploit technology while maintaining a healthy skepticism of its promises?

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Learning Technology to Aid Information Warfare Training

    How can we leverage learning technologies such as game-based learning, AI tutors, hypermedia, etc. to train IW forces most effectively on the roles, assets, and capabilities needed to achieve full spectrum IW effects? (616 OC) 

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Nationality of an Autonomous System

    What defines the nationality of an autonomous system? How does this affect their operational employment? (AF Futures)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Sustainment: Minuteman III

    What institutional changes (sustainment) are needed to maintain Minuteman III to 2052?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operational Energy in Space

    How can we design and operate spacecraft that have fewer constraints and can sustain operations in space over longer time periods and with more effectiveness? (SAF/IEN)

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Organic Software Development

    Can the USAF develop an organic capability to code within a squadron and then enable the infrastructure and processes that would allow that code to be deployed in a controlled environment with minimal overhead requirements to the squadron? (16 AF)

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Potential for Integrated Deterrence

    Why have strategic nuclear forces failed to deter some aspects of conventional aggression in the recent past? Would integrated deterrence architectures involving other capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, hypersonics, AI) better address concerns around theater-level conventional aggression? What would need to be included in future integrated deterrence strategies to deter conventional aggression? (AF/A10)

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Readiness Impacts of Traditional Aerospace Parts Manufacture on Aging Fleet

    Conduct analysis of manufacturing alternatives to current/traditional high upfront tooling and production costs for aircraft replacement parts. Research aerospace and non-aerospace manufacturing technology, companies, and processes that could provide a more cost-effective approach to developing adaptive, high-quality, and scalable production of replacement parts for the aging US Air Force fleet. Also explore additional benefits of various light weight material substitutions for part manufacturing that meet military standards, that could increase fuel savings based on weight reduction, and enhance overall mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.. The B-52 and KC-135 fleets date back to the late 1950s, the UH-1H Huey helicopter 1960s, and the C-5 was first fielded in the 1970s which are a few examples of airframes no longer in production, beyond their economic service life, but because they are still flying require replacement parts. Purchases of the new F-35, C-130J, and KC-46 airframes in recent years have only made a small dent in the average age of the Air Force’s fleet. (SAF/IEN)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Rethinking No First Use

    Analyzing the potential benefits and drawbacks of adopting a "No First Use" policy in the context of evolving security threats and technological advancements.

  • Road-Mobile ICBM system

    Does the US need to develop a road-mobile ICBM system as part of its nuclear arsenal? (8 AF)

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Impacts on Ethical Autonomy

    The integration of wearable, edible, or injectable technology for SOF can potentially raise concerns about the loss of autonomy in making ethical decisions. Wearable devices, such as smartwatches or fitness trackers, can collect vast amounts of personal data about our behaviors, activities, and health. The risk lies in the potential misuse or exploitation of this data, which could erode personal privacy and autonomy. Could external entities and malicious actors with access to such data manipulate individual choices or influence decision-making through targeted persuasive techniques? Edible technology refers to ingestible devices or substances, such as smart pills or edible sensors. While these technologies can provide valuable health monitoring or targeted drug delivery, there is a risk of overreliance and loss of agency. Can people become too dependent on such technologies for managing their health or decision-making processes? Could they inadvertently surrender their autonomy to technology or entities controlling it? Injectables include implanting devices or substances into the body, such as microchips or smart implants. These can offer benefits, such as enhanced cognitive capabilities or medical monitoring. Risks include potential unauthorized access to implanted devices, data breaches, or manipulation of bodily functions or behaviors. Such vulnerabilities may compromise personal autonomy and privacy. What are the potential risks or challenges the SOE should consider regarding the loss of SOF ethical autonomy when using wearable technology, edibles, or injectables? What measures can be taken to ensure individuals maintain their autonomy and ethical decision-making capabilities while using such technologies?

  • Technological Innovation & Integrated Deterrence

    How should the DOD and AF pursue and message technology innovation to support integrated deterrence in the NDS?  (AFNWC)

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • Technological Undermatch

    How can SOF adapt its operational strategies and leverage non-technological competitive advantages to succeed in an environment where an adversary may have technological parity or superiority, thus challenging the traditional "American way of war"?

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Limits of AI and Big Data Technology

    What assumptions currently pervade military culture about AI and Big Data that, from a social science perspective, are inaccurate and counterproductive? (JSOU)

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • Usage of AI in USAF Maintenance & Logistics

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force maintenance and logistics operations? (772 ESS)

  • Use of AI in Civilian Hiring Process

    Can AI be leveraged to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the civilian hiring process? (AFMISC/A1)

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Wargaming

    How should the AF conceptualize wargaming going forward? (PACAF)

  • Weapon system vulnerabilities introduced by cloud environment

    Does the dependence on cloud environments (commercial or organic) introduce risk to cyber security? If so, what unique risks does this pose to the military and its weapon systems? (16 AF/A4)

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • AI & Nuclear Command and Control or Other Areas

    Examining the opportunities and risks of incorporating AI into nuclear command and control systems, focusing on maintaining safety, security, and strategic stability. If not in NC2 where  could AI be used to support the Nuclear Enterprise?

  • Analytic Certification

    Does Analytic Certification provide a path toward Enhanced IC Analytic Effectiveness? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Can We Reengineer or Reconstruct Intelligence Sensor Data Flow Specifically for Network Performance, Operations, and Management Sensors?

    Can we reengineer or reconstruct intelligence sensor data flow specifically for network performance, operations, and management sensors?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Contemporary Artificial Intelligence Capability

    What off-the-shelf Artificial Intelligence capability could be quickly incorporated into the AOC? (PACAF/CC)

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber Force Structure

    How can the USAF optimize current Cyber Force Structure? (HAF A2/6)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyberspace Awareness/Operations Sensors

    Can we improve cyberspace awareness by improving the management of “operations” sensors and their ability to enhance the staff analytics supporting decision-making and execution? (CO-IPE (STRAT))

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Disposition of Forces (DOF) Consolidation

    How do we optimize the dissemination, visualization, storage, and cataloging of battlespace characterization data and Disposition of Forces (DOF) production? (480 ISRG)

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficient Fine Tuning of Large Language Models

    What are the most robust ways to incorporate new data sets into a large language model that do not truncate the breadth of data available while simultaneously allowing for complex answers and minimizing hallucinations? (16 AF/A5)

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Implications of Increased Use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

    As advances in computing are implemented in JADO, what are the ethical implications of increased use of artificial intelligence and machine learning?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Implementing AI & ML for cyber-enabled information operations

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the Information Warfare NAF to increase the pace and quality of Information Operations? What are the critical policy and technical limitations to harnessing AI and ML tools for the modernization of U.S. cyber-enabled information operations and what are the key requirements for solutions to overcome these limitations? (16 AF/A39)

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Nationality of an Autonomous System

    What defines the nationality of an autonomous system? How does this affect their operational employment? (AF Futures)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Operational Assessment in the Information Environment

    Given the complexities of human behavior and decision-making, how should the joint force approach operational assessment in the information environment? How can the Air Force enable that approach through the application of new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and sensors? (16 AF)

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Technological Impacts on Ethical Autonomy

    The integration of wearable, edible, or injectable technology for SOF can potentially raise concerns about the loss of autonomy in making ethical decisions. Wearable devices, such as smartwatches or fitness trackers, can collect vast amounts of personal data about our behaviors, activities, and health. The risk lies in the potential misuse or exploitation of this data, which could erode personal privacy and autonomy. Could external entities and malicious actors with access to such data manipulate individual choices or influence decision-making through targeted persuasive techniques? Edible technology refers to ingestible devices or substances, such as smart pills or edible sensors. While these technologies can provide valuable health monitoring or targeted drug delivery, there is a risk of overreliance and loss of agency. Can people become too dependent on such technologies for managing their health or decision-making processes? Could they inadvertently surrender their autonomy to technology or entities controlling it? Injectables include implanting devices or substances into the body, such as microchips or smart implants. These can offer benefits, such as enhanced cognitive capabilities or medical monitoring. Risks include potential unauthorized access to implanted devices, data breaches, or manipulation of bodily functions or behaviors. Such vulnerabilities may compromise personal autonomy and privacy. What are the potential risks or challenges the SOE should consider regarding the loss of SOF ethical autonomy when using wearable technology, edibles, or injectables? What measures can be taken to ensure individuals maintain their autonomy and ethical decision-making capabilities while using such technologies?

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of Learning in the Age of Quantum Information Science

    How can the SOF enterprise investigate the potential of quantum information science to revolutionize educational assessment, personalize learning pathways, and unlock new frontiers in human cognitive enhancement?

  • The Limits of AI and Big Data Technology

    What assumptions currently pervade military culture about AI and Big Data that, from a social science perspective, are inaccurate and counterproductive? (JSOU)

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • Usage of AI in USAF Installation & Mission Support Operations

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force installation and mission support operations? (772 ESS)

  • Usage of AI in USAF Maintenance & Logistics

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force maintenance and logistics operations? (772 ESS)

  • Use of AI in Civilian Hiring Process

    Can AI be leveraged to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the civilian hiring process? (AFMISC/A1)

  • Utilization of Mobile Adware Identification for Tracking Individuals and Implications for Force Protection

    How can a comprehensive framework be developed to understand the applicability and dangers of mobile adware identification (MAI) to SOF personnel and operations, address the associated legal and policy considerations, and create effective countermeasures and informational campaigns?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Artificial Intelligence in Warplans

    What is the impact of artificial intelligence or intelligent automation in the development of real-time generated war plans? (HQ USSF/S59/ACT)

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Space Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Creation of Space Force

    How does the Air Force transfer people, mission sets, R&D, and equipment to the Space Force?

  • Cyber Threat-Based Mission Assurance as a Service

    End-to-end cyber surety from penetration testing, fixing discovered vulnerabilities, and optimizing defensive cyber operations as one integrated entity and unit of action. What authorities, responsibilities, and resources would need to be realigned and where would that realignment best be suited? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber Threats Against Air Mobility Operations and Forces

    What are the cyber threats (and countermeasures) that are specific to AMC operations? (423 MTS)

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Deterrence in Space

    What potential uses of the latest space technologies can serve as deterrence? (50 OSS)

  • Develop Improved Assessments of Landing Weights

    Explore the effects on readiness and fiscal impact of excessive landing weight.  Mobility aircraft often land with excessive weight caused by carrying more fuel than required for the mission.  This topic seeks to understand the effects from a maintenance readiness perspective on short and long-term aircraft maintenance and sustainment, and how that relates to overall aircraft readiness and cost. (SAF/IEN)

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Emerging threats & TTPs of UAV/UAS against military installations

    What are examples of emerging threats of UAVs/UASs and TTPs of those groups that employ them? (423 MTS)

  • EMS/EW Awareness

    How does the Air Force re-instill a culture of EMS/EW awareness throughout the force? (ACC/A3/2/6K)

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Formation of the Space Force

    Analyze various elements of the formation of the Space Force. (HQ USSF/SEF & Museum Staff & 50 OSS)

  • Future of Air Mobility

    The future of Air Mobility with respect to Bypass Theory and the evolution of the Critical Path for Air Mobility. (AMC/CC)

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Global Mobility Airlift Positioning for Cargo Load Efficiency

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach. What are the additional benefits to increased fuel savings, increased cargo capacity, increased aircraft sustainment, increased mission readiness, and enhanced combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historical Studies for Space

    Analyze historical examples of space operations for potential use to contemporary operations.  (45 SW/MU & SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of Technological Advancements on Air Warfare

    How will current and future trends in military technology advancements impact air warfare? How will this evolution of air warfare impact the US's superiority in the air domain? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • In-Space Logistics

     

    Analysis of in-space logistics. (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • JADO - Space Force

     

    How do we integrate the Space Force into JADO?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Language Analysts in Cyber and Space Intelligence

    Can we develop analytic tradecraft and accesses for language analysts supporting cyber and space intelligence units, and develop specialized formal training courses for language analysis operating in the space and cyberspace domains? (480 ISRW)

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • Missions for the USSF

    What roles or responsibilities should the USSF have in asteroid detection and defense? (SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Novel Operating Environments

    Based on trends in the geostrategic environment, advances in technologies that allow SOF greater maneuver and capabilities in extreme environments, and the evolving role of the DOD as part of national security, what might SOF’s new roles and missions be, as part of the Joint Force, in novel operational environments? Such environments could include: the polar regions and approaches; areas of extreme heat and humidity too severe for normal human tolerance; the open ocean, to include all layers of the pelagic zone, the seabed, and resource exploitation platforms; and outer space, to include cislunar and lunar orbits. What might operations in these extreme environments look like? And what capabilities would be needed to sustain operations there? 

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Prioritization

    From security to survivability, which should  the Air Force prioritize first, nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery platforms? 

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational Energy in Space

    How can we design and operate spacecraft that have fewer constraints and can sustain operations in space over longer time periods and with more effectiveness? (SAF/IEN)

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Operations in Space

    Analyze various elements concerning the conduct of space operations. (SPOC/2SWS/DOC & 1 SOPS & USSF/45MSG) 

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Organizational Structure of Space Force

    What are the optimum organizational structures for the US Space Force and US Space Command? (USSF) How can Space Organizational Constructs evolve to facilitate enterprise responsiveness and standardization? (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Organizing & Training for Counter Small UAS Operations

    How should the AF organize and train appropriate operators and leaders (kinetic engagement authorities) to operate more complex C-sUAS/SHORAD-like capabilities in the future? (AFSFC/S3A)

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • Point-to-Point Cargo

    Evaluate alternatives for space-based cargo delivery, balancing mission needs with the storage/delivery cost in terms of energy resources and manpower.  What size cargo deliveries provide the most return on investment?  Should supplies be pre-staged on orbit or launch-on-demand.  

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Readiness Impacts of Traditional Aerospace Parts Manufacture on Aging Fleet

    Conduct analysis of manufacturing alternatives to current/traditional high upfront tooling and production costs for aircraft replacement parts. Research aerospace and non-aerospace manufacturing technology, companies, and processes that could provide a more cost-effective approach to developing adaptive, high-quality, and scalable production of replacement parts for the aging US Air Force fleet. Also explore additional benefits of various light weight material substitutions for part manufacturing that meet military standards, that could increase fuel savings based on weight reduction, and enhance overall mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.. The B-52 and KC-135 fleets date back to the late 1950s, the UH-1H Huey helicopter 1960s, and the C-5 was first fielded in the 1970s which are a few examples of airframes no longer in production, beyond their economic service life, but because they are still flying require replacement parts. Purchases of the new F-35, C-130J, and KC-46 airframes in recent years have only made a small dent in the average age of the Air Force’s fleet. (SAF/IEN)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Safeguarding AFCYBER's Critical Infrastructure

    Analyze NIST-evaluated PQC algorithms in an AFCYBER operational context, with an emphasis on critical digital infrastructure. (688 CW)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • SecAF's Operational Imperatives and CSAF's Future Operating Concept

    What is the impact of the new capabilities introduced in the OI's and new way of fighting in the Future Operating Concept? How will the USAF organizational structure adapt to support them? (HAF A5SM)

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Based Nuclear Deterrence

    Assessing the strategic implications and potential consequences of deploying nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems in space.

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Force Culture

    With the separation from the Air Force, the Space Force needs to establish its own identity and culture as a separate service branch. (ROPS, Museum Staff, 50 OSS & HQ USSF/SED) 

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Space Situational Awareness

    Analyze the future of space situational awareness, especially in the light of new technological advances. (SPOC/DOO & SPCO/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Space Policy

    Analyze various elements of US Space Policy (HQ USSF/SEK & HQ USSF/SEF & SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • US Statutory Constructs in Space/Space Guard

    How should the USSF leverage the total force construct in manning and executing its Title 10 mission? (USSF/NGB & JAO)

  • USAF Organizational Changes

    How should the USAF changes its organization to effectively adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

     

     

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • What is the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations?

    Analyze the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • AI & Nuclear Command and Control or Other Areas

    Examining the opportunities and risks of incorporating AI into nuclear command and control systems, focusing on maintaining safety, security, and strategic stability. If not in NC2 where  could AI be used to support the Nuclear Enterprise?

  • Are Nukes Still the Answer?

    Why should we still invest and employ nuclear weapons? No other country has shown the tangible will to utilize nuclear weapons. We all stay postured due to other countries Can we disarm to win? What would be the effect if the U.S. would be the first country to disarm?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Consolidating X1/X2/X3 into single career field

    Should X1/X2/X3 be consolidated into a single career field in order to gain efficiencies and generalization for missile maintenance technicians? (20 AF)

  • Conventional Conflict's Impact On The Air Leg Of The Triad

    What are the effects of prolonged conventional conflict on the nuclear air leg capabilities? How credible will that deterrent be after engaging in a prolonged conventional conflict? (AF/A10C)

  • Conventional-Nuclear Integration Capabilities of US Allies

    With US allies operating alongside of US forces, what is the CNI proficiency and capabilities of U.S. allies? How would cooperation on CNI with allies impact deterrence? (AF/A10)

     

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Deterrence in Era of Nuclear Proliferation

    How has increased nuclear proliferation affected the deterrence strategies and postures of the US and regional powers? (HAF A5SM)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Deterrence in Space

    What potential uses of the latest space technologies can serve as deterrence? (50 OSS)

  • Disruptive Technology's Effect On Deterrence

    What effect does disruptive technology such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing have on deterrence? (AF/A10C)

  • Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

    Is extended deterrence provided by tactical nuclear weapons worth the cost? (AF/A10)

  • Emerging Technology's Threat to Nuclear Assets

    What capabilities and intent do adversaries possess to utilize advanced technologies to hold AFGSC assets at increased risk? (AFGSC/A2)

  • EMP Effects on Nuclear Arsenal

    What are the effects of EMP on nuclear weapons? What can be done to mitigate risk? (20 AF)

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Threasholds

    Analyzing how hypersonic weapon development impacts nuclear deterrence calculations and potential escalation pathways.

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on Nuclear Deterrence

    Do losses in conventional weaponry during the invasion of Ukraine push Russia to be more likely to use nuclear weapons in the future? (8 AF)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impact on Deterrence by Emerging Technology

    What impact would the emergence and global diffusion of technologies with the potential dual-military ability to deliver strategic effects (e.g., biotechnology) have on the United States deterrence posture? (AF/A10)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Influence of Conventional Arms on Nuclear Deterrence

    How do advanced, long-range conventional weapons fit into the nuclear spectrum and what influence do they have on an adversary's willingness to escalate a conflict? (AFGSC/A2)

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • International Atomic Energy Agency & Nuclear Proliferation

    How has the International Atomic Energy Agency's focus and charter changed over the last 60 years? (AFTAC)

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Lessons Learned from the Cold War

    Deterrence Factors Ignored over the Last 35 Years

  • Logistic and Resupply Operations in a Chemical or Radiological Environment

    Is the Air Force prepared to continue critical logistics and re-supply operations despite the presence of a chemical or radiological hazard? What logistics strategies and guidance will enable the U.S. to achieve success in even the most austere environments available? (AF/A10S)

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Next-Generation Missile Operators

    Given the potential changes in the future strategic environment, what impact would this have on the development of missileers? Should current developmental programs remain the same for Sentinel operators? (20 AF)

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Prioritization

    From security to survivability, which should  the Air Force prioritize first, nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery platforms? 

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Nuclear Signaling and Miscalculation

    Examining effective communication strategies and mechanisms to avoid unintended escalation during crises involving nuclear-armed states.

  • Nuclear Sustainment: Minuteman III

    What institutional changes (sustainment) are needed to maintain Minuteman III to 2052?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • P5 Arms Control

    Could Washington leverage the P5 forum to open the aperture for strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China? (AF/A10)

  • Potential for Integrated Deterrence

    Why have strategic nuclear forces failed to deter some aspects of conventional aggression in the recent past? Would integrated deterrence architectures involving other capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, hypersonics, AI) better address concerns around theater-level conventional aggression? What would need to be included in future integrated deterrence strategies to deter conventional aggression? (AF/A10)

  • Prioritization of Requirements for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)

    With limited resources, what Air Force actions should be prioritized to ensure compliance with Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) while maintaining operational proficiency? (AF/A10P)

  • Priority of Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat

    What priority should a Hard and Deeply Buried Target (HDBT) defeat capability take within U.S. nuclear strategy? How important is it that U.S. nuclear forces continue to be able to deny adversary sanctuary and hold critical protected targets at risk for each of these countries? Is there any potential adversary that finds this capability either critically influential or irrelevant in their decision calculus? What role should an HDBT defeat capability play, if any, in U.S. employment strategy? (AF/A10C)

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Resourcing the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    AFGSC supports 3 of the four NDS Defense Priorities; however, is that reflected in how AFGSC is resourced (manning, money, etc.)? Comparing how MAJCOMs are resourced will determine how adequately the DAF has aligned weights of effort and resourcing with stated priorities and where there is room for improvement and rebalancing.

  • Rethinking No First Use

    Analyzing the potential benefits and drawbacks of adopting a "No First Use" policy in the context of evolving security threats and technological advancements.

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Road-Mobile ICBM system

    Does the US need to develop a road-mobile ICBM system as part of its nuclear arsenal? (8 AF)

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Views on Deterrence, Escalation Management & Conflict Termination

    What are the Russian views and theories of deterrence, escalation management, and conflict termination? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Size of Future Nuclear Force

    What does the nuclear force of the future need to look like in order to ensure deterrence holds in the current strategic environment? (AF/A10) 

  • Space Based Nuclear Deterrence

    Assessing the strategic implications and potential consequences of deploying nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems in space.

  • Tailored Integrated Deterrence in a Multipolar World

    Developing nuanced deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). D.I.M.E. model along with nuclear capabilities.

  • Technological Innovation & Integrated Deterrence

    How should the DOD and AF pursue and message technology innovation to support integrated deterrence in the NDS?  (AFNWC)

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • Trilateral Nuclear Arms

    What are the key elements of a possible trilateral nuclear arms control treaty that will maximize the value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enhance U.S. national security?

  • U.S. High Yield Weapon Strategy

    Should the U.S. have a requirement for a high-yield nuclear weapon (1 Megaton or 5 Megatons, or higher) beyond physical target damage requirements? (AF/A10C)

  • U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Posture and Effectiveness Without Nuclear Arms Control

    How might a U.S. withdrawal and renegotiation of nuclear-based treaties impact U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture against nuclear adversaries? How might this impact the U.S. extended deterrence strategy and force posture in support of allies? (AF/A10P)

  • Value of the IAEA in a New Era of Monitoring, Verification, and Nonproliferation

    Have the political decisions of the U.S. on JCPOA, and other partner nations' messaging on potential Iranian nuclearization marginalized or otherwise compromised the global value of the IAEA?  Can the IAEA reassert itself, independently as a global leader in safeguard development, and possibly further facilitate or engage in enforcement support actions where individual nations or coalitions may pursue 'sanction and reward' constructs to force nuclear proliferation reversal of non-NPT nations? 

    The IAEA has historically been regarded as one of the world's foremost leaders in assuring the safe use of nuclear power and energy.  What has changed in the last 60 years with regards to the organizations focus and charter?  Is the IAEA able to fully support the means necessary to assure a safe 21st century in light of increased conflict and new national aspirations to succeed as ancillary participants in an environment of great power competition?

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian concept for use of nuclear forces?

    What is the Russian concept for the use of nuclear forces? (Strategic and tactical) (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Why AF ICBM Maintenance Principles Are Not the Same as AF Aircraft Maintenance Principles

    The maintenance principles for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft differ significantly due to their vastly different operational environments, mission profiles, and lifespans. Applying aircraft maintenance principles to ICBMs, or vice-versa, would be ineffective and potentially dangerous.

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

  • World Economic Policies Impact on US Nuclear Deterrence

    What happens to US nuclear deterrence strategies if other countries abandon the US Dollar as their reserve currency? (AF/A10)

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

  • ‘Integration’ in Combined Force

    What does ‘integration’ mean for a combined force? (AF Futures)

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • AFCENT MICAP Velocity

    As transportation priority and supply priority are not always the same for MICAPs, is there a possibility to connect the two into one overall priority? (87 LRS)

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Allied and Partner Assumptions in Concept Development

    How are allied and partner assumptions considered and managed in USAF and Joint concept development and experimentation? (AFWIC)

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence in Warplans

    What is the impact of artificial intelligence or intelligent automation in the development of real-time generated war plans? (HQ USSF/S59/ACT)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Command Relationships in JADO

    What are the command relationship implications of JADO?

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber Survivability of Air Force Weapon Systems

    How can we prioritize and streamline cyber survivability efforts for the Air Force and ultimately mitigate these threats as mandated by Congress through the Joint Staff and executed by Program Management Offices? (70 ISRW)

  • Cyber Threat-Based Mission Assurance as a Service

    End-to-end cyber surety from penetration testing, fixing discovered vulnerabilities, and optimizing defensive cyber operations as one integrated entity and unit of action. What authorities, responsibilities, and resources would need to be realigned and where would that realignment best be suited? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber Threats Against Air Mobility Operations and Forces

    What are the cyber threats (and countermeasures) that are specific to AMC operations? (423 MTS)

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Cyberspace Awareness/Operations Sensors

    Can we improve cyberspace awareness by improving the management of “operations” sensors and their ability to enhance the staff analytics supporting decision-making and execution? (CO-IPE (STRAT))

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Developing Cyberspace Infrastructure Terrain Subject Matter Expertise

    As the AF looks to defend static, adaptive, and expeditionary bases, does the USAF need in terms of developing cyberspace infrastructure terrain (POL, power, etc) subject matter expertise?  (ACC/A2)

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Disposition of Forces (DOF) Consolidation

    How do we optimize the dissemination, visualization, storage, and cataloging of battlespace characterization data and Disposition of Forces (DOF) production? (480 ISRG)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Establishing Flexible Logistics

    The CSAF is looking for “initiatives focused on more agile, resilient, and survivable energy logistics—from bulk strategic supplies to deliveries at the tactical edge.” 

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Mobility Airlift Positioning for Cargo Load Efficiency

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach. What are the additional benefits to increased fuel savings, increased cargo capacity, increased aircraft sustainment, increased mission readiness, and enhanced combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Government-Wide Data Sharing

    What are the current effective methods of data sharing across the various government agencies and how can these methods be improved? (AFTAC)

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historical Battle Networks

    Analyze battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike, including their evolution, effectiveness in previous conflicts. (HAF A5SM)

  • Historical C2 lessons for JADC2

    What historical C2 lessons are relevant for the JADC2 construct?

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Autonomous Systems on Multinational Air Operations

    How will the rise of autonomous systems affect multinational air operations? (AFWIC)

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Information - A Joint Function

    What are the Air Force implications for Information being designed as a joint function by the Chairman? Is the emerging service concept of information warfare distinct from information operations as defined by Joint Publication 1-2? If so, how? (ACC/A2)

  • In-Space Logistics

     

    Analysis of in-space logistics. (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Intel Fusion

    Can we develop a repeatable process for developing cross-functional Analysis and Exploitation Teams that are capable of producing high-quality reports that meet Theater Joint Force Air Component Commander requirements within three months of initial team establishment? (480 ISRW)

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 - Coalition & Interagency Partners

    What does JADC2 mean for coalition and interagency partners? How can the Joint Force address the classification challenges of operations across domains with interagency partners and coalition partners?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • JADC2 Training/Education

    Should JADC2 become a career field in its own right, with specialized training and qualifications?

  • JADO - Centralization vs Decentralization

    What impact will JADO have for decentralized execution/tactical initiative? How does the USAF move from centralized command and decentralized execution? How can we go about pushing down authority and responsibility to the lowest level? (PACAF/CC)

  • JADO - Essential Information Requirements

    What are the essential information requirements for JADO? How does JADC2 overcome the problem of multiple incompatible networks that are used in contemporary C2?

  • JADO - Space Force

     

    How do we integrate the Space Force into JADO?

  • JADO Mission Orders

    What do mission-type orders look like in JADO?

  • Joint Cyber Command and Control (JCC2) integration into Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)

    What is the best strategy for Joint Cyber Command and Control (JCC2) integration into Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)? Explore and expound upon risk to mission/ forces, redundancy vs resiliency, and tools required. Determine resourcing requirements as a function of scale. (ACC/A5K)

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Language Proficiency for Cryptologic Language Analysts

    Can full-time Distance Learning (DL) be an effective foreign language acquisition training medium for Cryptologic Language Analysts (CLA) who have already demonstrated a strong record of proficiency in at least one DoD-trained foreign language? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Leadership in JADO

    For successful to JADO, how and when should a joint culture be inculcated into military leaders?

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistic and Resupply Operations in a Chemical or Radiological Environment

    Is the Air Force prepared to continue critical logistics and re-supply operations despite the presence of a chemical or radiological hazard? What logistics strategies and guidance will enable the U.S. to achieve success in even the most austere environments available? (AF/A10S)

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Manage, Training and Equipping for JADO

    How does the USAF manage, train and equip for JADO?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • National ROE in Mosaic Warfighting Concept

    How will a mosaic warfighting concept account for national ROE in a near-peer conflict? (AFWIC)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Novel Operating Environments

    Based on trends in the geostrategic environment, advances in technologies that allow SOF greater maneuver and capabilities in extreme environments, and the evolving role of the DOD as part of national security, what might SOF’s new roles and missions be, as part of the Joint Force, in novel operational environments? Such environments could include: the polar regions and approaches; areas of extreme heat and humidity too severe for normal human tolerance; the open ocean, to include all layers of the pelagic zone, the seabed, and resource exploitation platforms; and outer space, to include cislunar and lunar orbits. What might operations in these extreme environments look like? And what capabilities would be needed to sustain operations there? 

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational Assessment in the Information Environment

    Given the complexities of human behavior and decision-making, how should the joint force approach operational assessment in the information environment? How can the Air Force enable that approach through the application of new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and sensors? (16 AF)

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Organizing for Irregular Warfare

    Does the SOE require organizational changes to better carry out irregular warfare campaigns and operations? Are purpose-built SOF organizations and capabilities needed to successfully wage irregular warfare campaigns against adversaries? If most irregular warfare problems have at least some transregional element, and TSOCs have a regional focus, should the structure and focus of TSOCs be examined? Is there a need for additional TSOCs under U.S. Space Command or U.S. Cyber Command? Would it be helpful to create a transregionally focused irregular warfare headquarters? What would be the advantages and disadvantages to any restructuring of USSOCOM organizations? How do allies, partners, and adversaries conceptualize and organize for irregular warfare, and are there elements from other operations that USSOCOM could incorporate to be more effective?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Safeguarding AFCYBER's Critical Infrastructure

    Analyze NIST-evaluated PQC algorithms in an AFCYBER operational context, with an emphasis on critical digital infrastructure. (688 CW)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Components and Joint Special Operations Command

    How might the SOF service components (Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command) and Joint Special Operations Command best optimize themselves for strategic competition and integrated deterrence mission sets? Is there a need for new Joint Force training and exercises to determine or develop best practices for the integration of SOF and SOF enablers across services to best support mission requirements? What are the mission-critical capabilities for strategic competition and integrated deterrence within each SOF service component? Given each SOF service component’s unique capabilities, how might they best utilize new technologies? Do any of these capabilities require adjustments for optimal effectiveness in the current strategic environment? Are there requirements for new SOF capabilities that do not currently exist? If so, which SOF service component is best suited to meet each new requirement, and why?  

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Repetitive Assignments

    While the service personnel commands may view repetitive assignments in the same combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) negatively as they are not broadening, geographic combatant commands and TSOCs may view such repetitive assignments in the same combatant command AOR as beneficial due to increased experience within the operational environment. How can these opposing views be reconciled to achieve the objectives of the services, the combatant commands, and the personal goals of service members? What changes to the personnel system of each service would do the most to improve SOF relations with partners in each combatant command AOR?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • US Alliance System and Multinational Air Operations

    How has the US alliance system shaped and influenced the conduct of multinational air operations, and how will this inform future multinational operations? (AFWIC)

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Warfighting Domains in JADO

    What are the critical inter-dependencies that must be defended and exploited between the domains?

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Capitalizing on Non-Commissioned Officers' Advanced Degrees

    How can the SOF enterprise and its service components develop a process to effectively align the specialized skills, including graduate degrees, of noncommissioned officers with appropriate position roles to maximize their contributions?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese leadership tasking cyber-actors

    How does CCP/PLA senior leadership task the various cyber-actors: government and proxies? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • Civil Resistance in the Future Operating Environment

    How can the U.S. Government influence dissident population groups engaged in civil resistance in foreign countries? (JSOU)

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Continuous Learning and Adapting

    How can the SOF enterprise cultivate a culture and implement the necessary processes for continuous learning and adaptation at all echelons to remain effective in the evolving strategic environment?

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Management Systems for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    To better meet their unique requirements, Special Operations Forces should explore evolving their personnel systems to manage their own forces, rather than continuing to outsource this critical management function to the different service branches.

  • Cyber & Foreign Terrorist Organizations

    What are foreign terrorist organization (FTO) cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in FTO cyber operations? How do FTOs use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? What are the trends in FTO use of technology and social media platforms? (US Cyber Command)

  • Cybercrime

    What is the relationship between cybercriminal groups and state actors? Is there a command and control or tasking relationship? When do cybercrime and/or ransomware operations reach a threshold that constitutes a national security risk, not just a law enforcement matter? (US Cyber Command

     

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • DLOs on converging capabilities

    In what ways from both a conceptual and modeling/simulation standpoint can we start to include DLOs that exercise converging capabilities to effectively compete with our adversaries in the information environment? (16 AF)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • EiTaaS Tier 1 Maintenance Support

    How will 16 AF and the 688 CW conduct Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) Services for the Air Force Network-Unclassified (AFNET-U) when Tier 1 maintenance and operations for AFNET-U is contracted out to the private sector during the Enterprise to Infrastructure as a Service (EiTaaS)? (688 CW)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Government-Wide Data Sharing

    What are the current effective methods of data sharing across the various government agencies and how can these methods be improved? (AFTAC)

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Impact of Lawfare on Warfare

    How are legal strategies reshaping the traditional paradigms of warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Information Warfare Capabilities

    How should the AF and DoD organize themselves to optimize the development of Information Warfare capabilities? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Resilience and Resistance

    Resilience and resistance comprise psychological, physical, human, and material approaches to competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare. Such methods can include the transformation of infrastructure to support irregular activities, the hardening of or redundancy of institutions, and preparation of populations for conflict. For military planners struggling for numerical data to evaluate, the quantifiable effectiveness of asymmetric approaches to conflict can prove challenging. What are the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for SRR in an irregular or conventional threat? One method of evaluating a region or country is through analyses of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) metrics. Can PMESII-PT or other doctrinal analytical tools usefully measure the capabilities of a resistance movement or the resilience of a nation state? Are there lessons from the application of these analytical tools to counterinsurgency that could be applied to SRR? 

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Reflections in the Information Environment

    How do we accurately and meaningfully measure Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) in the Information Environment? How can we best measure the 'influence' of Information Warfare on an adversary actor? (616 OC) 

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Commercial Support of Cyber Operations

    How does Russia use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Civilian Workforce Optimization

    How can the SOF enterprise best optimize its use of the civilian workforce to be more efficient and lethal following multiple rounds of workforce cuts in 2025?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Special Operations Command South

    Within a global strategic competition, how can SOF compete for influence in South and Central America?  How can this command best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships in the region, and, in particular, what are indicators or warnings that US strategic influence might be challenged or losing ground to an adversary?  If we have lost ground, what are the best options for rebuilding influence?  How can we prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment?  What are the biggest threats emanating from adversarial influence in the region?  Can SOF mitigate the effects of adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries?

  • Strategic Empathy in Intelligence Analysis

    How should we develop strategic empathy, the ability to identify with a competitor or adversary, to optimize analysis capability? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strategy and Security Cooperation

    What are effective strategies for using Security Cooperation as an instrument of statecraft to advance national defense and foreign policy priorities? 

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Tailored Integrated Deterrence in a Multipolar World

    Developing nuanced deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). D.I.M.E. model along with nuclear capabilities.

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • Temporal Orientation and Strategic Considerations

    In The Politics and Science of Prevision: Governing and Probing the Future, Wenger, Jasper, and Cavelty (2020) state that modern “shifts in global economics and politics are in line with asynchronous shifts in the temporal thinking in Western and in Chinese politics.” The quote specifically references Chinese temporal orientation as distinct to the West, yet differences in perceptions of temporality exist across the world, as time plays a factor in worldview, outlook, decision-making processes, and in other cultural aspects. Where differences exist, they may create tensions between actors and impact relationships. These impacts may affect strategic interactions, and thus require deeper understanding.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of Learning in the Age of Quantum Information Science

    How can the SOF enterprise investigate the potential of quantum information science to revolutionize educational assessment, personalize learning pathways, and unlock new frontiers in human cognitive enhancement?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • U.S. Support to Peacekeeping Operations

    Should the US contribute logistical enablers like air mobility (fixed wing and rotary wing), engineering, line and short-haul motor transportation, medical, and signals communication to support United Nations Peacekeeping Operations? (SOUTHCOM)

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilization of Mobile Adware Identification for Tracking Individuals and Implications for Force Protection

    How can a comprehensive framework be developed to understand the applicability and dangers of mobile adware identification (MAI) to SOF personnel and operations, address the associated legal and policy considerations, and create effective countermeasures and informational campaigns?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • World Economic Policies Impact on US Nuclear Deterrence

    What happens to US nuclear deterrence strategies if other countries abandon the US Dollar as their reserve currency? (AF/A10)

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Allied and Partner Assumptions in Concept Development

    How are allied and partner assumptions considered and managed in USAF and Joint concept development and experimentation? (AFWIC)

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Conventional-Nuclear Integration Capabilities of US Allies

    With US allies operating alongside of US forces, what is the CNI proficiency and capabilities of U.S. allies? How would cooperation on CNI with allies impact deterrence? (AF/A10)

     

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Cyber & Foreign Terrorist Organizations

    What are foreign terrorist organization (FTO) cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in FTO cyber operations? How do FTOs use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? What are the trends in FTO use of technology and social media platforms? (US Cyber Command)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historic Case Studies of US Allies Neglecting Treaty Obligations

    What are the historical examples (case studies) of where U.S. allies have not lived up to treaty obligations (and why)? (AFWIC)

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • International Atomic Energy Agency & Nuclear Proliferation

    How has the International Atomic Energy Agency's focus and charter changed over the last 60 years? (AFTAC)

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Iran-Russia Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Iran? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 - Coalition & Interagency Partners

    What does JADC2 mean for coalition and interagency partners? How can the Joint Force address the classification challenges of operations across domains with interagency partners and coalition partners?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Foreign Influence in Hegemonic Powers

    What variables measure decreasing and/or diminishing foreign influence in a hegemonic power? (AFWIC)

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Nuclear Signaling and Miscalculation

    Examining effective communication strategies and mechanisms to avoid unintended escalation during crises involving nuclear-armed states.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • P5 Arms Control

    Could Washington leverage the P5 forum to open the aperture for strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China? (AF/A10)

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russo-Turkish Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Turkey? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Special Operations Command South

    Within a global strategic competition, how can SOF compete for influence in South and Central America?  How can this command best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships in the region, and, in particular, what are indicators or warnings that US strategic influence might be challenged or losing ground to an adversary?  If we have lost ground, what are the best options for rebuilding influence?  How can we prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment?  What are the biggest threats emanating from adversarial influence in the region?  Can SOF mitigate the effects of adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Empathy in Intelligence Analysis

    How should we develop strategic empathy, the ability to identify with a competitor or adversary, to optimize analysis capability? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strategy and Security Cooperation

    What are effective strategies for using Security Cooperation as an instrument of statecraft to advance national defense and foreign policy priorities? 

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Undermatch

    How can SOF adapt its operational strategies and leverage non-technological competitive advantages to succeed in an environment where an adversary may have technological parity or superiority, thus challenging the traditional "American way of war"?

  • Testing Reliability of Allies and Partners

    How can the reliability of allies and partners be tested? (AFWIC)

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Posture and Effectiveness Without Nuclear Arms Control

    How might a U.S. withdrawal and renegotiation of nuclear-based treaties impact U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture against nuclear adversaries? How might this impact the U.S. extended deterrence strategy and force posture in support of allies? (AF/A10P)

  • U.S. Support to Peacekeeping Operations

    Should the US contribute logistical enablers like air mobility (fixed wing and rotary wing), engineering, line and short-haul motor transportation, medical, and signals communication to support United Nations Peacekeeping Operations? (SOUTHCOM)

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Alliance System and Multinational Air Operations

    How has the US alliance system shaped and influenced the conduct of multinational air operations, and how will this inform future multinational operations? (AFWIC)

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Value of the IAEA in a New Era of Monitoring, Verification, and Nonproliferation

    Have the political decisions of the U.S. on JCPOA, and other partner nations' messaging on potential Iranian nuclearization marginalized or otherwise compromised the global value of the IAEA?  Can the IAEA reassert itself, independently as a global leader in safeguard development, and possibly further facilitate or engage in enforcement support actions where individual nations or coalitions may pursue 'sanction and reward' constructs to force nuclear proliferation reversal of non-NPT nations? 

    The IAEA has historically been regarded as one of the world's foremost leaders in assuring the safe use of nuclear power and energy.  What has changed in the last 60 years with regards to the organizations focus and charter?  Is the IAEA able to fully support the means necessary to assure a safe 21st century in light of increased conflict and new national aspirations to succeed as ancillary participants in an environment of great power competition?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Capitalizing on Non-Commissioned Officers' Advanced Degrees

    How can the SOF enterprise and its service components develop a process to effectively align the specialized skills, including graduate degrees, of noncommissioned officers with appropriate position roles to maximize their contributions?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Civilian Cyber Auxiliary - Civil Cyber Patrol?

    In light of the national shortage of cyber talent, how might the Air Force develop and utilize a Civil Cyber Patrol and/or a Civil Information Warfare Patrol to best protect U.S. national interests? What legal, operational, and technical challenges must ACC address to make a civilian cyber auxiliary a reality? (ACC/A3/2/6K)

  • Command Relationships in JADO

    What are the command relationship implications of JADO?

  • Continuity in Warfare

    What are the valuable insights from the timeless principles of warfare? How do they continue to inform contemporary practices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Continuous Learning and Adapting

    How can the SOF enterprise cultivate a culture and implement the necessary processes for continuous learning and adaptation at all echelons to remain effective in the evolving strategic environment?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Management Systems for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    To better meet their unique requirements, Special Operations Forces should explore evolving their personnel systems to manage their own forces, rather than continuing to outsource this critical management function to the different service branches.

  • Cutting-Edge Personnel Management for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    How can USASOC optimize its personnel management systems to better recruit, retain, and develop highly skilled SOF professionals by adapting cutting-edge private-sector talent management practices, all while balancing SOF's unique cultural and operational requirements with the larger Army's standardized personnel systems?

  • Cyber Personnel Retention

    What the USAF could do better to entice, develop, and maintain long-term careers in cyber to better ensure hard-earned experience and talent is passed onto future generations of cyberwarfare Airmen?  (ACC/A3/2/6KO)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historical Battle Networks

    Analyze battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike, including their evolution, effectiveness in previous conflicts. (HAF A5SM)

  • Historical C2 lessons for JADC2

    What historical C2 lessons are relevant for the JADC2 construct?

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Historical Uses of Information in War

    What are the long-term trends in the role and value of information in warfare? How has it shaped conflicts historically? (HAF A5SM)

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Information - A Joint Function

    What are the Air Force implications for Information being designed as a joint function by the Chairman? Is the emerging service concept of information warfare distinct from information operations as defined by Joint Publication 1-2? If so, how? (ACC/A2)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • Interoperability, Interdependence, and Integration in Combined Operations with Allies and Partners

    What is the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners? Analyze the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners. (AF Futures)

  • Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Technology

    Intelligence has a role to play in the identification of emerging technologies and assessment of how they may be used by adversaries. Within the SOE, how can collaboration be encouraged between the intelligence practitioners and the technological specialists? How can SOF best couple bottom-up-driven intelligence and technology solutions with top-down-driven research and acquisition programs? While the technologies are different, the problems of collaboration between two different communities during historical periods of technological disruption may offer ideas to inform current efforts in these areas. Can SOF use case studies of the past emergence of disruptive technologies to transform for the future? How can SOF intelligence exploit technology while maintaining a healthy skepticism of its promises?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Leadership in Combat Wings

    How can USAF officers be developed to lead in the new Combat Wing formation? (AFMISC/A3) 

  • Leadership in JADO

    For successful to JADO, how and when should a joint culture be inculcated into military leaders?

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Measuring Resilience and Resistance

    Resilience and resistance comprise psychological, physical, human, and material approaches to competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare. Such methods can include the transformation of infrastructure to support irregular activities, the hardening of or redundancy of institutions, and preparation of populations for conflict. For military planners struggling for numerical data to evaluate, the quantifiable effectiveness of asymmetric approaches to conflict can prove challenging. What are the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for SRR in an irregular or conventional threat? One method of evaluating a region or country is through analyses of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) metrics. Can PMESII-PT or other doctrinal analytical tools usefully measure the capabilities of a resistance movement or the resilience of a nation state? Are there lessons from the application of these analytical tools to counterinsurgency that could be applied to SRR? 

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Organizing for Irregular Warfare

    Does the SOE require organizational changes to better carry out irregular warfare campaigns and operations? Are purpose-built SOF organizations and capabilities needed to successfully wage irregular warfare campaigns against adversaries? If most irregular warfare problems have at least some transregional element, and TSOCs have a regional focus, should the structure and focus of TSOCs be examined? Is there a need for additional TSOCs under U.S. Space Command or U.S. Cyber Command? Would it be helpful to create a transregionally focused irregular warfare headquarters? What would be the advantages and disadvantages to any restructuring of USSOCOM organizations? How do allies, partners, and adversaries conceptualize and organize for irregular warfare, and are there elements from other operations that USSOCOM could incorporate to be more effective?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • Planning for the Unexpected

    How might we more effectively plan for unexpected, or “black swan” events, that might negatively affect critical military operations? (480 ISRW)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Civilian Workforce Optimization

    How can the SOF enterprise best optimize its use of the civilian workforce to be more efficient and lethal following multiple rounds of workforce cuts in 2025?

  • SOF Cognition

    Cognition is “the states and processes involved in knowing, which in their completeness include perception and judgment. Cognition includes all conscious and unconscious processes by which knowledge is accumulated, such as perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, and reasoning.” How can the SOE and SOF identify and address aspects of cognition that affect both their personnel and their organization? 

    At the individual level, how can we measure and build SOF resilience? Can we better understand the mental processes that lead to posttraumatic stress and suicidality as well as post-traumatic growth? Might research into cognition provide insights for POTFF programs? At the organizational level, how do we support cognitive decisionmaking on teams and across the SOE? What role does cognition play in terms of the assessment of risk? How can the SOE work to encourage and incorporate divergent and creative thinking within SOF? What might the benefits be of incorporating creative problemsolving? What are the risks of such encouragement, and how can those risks be mitigated?

  • SOF Educational Foci

    Formal education programs for SOF practitioners are available at several different military educational institutions. There are service-specific schools as well as joint educational opportunities. Is current education and training adequate to prepare for strategic competition? Is the content, type, and timing of education appropriate to meet the requirements of SOF? What does ‘SOFpeculiar education’ encompass? Should there be a SOF intake course before component training? What are the critical skills for a joint SOF officer? How do the educational touchpoints for SOF officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) support or affect their careers? How can the SOE best develop and nurture creative thinkers within a hierarchical/rules-based organization? How do we educate SOF professionals about evolving national strategies, policies, and mandates and the impacts these changes have on SOF operations?

    JSOU is unique among military educational institutions, as it is the only one that reports directly to USSOCOM. Where should JSOU’s focus be? Should JSOU be educating SOF practitioners and SOE personnel, nurturing critical and creative thinking, or developing SOF advocates? Should JSOU become a service-like school?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Repetitive Assignments

    While the service personnel commands may view repetitive assignments in the same combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) negatively as they are not broadening, geographic combatant commands and TSOCs may view such repetitive assignments in the same combatant command AOR as beneficial due to increased experience within the operational environment. How can these opposing views be reconciled to achieve the objectives of the services, the combatant commands, and the personal goals of service members? What changes to the personnel system of each service would do the most to improve SOF relations with partners in each combatant command AOR?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Talent Management

    While talent management remains an enduring priority for SOF, the contemporary environment offers unique issues that the SOE must address. The end of the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of strategic competition mean that SOF may need to reprioritize its missions and capabilities. Are there operational and organizational paradigms that need to be reconsidered to better develop SOF for the challenges of the future operating environment? Who is the current SOF practitioner and how did that practitioner evolve? What are the key attributes of the future SOF professional, and do they differ from the key attributes from historical SOF professionals? If SOF must operate within an environment of strategic competition, how can they be encouraged to cultivate ‘strategic interest’ or ‘strategic empathy’ in the world early in their career progression? How does the DOD culture and system affect the individual and the individual’s ability to operate in the strategic environment? What enhancements in competency, cognition, performance, and total health could enable SOF to better navigate the changing human and technology landscapes within the current operational environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Force Culture

    With the separation from the Air Force, the Space Force needs to establish its own identity and culture as a separate service branch. (ROPS, Museum Staff, 50 OSS & HQ USSF/SED) 

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Strategic Blind Spots in Modern Conflict

    Are there useful methods of blind spot analysis that could be utilized to uncover obsolete, incomplete, or incorrect assumptions? What role do historical case studies play in overcoming blind spots? How can the study of lessons learned from recent operations provide valuable insights to help the DoD avoid these pitfalls? (JSOU)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Leadership

    What role do strategic leaders play in effectively managing changes in the character of war? How do leadership practices need to adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Temporal Orientation and Strategic Considerations

    In The Politics and Science of Prevision: Governing and Probing the Future, Wenger, Jasper, and Cavelty (2020) state that modern “shifts in global economics and politics are in line with asynchronous shifts in the temporal thinking in Western and in Chinese politics.” The quote specifically references Chinese temporal orientation as distinct to the West, yet differences in perceptions of temporality exist across the world, as time plays a factor in worldview, outlook, decision-making processes, and in other cultural aspects. Where differences exist, they may create tensions between actors and impact relationships. These impacts may affect strategic interactions, and thus require deeper understanding.

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • USAF Organizational Changes

    How should the USAF changes its organization to effectively adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

     

     

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

CSAF Priorities

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

Arctic

    There does not appear to be any research for this topic.

Cyber

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • AI & Nuclear Command and Control or Other Areas

    Examining the opportunities and risks of incorporating AI into nuclear command and control systems, focusing on maintaining safety, security, and strategic stability. If not in NC2 where  could AI be used to support the Nuclear Enterprise?

  • Analytic Certification

    Does Analytic Certification provide a path toward Enhanced IC Analytic Effectiveness? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Can We Reengineer or Reconstruct Intelligence Sensor Data Flow Specifically for Network Performance, Operations, and Management Sensors?

    Can we reengineer or reconstruct intelligence sensor data flow specifically for network performance, operations, and management sensors?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Contemporary Artificial Intelligence Capability

    What off-the-shelf Artificial Intelligence capability could be quickly incorporated into the AOC? (PACAF/CC)

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber Force Structure

    How can the USAF optimize current Cyber Force Structure? (HAF A2/6)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyberspace Awareness/Operations Sensors

    Can we improve cyberspace awareness by improving the management of “operations” sensors and their ability to enhance the staff analytics supporting decision-making and execution? (CO-IPE (STRAT))

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Disposition of Forces (DOF) Consolidation

    How do we optimize the dissemination, visualization, storage, and cataloging of battlespace characterization data and Disposition of Forces (DOF) production? (480 ISRG)

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficient Fine Tuning of Large Language Models

    What are the most robust ways to incorporate new data sets into a large language model that do not truncate the breadth of data available while simultaneously allowing for complex answers and minimizing hallucinations? (16 AF/A5)

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Implications of Increased Use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

    As advances in computing are implemented in JADO, what are the ethical implications of increased use of artificial intelligence and machine learning?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Implementing AI & ML for cyber-enabled information operations

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the Information Warfare NAF to increase the pace and quality of Information Operations? What are the critical policy and technical limitations to harnessing AI and ML tools for the modernization of U.S. cyber-enabled information operations and what are the key requirements for solutions to overcome these limitations? (16 AF/A39)

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Nationality of an Autonomous System

    What defines the nationality of an autonomous system? How does this affect their operational employment? (AF Futures)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Operational Assessment in the Information Environment

    Given the complexities of human behavior and decision-making, how should the joint force approach operational assessment in the information environment? How can the Air Force enable that approach through the application of new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and sensors? (16 AF)

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Technological Impacts on Ethical Autonomy

    The integration of wearable, edible, or injectable technology for SOF can potentially raise concerns about the loss of autonomy in making ethical decisions. Wearable devices, such as smartwatches or fitness trackers, can collect vast amounts of personal data about our behaviors, activities, and health. The risk lies in the potential misuse or exploitation of this data, which could erode personal privacy and autonomy. Could external entities and malicious actors with access to such data manipulate individual choices or influence decision-making through targeted persuasive techniques? Edible technology refers to ingestible devices or substances, such as smart pills or edible sensors. While these technologies can provide valuable health monitoring or targeted drug delivery, there is a risk of overreliance and loss of agency. Can people become too dependent on such technologies for managing their health or decision-making processes? Could they inadvertently surrender their autonomy to technology or entities controlling it? Injectables include implanting devices or substances into the body, such as microchips or smart implants. These can offer benefits, such as enhanced cognitive capabilities or medical monitoring. Risks include potential unauthorized access to implanted devices, data breaches, or manipulation of bodily functions or behaviors. Such vulnerabilities may compromise personal autonomy and privacy. What are the potential risks or challenges the SOE should consider regarding the loss of SOF ethical autonomy when using wearable technology, edibles, or injectables? What measures can be taken to ensure individuals maintain their autonomy and ethical decision-making capabilities while using such technologies?

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of Learning in the Age of Quantum Information Science

    How can the SOF enterprise investigate the potential of quantum information science to revolutionize educational assessment, personalize learning pathways, and unlock new frontiers in human cognitive enhancement?

  • The Limits of AI and Big Data Technology

    What assumptions currently pervade military culture about AI and Big Data that, from a social science perspective, are inaccurate and counterproductive? (JSOU)

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • Usage of AI in USAF Installation & Mission Support Operations

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force installation and mission support operations? (772 ESS)

  • Usage of AI in USAF Maintenance & Logistics

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force maintenance and logistics operations? (772 ESS)

  • Use of AI in Civilian Hiring Process

    Can AI be leveraged to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the civilian hiring process? (AFMISC/A1)

  • Utilization of Mobile Adware Identification for Tracking Individuals and Implications for Force Protection

    How can a comprehensive framework be developed to understand the applicability and dangers of mobile adware identification (MAI) to SOF personnel and operations, address the associated legal and policy considerations, and create effective countermeasures and informational campaigns?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

China

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • China's critical cyber vulnerabilities

    What are the critical cyber vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the CCP/PLA? What are critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Chinese military networks? (US Cyber Command)

  • China's Global Expansion

    How does China's global expansion impact the aerospace domain?  (CASI)

  • China's Soft Power/Economic Power Approaches

    Analysis of China's use of soft power, particularly its use of economic power. (CASI)

  • China's TTPs for cyber incidents

    What are CCP/PLA tactics, techniques, procedures, and standard operating procedures for military and civilian government responses to cyber incidents? How do CCP/PLA cyber teams cooperate with each other? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Air Defense

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Conventional Precision Strike

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - EW and Network Operations

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Non War Military Activities

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Space Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Support to Ground or Maritime Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Policies

    What are China's national-level policies that are directly related or partially overlap with the aerospace industry or domain? (CASI)

  • Chinese Civil-Military Relations

    What is the balance of civil-military relations in Chinese strategy? (OSD)

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese leadership tasking cyber-actors

    How does CCP/PLA senior leadership task the various cyber-actors: government and proxies? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Naval Capabilities

    Analysis of PRC's naval capabilities. (CASI)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Presence in Region

    How does the PRC and PLA view U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific region? (CASI)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historic PRC–Taiwan Provocation Cycle

    Provide a historic analysis of PRC military provocation toward Taiwan through the lens of politics (US administration, PRC leadership, TWN leadership), PRC military capabilities, US regional posture, economic context, and information environments. (PACAF)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Meteorological Challenges and Dependencies

    What are the meteorological challenges and dependencies that a PLA combined arms assault on Taiwan would face? (557 WW) 

  • PLA Morale

    What is the overall state of morale within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • PLA Political Work

    How does the PLA conduct political work? How does the PLA perceive political work contributing to force effectiveness? (CASI)

  • PLA's Acquisition System

    How effectively can the PLA's acquisition system translate requirements into delivered systems? (CASI)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • PRC's "Military Civil Fusion" strategy

    Analysis of PRC's "Military Civil Fusion" strategy. How does the MCF support PLA operations in aerospace domains? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

Logistics

Deterrence

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • AI & Nuclear Command and Control or Other Areas

    Examining the opportunities and risks of incorporating AI into nuclear command and control systems, focusing on maintaining safety, security, and strategic stability. If not in NC2 where  could AI be used to support the Nuclear Enterprise?

  • Are Nukes Still the Answer?

    Why should we still invest and employ nuclear weapons? No other country has shown the tangible will to utilize nuclear weapons. We all stay postured due to other countries Can we disarm to win? What would be the effect if the U.S. would be the first country to disarm?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Consolidating X1/X2/X3 into single career field

    Should X1/X2/X3 be consolidated into a single career field in order to gain efficiencies and generalization for missile maintenance technicians? (20 AF)

  • Conventional Conflict's Impact On The Air Leg Of The Triad

    What are the effects of prolonged conventional conflict on the nuclear air leg capabilities? How credible will that deterrent be after engaging in a prolonged conventional conflict? (AF/A10C)

  • Conventional-Nuclear Integration Capabilities of US Allies

    With US allies operating alongside of US forces, what is the CNI proficiency and capabilities of U.S. allies? How would cooperation on CNI with allies impact deterrence? (AF/A10)

     

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Deterrence in Era of Nuclear Proliferation

    How has increased nuclear proliferation affected the deterrence strategies and postures of the US and regional powers? (HAF A5SM)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Deterrence in Space

    What potential uses of the latest space technologies can serve as deterrence? (50 OSS)

  • Disruptive Technology's Effect On Deterrence

    What effect does disruptive technology such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing have on deterrence? (AF/A10C)

  • Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

    Is extended deterrence provided by tactical nuclear weapons worth the cost? (AF/A10)

  • Emerging Technology's Threat to Nuclear Assets

    What capabilities and intent do adversaries possess to utilize advanced technologies to hold AFGSC assets at increased risk? (AFGSC/A2)

  • EMP Effects on Nuclear Arsenal

    What are the effects of EMP on nuclear weapons? What can be done to mitigate risk? (20 AF)

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Threasholds

    Analyzing how hypersonic weapon development impacts nuclear deterrence calculations and potential escalation pathways.

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on Nuclear Deterrence

    Do losses in conventional weaponry during the invasion of Ukraine push Russia to be more likely to use nuclear weapons in the future? (8 AF)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impact on Deterrence by Emerging Technology

    What impact would the emergence and global diffusion of technologies with the potential dual-military ability to deliver strategic effects (e.g., biotechnology) have on the United States deterrence posture? (AF/A10)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Influence of Conventional Arms on Nuclear Deterrence

    How do advanced, long-range conventional weapons fit into the nuclear spectrum and what influence do they have on an adversary's willingness to escalate a conflict? (AFGSC/A2)

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • International Atomic Energy Agency & Nuclear Proliferation

    How has the International Atomic Energy Agency's focus and charter changed over the last 60 years? (AFTAC)

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Lessons Learned from the Cold War

    Deterrence Factors Ignored over the Last 35 Years

  • Logistic and Resupply Operations in a Chemical or Radiological Environment

    Is the Air Force prepared to continue critical logistics and re-supply operations despite the presence of a chemical or radiological hazard? What logistics strategies and guidance will enable the U.S. to achieve success in even the most austere environments available? (AF/A10S)

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Next-Generation Missile Operators

    Given the potential changes in the future strategic environment, what impact would this have on the development of missileers? Should current developmental programs remain the same for Sentinel operators? (20 AF)

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Prioritization

    From security to survivability, which should  the Air Force prioritize first, nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery platforms? 

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Nuclear Signaling and Miscalculation

    Examining effective communication strategies and mechanisms to avoid unintended escalation during crises involving nuclear-armed states.

  • Nuclear Sustainment: Minuteman III

    What institutional changes (sustainment) are needed to maintain Minuteman III to 2052?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • P5 Arms Control

    Could Washington leverage the P5 forum to open the aperture for strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China? (AF/A10)

  • Potential for Integrated Deterrence

    Why have strategic nuclear forces failed to deter some aspects of conventional aggression in the recent past? Would integrated deterrence architectures involving other capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, hypersonics, AI) better address concerns around theater-level conventional aggression? What would need to be included in future integrated deterrence strategies to deter conventional aggression? (AF/A10)

  • Prioritization of Requirements for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)

    With limited resources, what Air Force actions should be prioritized to ensure compliance with Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) while maintaining operational proficiency? (AF/A10P)

  • Priority of Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat

    What priority should a Hard and Deeply Buried Target (HDBT) defeat capability take within U.S. nuclear strategy? How important is it that U.S. nuclear forces continue to be able to deny adversary sanctuary and hold critical protected targets at risk for each of these countries? Is there any potential adversary that finds this capability either critically influential or irrelevant in their decision calculus? What role should an HDBT defeat capability play, if any, in U.S. employment strategy? (AF/A10C)

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Resourcing the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    AFGSC supports 3 of the four NDS Defense Priorities; however, is that reflected in how AFGSC is resourced (manning, money, etc.)? Comparing how MAJCOMs are resourced will determine how adequately the DAF has aligned weights of effort and resourcing with stated priorities and where there is room for improvement and rebalancing.

  • Rethinking No First Use

    Analyzing the potential benefits and drawbacks of adopting a "No First Use" policy in the context of evolving security threats and technological advancements.

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Road-Mobile ICBM system

    Does the US need to develop a road-mobile ICBM system as part of its nuclear arsenal? (8 AF)

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Views on Deterrence, Escalation Management & Conflict Termination

    What are the Russian views and theories of deterrence, escalation management, and conflict termination? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Size of Future Nuclear Force

    What does the nuclear force of the future need to look like in order to ensure deterrence holds in the current strategic environment? (AF/A10) 

  • Space Based Nuclear Deterrence

    Assessing the strategic implications and potential consequences of deploying nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems in space.

  • Tailored Integrated Deterrence in a Multipolar World

    Developing nuanced deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). D.I.M.E. model along with nuclear capabilities.

  • Technological Innovation & Integrated Deterrence

    How should the DOD and AF pursue and message technology innovation to support integrated deterrence in the NDS?  (AFNWC)

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • Trilateral Nuclear Arms

    What are the key elements of a possible trilateral nuclear arms control treaty that will maximize the value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enhance U.S. national security?

  • U.S. High Yield Weapon Strategy

    Should the U.S. have a requirement for a high-yield nuclear weapon (1 Megaton or 5 Megatons, or higher) beyond physical target damage requirements? (AF/A10C)

  • U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Posture and Effectiveness Without Nuclear Arms Control

    How might a U.S. withdrawal and renegotiation of nuclear-based treaties impact U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture against nuclear adversaries? How might this impact the U.S. extended deterrence strategy and force posture in support of allies? (AF/A10P)

  • Value of the IAEA in a New Era of Monitoring, Verification, and Nonproliferation

    Have the political decisions of the U.S. on JCPOA, and other partner nations' messaging on potential Iranian nuclearization marginalized or otherwise compromised the global value of the IAEA?  Can the IAEA reassert itself, independently as a global leader in safeguard development, and possibly further facilitate or engage in enforcement support actions where individual nations or coalitions may pursue 'sanction and reward' constructs to force nuclear proliferation reversal of non-NPT nations? 

    The IAEA has historically been regarded as one of the world's foremost leaders in assuring the safe use of nuclear power and energy.  What has changed in the last 60 years with regards to the organizations focus and charter?  Is the IAEA able to fully support the means necessary to assure a safe 21st century in light of increased conflict and new national aspirations to succeed as ancillary participants in an environment of great power competition?

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian concept for use of nuclear forces?

    What is the Russian concept for the use of nuclear forces? (Strategic and tactical) (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Why AF ICBM Maintenance Principles Are Not the Same as AF Aircraft Maintenance Principles

    The maintenance principles for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft differ significantly due to their vastly different operational environments, mission profiles, and lifespans. Applying aircraft maintenance principles to ICBMs, or vice-versa, would be ineffective and potentially dangerous.

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

  • World Economic Policies Impact on US Nuclear Deterrence

    What happens to US nuclear deterrence strategies if other countries abandon the US Dollar as their reserve currency? (AF/A10)

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

Industrial

Diplomacy

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Allied and Partner Assumptions in Concept Development

    How are allied and partner assumptions considered and managed in USAF and Joint concept development and experimentation? (AFWIC)

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Conventional-Nuclear Integration Capabilities of US Allies

    With US allies operating alongside of US forces, what is the CNI proficiency and capabilities of U.S. allies? How would cooperation on CNI with allies impact deterrence? (AF/A10)

     

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Cyber & Foreign Terrorist Organizations

    What are foreign terrorist organization (FTO) cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in FTO cyber operations? How do FTOs use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? What are the trends in FTO use of technology and social media platforms? (US Cyber Command)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historic Case Studies of US Allies Neglecting Treaty Obligations

    What are the historical examples (case studies) of where U.S. allies have not lived up to treaty obligations (and why)? (AFWIC)

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • International Atomic Energy Agency & Nuclear Proliferation

    How has the International Atomic Energy Agency's focus and charter changed over the last 60 years? (AFTAC)

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Iran-Russia Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Iran? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 - Coalition & Interagency Partners

    What does JADC2 mean for coalition and interagency partners? How can the Joint Force address the classification challenges of operations across domains with interagency partners and coalition partners?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Foreign Influence in Hegemonic Powers

    What variables measure decreasing and/or diminishing foreign influence in a hegemonic power? (AFWIC)

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Nuclear Signaling and Miscalculation

    Examining effective communication strategies and mechanisms to avoid unintended escalation during crises involving nuclear-armed states.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • P5 Arms Control

    Could Washington leverage the P5 forum to open the aperture for strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China? (AF/A10)

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russo-Turkish Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Turkey? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Special Operations Command South

    Within a global strategic competition, how can SOF compete for influence in South and Central America?  How can this command best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships in the region, and, in particular, what are indicators or warnings that US strategic influence might be challenged or losing ground to an adversary?  If we have lost ground, what are the best options for rebuilding influence?  How can we prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment?  What are the biggest threats emanating from adversarial influence in the region?  Can SOF mitigate the effects of adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Empathy in Intelligence Analysis

    How should we develop strategic empathy, the ability to identify with a competitor or adversary, to optimize analysis capability? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strategy and Security Cooperation

    What are effective strategies for using Security Cooperation as an instrument of statecraft to advance national defense and foreign policy priorities? 

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Undermatch

    How can SOF adapt its operational strategies and leverage non-technological competitive advantages to succeed in an environment where an adversary may have technological parity or superiority, thus challenging the traditional "American way of war"?

  • Testing Reliability of Allies and Partners

    How can the reliability of allies and partners be tested? (AFWIC)

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Posture and Effectiveness Without Nuclear Arms Control

    How might a U.S. withdrawal and renegotiation of nuclear-based treaties impact U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture against nuclear adversaries? How might this impact the U.S. extended deterrence strategy and force posture in support of allies? (AF/A10P)

  • U.S. Support to Peacekeeping Operations

    Should the US contribute logistical enablers like air mobility (fixed wing and rotary wing), engineering, line and short-haul motor transportation, medical, and signals communication to support United Nations Peacekeeping Operations? (SOUTHCOM)

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Alliance System and Multinational Air Operations

    How has the US alliance system shaped and influenced the conduct of multinational air operations, and how will this inform future multinational operations? (AFWIC)

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Value of the IAEA in a New Era of Monitoring, Verification, and Nonproliferation

    Have the political decisions of the U.S. on JCPOA, and other partner nations' messaging on potential Iranian nuclearization marginalized or otherwise compromised the global value of the IAEA?  Can the IAEA reassert itself, independently as a global leader in safeguard development, and possibly further facilitate or engage in enforcement support actions where individual nations or coalitions may pursue 'sanction and reward' constructs to force nuclear proliferation reversal of non-NPT nations? 

    The IAEA has historically been regarded as one of the world's foremost leaders in assuring the safe use of nuclear power and energy.  What has changed in the last 60 years with regards to the organizations focus and charter?  Is the IAEA able to fully support the means necessary to assure a safe 21st century in light of increased conflict and new national aspirations to succeed as ancillary participants in an environment of great power competition?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

Space

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Artificial Intelligence in Warplans

    What is the impact of artificial intelligence or intelligent automation in the development of real-time generated war plans? (HQ USSF/S59/ACT)

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Space Operations

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Creation of Space Force

    How does the Air Force transfer people, mission sets, R&D, and equipment to the Space Force?

  • Cyber Threat-Based Mission Assurance as a Service

    End-to-end cyber surety from penetration testing, fixing discovered vulnerabilities, and optimizing defensive cyber operations as one integrated entity and unit of action. What authorities, responsibilities, and resources would need to be realigned and where would that realignment best be suited? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber Threats Against Air Mobility Operations and Forces

    What are the cyber threats (and countermeasures) that are specific to AMC operations? (423 MTS)

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Deterrence in Space

    What potential uses of the latest space technologies can serve as deterrence? (50 OSS)

  • Develop Improved Assessments of Landing Weights

    Explore the effects on readiness and fiscal impact of excessive landing weight.  Mobility aircraft often land with excessive weight caused by carrying more fuel than required for the mission.  This topic seeks to understand the effects from a maintenance readiness perspective on short and long-term aircraft maintenance and sustainment, and how that relates to overall aircraft readiness and cost. (SAF/IEN)

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Emerging threats & TTPs of UAV/UAS against military installations

    What are examples of emerging threats of UAVs/UASs and TTPs of those groups that employ them? (423 MTS)

  • EMS/EW Awareness

    How does the Air Force re-instill a culture of EMS/EW awareness throughout the force? (ACC/A3/2/6K)

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Formation of the Space Force

    Analyze various elements of the formation of the Space Force. (HQ USSF/SEF & Museum Staff & 50 OSS)

  • Future of Air Mobility

    The future of Air Mobility with respect to Bypass Theory and the evolution of the Critical Path for Air Mobility. (AMC/CC)

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Global Mobility Airlift Positioning for Cargo Load Efficiency

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach. What are the additional benefits to increased fuel savings, increased cargo capacity, increased aircraft sustainment, increased mission readiness, and enhanced combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historical Studies for Space

    Analyze historical examples of space operations for potential use to contemporary operations.  (45 SW/MU & SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of Technological Advancements on Air Warfare

    How will current and future trends in military technology advancements impact air warfare? How will this evolution of air warfare impact the US's superiority in the air domain? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • In-Space Logistics

     

    Analysis of in-space logistics. (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • JADO - Space Force

     

    How do we integrate the Space Force into JADO?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Language Analysts in Cyber and Space Intelligence

    Can we develop analytic tradecraft and accesses for language analysts supporting cyber and space intelligence units, and develop specialized formal training courses for language analysis operating in the space and cyberspace domains? (480 ISRW)

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • Missions for the USSF

    What roles or responsibilities should the USSF have in asteroid detection and defense? (SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Novel Operating Environments

    Based on trends in the geostrategic environment, advances in technologies that allow SOF greater maneuver and capabilities in extreme environments, and the evolving role of the DOD as part of national security, what might SOF’s new roles and missions be, as part of the Joint Force, in novel operational environments? Such environments could include: the polar regions and approaches; areas of extreme heat and humidity too severe for normal human tolerance; the open ocean, to include all layers of the pelagic zone, the seabed, and resource exploitation platforms; and outer space, to include cislunar and lunar orbits. What might operations in these extreme environments look like? And what capabilities would be needed to sustain operations there? 

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Prioritization

    From security to survivability, which should  the Air Force prioritize first, nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery platforms? 

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational Energy in Space

    How can we design and operate spacecraft that have fewer constraints and can sustain operations in space over longer time periods and with more effectiveness? (SAF/IEN)

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Operations in Space

    Analyze various elements concerning the conduct of space operations. (SPOC/2SWS/DOC & 1 SOPS & USSF/45MSG) 

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Organizational Structure of Space Force

    What are the optimum organizational structures for the US Space Force and US Space Command? (USSF) How can Space Organizational Constructs evolve to facilitate enterprise responsiveness and standardization? (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Organizing & Training for Counter Small UAS Operations

    How should the AF organize and train appropriate operators and leaders (kinetic engagement authorities) to operate more complex C-sUAS/SHORAD-like capabilities in the future? (AFSFC/S3A)

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • Point-to-Point Cargo

    Evaluate alternatives for space-based cargo delivery, balancing mission needs with the storage/delivery cost in terms of energy resources and manpower.  What size cargo deliveries provide the most return on investment?  Should supplies be pre-staged on orbit or launch-on-demand.  

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Readiness Impacts of Traditional Aerospace Parts Manufacture on Aging Fleet

    Conduct analysis of manufacturing alternatives to current/traditional high upfront tooling and production costs for aircraft replacement parts. Research aerospace and non-aerospace manufacturing technology, companies, and processes that could provide a more cost-effective approach to developing adaptive, high-quality, and scalable production of replacement parts for the aging US Air Force fleet. Also explore additional benefits of various light weight material substitutions for part manufacturing that meet military standards, that could increase fuel savings based on weight reduction, and enhance overall mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.. The B-52 and KC-135 fleets date back to the late 1950s, the UH-1H Huey helicopter 1960s, and the C-5 was first fielded in the 1970s which are a few examples of airframes no longer in production, beyond their economic service life, but because they are still flying require replacement parts. Purchases of the new F-35, C-130J, and KC-46 airframes in recent years have only made a small dent in the average age of the Air Force’s fleet. (SAF/IEN)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Safeguarding AFCYBER's Critical Infrastructure

    Analyze NIST-evaluated PQC algorithms in an AFCYBER operational context, with an emphasis on critical digital infrastructure. (688 CW)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • SecAF's Operational Imperatives and CSAF's Future Operating Concept

    What is the impact of the new capabilities introduced in the OI's and new way of fighting in the Future Operating Concept? How will the USAF organizational structure adapt to support them? (HAF A5SM)

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Based Nuclear Deterrence

    Assessing the strategic implications and potential consequences of deploying nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems in space.

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Force Culture

    With the separation from the Air Force, the Space Force needs to establish its own identity and culture as a separate service branch. (ROPS, Museum Staff, 50 OSS & HQ USSF/SED) 

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Space Situational Awareness

    Analyze the future of space situational awareness, especially in the light of new technological advances. (SPOC/DOO & SPCO/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Space Policy

    Analyze various elements of US Space Policy (HQ USSF/SEK & HQ USSF/SEF & SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • US Statutory Constructs in Space/Space Guard

    How should the USSF leverage the total force construct in manning and executing its Title 10 mission? (USSF/NGB & JAO)

  • USAF Organizational Changes

    How should the USAF changes its organization to effectively adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

     

     

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • What is the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations?

    Analyze the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

ISR

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

Education

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Capitalizing on Non-Commissioned Officers' Advanced Degrees

    How can the SOF enterprise and its service components develop a process to effectively align the specialized skills, including graduate degrees, of noncommissioned officers with appropriate position roles to maximize their contributions?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese leadership tasking cyber-actors

    How does CCP/PLA senior leadership task the various cyber-actors: government and proxies? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • Civil Resistance in the Future Operating Environment

    How can the U.S. Government influence dissident population groups engaged in civil resistance in foreign countries? (JSOU)

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Continuous Learning and Adapting

    How can the SOF enterprise cultivate a culture and implement the necessary processes for continuous learning and adaptation at all echelons to remain effective in the evolving strategic environment?

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Management Systems for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    To better meet their unique requirements, Special Operations Forces should explore evolving their personnel systems to manage their own forces, rather than continuing to outsource this critical management function to the different service branches.

  • Cyber & Foreign Terrorist Organizations

    What are foreign terrorist organization (FTO) cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in FTO cyber operations? How do FTOs use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? What are the trends in FTO use of technology and social media platforms? (US Cyber Command)

  • Cybercrime

    What is the relationship between cybercriminal groups and state actors? Is there a command and control or tasking relationship? When do cybercrime and/or ransomware operations reach a threshold that constitutes a national security risk, not just a law enforcement matter? (US Cyber Command

     

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • DLOs on converging capabilities

    In what ways from both a conceptual and modeling/simulation standpoint can we start to include DLOs that exercise converging capabilities to effectively compete with our adversaries in the information environment? (16 AF)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • EiTaaS Tier 1 Maintenance Support

    How will 16 AF and the 688 CW conduct Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) Services for the Air Force Network-Unclassified (AFNET-U) when Tier 1 maintenance and operations for AFNET-U is contracted out to the private sector during the Enterprise to Infrastructure as a Service (EiTaaS)? (688 CW)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Government-Wide Data Sharing

    What are the current effective methods of data sharing across the various government agencies and how can these methods be improved? (AFTAC)

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Impact of Lawfare on Warfare

    How are legal strategies reshaping the traditional paradigms of warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Information Warfare Capabilities

    How should the AF and DoD organize themselves to optimize the development of Information Warfare capabilities? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Resilience and Resistance

    Resilience and resistance comprise psychological, physical, human, and material approaches to competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare. Such methods can include the transformation of infrastructure to support irregular activities, the hardening of or redundancy of institutions, and preparation of populations for conflict. For military planners struggling for numerical data to evaluate, the quantifiable effectiveness of asymmetric approaches to conflict can prove challenging. What are the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for SRR in an irregular or conventional threat? One method of evaluating a region or country is through analyses of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) metrics. Can PMESII-PT or other doctrinal analytical tools usefully measure the capabilities of a resistance movement or the resilience of a nation state? Are there lessons from the application of these analytical tools to counterinsurgency that could be applied to SRR? 

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Reflections in the Information Environment

    How do we accurately and meaningfully measure Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) in the Information Environment? How can we best measure the 'influence' of Information Warfare on an adversary actor? (616 OC) 

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Commercial Support of Cyber Operations

    How does Russia use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Civilian Workforce Optimization

    How can the SOF enterprise best optimize its use of the civilian workforce to be more efficient and lethal following multiple rounds of workforce cuts in 2025?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

  • Special Operations Command South

    Within a global strategic competition, how can SOF compete for influence in South and Central America?  How can this command best assess the quality and nature of allied and partner relationships in the region, and, in particular, what are indicators or warnings that US strategic influence might be challenged or losing ground to an adversary?  If we have lost ground, what are the best options for rebuilding influence?  How can we prevent or minimize adversarial entrenchment?  What are the biggest threats emanating from adversarial influence in the region?  Can SOF mitigate the effects of adversarial influence without directly competing against adversaries?

  • Strategic Empathy in Intelligence Analysis

    How should we develop strategic empathy, the ability to identify with a competitor or adversary, to optimize analysis capability? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strategy and Security Cooperation

    What are effective strategies for using Security Cooperation as an instrument of statecraft to advance national defense and foreign policy priorities? 

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Tailored Integrated Deterrence in a Multipolar World

    Developing nuanced deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). D.I.M.E. model along with nuclear capabilities.

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • Temporal Orientation and Strategic Considerations

    In The Politics and Science of Prevision: Governing and Probing the Future, Wenger, Jasper, and Cavelty (2020) state that modern “shifts in global economics and politics are in line with asynchronous shifts in the temporal thinking in Western and in Chinese politics.” The quote specifically references Chinese temporal orientation as distinct to the West, yet differences in perceptions of temporality exist across the world, as time plays a factor in worldview, outlook, decision-making processes, and in other cultural aspects. Where differences exist, they may create tensions between actors and impact relationships. These impacts may affect strategic interactions, and thus require deeper understanding.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Future of Learning in the Age of Quantum Information Science

    How can the SOF enterprise investigate the potential of quantum information science to revolutionize educational assessment, personalize learning pathways, and unlock new frontiers in human cognitive enhancement?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • U.S. Support to Peacekeeping Operations

    Should the US contribute logistical enablers like air mobility (fixed wing and rotary wing), engineering, line and short-haul motor transportation, medical, and signals communication to support United Nations Peacekeeping Operations? (SOUTHCOM)

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • US Approach to Strategic Partnerships

    What are strategies that can be used to enhance the Department's approach to strategic security, economic, and technology partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region?  

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilization of Mobile Adware Identification for Tracking Individuals and Implications for Force Protection

    How can a comprehensive framework be developed to understand the applicability and dangers of mobile adware identification (MAI) to SOF personnel and operations, address the associated legal and policy considerations, and create effective countermeasures and informational campaigns?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • World Economic Policies Impact on US Nuclear Deterrence

    What happens to US nuclear deterrence strategies if other countries abandon the US Dollar as their reserve currency? (AF/A10)

Russia

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Russia's Cyber TTPs

    What are Russia's security services cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)? What are the trends in Russian cyber actor TTPs? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Commercial Support of Cyber Operations

    How does Russia use commercial entities to enable cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • What is the Russian Way of War?

    Analyze the Russian way of war. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Policy Goals

    What are Russia's goals regarding NATO? The EU? (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Long-Term Strategy

    Does Moscow have a long-term strategy? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Regime Stability

    How does Putin protect the regime? How will Putin manage domestic threats to regime stability? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on Nuclear Deterrence

    Do losses in conventional weaponry during the invasion of Ukraine push Russia to be more likely to use nuclear weapons in the future? (8 AF)

  • Russian Businessmen

    What is the level of influence of prominent businessmen in Russia? How do they serve Putin's interests? Russia's interests? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Views on Cyber Operations

    What are Russia's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for conducting cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Russian Expeditionary Operations

    How and why does Russia execute expeditionary operations? Analyze Russian expeditionary operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • What is Russia's Theory of Competition?

    Analyze Russia's Theory of Competition. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • What Russian Defense Industry Initiatives Lead to Competitive Advantage?

    Analyze Russian defense industry initiatives. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • What is the Russian concept for use of nuclear forces?

    What is the Russian concept for the use of nuclear forces? (Strategic and tactical) (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM)) 

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Russian Domestic Stability's Impact on National Security Decision Making

    What impact does Russia's domestic security have on its national security decision-making? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Iran-Russia Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Iran? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Critical Vulnerabilities

    What are the systemic weaknesses of the Russian state? What are the critical vulnerabilities within its military's operations and systems, as well as logistics and sustainment? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russo-Turkish Relations

    What is Russia's relationship with Turkey? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with this relationship? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military Leadership

    What is the decision-making process of senior Russian military leaders? What is the Russian system of command and control? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

     

  • Russian Unconventional & Counter-Unconventional Warfare

    What are the Russian approaches and capabilities regarding unconventional and counter-unconventional warfare? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military Morale

    What is the morale of the Russian military? What is the role of Russian military leadership? What impacts its will to fight? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Military as an Operational/Strategic Learning Organization

    How does the Russian military function as an operational/strategic Learning Organization? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

     

  • Reconstitution of Russian Military

    How will the Russian military reconstitute itself in the future? What future threats does it pose? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Nuclear Issues in Strategic Competition

    The rise of strategic competition as the defining feature of the contemporary strategic environment has renewed the discussion of the threats posed by nuclear states. China, Russia, and North Korea are all nuclear powers, and Iran has aspirations in this area. Yet each of these states poses different nuclear weapons risks. Within its counterweapons of mass destruction mandate, how can SOF best understand and prepare against the most likely and most dangerous threats emanating from these disparate states? What could appropriate responses look like against a wide variety of nuclear threats?

  • How are Russia's military and security forces postured?

    Analyze the posture of Russia's military and security forces. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • What is the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations?

    Analyze the Russian concept of use for space and counter-space operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Views on Deterrence, Escalation Management & Conflict Termination

    What are the Russian views and theories of deterrence, escalation management, and conflict termination? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

JADO

  • ‘Integration’ in Combined Force

    What does ‘integration’ mean for a combined force? (AF Futures)

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • AFCENT MICAP Velocity

    As transportation priority and supply priority are not always the same for MICAPs, is there a possibility to connect the two into one overall priority? (87 LRS)

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Allied and Partner Assumptions in Concept Development

    How are allied and partner assumptions considered and managed in USAF and Joint concept development and experimentation? (AFWIC)

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence in Warplans

    What is the impact of artificial intelligence or intelligent automation in the development of real-time generated war plans? (HQ USSF/S59/ACT)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Assessing Civilian Vulnerabilities in Conflict

    How should SOF prepare to operate in conflicts where adversaries weaponize civilian resources like food and energy, requiring strategies to protect infrastructure, mitigate the use of refugees as weapons, and manage its own logistical footprint to avoid further draining local resources?

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Command Relationships in JADO

    What are the command relationship implications of JADO?

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Coordination and Collaboration

    The genesis of the great power competition has created an operational environment that demands a greater collaboration/ synthesis between SOF and the interagency to enable future SRR. Should the current SOF Liaison Network include specific training for SRR activities? How can the SOF Liaison Network to the interagency be more integrated and responsive to the collective threat across geographic commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)? Is the current global SOF network optimal and organized to support future SRR? What is the most appropriate global SOF network configuration to support SRR from an allied/U.S. Department of State perspective? What lessons can be drawn from the global war on terror about allied approaches that can be repurposed for SRR? Should the relationship with allies and partners be coordinated or institutionally integrated?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber Survivability of Air Force Weapon Systems

    How can we prioritize and streamline cyber survivability efforts for the Air Force and ultimately mitigate these threats as mandated by Congress through the Joint Staff and executed by Program Management Offices? (70 ISRW)

  • Cyber Threat-Based Mission Assurance as a Service

    End-to-end cyber surety from penetration testing, fixing discovered vulnerabilities, and optimizing defensive cyber operations as one integrated entity and unit of action. What authorities, responsibilities, and resources would need to be realigned and where would that realignment best be suited? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber Threats Against Air Mobility Operations and Forces

    What are the cyber threats (and countermeasures) that are specific to AMC operations? (423 MTS)

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Cyberspace Awareness/Operations Sensors

    Can we improve cyberspace awareness by improving the management of “operations” sensors and their ability to enhance the staff analytics supporting decision-making and execution? (CO-IPE (STRAT))

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Developing Cyberspace Infrastructure Terrain Subject Matter Expertise

    As the AF looks to defend static, adaptive, and expeditionary bases, does the USAF need in terms of developing cyberspace infrastructure terrain (POL, power, etc) subject matter expertise?  (ACC/A2)

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Disposition of Forces (DOF) Consolidation

    How do we optimize the dissemination, visualization, storage, and cataloging of battlespace characterization data and Disposition of Forces (DOF) production? (480 ISRG)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Establishing Flexible Logistics

    The CSAF is looking for “initiatives focused on more agile, resilient, and survivable energy logistics—from bulk strategic supplies to deliveries at the tactical edge.” 

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Mobility Airlift Positioning for Cargo Load Efficiency

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach. What are the additional benefits to increased fuel savings, increased cargo capacity, increased aircraft sustainment, increased mission readiness, and enhanced combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Government-Wide Data Sharing

    What are the current effective methods of data sharing across the various government agencies and how can these methods be improved? (AFTAC)

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historical Battle Networks

    Analyze battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike, including their evolution, effectiveness in previous conflicts. (HAF A5SM)

  • Historical C2 lessons for JADC2

    What historical C2 lessons are relevant for the JADC2 construct?

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Autonomous Systems on Multinational Air Operations

    How will the rise of autonomous systems affect multinational air operations? (AFWIC)

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Information - A Joint Function

    What are the Air Force implications for Information being designed as a joint function by the Chairman? Is the emerging service concept of information warfare distinct from information operations as defined by Joint Publication 1-2? If so, how? (ACC/A2)

  • In-Space Logistics

     

    Analysis of in-space logistics. (HQ USSF S36RL)

  • Integrated Deterrence

    Integrated deterrence is the alignment of the DOD’s “policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence— tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department,” in order to address competitors’ “holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion, malign behavior, and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundation of a stable and open international system.”5 Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions which need to be changed or created in order for SOF to be effective in integrated deterrence?

    Within the DOD, what is SOF’s role for global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? How can SOF best contribute to whole-of-government integrated deterrence efforts? How can integrated deterrence operations be tailored to different states and regions? Are there specific allies and partners in each region that should be the focus of integrated deterrence efforts? How can SOF prioritize which states to focus on within a regional integrated deterrence campaign? Might long-term irregular warfare campaigning contribute to integrated deterrence and optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?

    Where does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in nuclear deterrence? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals? 

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Intel Fusion

    Can we develop a repeatable process for developing cross-functional Analysis and Exploitation Teams that are capable of producing high-quality reports that meet Theater Joint Force Air Component Commander requirements within three months of initial team establishment? (480 ISRW)

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 - Coalition & Interagency Partners

    What does JADC2 mean for coalition and interagency partners? How can the Joint Force address the classification challenges of operations across domains with interagency partners and coalition partners?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • JADC2 Training/Education

    Should JADC2 become a career field in its own right, with specialized training and qualifications?

  • JADO - Centralization vs Decentralization

    What impact will JADO have for decentralized execution/tactical initiative? How does the USAF move from centralized command and decentralized execution? How can we go about pushing down authority and responsibility to the lowest level? (PACAF/CC)

  • JADO - Essential Information Requirements

    What are the essential information requirements for JADO? How does JADC2 overcome the problem of multiple incompatible networks that are used in contemporary C2?

  • JADO - Space Force

     

    How do we integrate the Space Force into JADO?

  • JADO Mission Orders

    What do mission-type orders look like in JADO?

  • Joint Cyber Command and Control (JCC2) integration into Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)

    What is the best strategy for Joint Cyber Command and Control (JCC2) integration into Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)? Explore and expound upon risk to mission/ forces, redundancy vs resiliency, and tools required. Determine resourcing requirements as a function of scale. (ACC/A5K)

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Language Proficiency for Cryptologic Language Analysts

    Can full-time Distance Learning (DL) be an effective foreign language acquisition training medium for Cryptologic Language Analysts (CLA) who have already demonstrated a strong record of proficiency in at least one DoD-trained foreign language? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Leadership in JADO

    For successful to JADO, how and when should a joint culture be inculcated into military leaders?

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistic and Resupply Operations in a Chemical or Radiological Environment

    Is the Air Force prepared to continue critical logistics and re-supply operations despite the presence of a chemical or radiological hazard? What logistics strategies and guidance will enable the U.S. to achieve success in even the most austere environments available? (AF/A10S)

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Manage, Training and Equipping for JADO

    How does the USAF manage, train and equip for JADO?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • National ROE in Mosaic Warfighting Concept

    How will a mosaic warfighting concept account for national ROE in a near-peer conflict? (AFWIC)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Novel Operating Environments

    Based on trends in the geostrategic environment, advances in technologies that allow SOF greater maneuver and capabilities in extreme environments, and the evolving role of the DOD as part of national security, what might SOF’s new roles and missions be, as part of the Joint Force, in novel operational environments? Such environments could include: the polar regions and approaches; areas of extreme heat and humidity too severe for normal human tolerance; the open ocean, to include all layers of the pelagic zone, the seabed, and resource exploitation platforms; and outer space, to include cislunar and lunar orbits. What might operations in these extreme environments look like? And what capabilities would be needed to sustain operations there? 

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational Assessment in the Information Environment

    Given the complexities of human behavior and decision-making, how should the joint force approach operational assessment in the information environment? How can the Air Force enable that approach through the application of new tradecraft, data science, behavioral analysis, and sensors? (16 AF)

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Organizing for Irregular Warfare

    Does the SOE require organizational changes to better carry out irregular warfare campaigns and operations? Are purpose-built SOF organizations and capabilities needed to successfully wage irregular warfare campaigns against adversaries? If most irregular warfare problems have at least some transregional element, and TSOCs have a regional focus, should the structure and focus of TSOCs be examined? Is there a need for additional TSOCs under U.S. Space Command or U.S. Cyber Command? Would it be helpful to create a transregionally focused irregular warfare headquarters? What would be the advantages and disadvantages to any restructuring of USSOCOM organizations? How do allies, partners, and adversaries conceptualize and organize for irregular warfare, and are there elements from other operations that USSOCOM could incorporate to be more effective?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Safeguarding AFCYBER's Critical Infrastructure

    Analyze NIST-evaluated PQC algorithms in an AFCYBER operational context, with an emphasis on critical digital infrastructure. (688 CW)

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Components and Joint Special Operations Command

    How might the SOF service components (Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command) and Joint Special Operations Command best optimize themselves for strategic competition and integrated deterrence mission sets? Is there a need for new Joint Force training and exercises to determine or develop best practices for the integration of SOF and SOF enablers across services to best support mission requirements? What are the mission-critical capabilities for strategic competition and integrated deterrence within each SOF service component? Given each SOF service component’s unique capabilities, how might they best utilize new technologies? Do any of these capabilities require adjustments for optimal effectiveness in the current strategic environment? Are there requirements for new SOF capabilities that do not currently exist? If so, which SOF service component is best suited to meet each new requirement, and why?  

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Repetitive Assignments

    While the service personnel commands may view repetitive assignments in the same combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) negatively as they are not broadening, geographic combatant commands and TSOCs may view such repetitive assignments in the same combatant command AOR as beneficial due to increased experience within the operational environment. How can these opposing views be reconciled to achieve the objectives of the services, the combatant commands, and the personal goals of service members? What changes to the personnel system of each service would do the most to improve SOF relations with partners in each combatant command AOR?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF’s Relationship with Space and Cyber

    What is the role of special operations in the cyber and space domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum? How can SOF best work with space and cyber forces and capabilities within the DOD? What cyber and space capabilities are best suited for collaboration with SOF? What would supported and supporting relationships look like? Within SOF, is there a need to redefine what an ‘operator’ is in terms of space or cyber talent? How might SOF build relationships with patriotic civilian talent? 

    How can the SOE determine the degree of vulnerability of deployed SOF elements to adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threats? How can adversary electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyberspace threat activity against deployed SOF be best illuminated? 

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Support to Resistance and Resilience Approaches to Preventing or Deterring Aggression

    SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?

    How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts? 

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • Trust in Non-US Autonomous Systems

    How do we ensure sufficient trust in non-US autonomous systems to support multinational human-machine teaming? (AF Futures)

  • US Alliance System and Multinational Air Operations

    How has the US alliance system shaped and influenced the conduct of multinational air operations, and how will this inform future multinational operations? (AFWIC)

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Warfighting Domains in JADO

    What are the critical inter-dependencies that must be defended and exploited between the domains?

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

Leadership

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Artificial Intelligence-Powered Adaptive Learning Systems

    How can SOF best develop and apply AI algorithms, through tools like personalized tutors and adaptive learning platforms, to improve individual performance and reduce learning gaps in education and training?

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Capitalizing on Non-Commissioned Officers' Advanced Degrees

    How can the SOF enterprise and its service components develop a process to effectively align the specialized skills, including graduate degrees, of noncommissioned officers with appropriate position roles to maximize their contributions?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Civilian Cyber Auxiliary - Civil Cyber Patrol?

    In light of the national shortage of cyber talent, how might the Air Force develop and utilize a Civil Cyber Patrol and/or a Civil Information Warfare Patrol to best protect U.S. national interests? What legal, operational, and technical challenges must ACC address to make a civilian cyber auxiliary a reality? (ACC/A3/2/6K)

  • Command Relationships in JADO

    What are the command relationship implications of JADO?

  • Continuity in Warfare

    What are the valuable insights from the timeless principles of warfare? How do they continue to inform contemporary practices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Continuous Learning and Adapting

    How can the SOF enterprise cultivate a culture and implement the necessary processes for continuous learning and adaptation at all echelons to remain effective in the evolving strategic environment?

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Management Systems for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    To better meet their unique requirements, Special Operations Forces should explore evolving their personnel systems to manage their own forces, rather than continuing to outsource this critical management function to the different service branches.

  • Cutting-Edge Personnel Management for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    How can USASOC optimize its personnel management systems to better recruit, retain, and develop highly skilled SOF professionals by adapting cutting-edge private-sector talent management practices, all while balancing SOF's unique cultural and operational requirements with the larger Army's standardized personnel systems?

  • Cyber Personnel Retention

    What the USAF could do better to entice, develop, and maintain long-term careers in cyber to better ensure hard-earned experience and talent is passed onto future generations of cyberwarfare Airmen?  (ACC/A3/2/6KO)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Developing and Modeling Strategic Patience

    It is sometimes more prudent to exercise patience and pursue a long-term strategy instead of rushing into immediate action or resorting to aggressive measures. Strategic patience can also involve a willingness to wait for favorable circumstances or changes in the geopolitical landscape before taking decisive action. The underlying idea is that a country can achieve better outcomes by exercising patience, avoiding unnecessary risks, and creating conditions that favor long-term stability and progress. How can ongoing SOF training and development programs reinforce an understanding and application of strategic patience? Are there case studies where the application of strategic patience by SOF has yielded significant results or helped to achieve broader national outcomes? Can these case studies provide insight into how strategic patience was successfully implemented by SOF? What historical or cultural factors have influenced the understanding of strategic patience across countries, and how does this shape each country’s approach to the use of SOF? 

  • Digital Twin Technology for Skill Acquisition and Training

    How can research explore the effectiveness of using digital twin technology for training SOF functions and support efforts by examining instructional design, user strategies, and the impact on skill transfer and performance improvement?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Forecasting Unintended Consequences

    Given the current focus on strategic competition and competitive statecraft, SOF’s operations around the globe have an important role to play. However, activities in one country or on one continent may have far-reaching effects in neighboring countries or across the globe. The scale of potential effects provides both opportunities and risks. How can SOF better understand the unintended consequences of its activities around the globe? What are the risks for escalation? Can cross-regional planning be used to help mitigate risks? How can the SOE better communicate with policymakers to address issues of strategic risk and risk aversion? How can risk be characterized in terms of probability, assessment, measurement, identification, and mitigation? 

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historical Battle Networks

    Analyze battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike, including their evolution, effectiveness in previous conflicts. (HAF A5SM)

  • Historical C2 lessons for JADC2

    What historical C2 lessons are relevant for the JADC2 construct?

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Historical Uses of Information in War

    What are the long-term trends in the role and value of information in warfare? How has it shaped conflicts historically? (HAF A5SM)

  • How Do We Make Intelligence Support to Operations More Efficient?

    In the context of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), What strategies and modifications can be implemented in the Combat Information Network (CIN) and Mission Planning Team (MPT) workflows to increase efficiency, resilience, agility, and decrease waste in intelligence support operations? Is there a simplified workflow that maintains situational awareness and operational alignment with reduced personnel and meeting frequency? What is the minimum viable intelligence support team?

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Information - A Joint Function

    What are the Air Force implications for Information being designed as a joint function by the Chairman? Is the emerging service concept of information warfare distinct from information operations as defined by Joint Publication 1-2? If so, how? (ACC/A2)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • Interoperability, Interdependence, and Integration in Combined Operations with Allies and Partners

    What is the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners? Analyze the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners. (AF Futures)

  • Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Technology

    Intelligence has a role to play in the identification of emerging technologies and assessment of how they may be used by adversaries. Within the SOE, how can collaboration be encouraged between the intelligence practitioners and the technological specialists? How can SOF best couple bottom-up-driven intelligence and technology solutions with top-down-driven research and acquisition programs? While the technologies are different, the problems of collaboration between two different communities during historical periods of technological disruption may offer ideas to inform current efforts in these areas. Can SOF use case studies of the past emergence of disruptive technologies to transform for the future? How can SOF intelligence exploit technology while maintaining a healthy skepticism of its promises?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Leadership in Combat Wings

    How can USAF officers be developed to lead in the new Combat Wing formation? (AFMISC/A3) 

  • Leadership in JADO

    For successful to JADO, how and when should a joint culture be inculcated into military leaders?

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Building a Security Cooperation Profession

    Building a professional security cooperation workforce requires overcoming challenges in defining expertise and creating career paths, while shifting the culture from task-oriented compliance to one that values strategic outcomes, critical thinking, and collaboration.

  • Measuring LLM Compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards

    How can the compliance of large language models (LLMs) with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203's analytic tradecraft standards of objectivity, independence of political consideration, and traceability to underlying sources be verified when LLMs are used for intelligence purposes? Can we ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated intelligence summaries?

  • Measuring Resilience and Resistance

    Resilience and resistance comprise psychological, physical, human, and material approaches to competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare. Such methods can include the transformation of infrastructure to support irregular activities, the hardening of or redundancy of institutions, and preparation of populations for conflict. For military planners struggling for numerical data to evaluate, the quantifiable effectiveness of asymmetric approaches to conflict can prove challenging. What are the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for SRR in an irregular or conventional threat? One method of evaluating a region or country is through analyses of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) metrics. Can PMESII-PT or other doctrinal analytical tools usefully measure the capabilities of a resistance movement or the resilience of a nation state? Are there lessons from the application of these analytical tools to counterinsurgency that could be applied to SRR? 

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • Multi-level Security for Mobile Platforms versus Static Ground-Based Systems

    With EMSO and IO intertwining with almost every DOD mobile asset, the sharing of data aggregated from systems of different levels of security is becoming more of a requirement for any operation. The ability for data of lower classification to flow from systems of higher classification (i.e., advanced sensors) to another system/platform (that meets the classification of the data) has yet to be developed. Is MLS capability feasible for mobile platforms in the near future let alone static ground-based systems? Additionally, what are the different considerations for mobile platforms (i.e., aircraft, UxS, Ships) that must be taken into account versus static ground-based systems? Finally, what are the best practices to solve this problem (AI/ML, contextual analysis, etc)? 

     

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Optimization of Cargo Processing and Load Planning

    Explore the impact of precision cargo processing (weight, dimensions, shape) on cargo load planning and mobility mission planning.  Using modeling and simulation, analyze how precision processing and more accurate cargo load planning impacts mission planning, (to include fuel planning and routing), mobility ground times during contingency movements, and mobility routing optimization to increase peacetime efficiency and enhance overall combat capability. (SAF/IEN)

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Organizing for Irregular Warfare

    Does the SOE require organizational changes to better carry out irregular warfare campaigns and operations? Are purpose-built SOF organizations and capabilities needed to successfully wage irregular warfare campaigns against adversaries? If most irregular warfare problems have at least some transregional element, and TSOCs have a regional focus, should the structure and focus of TSOCs be examined? Is there a need for additional TSOCs under U.S. Space Command or U.S. Cyber Command? Would it be helpful to create a transregionally focused irregular warfare headquarters? What would be the advantages and disadvantages to any restructuring of USSOCOM organizations? How do allies, partners, and adversaries conceptualize and organize for irregular warfare, and are there elements from other operations that USSOCOM could incorporate to be more effective?

     

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • Planning for the Unexpected

    How might we more effectively plan for unexpected, or “black swan” events, that might negatively affect critical military operations? (480 ISRW)

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Psychological and Cognitive Conditioning for High-Stress, Multi-Domain Scenarios

    To ensure Special Operations Forces can effectively operate in high-stress, multi-domain scenarios, it is critical to optimize training programs to address psychological readiness and cognitive conditioning while integrating ongoing mental health support.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Recruitment, Training and Education for Supporting/Advising Resistance

    While resistance and resilience tend to be discussed in terms of the people resisting, or the state or population within which resilience is being built, this topic calls for a shift in focus toward the forces offering support for resistance and/or resilience. Those forces might be U.S. conventional/traditional, SOF, or partner forces. It is widely understood that a diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and experience are relevant to the area of resistance and resilience. How can the United States government (USG) ensure those diverse perspectives are captured in recruitment, training, and education efforts? What impact might a resilience and resistance focus have on recruiting efforts? How can the DOD ensure that those recruited to the Joint Force understand the nature of activities associated with resistance and resilience and the differences with more kinetic-oriented, conventional military activities? What is the existing state of education and training efforts on resistance and resilience, and where are there gaps or untapped potential? How do we instill a counterintelligence mindset in a populace to deny foreign intelligence entity collection and exploitation, especially since intelligence operations can either advance or undermine resistance and resilience?

    Within the USG, to what degree is there a common understanding of the nature of support to resistance and resilience, and what education and training might be necessary internally to develop or augment that understanding across not just the services, but the wider interagency? How can we mesh training and education in this area to optimize outcomes? Which organizations should take the lead facilitating that training and education, and why? Is there value in a special-skill identifier for resilience and resistance expertise? Are there generalizable principles, or best practices, in education for resilience and resistance which partners can agree upon? What doctrinal efforts can build upon the Resistance Operating Concept for common practices? What is SOF’s role in a civil defense campaign?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Security Cooperation: Resourcing and Workforce Planning

    What approaches work best to plan and resource multi-year Security Cooperation strategies, bridge gaps, and deliver a professional, diversified, and right-sized Security Cooperation workforce?  

  • Serial-Based Defensive Cyberspace Operations

    How can a defensive cyber operator effectively identify malicious cyber activity occurring on serial networks? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Civilian Workforce Optimization

    How can the SOF enterprise best optimize its use of the civilian workforce to be more efficient and lethal following multiple rounds of workforce cuts in 2025?

  • SOF Cognition

    Cognition is “the states and processes involved in knowing, which in their completeness include perception and judgment. Cognition includes all conscious and unconscious processes by which knowledge is accumulated, such as perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, and reasoning.” How can the SOE and SOF identify and address aspects of cognition that affect both their personnel and their organization? 

    At the individual level, how can we measure and build SOF resilience? Can we better understand the mental processes that lead to posttraumatic stress and suicidality as well as post-traumatic growth? Might research into cognition provide insights for POTFF programs? At the organizational level, how do we support cognitive decisionmaking on teams and across the SOE? What role does cognition play in terms of the assessment of risk? How can the SOE work to encourage and incorporate divergent and creative thinking within SOF? What might the benefits be of incorporating creative problemsolving? What are the risks of such encouragement, and how can those risks be mitigated?

  • SOF Educational Foci

    Formal education programs for SOF practitioners are available at several different military educational institutions. There are service-specific schools as well as joint educational opportunities. Is current education and training adequate to prepare for strategic competition? Is the content, type, and timing of education appropriate to meet the requirements of SOF? What does ‘SOFpeculiar education’ encompass? Should there be a SOF intake course before component training? What are the critical skills for a joint SOF officer? How do the educational touchpoints for SOF officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) support or affect their careers? How can the SOE best develop and nurture creative thinkers within a hierarchical/rules-based organization? How do we educate SOF professionals about evolving national strategies, policies, and mandates and the impacts these changes have on SOF operations?

    JSOU is unique among military educational institutions, as it is the only one that reports directly to USSOCOM. Where should JSOU’s focus be? Should JSOU be educating SOF practitioners and SOE personnel, nurturing critical and creative thinking, or developing SOF advocates? Should JSOU become a service-like school?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Repetitive Assignments

    While the service personnel commands may view repetitive assignments in the same combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) negatively as they are not broadening, geographic combatant commands and TSOCs may view such repetitive assignments in the same combatant command AOR as beneficial due to increased experience within the operational environment. How can these opposing views be reconciled to achieve the objectives of the services, the combatant commands, and the personal goals of service members? What changes to the personnel system of each service would do the most to improve SOF relations with partners in each combatant command AOR?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Talent Management

    While talent management remains an enduring priority for SOF, the contemporary environment offers unique issues that the SOE must address. The end of the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of strategic competition mean that SOF may need to reprioritize its missions and capabilities. Are there operational and organizational paradigms that need to be reconsidered to better develop SOF for the challenges of the future operating environment? Who is the current SOF practitioner and how did that practitioner evolve? What are the key attributes of the future SOF professional, and do they differ from the key attributes from historical SOF professionals? If SOF must operate within an environment of strategic competition, how can they be encouraged to cultivate ‘strategic interest’ or ‘strategic empathy’ in the world early in their career progression? How does the DOD culture and system affect the individual and the individual’s ability to operate in the strategic environment? What enhancements in competency, cognition, performance, and total health could enable SOF to better navigate the changing human and technology landscapes within the current operational environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force & the "Warfighting" mindset

    How does the Space Force develop a "warfighting" mindset? Does the Space Force need a "warfighting" mindset?

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Force Culture

    With the separation from the Air Force, the Space Force needs to establish its own identity and culture as a separate service branch. (ROPS, Museum Staff, 50 OSS & HQ USSF/SED) 

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Strategic Blind Spots in Modern Conflict

    Are there useful methods of blind spot analysis that could be utilized to uncover obsolete, incomplete, or incorrect assumptions? What role do historical case studies play in overcoming blind spots? How can the study of lessons learned from recent operations provide valuable insights to help the DoD avoid these pitfalls? (JSOU)

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Strategic Leadership

    What role do strategic leaders play in effectively managing changes in the character of war? How do leadership practices need to adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

  • Strategic Patience and Campaigning

    SRR poses particular challenges in the context of metrics of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in strategic competition. How do you win an ongoing competition? Winning might look like sustaining the status quo or gaining amorphous, incremental ‘wins’ in terms of resilience, influence, or trust, but the desirability of clearly identifiable quick wins and avoiding any perceived loss are powerful motivators for short-term thinking. How can SOF inculcate a culture that recognizes incremental progress and encourages consideration of metrics of success beyond one operation cycle or stint in a leadership role? 

    Are strategic competition and SRR necessarily a zero-sum game where there are winners and losers? What role can and should ‘strategic patience’ play in SRR? Are there historical examples that might help our understanding of competition and SRR over the longer term? Would a campaigning perspective on resistance and resilience aid in longer-term thinking? How can SOF ensure that realistic timelines for success are shared with partners and allies? Are there examples of benchmarks for resistance and resilience that might serve to increase understanding of SRR? How might those benchmarks be developed and reassessed over time via a campaign? The Russian war in Ukraine has shown external support takes time. 

    How did Ukraine build that support and sustain it over time? What lessons for winning and losing (in the context of SRR) might be derived from the Ukrainian experience for the United States, its allies, partners, and adversaries?

  • Strategic Sabotage

    How can SOF, in coordination with interagency and foreign partners, effectively conduct non-attributable, time-sensitive strategic sabotage to proactively impose costs and shape adversary decision-making below the threshold of armed conflict, all while operating within legal and ethical frameworks?

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • Successful Resistance Movements

    By analyzing the political-military parameters and governmental approaches that determine success and failure in conflicts against resistance movements, what are the most effective strategies for countering both armed and nonviolent resistance?

  • Sustainability of the Force

    During the past two decades, SOF have conducted innumerable counterterrorism and direct-action activities around the world in places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The taxing operational tempo and unforgiving dwell time of operational units resulted in former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven standing up the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative to ensure readiness, longevity, and performance of SOF and to strengthen family readiness. How effectively has POTFF addressed the needs of special operations personnel during the long wars? Has the new challenge of strategic competition changed how USSOCOM should approach sustainability of the force? What are the greatest challenges today for retention of quality people and the approach required to maintain their efforts? Does support to resilience and resistance undertakings pose unique challenges for sustaining special operations personnel both today and tomorrow? What is the optimal balance for dwell time in support to SRR? Does SRR pose distinctive ethical dilemmas for personnel that need to be addressed? How does the SOE secure its own resilience against external forces and factors?

    What is the long-term impact of the current defense drawdowns on the future SRR force structure? Are conventional forces prepared and integrated into organizational design for SRR? Should SRR comprise a U.S. Army Special Operations approach, or should it include the other special operations service components? What does the SRR organizational structure look like at the tactical, operational, and strategic level? Which metrics should be utilized to analyze SRR force structure?

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Temporal Orientation and Strategic Considerations

    In The Politics and Science of Prevision: Governing and Probing the Future, Wenger, Jasper, and Cavelty (2020) state that modern “shifts in global economics and politics are in line with asynchronous shifts in the temporal thinking in Western and in Chinese politics.” The quote specifically references Chinese temporal orientation as distinct to the West, yet differences in perceptions of temporality exist across the world, as time plays a factor in worldview, outlook, decision-making processes, and in other cultural aspects. Where differences exist, they may create tensions between actors and impact relationships. These impacts may affect strategic interactions, and thus require deeper understanding.

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • Understanding the Will to Resist

    Support to Resistance and Resilience (SRR) is focused on people— both for the populations who are building resilience and resistance skills, and on the SOF professionals who advise and assist those populations. Understanding, defining, and measuring the will to resist is a complex topic. What is the relationship between the people and their will to resist? What is SOF’s role in shaping the will to resist? Is there a difference between will to win and will to fight? Should capturing a willingness to resist be focused on the group or individual level? How can you measure a given group or individual’s will to resist, especially when that will is likely to vary over time? If we can better measure will to resist, might that inform where the next resistance movement will be likely to occur? 

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • USAF Organizational Changes

    How should the USAF changes its organization to effectively adapt to the changing character of war? (HAF A5SM)

     

     

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Virtual Reality-Based Embodied Cognition Training

    How can research investigate the effectiveness of VR-based simulations for enhancing embodied cognition to develop spatial reasoning, problem-solving skills, and creativity within SOF?

  • War Termination Processes and Prospects

    Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.

  • Wargaming for Competitive Statecraft

    To improve integration with interagency and academic partners, Special Operations Forces should consider broadening their terminology for operational exercises like "wargaming" to be more inclusive of the different terms and cultures of these partners.

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Why ICBM Combined Maintenance Facilities Should Not Be Designed to the Same Standard as Aircraft Combined Maintenance Facilities

    Given the distinct nature of the systems they support, why would designing ICBM maintenance facilities to aircraft maintenance standards be inefficient, costly, and potentially compromise the safety and security of nuclear assets?

Nuclear

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • AI & Nuclear Command and Control or Other Areas

    Examining the opportunities and risks of incorporating AI into nuclear command and control systems, focusing on maintaining safety, security, and strategic stability. If not in NC2 where  could AI be used to support the Nuclear Enterprise?

  • Are Nukes Still the Answer?

    Why should we still invest and employ nuclear weapons? No other country has shown the tangible will to utilize nuclear weapons. We all stay postured due to other countries Can we disarm to win? What would be the effect if the U.S. would be the first country to disarm?

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • CNI--How to Integrate Conventional and Nuclear Munition on American Bomber and Fighter Aircraft

    Current US policy restricts the military from loading conventional and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft.  This old cold war practice does not fit into the modern warfare paradigm. 

  • Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Stability

    Evaluating the vulnerabilities and resilience of nuclear command, control, and communication systems to cyberattacks and their potential to escalate to nuclear conflict.

  • Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Threasholds

    Analyzing how hypersonic weapon development impacts nuclear deterrence calculations and potential escalation pathways.

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • Influence of Operational Tempo on Nuclear Deterrence

    AI, multi-domain C3BM, and non-kinetic weapons (especially effects at a distance) are allowing an increase in the tempo of decision making and operational tempo. How will the speed of conflict and decision making influence decisions to use nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?  

     

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • Lessons Learned from the Cold War

    Deterrence Factors Ignored over the Last 35 Years

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Education

    How do we better educate the Defense Enterprise, at all levels, on the nuclear requirements process, from AFI 63-125 certification requirements to USSTRATCOM OPLAN requirements and required platform capability? How should the Air Force and DoD educate Air Force General Officers on the Nuclear Enterprise, from OPLAN requirements, to mission sets, stockpile management, and generation activities?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Prioritization

    From security to survivability, which should  the Air Force prioritize first, nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery platforms? 

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Signaling and Miscalculation

    Examining effective communication strategies and mechanisms to avoid unintended escalation during crises involving nuclear-armed states.

  • Nuclear Sustainment: Minuteman III

    What institutional changes (sustainment) are needed to maintain Minuteman III to 2052?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Resourcing the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    AFGSC supports 3 of the four NDS Defense Priorities; however, is that reflected in how AFGSC is resourced (manning, money, etc.)? Comparing how MAJCOMs are resourced will determine how adequately the DAF has aligned weights of effort and resourcing with stated priorities and where there is room for improvement and rebalancing.

  • Rethinking No First Use

    Analyzing the potential benefits and drawbacks of adopting a "No First Use" policy in the context of evolving security threats and technological advancements.

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Campaigning

    What approaches to active campaigning and burden sharing enable improved access and influence with partners for effective deterrence? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Should NATO/US Reposition or Add Nuclear Weapons to Poland to Improve Deterrence Position?

    Poland has signalled that they are willing to host nuclear weapons if requested to do so by NATO, but is there any advantage to be gained by doing so? What military/political tactical/strategic implications would there be to having nuclear weapons closer to Belarus/Kaliningrad/Russia?

  • Space Based Nuclear Deterrence

    Assessing the strategic implications and potential consequences of deploying nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems in space.

  • Tailored Integrated Deterrence in a Multipolar World

    Developing nuanced deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran). D.I.M.E. model along with nuclear capabilities.

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • Value of the IAEA in a New Era of Monitoring, Verification, and Nonproliferation

    Have the political decisions of the U.S. on JCPOA, and other partner nations' messaging on potential Iranian nuclearization marginalized or otherwise compromised the global value of the IAEA?  Can the IAEA reassert itself, independently as a global leader in safeguard development, and possibly further facilitate or engage in enforcement support actions where individual nations or coalitions may pursue 'sanction and reward' constructs to force nuclear proliferation reversal of non-NPT nations? 

    The IAEA has historically been regarded as one of the world's foremost leaders in assuring the safe use of nuclear power and energy.  What has changed in the last 60 years with regards to the organizations focus and charter?  Is the IAEA able to fully support the means necessary to assure a safe 21st century in light of increased conflict and new national aspirations to succeed as ancillary participants in an environment of great power competition?

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • Why AF ICBM Maintenance Principles Are Not the Same as AF Aircraft Maintenance Principles

    The maintenance principles for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft differ significantly due to their vastly different operational environments, mission profiles, and lifespans. Applying aircraft maintenance principles to ICBMs, or vice-versa, would be ineffective and potentially dangerous.

Strategic Competition

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Air Mobility in a Kinetic/Contested Environment with China

    How should Air Mobility plan to operate effectively in a kinetic and contested environment with China, considering the potential impacts on its capabilities?

  • Are Nukes Still the Answer?

    Why should we still invest and employ nuclear weapons? No other country has shown the tangible will to utilize nuclear weapons. We all stay postured due to other countries Can we disarm to win? What would be the effect if the U.S. would be the first country to disarm?

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Battlefield Airman for Duty in the Pacific AOR

    Better Trained and Equipped Battlefield Airman (TACP, CCT, etc.) for Duty in the Pacific AOR (PACAF/A9L)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • China vs. India at the Line of Actual Control: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

    What are the geostrategic, political, and military implications of the continued standoff between China and India, and what lessons can be learned from the PRC's handling of the situation through its integrated use of military actions, media communications, and diplomacy?

  • China's Soft Power/Economic Power Approaches

    Analysis of China's use of soft power, particularly its use of economic power. (CASI)

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - Nuclear Missions

    How have changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

     

  • Chinese Economic Ties to India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How is China imposing costs on India, South Korea, Japan & Australia? How could their economic ties to China limit their economic choices? (HAF A5SM)

  • Chinese Propaganda

    What is the Communist Party / Peoples' Liberation Army (CCP/PLA's) propaganda apparatus structure, strategy, and capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Use of Resistance Groups

    By analyzing the PRC's historical support for resistance movements and the current influence operations of the CCP United Front, how can a strategy be developed to counter China's potential future sponsorship of dissident organizations as its elite capture strategies become less effective?

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Operations

    How does the People's Republic of China view U.S. military operations, and what lessons does it learn from them for its own strategic and operational development?

  • Chinese Views of U.S. Presence in Region

    How does the PRC and PLA view U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific region? (CASI)

  • Civil Resistance in the Future Operating Environment

    How can the U.S. Government influence dissident population groups engaged in civil resistance in foreign countries? (JSOU)

  • Coalition Partners in Space

    How can partner nations contribute to and participate in US-led developmental and operational efforts in the space domain? (SPOC/DOO & USSF/S36TG & HQ USSF/SEK) 

  • Conflict Dynamics in Proliferated Environments

    How have the dynamics of conflict changed in regions where nuclear proliferation has already occurred? (HAF A5SM)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crisis Response Preparedness and Security Cooperation

    How is Security Cooperation enabling preparedness for crisis and disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and emerging transboundary challenges? 

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Cyber's Impact on Risk Mitigation and Integrated Deterrence

    How might offensive and defensive cyber capabilities be implemented into existing or new risk mitigation frameworks (e.g. arms control treaties and agreements) in order to manage strategic stability? (AF/A10)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Decision Timelines

    With the advent of modern strategic weapons, does current planning and decision timelines still hold true, or do the US Strategic Forces need to rethink, and adapt to the newest strategic threats? (8 AF)

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber capabilities

    What is the comprehensive structure of DPRK's cyber enterprise, including its tool development process, internal and external operational coordination, and the locations, numbers, and organization of its actors?

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Dependence of United States Air Force on its Allies and Partners

    In what ways is the United States Air Force dependent on its allies and partners for operational effectiveness? (AF Futures)

  • Deterrence in Era of Nuclear Proliferation

    How has increased nuclear proliferation affected the deterrence strategies and postures of the US and regional powers? (HAF A5SM)

  • Deterrence in Post-Missile Age

    In a hypothetical scenario that Sentinel would be the country's last ICBM, what would US strategic deterrence look like in a post-ICBM age? (20 AF)

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • DLOs on converging capabilities

    In what ways from both a conceptual and modeling/simulation standpoint can we start to include DLOs that exercise converging capabilities to effectively compete with our adversaries in the information environment? (16 AF)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Effectively Assessing OAI Impacts to PRC behavior

    PACAF requires analysis to help develop methodologies to accurately, succinctly, and effectively capture the cumulative impacts of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI) over time on PRC perceptions and behaviors and PACAF desired objectives. (PACAF/A303)

     

  • Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

    Is extended deterrence provided by tactical nuclear weapons worth the cost? (AF/A10)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Foreign Operating Concepts in Air Warfare

    How are nation-state and non-nation-state objectives and their associated operating concepts influencing the changing dynamics of air warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Great Power Competition in Africa

    Explain the advantages and disadvantages Great Powers have garnered from their involvement in Africa in the past and how their actions compare to Russian and Chinese involvement today. (J2) 

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Historic Case Studies of US Allies Neglecting Treaty Obligations

    What are the historical examples (case studies) of where U.S. allies have not lived up to treaty obligations (and why)? (AFWIC)

  • Historic PRC–Taiwan Provocation Cycle

    Provide a historic analysis of PRC military provocation toward Taiwan through the lens of politics (US administration, PRC leadership, TWN leadership), PRC military capabilities, US regional posture, economic context, and information environments. (PACAF)

  • Historical Forms of Strategic Risk Management

    Should U.S. negotiators focus on developing politically binding agreements to increase confidence building and/or transparency measures, similar to those nascent arms control agreements between the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War? (AF/A10)

  • Historical Lessons for Operations in the Pacific

    For example, how does General George Kenney’s approach in the South Pacific compare to what will be required in a future conflict with China? (AMC/CC)

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Historical Uses of Information in War

    What are the long-term trends in the role and value of information in warfare? How has it shaped conflicts historically? (HAF A5SM)

  • How Does SOF Conduct Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting as a Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    Drawing on their historical success with strategic and mobile targets beyond conventional capabilities, what is the specific role for SOF in conducting fires to achieve effects on priority targets within the modern frameworks of large-scale combat operations, JADO, and the joint warfighting concept?

  • Human Rights as a Weapons System

    How could the USAF utilize the promotion of human rights as a weapon system to isolate strategic competitors like China and Russia, forcing them to either become international pariahs or alter their behavior to be less threatening to U.S. interests?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • Impact of Autonomous Systems on Multinational Air Operations

    How will the rise of autonomous systems affect multinational air operations? (AFWIC)

  • Impact of Dynamic Force Employment on Indo-Pacific Bomber Deterrence

    How can the U.S. optimize deterrence and assurance within the Bomber Task Force (BTF)/Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct? Shifting from Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), how can the U.S. increase its deterrence advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia? (AF/A10P & AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Impact of Lawfare on Warfare

    How are legal strategies reshaping the traditional paradigms of warfare? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of the loss of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements

    What have been the effects of the loss of various Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Implementing ML & AI for Automatic ELINT Identification

    What AI-enabled suite of tools could enable the IC to increase the pace and quality of threat-processing and threat warning?  What are more robust ways to process data and decrease data-load on operators? From the most recent National Defense Strategy, there is a renewed focus on peer adversaries, along with the growing interest of incorporating machine learning techniques to aid operators in an increasingly clustered and contested electromagnetic environment. The dense electronic intelligence (ELINT) environment in these countries while performing strategic reconnaissance missions for the Air Force has highlighted the gaps in our automated equipment’s capacity to distinguish between land-based tracks and air-based tracks. While operators can eventually make the distinction between the two, the time necessary to conclude the difference between a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) or a Ship (surface track) vs an Airborne Interceptor (AI) would likely result in massive blue-force loss in a wartime scenario.

     

     

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Improving Integrations with U.S. Allies and Partners

    Why should/shouldn’t the United States Air Force devote effort and resources to improving integrations with its allies and partners? (AF Futures)

  • India's "Necklace of Diamonds" Strategy

    Considering India's "Necklace of Diamonds" strategy is primarily viewed through a naval-centric lens to counter Chinese influence, what potential contributions from the air and space domains could enhance this cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean Region?

     

  • Indirect Approach and PRC

    An indirect approach to conflict with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) might reduce the immense damage a direct conflict would cause to the United States, its allies and partners, and global trade. What are the potential indirect approaches to countering the PRC threat, and how would the PRC react? How can non-attributable, asymmetric, indirect actions and non-traditional partner operations be integrated into Joint Force campaigning efforts? What activities offer the greatest payoff across the conflict continuum-in competition, crisis, and/or contingency? Historical examples and case studies of such activities, combined with concrete
    recommendations on how to incorporate them, will be especially useful.

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Influence of Conventional Arms on Nuclear Deterrence

    How do advanced, long-range conventional weapons fit into the nuclear spectrum and what influence do they have on an adversary's willingness to escalate a conflict? (AFGSC/A2)

  • Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

    Analyzing how to effectively integrate conventional, nuclear, and cyber capabilities to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration & Building Multi-Capable Airmen in the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    Current CONOPs for Sentinel Integrated Command Centers (ICC) and Integrated Training Facilities (ITF) for the Missile Wings are being devised without integrating one of the key critical nuclear AFSCs, our 1C3s.  This is happening as our CSAF is calling for establishing an NC3 Wing, establishing an Integrated Capabilities Command to "develop competitive operational concepts" and "integrated requirements" to "align with force design" and for structuring our operational wings to execute the mission with assigned airmen and units.  Our previous CSAF called for "multi-capable" airmen.  Each Missile wing is assigned ~15 1C3s.  Are we adequately integrating them into the next era of nuclear deterrence or are we neglecting an opportunity to leverage this substantial manpower to further integrate all assigned airmen into the AFGSC nuclear mission? Ideally, CP Controllers would be nested in the ICC with the other controllers/operators (MMOC/MSC/Ops) to enable better/quicker C2 to ensure timeliness and accuracy. Picture 1C3 and 13N professionals operating side-by-side in a Wing ICC EA Cell much like they do in our strategic command centers, capitalizing on the different skill sets and assigned/available manning to support the OPLAN.  Not to mention optimizing our human capital development through increased crosstalk and shared responsibility. Finally, who else is missing from true integration?  Where are the helos?  To paraphrase Col Hundley (90 MW/CD) during a recent 90 MW Sentinel Working Group Meeting, if we are missing [insert Helos, CP, other], are we really integrated?                                            

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Intelligence in Strategic Competition

    How should the SOF intelligence enterprise adapt its practitioners and culture to meet the unique intelligence challenges of strategic competition, moving beyond its post-9/11 mindset to cultivate the strategic foresight and counterintelligence focus required in this new era?

  • International Space Law/Responsible Behavior in Space

    Analyze various elements of international space law. (HQ USSF/SEK & USSF/S5I & SPOC, 3 SES/MAF)

  • Interoperability, Interdependence, and Integration in Combined Operations with Allies and Partners

    What is the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners? Analyze the relationship between interoperability, interdependence, and integration in combined operations with allies and partners. (AF Futures)

  • Iran's Cyber Capabilities

    What are Iranian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures? What are the trends in Iranian cyber operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Is AF Meeting Congress' Intent to Properly Resource, Man, Fund and Equip AFGSC to Support 2/3 of Nuclear Enterprise?

    Between FY08 and FY16, Congress responded to critical lapses in Air Force nuclear operations by directing increased emphasis on strategic weapons policy and eventually mandating centralized oversight under a single MAJCOM—AFGSC. However, despite these efforts and continued congressional involvement, AFGSC has not been granted the full authorities and responsibilities originally envisioned to effectively lead the nuclear deterrence mission.

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Lessons Learned from the Cold War

    Deterrence Factors Ignored over the Last 35 Years

  • Leveraging Institutional Capacity Building in Security Cooperation

    What approaches work best to leverage institutional capacity building in support of the NDS and other national security objectives, including military effectiveness, rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights?  

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

    How can SOF adapt its risk methodologies, decision-making, and resource allocation to better plan for, and manage the follow-on effects and subsequent de-escalation campaigns of, low-probability, high-consequence events?

  • Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Targeting

    How can SOF best utilize machine learning and AI to revolutionize the targeting process, especially by enhancing automated detection and expediting the processing of large datasets?

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Measuring Foreign Influence in Hegemonic Powers

    What variables measure decreasing and/or diminishing foreign influence in a hegemonic power? (AFWIC)

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Modeling and Simulating Multi-Competitor Deterrence in a Dynamic Geopolitical National Security Environment

    During the Cold War, the United States and NATO utilized  the instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economics) to deter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  In the 21st Century, however, the United States must now deter multi-competitors in a much more dynamic geopolitical environment, forcing senior leaders to consider multiple cultural norms and environments in which to operate (e.g., kinetic, cyber, space, etc.). Additionally, they must also consider how actions taken to deter one, may exacerbate or force unintended confrontations and/or engagements with others.  Having the ability to model and simulate a multi-party, a multi-geopolitical, three-dimensional, "chess board" will enable senior leaders to more effectively operate inside potential adversaries' OODA Loops.

  • National ROE in Mosaic Warfighting Concept

    How will a mosaic warfighting concept account for national ROE in a near-peer conflict? (AFWIC)

  • NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

    Assessing the adequacy and credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare strategies.

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • No First Use Policy

     What impact would a US policy of "No First Use" have on our allies and our extended deterrence commitments?  Would such a policy cause a change in force structure? (8 AF)

  • Nuclear Ethics in the 21st Century

    Re-evaluating ethical considerations surrounding the possession, threat of use, and potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

  • Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

    Examining the drivers and consequences of potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and developing strategies to mitigate the risks.

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US National Security Policy

    How has increased nuclear proliferation impacted the execution of US national security policy? (HAF A5SM)

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Burden Sharing in Practice

    To improve security cooperation, practitioners must bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of burden-sharing and the practical design of coordinated activities that can effectively influence partners and achieve coherent outcomes, even with internal U.S. government coordination challenges.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM best support the global, long-term requirements of irregular warfare campaigning for joint all-domain operations and the joint warfighting concept, given that the current DoD structure is primarily organized for regional, large-scale combat?

  • Operationalizing Irregular Warfare: How to Conduct Long-Term and Transregional Irregular Warfare Campaigns

    How can USSOCOM overcome structural limitations and leverage unique capabilities to conduct more effective long-term and transregional Irregular Warfare campaigns in support of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • Operationalizing Strategic Influence and Information

    The term ‘strategic influence’ is utilized to describe how SOF can project soft power around the globe. How can we measure strategic influence? Who are we seeking to influence? What are we seeking to achieve with influence? Influence to do what, and for what ends? What does strategic influence imply in terms of military strategy? How do measures of strategic influence inform operational design? What does success in achieving a strategic influence end state look like, and how can it be measured? How can SOF set objectives for influence, and how can SOF’s objectives be nested within larger USG strategic influence initiatives?

    Information has a critical role to play within strategic competition. Words are powerful, and our messages affect both our friends and our adversaries. What is the relationship between information and influence? If information is a form of power, what does that imply for the strategic pursuit of influence? How can SOF achieve information advantage throughout the competition continuum? How can SOF better understand, apply, and integrate information across operations to achieve strategic influence objectives? How can information strategies be tailored to address mission-specific needs? What is the balance between attributable and nonattributable operations, and which would provide the highest probability of success while minimizing political and operational risk? How can SOF address risk aversion to information activities? 

    What are the best methods/practices to assess the effects of operations in the information environment? How do we measure and assess results from information operations and campaigns, and how do we communicate these results to stakeholders/authorities? What types of organizational structures and resourcing would best set the conditions to integrate information and influence efforts across SOF; the Services; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial (JIIM-C) partners? Are there capability gaps across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that need to be addressed? How can SOF work with centers such as the Global Engagement Center, Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center, and the NATO's Strategic Communications Center of Excellence to enhance strategic influence operations? 

    A component of strategic influence is credibility. How can SOF build and maintain persistent and meaningful relationships with relevant partners and allies? How can USSOCOM minimize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality? What are the implications of a words and deeds mismatch? How can SOF contribute to building USG credibility? How do you achieve balance between accountability and ‘speed of need’ when seeking influence? In addition to efforts to build strategic influence, how can SOF counter adversarial strategic influence efforts?

     

  • Operations in Space

    Analyze various elements concerning the conduct of space operations. (SPOC/2SWS/DOC & 1 SOPS & USSF/45MSG) 

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Partner-Centric Approaches to Security Cooperation

    To what extent does partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional analysis influence Security Cooperation strategy, planning, and resource decisions? 

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Personnel within the PLA

    Analysis of the PLA's personnel. 

  • PLA C2 and Decision Making

    What are the command authorities and decision making processes within the PLA? (CASI)

  • PLA Organization and Command Culture

    How does the organization of the PLA and its command culture affect how the PLA makes decisions and fights?  

  • Point-to-Point Cargo

    Evaluate alternatives for space-based cargo delivery, balancing mission needs with the storage/delivery cost in terms of energy resources and manpower.  What size cargo deliveries provide the most return on investment?  Should supplies be pre-staged on orbit or launch-on-demand.  

  • Political Limitations on Operations

    How can SOF effectively plan and execute deep area operations by mitigating political restraints, while simultaneously developing tailored counternarratives to combat adversary influence campaigns that create those very limitations?

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Public Opinion and Nuclear Deterrence

    Analyzing the role of public opinion in shaping nuclear deterrence policies and strategies.

  • Putin's Decision-Making Process

    How do the complex interplay of Vladimir Putin's personal history, centralized leadership style, inner circle of advisors, and strategic calculations influence his decision-making process, particularly regarding major geopolitical actions like the invasion of Ukraine?

  • Putin's Future

    What will Putin's role be after 2026?  

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Reconstitution of Russian Military

    How will the Russian military reconstitute itself in the future? What future threats does it pose? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Reflections in the Information Environment

    How do we accurately and meaningfully measure Effectiveness and Performance (MOEs and MOPs) in the Information Environment? How can we best measure the 'influence' of Information Warfare on an adversary actor? (616 OC) 

  • Resourcing the Nuclear Enterprise for Great Power Competition

    AFGSC supports 3 of the four NDS Defense Priorities; however, is that reflected in how AFGSC is resourced (manning, money, etc.)? Comparing how MAJCOMs are resourced will determine how adequately the DAF has aligned weights of effort and resourcing with stated priorities and where there is room for improvement and rebalancing.

  • Risks to the Strategic Domain of Space From An Ablation Cascade

    Nuclear Deterrence capabilities rely upon the domain of outer space, which is particularly vulnerable to an ablation cascade, also known as Kessler Syndrome, where an increasing series of collisions between objects can render the environment unsafe for further use. While space-faring nations have a vested interest to avoid such a scenario, non-space faring adversaries may find it useful for denying the United States strategic capabilities which operate in LEO (Low Earth Orbit). What are the risks of an adversary initiating an ablation cascade on the use of strategic assets in the domain of outer space? Are there any protective or mitigating measures that can be undertaken? Could a revision of the Outer Space Treaty include weapons or other devices to combat debris that are not technically armaments but pose an equivalent risk to satellites, the strategic use of space, and other human activities?

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russia-Belarus Cooperation

    What are the opportunities and challenges surrounding Russia-Belarus cooperation? 

  • Russian Cooperation with the West

    What are areas of Russian cooperation with the West? (Russia Strategic Initiative (EUCOM))

  • Russian Cyber & Influence Activities

    What cyber and influence activities have the Russians undertaken? What was their impact? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Domestic Stability's Impact on National Security Decision Making

    What impact does Russia's domestic security have on its national security decision-making? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Expeditionary Operations

    How and why does Russia execute expeditionary operations? Analyze Russian expeditionary operations. (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Interventions

    What might prompt new or expanded interventions by Russia? 

  • Russian Policy Goals

    What are Russia's goals regarding NATO? The EU? (Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Powerbrokers

    Who are the powerbrokers in Russia (how is power allocated)? 

  • Russian Relationships with Balkan States

    What are Russia's relationships with the Balkan states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Former Soviet States

    What is the Russian relationship with former Soviet states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships?  (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with Indo-Pacific States

    What are Russia's relationships with Indo-Pacific states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Relationships with South American States

    What are Russia's relationships with South American states? What does the Kremlin perceive as challenges or opportunities with these relationships? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Reliance on Foreign Cyber Technologies

    How reliant is Russia on foreign technologies for development and procurement of cyberspace capabilities? (US Cyber Command)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian Use of Private Military Companies

    Analyze Russia's use of private military companies. (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Views on Cyber Operations

    What are Russia's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for conducting cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Russia's Security Council

    What is the role and importance of the Russian Security Council, and how significant are its decision-making processes and decrees in shaping national policy?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation and Deterrence

    How does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Security Cooperation: Methods and Evidence

    What approaches work best to improve Security Cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods, access to and use of data, and to build a sufficient evidence base to inform Security Cooperation decision-making? 

  • Shaping the Information Environment

    What are proven effective ways to shape the information environment during Phase 0/Phase I operations, specifically regarding, near-peer competitors? Do TTPs exist that PACAF/PA should be aware of to dial up and down the amount of deterrence/pressure messaging for effective deterrence and to avoid escalation? 

     

  • Sino-Russian Security Cooperation & Competition

    How does the complex dynamic of cooperation and competition between Russia and China affect their military alignment, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic and with Central Asian states?

  • Size of Future Nuclear Force

    What does the nuclear force of the future need to look like in order to ensure deterrence holds in the current strategic environment? (AF/A10) 

  • SOCOM Operations with Partners

    What lessons from SOCOM operations with partners can be applied to the integration of multinational air power? (AFWIC)

  • SOF Components and Joint Special Operations Command

    How might the SOF service components (Air Force Special Operations Command, Marine Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command) and Joint Special Operations Command best optimize themselves for strategic competition and integrated deterrence mission sets? Is there a need for new Joint Force training and exercises to determine or develop best practices for the integration of SOF and SOF enablers across services to best support mission requirements? What are the mission-critical capabilities for strategic competition and integrated deterrence within each SOF service component? Given each SOF service component’s unique capabilities, how might they best utilize new technologies? Do any of these capabilities require adjustments for optimal effectiveness in the current strategic environment? Are there requirements for new SOF capabilities that do not currently exist? If so, which SOF service component is best suited to meet each new requirement, and why?  

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration with Conventional Forces

    How can Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces enhance their interdependence, interoperability, and integration to create a decisive joint force advantage over adversaries within the frameworks of Joint All-Domain Operations and the Joint Warfighting Concept?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Talent Management

    While talent management remains an enduring priority for SOF, the contemporary environment offers unique issues that the SOE must address. The end of the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of strategic competition mean that SOF may need to reprioritize its missions and capabilities. Are there operational and organizational paradigms that need to be reconsidered to better develop SOF for the challenges of the future operating environment? Who is the current SOF practitioner and how did that practitioner evolve? What are the key attributes of the future SOF professional, and do they differ from the key attributes from historical SOF professionals? If SOF must operate within an environment of strategic competition, how can they be encouraged to cultivate ‘strategic interest’ or ‘strategic empathy’ in the world early in their career progression? How does the DOD culture and system affect the individual and the individual’s ability to operate in the strategic environment? What enhancements in competency, cognition, performance, and total health could enable SOF to better navigate the changing human and technology landscapes within the current operational environment?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • SOF's Integrative Role in Coalition Operations

    USSOCOM maintains ties to allied and partner SOF, but does that SOF partner network require transformation and adjustment for better effectiveness in strategic competition? What specific roles should SOF prioritize developing within the current strategic environment with respect to strategic competition and integrated deterrence? SOF have a unique capacity to build relationships with allies and partners. How can SOF best leverage those partnerships? What can SOF do to enable a coalition fight, and how can they communicate that with conventional forces? How can SOF better collaborate with the Joint Force in areas such as helping to build resistance and resilience in the host nation, preparing an environment for potential future conflict, and integrating a host nation into coalition operations? 

  • SOF's Role in Protecting the Homeland and Countering Designated Other Terrorist Organizations--International Cartels

    How can SOF most effectively leverage its unique capabilities, in conjunction with partners and allies, to degrade and defeat newly designated terrorist organizations and transnational cartels in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the element of surprise?

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space Operations Forces and SOF

    Should the SOE and U.S. Space Force explore options for employing a military force that can support diplomacy, information operations, and U.S. and allied partner economic interests on the moon and celestial bodies as a way to deter adversaries? If so, what would their core activities and mission sets be? Would such a force be ground-based, or would there be requirements to deploy into cislunar and lunar space? Does this future threat call for the development of SOF personnel who can operate in the austere and mentally taxing environment of space? Could SOF personnel from the different components be trained to perform core activities in the space domain? Could these SOF personnel form the beginnings of a U.S. Space Force SOF?

  • Space Professional/Safe or Responsible Behaviors

    How can the FVEY+2 nations agree upon and codify a set of acceptable norms for safe and responsible space behaviors, and through which forums and international agreements should these norms be established?

  • Special Operations Command Central

    In what ways might the regional balance of power shift within this AOR? Diplomatically, are there ways to better understand the relationship between, and potential dynamics of, alliances and partnerships in the region between both states and non-state actors? How can SOF better understand what might cause shifts in the constellation of power? How might economic developments affect the fortunes, and potential for conflict, of regional actors? What might global shifts in energy generation towards renewable sources, and the rise and fall of ‘peak oil,’ lead to? How might petrostates respond to a sustained decrease in demand for oil and natural gas? Alternatively, as sea lanes open in the Arctic circle, what does this mean for current global shipping routes that pass through the Middle East? How might changes in shipping routes and follow-on economic effects affect the risk-reward calculus for violent extremist organizations? 

  • Special Operations Command Europe

    The conflict in Ukraine will end at some point, and when it does, changes to the Ukrainian military are likely to result. Are there lessons that can be drawn from history about what the transition from wartime to peacetime SOF looks like, especially in a smaller state that may need to dramatically reduce the size of its military? What capabilities are most critical to maintain? Should there be a larger role for reserve forces? How does Ukraine’s potential accession to NATO affect the role(s) that Ukrainian SOF will play? In what ways can U.S. SOF, in conjunction with allies and partners, support Ukrainian SOF through organizational and individual transitions to peacetime? 

  • Special Operations Command North

    How can SOF best prepare for future operations in the Arctic? What does the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden mean for the region? What are the interoperability requirements between SOF and conventional forces operating in the region, such as Coast Guard icebreakers and Navy submarines? Are there new capabilities or technologies that are required for operations in this environment? What can U.S. SOF learn from allies and partners that routinely operate in the Arctic? How might SOF best work with the USG interagency, as well as allies and partners, to understand and partner with Arctic peoples? 

  • Special Operations Command Pacific and Special Operations Command Korea

    How can SOF better understand and adapt to this potentially destabilizing environment, and how can they best support allied and partner nations facing these issues?

Information Warfare

Technological Development

  • Advanced Data Acquisition and Management for Joint SOF

    How can SOF best define its requirements for, acquire, and utilize the advanced data management and processing systems necessary to effectively employ AI/ML for operational advantage?

  • Advanced Resilience and Resistance in Digital Battlespaces: Countering Multi-Platform Influence Operations through Adaptive Communications Networks

    How can USSOCOM establish effective counter-narrative capabilities that leverage platform-specific affordances and audience engagement patterns to build resilience against sophisticated adversarial influence campaigns?

  • Adversary Approaches to Political Warfare and Information Warfare

    How can an analysis of Russian and Chinese political warfare models, including their planning cycles, coordination methods, and tools for coercion, inform a U.S. strategy to disrupt malign information and inoculate populations against their influence?

  • Aging Nuclear Fleet and Transition Plan to Replacements

    Staying relevant and creditable with delays on some and rapidly approaching IOC dates on replacement systems (ICBM, Aircraft, LRSO, NC3)  

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/Characterizing the Changing Global Market for Arms

    To maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global arms trade, it is crucial to understand the market's complex dynamics, including the interactions between various actors and the factors that drive nations' decisions on acquiring military capabilities.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Challenge of Constrained Supply

    To address the strain on the U.S. defense industrial base caused by increasing domestic and partner demand, it is essential to examine how to expand production capacity, encourage new investment, and manage the complexities of international armaments cooperation in a competitive market.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Sales/The Value of Defense Sales

    It is crucial to reassess the benefits, costs, and risks of the arms trade through rigorous analysis, as traditional beliefs about its consequences—including dependence, political leverage, and economic effects—are increasingly viewed with skepticism.

  • Artificial Intelligence Analyzing Forensic Data and Patterns of Life

    Can AI be harnessed to analyze forensic data and patterns of life to assist the ISRD in building ISR packages? Can it analyze real-time data to assist re-tasking of existing assets in theater? (319 RW)

  • Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning in Misinformation and Disinformation

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), to include the widespread promulgation of easily accessible large language models (LLM), appear to be ushering in a new era of misinformation and disinformation. What impact will AI/ML have on the speed at which misinformation and disinformation can be created and spread? What AI/ML-enabled capabilities can promote resistance to disinformation? How can we counter adversarial messaging that utilizes LLM? 

    What are the training and education requirements for the use of AI/ML within SOF? How can SOF practitioners leverage AI/ ML and other new technology at the individual and small-unit levels? Does the rise of AI/ML affect the skillsets needed at both individual and organizational levels to conduct the Information joint function? Within the SOE and SOF, how do you develop resiliency to misinformation and disinformation? How can SOF capabilities such as psychological operations best utilize AI/ML and LLMs? How can we use commercial off-the-shelf technology to promote resiliency to misinformation and disinformation both with U.S. SOF and our partners and allies? 

  • Automated AI/ML Application Development

    How can AI/ML be harnessed to assist cyber operators in rapidly developing applications for offensive and defensive operations, while addressing the associated legal and ethical considerations and implementing robust process and technical controls? 

  • Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Defense & Nuclear Proliferation

    What is the role of Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense systems in an environment of increasing nuclear proliferation?

  • Benchmarking Fuel Usage

    Develop better simulations of fuel usage that can inform mission planning tools or provide benchmarks for anomaly detection in real-time or post-mission analysis. (SAF/IEN)

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • Bridging Gap from Innovation to Sustainment

    What processes and procedures can help bridge the gap between innovation, distribution, and sustainment? (AFCEC/CB)

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Can We Reengineer or Reconstruct Intelligence Sensor Data Flow Specifically for Network Performance, Operations, and Management Sensors?

    Can we reengineer or reconstruct intelligence sensor data flow specifically for network performance, operations, and management sensors?

  • Challenges Associated with Integrating Manned and Un-manned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

    What are the primary challenges to integrating manned and unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System, and what recommendations can be made to overcome them?

  • Cheap SDRs and the ACE Concept

    What effect will the proliferation of cheap software defined radios (SDR) have on the agile combat employment (ACE) concept in relation to our adversaries’ ability to rapidly find and fix US equipment/personnel during conflict?

  • Chinese Aerospace Force Modernization - EW and Network Operations

    How has changes within the PLA aerospace forces' DOTMLPFP contributed to their effectiveness in this mission/activity? (CASI)

  • Chinese commercial support of cyber operations

    How does China leverage commercial entities to support its cyberspace operations? (US Cyber Command)

  • Chinese Views of Specific U.S. Systems

    How does the People's Republic of China assess specific U.S. military systems, including the threat they pose and the development of countermeasures?

  • Civil and Military Collaboration in Space

    How can the US military best take advantage of the domestic space industry to enhance its capabilities (both technologically and in terms of infrastructure/economics)? (2 ROPS)

  • Converging Allies and Partner Data into the DAF Data Fabric

    How can data/information from our Allies and Partners be woven into the Department of the Air Force's data fabric? (16 AF)

  • Cost Imposition in Strategic Competition

    How can the Department of the Air Force, informed by historical lessons and an understanding of PRC strategic sensitivities, leverage its investments in programs, postures, and concepts—particularly within the nuclear enterprise—to impose costs and create strategic dilemmas for China as part of their long-term competition?

  • Counter Drone Operational Art and Practice

    How can an analysis of recent conflicts, particularly the impact of high-technology drones on intelligence, fires, and command and control in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, inform the development of effective counter-drone strategies and adaptive operational tactics, techniques, and procedures?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Crowdsourcing

    How can the Air Force more effectively crowdsource solutions to capability and capacity gaps across the industrial-military complex while balancing security concerns? 

  • Cutting-Edge Personnel Management for Next-Generation SOF Talent

    How can USASOC optimize its personnel management systems to better recruit, retain, and develop highly skilled SOF professionals by adapting cutting-edge private-sector talent management practices, all while balancing SOF's unique cultural and operational requirements with the larger Army's standardized personnel systems?

  • Cyber Innovation Centers & Acquisitions

     How can cyber innovation centers blend into traditional requirement development and agile/traditional acquisition processes to produce short-term sustainable capability?  (ACC/A5K)

  • Cyber Weapon System and Infrastructure Tool Accreditation

    How can the Air Force accredit IT systems in a more efficient, trackable, and consistent manner?

     

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Concepts

    How can the AF gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over peer and near-peer competitors in future conflicts leveraging Cyber-Physical System (CPS) concepts to effectively identify, characterize, defend against, and respond to cyber-threats and attacks across all AFIN enclaves, coupled with advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing? (ACC/A6O)

  • Data Convergence/Analytics

    How can data tools drive analytical collaboration at the tactical level, and create white space for decision makers to maintain a decision advantage across the conflict continuum? (480 ISRW)

  • Data Convergence/Information Warfare

    Can Army notions of data convergence in the tactical realm be extrapolated and applied in the information warfare environment to achieve automation of data sharing across functions and domains? (16 AF)

  • Defense Industrial and Innovation Base

    The ability of U.S. companies and inventors to deliver innovation is one of America's greatest comparative advantages. However, DoD faces challenges in adopting that innovation to deliver path-breaking capabilities on time and within budget.

  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Cyber Policy

    What is the DPRK policy and doctrine for cyberspace operations? What are DPRK's cyber red lines? What cyber actions by other nation-states might cause the DPRK to escalate to the use of military force? (US Cyber Command) 

  • Develop Improved Assessments of Landing Weights

    Explore the effects on readiness and fiscal impact of excessive landing weight.  Mobility aircraft often land with excessive weight caused by carrying more fuel than required for the mission.  This topic seeks to understand the effects from a maintenance readiness perspective on short and long-term aircraft maintenance and sustainment, and how that relates to overall aircraft readiness and cost. (SAF/IEN)

  • Digital Force Protection: Threats and Risks to SOF

    How can SOF develop a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the growing technical and privacy threats from the digital environment to its personnel and operations, balancing operational security with personal privacy by leveraging new technologies, fostering multi-sector collaboration, and creating effective risk mitigation strategies?

  • Directed Energy for De-Escalating Conflicts

    How can directed energy be used for de-escalating conflict, and what concepts of operations can be developed that meet demanding policy restrictions?

  • Directed Energy Weapons Impact on Taiwan Straits Conflict

    Does the Chinese Communist Party's directed energy weapons advancements compromise US, allies, and partner nations’ advanced weapons systems capabilities in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict?  (AFTAC)

  • Directed Energy Weapons, the New Indiscriminate Threat?

    Should Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) be considered an emerging form of WMD? (AFTAC)

  • Disruptive Technology's Effect On Deterrence

    What effect does disruptive technology such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing have on deterrence? (AF/A10C)

  • Due Regard and Changing Borders

    How should the Air Force prioritize the modernization of its airborne surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to ensure survivability and operational effectiveness in response to increasing and aggressive adversary actions in international airspace?

  • Effect-Based Metrics Posture

    How can modeling and simulation be used to develop heuristics that connect engineering-level improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency to operationally valued capabilities within campaign scenarios?

  • Efficiency of Cargo Operations

    Conduct analysis on the command, control, and positioning of mobility aircraft globally to reduce dead legs and improve global reach.

  • EiTaaS Tier 1 Maintenance Support

    How will 16 AF and the 688 CW conduct Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) Services for the Air Force Network-Unclassified (AFNET-U) when Tier 1 maintenance and operations for AFNET-U is contracted out to the private sector during the Enterprise to Infrastructure as a Service (EiTaaS)? (688 CW)

  • Emerging Cyber Powers

    What states are investing in military cyber capabilities and may emerge as advanced threats to the U.S. and its allies in the next 5-10 years?

  • Emerging Technology's Threat to Nuclear Assets

    What capabilities and intent do adversaries possess to utilize advanced technologies to hold AFGSC assets at increased risk? (AFGSC/A2)

  • EMP Effects on Nuclear Arsenal

    What are the effects of EMP on nuclear weapons? What can be done to mitigate risk? (20 AF)

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Establishing Flexible Logistics

    The CSAF is looking for “initiatives focused on more agile, resilient, and survivable energy logistics—from bulk strategic supplies to deliveries at the tactical edge.” 

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolution of Russian Strategy and Doctrine

    How are Russian strategy and doctrine evolving in response to the contemporary global geopolitical landscape and military technological advancements?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Future Battle Networks

    Analyze potential developments in battle networks as integrated systems of sensors, analytics, and strike.  (HAF A5SM)

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generative Adversarial Networks

    What are some potential defensive measures for mitigating the threat of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)?

  • Global Presence

    How can SOF optimize its global posture by identifying key geostrategic locations and balancing physical and virtual presence to best support persistent campaigning, rapid capability fusion, and its role as the partner of choice for advancing U.S. interests?

  • Hacktivists

    How might the emergence of hacktivists impact state dynamics in cyberspace during a conflict, and, for example, what can be learned from examples such as their effect on Russia during the Ukrainian invasion?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF, working with partners like USSPACECOM, ethically and effectively integrate data-driven technologies and AI/ML into irregular warfare operations by developing the necessary new warfighting concepts?

  • Harnessing Data for Irregular Warfare

    How can SOF better capitalize on data-analytics systems, data-driven technologies, and AI/ML-enabled capabilities to develop new warfighting concepts for irregular warfare?

  • Historical Review of Successful USAF Military Transformations

    When has the USAF successfully executed a military transformation in response to significant strategic shifts or revolutions in military affairs? What lessons do past examples provide that could assist USAF leadership today? (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Homeland Defense Concepts

    Managing risk to defense-critical infrastructure is a key homeland defense mission. Recognizing that competitors and adversaries seek to undermine, degrade, or attack U.S. critical infrastructure.

  • Human/Technology Interface

    The human/technology interface encompasses the ways in which humans engage with and utilize technology to enhance their capabilities, perform tasks more efficiently, and achieve desired outcomes. The interface can range from simple physical interactions, such as pressing buttons or using touch screens, to more complex interactions involving augmented reality, AI, and wearable devices. How can a human/technology interface enhance the span of control a person has over the technology they use? What role does trust play in the successful adoption and integration of technology into human activities? When should we trust AI, and when should we not? What potential risks or challenges are associated with increasing reliance on technology in human decision-making processes? Can we ensure people have appropriate control and autonomy in their interactions with technology to maintain trust and mitigate potential negative consequences? 

    What are the implications of ever more tightly interwoven connections between SOF operators and technology? Are humans always more important than hardware, or, at some point, does technology become more critical? Is it possible that the line between humans and technology becomes blurred via human/machine symbiosis, and if so, what are the potential effects on the development and utilization of SOF?

  • Hypersonic Messaging

    As the U.S. develops and fields hypersonic weapons, how should the U.S. message adversaries and allies about this new capability? (AF/A3K Checkmate)

  • Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Threasholds

    Analyzing how hypersonic weapon development impacts nuclear deterrence calculations and potential escalation pathways.

  • ICBM Logistics and Planning

    ICBMs have received the new Transporter Erector Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) vehicles that move a booster, Post Boost Control System (PBCS), and Re-entry System (RS) to facilitate MMIII missile movements. What are the logistic supply/support chains to maintain these key vehicles to last beyond 2050 and what considerations need to be made?

  • ICS/SCADA Cyber Hunt Kit

    Can we build a comprehensive cyber hunt kit with ICS/SCADA based-tools, that is all or mostly open-source to effectively hunt on ICS/SCADA networks with the lowest risk to the mission partner and the highest success to the team? 

  • Impact of Private Cellular Networks for Unmanned Systems C2

    How does the industry shift of utilizing high-density consumer and private cellular bands for control and communications affect military counter-drone technology and capabilities? (20 AF)

  • Impact of Technological Advancements on Air Warfare

    How will current and future trends in military technology advancements impact air warfare? How will this evolution of air warfare impact the US's superiority in the air domain? (HAF A5SM)

  • Impact on Deterrence by Emerging Technology

    What impact would the emergence and global diffusion of technologies with the potential dual-military ability to deliver strategic effects (e.g., biotechnology) have on the United States deterrence posture? (AF/A10)

  • Impacts of Temperature on Mobility Aircraft Performance in the PACAF Region

    How can a decision-making tool or vulnerability assessment framework be developed using climate projection data to assess how temperature will degrade aircraft performance and impact the projection of combat power, considering effects on operational planning, logistics, and strategic basing?

  • Impacts of Unmanned, Automated Platforms for Logistics Under Attack

    Explore the impact of using autonomous unmanned platforms to augment intra-theater airlift missions requirements in a Logistics Under Attack scenario.

  • Implementation and Absorption Capacity for New Capabilities and Concepts

    Using unitary analysis or comparative analysis, examine either or both of the USAF/Joint Force and PLA’s capacity to absorb new capabilities and concepts into demonstrated operational utility, identifying recommendations for accelerating change and innovation at scale within the USAF and DoD. (HAF/A5SM Strategic Assessments)

  • Implications of Militarily Relevant Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technologies

    How can the USAF effectively understand and counter the exploitation of the ongoing information technology revolution by potential adversaries, especially given the dual-use nature of these technologies and the challenges of controlling their diffusion?

  • Improving Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI) in Wargaming

    How can the Joint Force, USAF, and AFGSC use focused wargaming to develop effective concepts of operation for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) by identifying and addressing the operational seams, resource constraints, and command and control challenges of fighting in a nuclear environment?

  • Industrial Base of India, South Korea, Japan & Australia

    How can an analysis of the industrial base capacity, projectability, economic growth trends, and potential for defense-sector expansion in India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia inform a U.S. cost-imposition strategy within the context of the strategic competition with China?

  • Industrial Preparedness for Competition

    How can the U.S. transform its defense industrial base to better manage technological uncertainty and meet emerging military challenges by addressing internal industry dynamics and systemic barriers within the acquisition process?

  • Information Warfare Capabilities

    How should the AF and DoD organize themselves to optimize the development of Information Warfare capabilities? (HAF/A2/6)

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Mission in INDOPACOM AOR

    How can a coalition of willing nations in the INDOPACOM AOR synergistically develop and employ an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture capable of deterring Chinese aggression or effectively executing combat operations against its advanced multi-domain threats?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Integration with Allied and Partners' Industrial Base

    How does the United States integrate the allied and partners' industrial base to generate and sustain mass in a future conflict? (AF Futures)

  • Intelligence Production in Agile Combat Employment

    What LLM solutions can be used to develop methods, processes, applications, capabilities, etc. enabling rapid production at scale to meet future demands associated with the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept? (363 ISRW)

  • Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Technology

    Intelligence has a role to play in the identification of emerging technologies and assessment of how they may be used by adversaries. Within the SOE, how can collaboration be encouraged between the intelligence practitioners and the technological specialists? How can SOF best couple bottom-up-driven intelligence and technology solutions with top-down-driven research and acquisition programs? While the technologies are different, the problems of collaboration between two different communities during historical periods of technological disruption may offer ideas to inform current efforts in these areas. Can SOF use case studies of the past emergence of disruptive technologies to transform for the future? How can SOF intelligence exploit technology while maintaining a healthy skepticism of its promises?

  • Iran's Cyber Policy

    What are Iran's policy, strategy, and mission objectives for cyberspace operations, what does it perceive as U.S. or partner red lines, and what geopolitical events would most likely trigger a retaliatory cyberspace attack against the U.S. or its allies?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • JADC2 Headquarters

    How should the JADC2 headquarters and its components be structured—considering centralization versus decentralization and forward versus CONUS basing—to best maintain the doctrinal principle of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower while ensuring survivability?

  • Joint Force Design and Concepts

    The operational challenges DoD must confront, in the face of an ever-changing operating environment and changing character of war, require us to develop compelling and relevant concepts that link U.S. strategic objectives, policies, and capabilities.

  • Learning Technology to Aid Information Warfare Training

    How can we leverage learning technologies such as game-based learning, AI tutors, hypermedia, etc. to train IW forces most effectively on the roles, assets, and capabilities needed to achieve full spectrum IW effects? (616 OC) 

  • Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations of New Technologies

    What are the core legal, moral, and ethical principles that transcend technology? How can the SOF best prepare for the legal, moral, and ethical challenges inherent in new technologies? How can SOF develop personnel who understand the legal, moral, and ethical implications of new technologies? Legally, what authorities are needed to incorporate new technologies? What is the obligation to inform the SOF user of potential long-term impacts before use? Morally, are there any potential impacts of novel technologies on human rights, privacy, or environmental sustainability? What ethical dilemmas might be caused by a specific technology, and how can those dilemmas be resolved? How can a technology’s potential moral hazards and moral injuries be avoided or mitigated?

  • Light and Lean: ACE Maneuver Unit Footprint Reduction

    Explore the impact of reducing the overall deployment footprint of operational units during ACE operations. 

  • Logistics Under Threat

    How can the DoD develop novel logistical approaches, advanced tools, and resilient policies, potentially including a Manufacturing Security Program, to ensure the mobilization, surge, and sustainment of the Joint Force during large-scale, contested combat operations?

  • Long-Range, Low-Fuel Consumption Turbine Engines

    Conduct analysis on how fuel consumption can be reduced by utilizing smaller scale systems and more efficient engines, e.g. small-scale turbofan engines suitable for long endurance ISR and/or strike applications. Research/analyze performance at mission relevant flight conditions, to better understand which missions (e.g. ISR/Strike/EW/counter-UAS) in permissive/semi-contested environments can be accomplished with low-fuel consumption engines. What are the additional benefits to various aircraft substitutions (e.g. increased fuel savings, enhanced mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.)

    (SAF/IEN and AFIT) 

  • Managing Risk Over Time

    What decision-making frameworks, conceptual models, or tools can be developed to help senior leaders balance the trade-offs between near-term activities and long-term investments required to effectively counter adversary strategies?

  • Managing the Security Cooperation Enterprise/Coordination and Efficiency across a Decentralized and Distributed Enterprise

    Addressing the substantial obstacles to strategic alignment, process efficiency, and accountability within the vast and fragmented security cooperation enterprise requires closing key knowledge gaps about its structure, the incentives of its actors, and the pathways for institutional change.

  • Metrics of Industrial Base Capacity

    What are the key economic, political, technological, and demographic indicators that define the capacity of an industrial base? How do these metrics interact with each other and impact the overall industrial capacity of a country? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Military Utility and Cost of Cargo Launched Combat Air Vehicles

    How can the Department of the Air Force develop new concepts of operations to effectively utilize large numbers of air-launched vehicles across a wide range of combat roles, and how does the cost-effectiveness of these new approaches compare to traditional methods for meeting the same military requirements?

  • Mission Risk Reduction for Security Mitigation Efforts

    How can a model be developed that clearly depicts the relationship between mission risk reduction and the resources expended on security mitigations, thereby allowing mission owners and Authorizing Officials to better defend decisions to monitor, rather than mitigate, low-impact risks?

  • MMIII Sustainment beyond 2030

    Analyzing the timeframe MIRV'ing and consolidation of misslie sites to bridge the gap until Sentinal is online and to do so in a timeline that does not make large maintenance waves in the maintenance cycle. Maintenance and logistic challenges the system faces and what different targeting solutions may need to be considered as MMIII ages.

  • Nationality of an Autonomous System

    What defines the nationality of an autonomous system? How does this affect their operational employment? (AF Futures)

  • Next-Generation ISR/Tactically Relevant for Advanced Situational Awareness

    How can SOF develop next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems while simultaneously leveraging AI and machine learning to process the vast amounts of resulting data for pattern identification and predictive analysis?

  • Nexus/Triad Strategic-Level Synthesis

    How can USSOCOM overcome strategic-level integration challenges, such as information sharing and clearance issues, to rapidly synthesize and implement a space-SOF-cyber nexus with allies and partners for effective deterrence and conflict operations?

  • Nuclear Deterrence Acquisition

    How does the future Air Force Integrated Capability Development Command develop and field platforms that are both conventional and nuclear (like bombers and DCA)? How do they prioritize requirements for dual capable platforms?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on Foreign Militaries

    How does increasing nuclear proliferation impact the military programs, and specifically the nuclear initiatives, of third-party actors?

  • Nuclear Proliferation's Impact on US Military Capabilities

    How does the trend of increasing nuclear proliferation impact the U.S. military's ability to project force and accomplish its missions as directed by the National Command Authority?

  • Nuclear Sustainment: Minuteman III

    What institutional changes (sustainment) are needed to maintain Minuteman III to 2052?

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Individuals, Personal Relationships and Security Cooperation Out-Comes

    Despite countless anecdotal examples, there is limited evidence of how relationship-building programs in security cooperation translate into significant institutional change and enhanced burden-sharing, especially given the complexities of partner political systems and frequent personnel turnover.

  • Operational and Industrial Burden Sharing/Security Cooperation and Readiness

    A critical gap remains in understanding how peacetime security cooperation activities translate into meaningful operational and industrial burden-sharing from partners during periods of intensified competition and armed conflict.

  • Operational Energy in Space

    How can we design and operate spacecraft that have fewer constraints and can sustain operations in space over longer time periods and with more effectiveness? (SAF/IEN)

  • Operational Energy Peer-Adversary Competition & Deterrence

    Assess the criticality (or lack thereof) of maintaining a competitive edge and posture of strength in technology areas related to operational energy.

  • Operationalizing the Drone Effect

    What are the full effects on fuel consumption, mission capabilities, and aircraft sustainment when substituting manned aircraft with more fuel-efficient remotely piloted aircraft for missions like ISR, strike, and electronic warfare in permissive to semi-contested environments?

  • Optimization of Cargo Planning with ICODES - Improved Tools for Load Planners

    How can improved tools for load planners, specifically those integrated with ICODES, optimize cargo planning to enhance efficiency and effectiveness?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • Options for AFGSC in Response to the Next Potential "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Space

    The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bars signatories from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." In recent months, reports have been made public that the United States believes Russia is developing a space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space has the potential to disrupt not only military capabilities, but also commercial services all over the world. What actions should AFGSC be prepared for in the case that Russia rescinds themselves from the 1967 treaty and deploys these weapons in space? What can AFGSC do to proactively deter Russia from doing this? In the event that deterrence fails, are there any new assurances to allies that AFGSC is uniquely positioned to provide? Potential options might include fielding new capabilities, the declassification of current programs, and force posture adjustments. 

  • Organic Software Development

    Can the USAF develop an organic capability to code within a squadron and then enable the infrastructure and processes that would allow that code to be deployed in a controlled environment with minimal overhead requirements to the squadron? (16 AF)

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Post 9/11 Transformations in Warfare

    How has warfare evolved over time in the post 9/11 world? (HAF A5SM)

  • Potential for Integrated Deterrence

    Why have strategic nuclear forces failed to deter some aspects of conventional aggression in the recent past? Would integrated deterrence architectures involving other capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, hypersonics, AI) better address concerns around theater-level conventional aggression? What would need to be included in future integrated deterrence strategies to deter conventional aggression? (AF/A10)

  • PRC Aerospace Industry

    What is the ability of the PRC's aerospace industry to emulate, innovate, develop, prototype, refine, and finalize aerospace systems? (CASI)

  • PRC Industry Actors

    How are they connected to the state and military? To what extent can they support military requirements? (CASI)

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Predictive Analytics

    The analysis of large datasets can provide new insights into relationships between variables and potentially enable better predictions of the likelihood of processes and events. Areas of interest to the SOE for these data-driven analytics could include selection, training, scenario development, and contingency planning. How can SOF use tools like predictive analytics and ML to capture important trends and prepare for the future? What new or emerging technology in the field of predictive analytics could help SOF better accomplish its missions in the future? What SOF OAIs are best suited for this type of data-driven analysis? How can SOF incorporate LLMs and user-interface friendly systems like ChatGPT into its operations? What are the risks and benefits of doing so? 

  • Prioritizing US Investments in Asia-Pacific Region

    What capabilities and potential investments should the US consider to offset the effects of the US-China strategic competition in the region? In particular, what opportunities are there in the development of defense, technology, and infrastructure? (HAF A5SM) 

  • Rapid All-Domain Fusion for SOF

    What concepts, capabilities, and command and control solutions must SOF develop to effectively act as the synchronizer for a multi-domain (space, cyber) nexus that delivers strategic effects for the joint force?

  • Readiness Impacts of Traditional Aerospace Parts Manufacture on Aging Fleet

    Conduct analysis of manufacturing alternatives to current/traditional high upfront tooling and production costs for aircraft replacement parts. Research aerospace and non-aerospace manufacturing technology, companies, and processes that could provide a more cost-effective approach to developing adaptive, high-quality, and scalable production of replacement parts for the aging US Air Force fleet. Also explore additional benefits of various light weight material substitutions for part manufacturing that meet military standards, that could increase fuel savings based on weight reduction, and enhance overall mission capabilities, aircraft sustainment, etc.. The B-52 and KC-135 fleets date back to the late 1950s, the UH-1H Huey helicopter 1960s, and the C-5 was first fielded in the 1970s which are a few examples of airframes no longer in production, beyond their economic service life, but because they are still flying require replacement parts. Purchases of the new F-35, C-130J, and KC-46 airframes in recent years have only made a small dent in the average age of the Air Force’s fleet. (SAF/IEN)

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Rethinking No First Use

    Analyzing the potential benefits and drawbacks of adopting a "No First Use" policy in the context of evolving security threats and technological advancements.

  • Road-Mobile ICBM system

    Does the US need to develop a road-mobile ICBM system as part of its nuclear arsenal? (8 AF)

  • Role of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in JADO

    How can Remotely Piloted Aircraft be effectively integrated to support the requirements of Joint All-Domain Operations in future conflicts?

     

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • Russian Defense Industry

    What are the domestic and export capacities of Russia's defense industry? What effects have sanctions had on it? What is the evolving role of the wartime economy on the Russian defense industry? (EUCOM - Russia Strategic Initiative)

  • Russian Supply Chain Operations against the US/NATO

    How does Russia conduct supply chain operations against the US and NATO, and what are the key methods, vulnerabilities, and strategic objectives of these actions?

  • Russian War Plans

    What are Russian war plans, and what is the anticipated level and integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces within them?

  • Scaling of SOF Authorities and Permissions from Competition to Conflict

    How can SOF authorities and permissions be structured to scale from competition to conflict at the speed necessary to gain a joint force advantage, particularly when operating in a degraded communications environment?

  • Scientific and Technical Implications of DOTMLPF-P Challenges for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

    A key element of the current national military priorities is to be prepared for a fight against China and Russia, which are nuclear-capable powers.  This pacing threat highlights the importance for the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to have the ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear planning and operations, both for deterrence and to support combatant command operations should deterrence fail.  Since the end of the Cold War and the Goldwater Nichols Act, nuclear and conventional planning and operations have been stovepiped.  For integrated conventional-nuclear operations, a great deal of coordination and collaboration is needed between the two communities, and the force needs to be able to operate in a nuclear environment.  This project will examine the most salient challenges in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, along with Policy (DOTMLPF-P) relevant to Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) in the DAF.  This examination will focus on areas in which research and development of scientific and technical capabilities can enhance CNI.  The work would look at DOTMLPF-P elements across the warfighting phases of planning, operations, command and control, sensors for situational awareness, and survivability.   The goal of the project is to find the most promising areas for research to advance CNI in the DAF.

  • Secure and Accessible Collaboration on Personally Owned Devices

    Given the current reliance of Air Force personnel on insecure commercial communication apps (such as GroupMe, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal) for operational and tactical coordination, can the Air Force provide a collaboration application to surpass these existing tools in usability, functionality, and security? This application must address the critical need for accessibility on personally owned devices while maintaining robust information security and operational security (OPSEC). Importantly, this approach acknowledges that outright banning of insecure apps is impractical and ineffective, necessitating a solution that empowers airmen to collaborate effectively without compromising security.

     

  • Security Cooperation and Capacity Building

    How effective are defense capacity building programs at expanding and enabling a network of likeminded, capable, and interoperable allies and partners to perform desired roles and achieve regional security objectives? 

  • Security Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Context

    Existing research on security cooperation needs updating because the global context has changed significantly due to shifts in military technology, the nature of war, and the strategic environment. It is now essential to examine how emerging technologies, new warfighting domains, and global competition impact U.S. national security strategy and its security cooperation activities.

  • Social Impact of Technological Change

    Throughout history, technology had been influential in driving societal change. Most recently, this has included an evolving relationship with information, characterized by innovations that have transformed how information is transmitted, stored, and ultimately used.

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF in a Technological World

    As technology expands in both sophistication and reach, the SOE must adapt to keep up with, and take advantage of, technologies. What are the risks and opportunities of these technologies, and what are the limitations or thresholds associated with new capabilities? How can the trustworthiness of such technologies be determined? Within personnel, will computer-to-brain interfaces enhance SOF performance? Will AI/ML and LLMs change USSOCOM processes and operations? What are the legal and ethical standards for the use of such technology? Will remotely piloted and/or autonomous systems change expeditionary logistics, maneuver, and disbursement of resources and sustainment in a contested environment? How might quantum computing affect offensive and defensive cyber operations? How can SOF exploit existing infrastructure to cover their electronic tracks, and how might adversaries use technology to track SOF? Does the spread of technology correspond with an increasing difficulty for covert or clandestine operations?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

    How can SOF adapt its targeting processes, refined during two decades of counterterrorism, for the complexities of Large-Scale Combat Operations, by defining its unique contributions to the joint targeting process and leveraging advanced technologies for effective dynamic targeting in a multi-domain environment?

  • SOF Use of Non-Governmental Hackers in Support of Strategic Objectives

    What legal, ethical, and operational frameworks, including command and control relationships, would be necessary for SOF to effectively and accountably utilize non-governmental hacking groups in support of national security objectives?

  • Space Acquisitions

    Examine various aspects of Space-related acquisitions. (USSF/S8ZX, 5 SLS-MSA, 7SWS/DO, SPOC/2SWS/DOC)

  • Space Debris

    How can a comprehensive international framework be established to track, avoid, and legally remove space debris, incorporating advanced technologies and potential economic incentives to mitigate the growing problem?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Space-Cyber-SOF U.S. Strategic Command Nexus: How to Build Capability Greater than the Sum of Its Parts to Achieve Joint Effects

    How can space, cyber, SOF, and STRATCOM entities move beyond ad-hoc relationships to form an enduring partnership that allows for formal joint training and deployment, enabling combatant commands to better employ these integrated forces to achieve strategic objectives?

  • Space-Cyber-SOF-U.S. Strategic Command Nexus

    How can the synergy between space, cyber, SOF, and U.S. Strategic Command be maximized to achieve greater joint effects in future conflicts, considering the necessary organizational structures, joint training processes, and the associated legal and policy implications?

  • Strategic Basing

    Develop a relatively high-fidelity simulation of an average year of training for a unit (ideally KC-46 or F-35) to develop comparative metrics that can inform basing decisions for the aircraft fielding process.

  • Strategic Influence through SOF

    How can SOF systematically enhance its strategic influence capabilities by integrating the necessary authorities, synchronizing tactical actions with strategic messaging, and leveraging insights from academic and business disciplines?

  • Sustaining SOF Maritime Mobility

    How can persistently forward-postured SOF, in collaboration with allies and partners, sustain resilient and fiscally sustainable land, sea, and air mobility within various archipelagoes?

  • Sustainment for Dispersed Forces in the Pacific

    Sustainment solutions for fuel and munitions in the Pacific theater. 

     

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space

    What intelligence community and commercial industry TTP validation methodologies for space could, following a cost-benefit analysis, be feasibly adopted to streamline or innovate current USAF/USSF validation processes?

  • Technical Interoperability with Allies & Partners

    How does a focus on technical interoperability help or hinder operational integration with allies and partners? (AFWIC)

  • Technological Impacts on Ethical Autonomy

    The integration of wearable, edible, or injectable technology for SOF can potentially raise concerns about the loss of autonomy in making ethical decisions. Wearable devices, such as smartwatches or fitness trackers, can collect vast amounts of personal data about our behaviors, activities, and health. The risk lies in the potential misuse or exploitation of this data, which could erode personal privacy and autonomy. Could external entities and malicious actors with access to such data manipulate individual choices or influence decision-making through targeted persuasive techniques? Edible technology refers to ingestible devices or substances, such as smart pills or edible sensors. While these technologies can provide valuable health monitoring or targeted drug delivery, there is a risk of overreliance and loss of agency. Can people become too dependent on such technologies for managing their health or decision-making processes? Could they inadvertently surrender their autonomy to technology or entities controlling it? Injectables include implanting devices or substances into the body, such as microchips or smart implants. These can offer benefits, such as enhanced cognitive capabilities or medical monitoring. Risks include potential unauthorized access to implanted devices, data breaches, or manipulation of bodily functions or behaviors. Such vulnerabilities may compromise personal autonomy and privacy. What are the potential risks or challenges the SOE should consider regarding the loss of SOF ethical autonomy when using wearable technology, edibles, or injectables? What measures can be taken to ensure individuals maintain their autonomy and ethical decision-making capabilities while using such technologies?

  • Technological Innovation & Integrated Deterrence

    How should the DOD and AF pursue and message technology innovation to support integrated deterrence in the NDS?  (AFNWC)

  • Technological Support to Resilience or Resistance

    Technology is already playing an increasing role in multiple aspects of the security environment and will undoubtedly continue to do so in our ability to identify the need for, assess the potential for, and support resilience and resistance. How might the innovative use of new and emerging technologies enable SOF efforts to support resilience and resistance in developed, underdeveloped, fragile, and/ or at-risk countries and regions? What might be some of the roles of AI/ML in assessing, building, enabling, and supporting SRR in deterrence, competition, or armed conflict? In contrast, does the integration of ‘low-tech’ solutions to SSR provide any advantage in the future operating environment, and if so, where, and how? How might an infusion of standard technologies across select allies and partners support global fusion in the application of SRR against global and transregional threats? How does the level of technological development, and technological saturation within a society, contribute to, detract from, or otherwise impact the potential and challenges to SRR? How might technologies enable the assessment of a group, population, or country’s will to resist? How might the democratization of technology within a society, and its potential adversary, enable SRR across the spectrum of subversion, coercion, and aggression? What does the role of the protection of technological advantage play in enabling SRR?

  • Technological Undermatch

    How can SOF adapt its operational strategies and leverage non-technological competitive advantages to succeed in an environment where an adversary may have technological parity or superiority, thus challenging the traditional "American way of war"?

  • The Future of Arms Control

    Exploring new frameworks and approaches to arms control and strategic stability in a multipolar world, including emerging technologies.

  • The Future of Information and Influence

    There are many ways in which current technologies shape the ways that people receive information. The ability to create realistic, believable information, events, documents, pictures, and video based on a computer prompt makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. The combination of virtual reality and augmented reality offers the ability to virtually see, ‘be with,’ and respond in real time to another person anywhere in the world. What are the second and third-order effects of such technologies on information operations and strategic influence campaigns? If distinguishing the truth becomes increasingly difficult, will there be a corresponding reaction in which groups or individuals care less about the ‘truth’ or simply distrust everything not seen to occur with their own eyes? What are the implications of such distrust? Will societies become less vulnerable to disinformation, but also less receptive to strategic messaging? How might virtual interactive experiences be utilized to develop strategic influence? Training and education with partners and allies can provide a form of relationship building that may lead to strategic influence. Does virtual training and education build the same relationships, and have the same strategic effects, as in-person interactions? 

  • The Limits of AI and Big Data Technology

    What assumptions currently pervade military culture about AI and Big Data that, from a social science perspective, are inaccurate and counterproductive? (JSOU)

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?

  • US Air Force Supply Chain Protection for IT Assets and Support Infrastructure

    How is the Air Force currently protecting, certifying, and ensuring chain of custody for the IT supply chain and facility infrastructure and what industry best practices should the Air Force adopt to ensure quality, integrity, and accreditation?  

  • Usage of AI in USAF Maintenance & Logistics

    How can emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, be integrated into the operational workflows of various Air Force units? What are the challenges in effectively transitioning to AI-driven decision-making processes within Air Force maintenance and logistics operations? (772 ESS)

  • Use of AI in Civilian Hiring Process

    Can AI be leveraged to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the civilian hiring process? (AFMISC/A1)

  • Utilization of Cyberspace Proxies in Unconventional Warfare

    How can a review of the current legal framework and historical examples be used to develop recommendations that enable the effective and legal use of cyber proxies by SOF throughout the phases of an unconventional warfare campaign?

  • Utilizing Internet-Of-Things (IOT) Sensors or Similar Physical Sensing Systems

    How can the Air Force leverage in-situ Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors combined with cyber-surveillance and reconnaissance to overcome physical access barriers and collect essential data on adversary personnel and systems, thereby mitigating critical information and intelligence gaps?

  • Wargaming

    How should the AF conceptualize wargaming going forward? (PACAF)

  • Weapon system vulnerabilities introduced by cloud environment

    Does the dependence on cloud environments (commercial or organic) introduce risk to cyber security? If so, what unique risks does this pose to the military and its weapon systems? (16 AF/A4)

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What Comes after the B61-12?

    The B61-12 is a welcome and much needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for US dual-capable aircraft - but it is not the end.  The US and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now. 

  • What is the Russian Concept of Domains?

    How does the Russian concept of warfare domains, which integrates the information and cognitive spaces as a primary theater of confrontation, differ from the West's traditional domain structure, and what are the strategic implications of this holistic approach for modern conflict?

  • Worldwide Deployable Dual-Capable Aircraft in Extended Deterrence

    How would the capability to deploy DCA worldwide affect extended deterrence?  (AF/A10)

VR/AR

Pacific

  • Black Swan Capabilities

    How can the SOF enterprise establish a comprehensive process to identify, assess, experiment with, and integrate emerging disruptive technologies within current fiscal and legal constraints, all while managing strategic blind spots and mitigating inherent risks?

  • C2 in Space

    What is the optimal command and control architecture for space forces to provide desired capabilities and effects, considering alternatives to the Air Operations Center model and the feasibility of unifying military and civilian networks for increased resiliency and efficiency?

  • Countering Hybrid Warfare in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

    How must SOF adapt its training, doctrine, and strategies to effectively counter the evolving threats of hybrid warfare employed by both state and technologically advanced non-state actors?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model

    How can the Air Force develop an adaptive, role-specific cyber-awareness training model that demonstrates greater effectiveness than the current annual training by building from foundational to complex concepts and illustrating the real-world consequences of security lapses?

  • Cyber-Awareness Training Model for ISR Collection Managers (CMs) (ACC/A22C)

    How can a specialized cyber-awareness training model be developed for ISR Collection Managers to overcome their current lack of familiarity with cyber concepts and enable them to effectively support requirements management in a multi-domain environment?

  • Education of Space Professionals

    Analyze various methods and systems for educating space professionals. 

  • Enhancing Multi-Domain Training with AI-Driven Virtual and Augmented Reality

    How can innovations in virtual, augmented reality, and AI-driven simulation technologies be integrated to create immersive training scenarios that enhance decision-making, adaptability, and strategic response for SOF in complex, multi-domain operations?

  • Ethical Performance and Moral Injury

    How can the SOF enterprise develop a comprehensive ethics program that not only identifies and learns from ethical lapses and measures performance but also effectively inculcates ethical behavior to mitigate moral injury and post-combat trauma?

  • Ethical, Legal and Operational Challenges of AI-Driven Warfare and Autonomous Systems

    How can SOF navigate the complex ethical, legal, and operational challenges of deploying AI-driven autonomous systems, ensuring accountability and compliance with international law while balancing the need for rapid decision-making with the preservation of human rights?

  • Evolving Contexts of Deterrence

    How can predictive models of integrated deterrence be developed and empirically tested to account for cross-cultural nuances, competitor decision-making processes, whole-of-government approaches, multi-party conflict dynamics, and the impact of emerging technologies?

  • Exercising Armageddon

    What new models for nuclear-focused exercises, wargames, and simulations, along with the necessary organizational culture changes, can enable the nuclear enterprise to effectively modernize its doctrine for future challenges while still maintaining today's operational deterrent readiness?

  • Future of the 2W2 Career-Field in an Evolving Air Force

    Given the increased demand for 2W2 nuclear weapons technicians at bomber and fighter bases, should the Nuclear Enterprise use contract maintenance personnel for routine ICBM support to reallocate its finite active-duty specialists to bases with nuclear flying missions?

  • Future of U.S. SOF Enterprise: Flat, Fast and Focused

    How can the SOF enterprise adapt its structure, processes, and workforce optimization strategies to become flatter, faster, and more focused, enabling the rapid decision-making required by the increased speed of modern warfare?

  • Generational Differences

    How do generational differences in approaches to leadership, followership, recruitment, retention, and training impact the military, and what strategies can be developed to effectively manage these differences for optimal organizational performance?

  • Integration of Emerging Technologies into SOF Operations

    How can SOF effectively integrate emerging technologies like AI, ML, and cyber capabilities, including in multinational settings, to enhance mission success while balancing the associated operational gains and risks?

  • Irregular and Unconventional Warfare Campaigning

    How can SOF holistically update its doctrine, training, and operational concepts for irregular and unconventional warfare to effectively counter adversaries in an era of strategic competition, considering new technologies and the need for seamless integration with conventional forces and security cooperation efforts?

  • Joint SOF Modular Formations

    How can the SOF enterprise best develop and manage joint SOF modular formations by transforming its personnel systems to cultivate the required expertise and capabilities, while ensuring the enduring relevance of core SOF principles?

  • Medical Return to Duty in Conflict

    How can the medical service shift its operations during peer conflict to treat patients closer to the front lines within the area of responsibility, thereby expediting an Airman's return to duty?

  • Optimizing Drone Use and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Strategies

    How can SOF optimize the operational use of drones, develop robust counter-UAS strategies, and adapt its training and tactics to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies as seen in conflicts like Ukraine?

  • P3 Airmen

    How can the optimal organizational construct for P3 Airmen be determined by examining effective task-organization models from other services and interagency partners to evaluate if the traditional squadron model is still the most effective structure?

  • Personnel in USSF

    What comprehensive talent management strategy must the USSF develop to ensure it can recruit, retain, and develop the necessary number of enlisted and officer personnel to generate future senior leaders, while accounting for motivational factors and the competitive pull of the commercial space industry?

     

  • Precision Access

    How can SOF enhance its "precision access" imperative by overcoming physical and virtual infiltration challenges, modernizing platforms and ISR systems, and optimizing its special skills and capabilities to operate in any environment?

  • Preparation for Theater Special Operation Command Assignments

    How can a flexible and prioritized training and education pipeline be developed for newly assigned TSOC personnel, considering various providers and delivery methods, to effectively prepare them for success despite potentially lacking prior SOF or joint experience?

  • Recruitment, Training, Development, and Retention of AF Intelligence Personnel

    How should the recruiting, training, development, and retention of Air Force intelligence personnel be reformed to address the dramatically increased importance of data science and space-based capabilities?

  • Reestablishing Nuclear Surety Culture at Previous Nuclear Installations

    How can AFGSC and the nuclear enterprise develop a comprehensive approach to instill a robust culture of nuclear surety and build the requisite expertise in leadership, training, and personnel at installations transitioning to the B-21 bomber?

  • Roles & Functions of USAF

    Given the rapidly changing character of military competition, how can the USAF identify and address future strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities to define its new or expanded roles?

  • SOF Future Requirements

    Considering key geopolitical trends, how can SOF enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • SOF Interoperability

    How can SOF, its partners, and allies (including NATO) overcome cultural and linguistic differences and improve collaboration to enhance interoperability and cohesion in addressing global security challenges?

  • SOF Requirements

    How can NATO and national SOF, in response to key geopolitical trends, enhance their capabilities and develop the necessary skills, competencies, and training to effectively operate in future conflict scenarios?

  • Space Force Basing

    Analyze various aspects of the future of Space Force basing.

  • Space Force Career Fields

    Does the Space Force need to develop a “Space Maintenance” career field to maintain its weapon systems instead of relying so much on Contract Logistics Support and a handful of 3Ds? (DS4) Should Space Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and Financial Analysts career fields transition to Space Force? (30 SW/PMD)

  • Strengthening SOF Capabilities in DoW Workforce Optimization

    How can SOF implement broader DoW workforce optimization efforts to become more efficient and lethal by strengthening critical capabilities, addressing unique challenges, and applying lessons from past transformations like JTF-SREC?

  • The Future of the All-Volunteer Force

    What alternative models for recruitment, career progression, and retention can the DoD develop, analyzing lessons from allies and associated risks, to ensure the Joint Force has the talent needed to meet its defense obligations?

  • Training of Space Professionals

    How has the training and proficiency of space professionals evolved from the Space Race through the creation of Air Force Space Command to the present, and should the USSF now establish its own dedicated Space Intelligence technical school to meet current and future demands?